



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


**The Times History**  
of  
The War in South Africa









THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT MILNER, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR S. AFRICA, 1897-1905;  
GOVERNOR OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, 1897-1901;  
GOVERNOR OF THE TRANSVAAL AND ORANGE RIVER COLONY, 1901-5.

*Photo by Duffus Bros., Cape Town.*




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# The Times History

of

## The War in South Africa

1899-1902



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Edited by **L. S. Amery**  
Fellow of All Souls

With Maps, Plans, and Photogravure Portraits

*Vol. VI.*

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## PREFACE

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THE regrettable delay in the appearance of this, the last volume of the present work, has been due to various causes. The editor originally selected to take in hand the special military chapters which compose the second part of the volume, broke down in health after nearly two years of preliminary study, leaving behind him a quantity of unintelligible jottings, but only a single short chapter in a completed form. On my own part, an enforced absence of several months in 1907, followed by a political election early in 1908, prevented the volume as a whole being seriously taken in hand till last summer, though the original drafts of most of the military chapters had been written before that date.

The volume falls into two entirely distinct parts. The first deals with the work of reconstruction in South Africa, both during and after the war, and with the subsequent political history of South Africa down to the early part of the present year. The second contains a series of special chapters on the more important technical and administrative aspects of the war. The index to the whole work, and several appendices, which were originally to have been included in the volume, have, for the greater convenience of the reader, been bound separately.

Part II of the volume is really in the nature of a special appendix to Volumes II-V. Difficult as was the task of attempting to present the story of the actual military operations in anything approaching a readable form, it would

have proved altogether impossible if the narrative had been continually interrupted by detailed disquisitions on the special work of the technical military services, or on problems of a purely administrative character. But to omit all account of the technical and administrative aspects of the war would have seriously impaired the value of the present work, at any rate for military students, and the treatment of those aspects, in some shape or other, always formed an essential part of my historical scheme. After the illness of the editor to whom the task of dealing with this portion of the volume had originally been entrusted, the military authorities courteously gave leave to a number of officers possessing special experience in the several departments whose work is here surveyed to give me their assistance. These chapters have, however, been freely edited by myself since they were written, and are in no sense to be regarded as an exposition of purely official views. They are in the main of an explanatory and narrative rather than of a critical and controversial character, and deal with what was done rather than with what might have been done, or ought to be done now. For instance, changes introduced since the war, and in consequence of its lessons, are referred to, but are not, as a rule, exhaustively discussed; to have done so would, indeed, have opened a very wide field. The same necessity of keeping within certain limits decided me not to attempt the task of dealing in these chapters with the general changes which have been introduced into our military system in the last few years, or which ought to be introduced in the future, or to embark on a discussion of the general problems of modern strategy and tactics, which, in so far as they can be illustrated by the experiences of the South African War alone, have already been sufficiently emphasized in previous volumes. As they stand the twelve chapters form to some extent a continuous sequence. From them the reader can learn how the soldiers who fought in South Africa were raised; how they were conveyed to the front by sea and rail; how they were kept supplied with victuals on the march; how they were replenished with all necessaries, from horses and mules to boots and ammunition;



how they were tended when sick or wounded. Closely connected with these themes is the special work done by the Artillery and Engineers, and by the officers who had to face the administrative and legal problems implied in the proclamation of martial law in British colonies and in the government of occupied territory. To all these various subjects the consideration of the cost of the war and of the provision and expenditure of the necessary funds furnishes an appropriate sequel.

The real historical conclusion, however, of the present work is contained in the nine chapters which compose Part I of the volume. Throughout these volumes I have endeavoured to treat the war not merely as a military incident, but as a great historical and political event: the greatest event in the history of South Africa; one of the greatest in the development of the British Empire. For South Africa, the war was the crisis of a political struggle which had continued intermittently for well-nigh a century. For the Empire, it was the first serious test of the strength of the growing sentiment of Imperial Unity. From either point of view its chief interest lies in the results which it has achieved. The time has not yet arrived, perhaps, to pronounce a final verdict on the results of the war. But enough has happened in the last seven years to allow, at any rate, a provisional conclusion to be given, and to be given with some confidence. It is to furnish the materials for that conclusion that these chapters have been written. They do not profess to give an adequate account of the enormous mass of work accomplished by Lord Milner and his fellow workers in the first three years after the peace, though they represent the condensation of an amount of material out of which several volumes might easily have been compiled. Still less can they claim to deal exhaustively with the events of the last four years, with Lord Selborne's administration in the new colonies, with the change of policy in England, with the grant of self-government, or with the movement for South African Union. It is enough for my purpose if they make clear the greatness of the performance of those earlier years, and if they bring

the changes which have since taken place into their correct perspective, and into their true causal relation with the work both of the war and of the reconstruction. The delay in the production of the volume has had at least this compensating advantage, that it has made that task easier. The approaching union of South Africa—the near birth of a new nation in the British Empire—forms a fitting conclusion to the century of struggle recounted in this work, and affords a triumphant vindication of the statesmanship which faced the inevitable issue of war, and laid, broad and deep, the foundations of the new South Africa.

My special thanks are due to my old collaborator Mr. Lionel James, and to Colonel C. à Court Repington, for their help in selecting the contributors to the second part of the volume and in making all the arrangements for me during my absence abroad in 1907-8. I have also to thank the contributors themselves, as well as the many friends who have given me their helpful criticism and advice in the preparation of the volume generally.

I now take my leave of the History of the South African War. It is just nine years since I wrote the opening pages. Had I known then how laborious the task would prove, I freely confess that I should probably not have had the courage to embark upon it. I have grown very weary of it at intervals. But now the work is done I regret none of the labour which it has cost. To me it has been a wonderful lesson not only in the supremely interesting business of war, but in the whole Imperial problem of which the struggle in South Africa has been but a single phase. My only hope is that I have succeeded in some measure, however small, in making that lesson plain to those who have the patience to study these volumes.

L. S. AMERY.

THE TEMPLE, April 28, 1909.



PART I  
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH  
AFRICA





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*The Medallion on this Volume is the reverse of the "King's Medal" given to the troops who took part in the South African Campaign, 1901-1902.*

"Later shall rise a people, sane and great  
Forged in strong fires, by equal war made one."

RUDYARD KIPLING.

"We may confidently anticipate for the first time in the history of modern South Africa Dutch and English will work together for a common purpose and for the good of their common country. But I go further and I expect more than that. It is my hope that in the near future provincial feeling will give way before a wider conception of national interest, and our Dutch fellow-subjects will share with us our sense of responsibility in our possessions, and petty differences which have hitherto divided us will be lost in the wider circle of Imperial interests and obligations."

MR. CHAMBERLAIN.

"The Dutch can never own a perfect allegiance merely to Great Britain. The British can never, without moral injury, accept allegiance to any body politic which excludes their motherland. But British and Dutch alike could, without loss of dignity, without any sacrifice of their several traditions, unite in loyal devotion to an empire-state, in which Great Britain and South Africa would be partners, and could work cordially together for the good of South Africa as a member of that great whole. And so you see the true Imperialist is also the best South African."

LORD MILNER.

"Alles zal recht kom."

PRESIDENT BRAND.

# The Times History

OF

## THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

---

### CHAPTER I

#### LAYING THE GROUNDWORK

THE reannexation of the Boer Republics to the British Empire was an inevitable consequence of the success of the Imperial forces. In its essence the war was an internal conflict; a struggle within the confines of the Empire between the forces making for union and the forces making for disintegration. The Republics were not foreign states whose development brought them into collision with British interests. They were offshoots of the British Empire, and, though severed politically, remained linked to the adjoining British territories by innumerable bonds of race, traditions and commercial interests. That they were originally severed at all was no doubt due in part to a conscious movement for republican independence in South Africa. But it was due even more to the long dominance in England of a political school of thought which not only tolerated but directly encouraged any step calculated to hasten or anticipate the peaceful disintegration of the British Empire, and consequently welcomed the establishment of wholly or partly independent republics in South Africa as an example for British subjects elsewhere. Fortunately the example was not followed. A similar offshoot, it is true, threatened once to arise in the Canadian North-West in the shape of a French half-breed republic, and there were not wanting, both in Canada and in England, those who looked complacently upon the prospect. Happily for Canada the forces of union, in her case, proved strong enough to

The annexations. Their meaning and necessity.



crush the movement in its infancy, and to avert the incessant unrest, the bitter racial feud throughout the Dominion, the foreign interference, and the eventual, inevitable appeal to arms which would have followed any weak-kneed compromise with Riel and his associates.\* In South Africa long periods of avowed separatism on the part of the Imperial authorities, occasional spurts of unifying activity, and disastrous reactions alternated to create the almost continuous crisis which culminated in the war. The Republics became the armed rallying-point of all the disruptive elements in the adjoining colonies. The friction between the Transvaal and the British Government enlisted in frenzied, unreasoning defence of the former all opponents of the growing movement for Imperial unity in South Africa, in the United Kingdom and in every other part of the Empire. The war, disappointing, perhaps, as a display of British military power, proved conclusively the overwhelming strength throughout the Empire of the sentiment of union. And that sentiment demanded, with unhesitating logic, the formal reincorporation of the Republics in the Empire. Never again should South Africa see the flags of separatism flying by the side of the flag of union, and competing for the allegiance of its citizens. Never again should racial intolerance in one part of South Africa poison the springs of the whole political life of the country. Never again should artificial boundaries stand in the way of the creation and development of a united South African Dominion, and of a united South African nation.

“‘Never again’ must be the motto of all thinking, of all humane men. . . . If there is one thing of which, after recent experiences, I am absolutely convinced, it is that the vital interests of all those who live in South Africa, of our present enemies as much as of those who are on our side, demand that there should not be two dissimilar and antagonistic political systems in that which nature and history have irrevocably decided must be one country. To agree to a compromise

\* Some interesting light on the attitude of Canadian politicians towards the Riel rebellion in 1870 is given by Colonel G. T. Denison in “The Struggle for Imperial Unity.”

which would leave any ambiguity on that point would not be magnanimity : it would be weakness, ingratitude, and cruelty—ingratitude to the heroic dead, and cruelty to the unborn generations.\*

The decision to annex the Republics was inevitable if the sentiment of Imperial unity was to carry the day. But it was no less inevitable that the deep-rooted traditions and ideals of separatism should refuse to acquiesce in that decision without a convulsive struggle. The stubborn reluctance of the Boers to own defeat, the vain endeavour of colonial Afrikanerdom to avert the irrevocable end, if not by successful rebellion, then, at least, by means of bitter political agitation in South Africa and in England, the futile protests of English "pro-Boers"—all these things are only intelligible as parts of a single struggle for a common political ideal, whose overthrow, in England as in South Africa, was involved in annexation. In the first flush of British success, few realized the intensity of the moral resistance which had yet to be overcome. Since then some may have been inclined to think that the victory, so long delayed, so hardly won, was but momentary. They fail to see how crushing and irrevocable was the blow which separatism suffered in the annexation, and how comparatively feeble, even in the inevitable hour of reaction, have been its efforts to undo the past, or to stay the progress of the Imperial movement in the future.

On March 11, 1900, Lord Salisbury informed the Presidents of the two Republics that the British Government was not prepared to assent to their independence. On May 11, Mr. Chamberlain, speaking at Birmingham, followed up this declaration by a definite statement of policy. The Republics were to be annexed ; after an intervening period of Crown Colony government they should be admitted, as soon as it was safe and possible, into the great circle of the self-governing colonies of the Empire. On May 24 the Orange Free State was formally annexed as the Orange River Colony ; the annexation of the South African Republic, henceforward the Transvaal Colony, was not actually published till September 1.

Lord Salisbury's message. The formal annexations.

\* Sir A. Milner : speech at Cape Town, April 12, 1900.

Annexation  
and recon-  
struction.

From the very first the policy of annexation was carried out to its logical consequences, subject only to such slight inconsistencies as were rendered inevitable by the continuance of the war. It is true that, one or two threatening proclamations notwithstanding,\* there was no attempt to treat the Boers in the field otherwise than as belligerents. The continued existence of the Republics in the persons of the burghers and of their leaders was even conceded in the preamble to the terms of surrender, though the articles themselves throughout treated the annexations as established facts. But if the Boers in the field were treated as belligerents, the concession was presumed to be a matter of equity rather than of right. Those who accepted the situation, and remained within the area effectively occupied by the British forces, were treated as already British subjects by virtue of the annexations. What is equally important, they regarded themselves as such. They not only accepted appointments under the new Government, but even, in many cases, eventually took up arms in order to enforce its authority. The civil administration set up during the war in each colony was no mere provisional device for maintaining order in the occupied districts. It was a complete system of government, issuing, amending, and repealing legislation for the whole colony, and engaged upon every kind of far-reaching project for the future development of its resources. To understand the reconstruction in South Africa it is essential to remember that it was founded upon the annexations and began with them, and even in anticipation of them. Logically and actually, they were the starting-point. The cessation of hostilities was a subsequent and subordinate incident.

Military ad-  
ministration  
in the Orange  
River Colony.

The occupation of Bloemfontein and the southern portion of the Orange Free State in March, 1900, was followed by the immediate establishment of a military administration,† under the charge of Major-General Pretzman. The finances

\* See vol. iv., p. 491; vol. v., p. 321-2.

† A fuller account of the military administration of the occupied towns or districts, regarded as an important incidental feature of the military operations, is given in chapter xi. of the second part of this volume. Here only so much is given as is necessary to make clear the beginnings of the work of reconstruction.



of the occupied area were taken in hand by Mr. Emrys Evans, of the Standard Bank, lately British vice-consul in Johannesburg. The departments of Customs, Posts, Education, Orphan Chamber, Registrar of Deeds, etc., were carried on, mostly in charge of officials of the old Government. The Landdrost's Court was reopened in Bloemfontein; resident magistrates were appointed in the villages, at first mainly from the old landdrosts; but as few of these were found satisfactory, their places were gradually taken by Englishmen, many of them selected from the civil service of Cape Colony. District commissioners selected from the Army were placed over the districts, with control over resident magistrates and other district officials. From the annexation, on May 24, to the end of September, 1900, the southern half of the new colony was practically settled. Agriculture and commerce were resumed, taxes were paid, schools attended, and an insignificant handful of troops and mounted police maintained order.

A similar policy was followed in the Transvaal. Here, however, the Rand, with its vast financial interests and with its large cosmopolitan and native population, presented a problem by itself. With a view to this, Lord Roberts took up with him several members of the Uitlander community to help in the work of administration, including Messrs. Wybergh, Hoyle, Douglas Forster, and Samuel Evans, deputed to look after various public departments, while a number of others were subsequently appointed. Colonel Colin Mackenzie was appointed Military Governor, while the important department of Police was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel F. J. Davies. Pretoria and the rest of the Transvaal were placed under the charge of Major-General Maxwell. Circumstances did not allow of the extension of effective administration beyond the capital, though, for a while, the western and south-western districts of the Transvaal remained quiet. A general administrative control was moreover retained by Lord Roberts, who had attached to him as Political Adviser Mr. G. V. Fiddes, hitherto Imperial Secretary; as Legal Adviser, Mr. (now Sir W.) van Hulsteyn; and as Financial Adviser, Mr. Emrys Evans, who

Military  
administra-  
tion in the  
Transvaal.

was succeeded at Bloemfontein by Mr. A. Browne, a member of the High Commissioner's staff.

Future civil  
administra-  
tion outlined  
by Mr.  
Chamberlain,  
Aug. 1900.

The military administration was naturally only of a temporary character. What differentiated it, however, from the military administration of similarly occupied territories in other wars was that, from the outset, it was regarded, not as a mere makeshift substitute for a normal administration which would revive when the war was over, but as the first stage in the process of converting the Boer Republics into British colonies. The second stage, the creation of a civil administration on the lines of a British Crown colony, would follow as soon as the Boers abandoned their resistance. In the summer and autumn of 1900 the end seemed imminent and certain, and the definite establishment of civil government was confidently expected by the end of the year. On August 2, Mr. Chamberlain outlined his general conception of the new system of government in a despatch to Sir A. Milner. While urging that the change to British rule should be made as easy as possible to the burghers by retaining old laws and customs, and even old officials as far as possible, Mr. Chamberlain realized that in the Transvaal the complexity of the problems, the one-sidedness, incompetence, and corruption of the old *régime* would necessitate the reconstruction of the machinery of government. But in the Orange River Colony he considered few changes were required, and even looked forward to an earlier grant of self-government. In any case self-government was to be introduced in each colony as soon as circumstances permitted. Meanwhile, at the earliest possible date, genuine municipal institutions, giving full self-government in local affairs, were to be instituted. In each colony the Governor, or Lieutenant-Governor, should be assisted by an Executive Council, composed of the principal officials, and by a Legislative Council, which, in the Orange River Colony at any rate, should include a nominated unofficial element; in the Transvaal, deeply divided as it was, such a step might prove more difficult. The difference of treatment suggested for the two colonies is significant. In view of the somewhat exaggerated current notion as to the excellence of the old Free State administration, and of the

temporary tranquillity of a great part of the colony, Mr. Chamberlain's attitude was natural enough. But it overlooked one important factor, that of racial sentiment. The divisions in the Transvaal—in other words, the presence of a large British community—so far from complicating, simplified the problem of self-government enormously. The real difficulty of the future was the Orange River Colony, where British supremacy and British ideals had but few ready-made supporters, and where they could only gradually be expected to win the acquiescence of those who had fought for the cause of Afrikaner supremacy and republican separatism.

That the general direction of the work of reconstruction should be entrusted to Sir A. Milner was as inevitable as annexation itself. Over and above his financial experience, his knowledge of South Africa, and his personal influence with the British inhabitants of the Transvaal, Sir A. Milner personified the resolve of the British people to carry through the policy of the war without flinching. Any other appointment would not only have been unsatisfactory in itself, but would have been regarded throughout South Africa as a deliberate weakening of British policy. What else the appointment involved of new creative effort was, at that moment, known to none but Milner himself. But that the new task would be far too heavy to allow Milner to combine it permanently with the Governorship of Cape Colony was obvious. On the other hand, it was desirable that he should retain the High Commissionership. Accordingly, on October 6, a commission was signed, by which the High Commissionership, instead of following the office of Governor of Cape Colony, was attached to Sir A. Milner personally.\* A further commission, of October 8, appointed him administrator of the new colonies in the event of Lord Roberts's departure or death. The succession to the Governorship of

Sir A. Milner appointed Governor of the new colonies, retaining High Commissionership.

\* The new High Commission contained an important new clause authorizing the High Commissioner to invite the Governments of the various colonies and protectorates to send representatives to confer with him on subjects of common interests, a clause intended to help to pave the way towards the closer union and consolidation of South Africa.



Cape Colony, and the appointment of a Deputy Administrator for the Orange River Colony were, for the moment, left in abeyance. These commissions were sent out by Mr. Chamberlain on October 18, in the confident hope that they would enter into effect within the next few weeks.

Views of  
other South  
African  
colonies.

The general policy outlined in the despatch of August 2 was expounded to the House of Commons by Mr. Chamberlain on December 7, and was subsequently submitted for comment to the Governments of Cape Colony and Natal. In a minute of February 25, 1901, Sir Gordon Sprigg expressed the general concurrence of his Ministry in the proposed scheme of government, but laid stress on the inadvisability of any premature grant of self-government, and urged the importance of a vigorous policy of immigration and land settlement in creating the conditions which would facilitate the grant of representative institutions. That South African confederation was the ultimate goal to be kept in view was urged both in this minute and in the one submitted for Natal by Sir A. Hime on March 23, 1901. The Natal minute emphasized the vital importance of making English the official and predominant language in the new colonies, and further took the opportunity of pressing Natal's claims for an enlargement of territory. The claim now made was for the transfer to Natal of the Vryheid, Utrecht, Piet Retief and Wakkerstroom districts of the Transvaal, and of the Harrismith and Vrede districts of the Orange River Colony. The question was discussed at intervals during 1901 and settled in March, 1902, by the transfer to Natal of Vryheid, Utrecht, and part of Wakkerstroom. These districts had hitherto formed an inconvenient wedge separating northern Natal and Zululand. Their native population was either Zulu or closely allied to that of the adjoining districts of Natal; Vryheid itself had been part of Zululand till 1883, when it was overrun by Lukas Meyer's band of adventurers and converted into the "New Republic," subsequently incorporated in the Transvaal. The total area transferred was over 7,000 square miles, with a population of 8,000 whites and 50,000 natives. In return for this accession of territory Natal took over £700,000 of the

Transfer of  
territory to  
Natal.

Transvaal debt. The claim to an extension across the Drakensberg on the Orange River Colony side was rejected.

Meanwhile, in view of the anticipated advent of peace, several commissions had been appointed during 1900 to investigate certain important questions of policy. A commission composed of Mr. A. Lyttelton, Mr. A. M. Ashmore, and Mr. R. K. Loveday was charged with investigating the whole wide subject of the concessions granted to individuals or companies under the Kruger *régime*. The commissioners met at Pretoria in August, 1900, and reported in the following April. They recommended the cancellation of the concession to the Netherlands Railway as contrary to the public interest, and considered that the action of the company during the war deprived the ordinary shareholders of any right to compensation, but commended the debenture holders for favourable consideration. A similar recommendation was made with regard to the debenture holders of that notorious venture, the Selati Railway, while the report urged the recognition, in some cases with modifications, of the Pretoria-Pietersburg, Ermelo, and sundry minor railway concessions. In view of the wholesale bribery which had accompanied the passing of the dynamite concession, the report urged its cancellation, adding that the company should enjoy no advantages beyond those secured by its being actually in the field. The Hatherley Distillery Concession was found to be lawfully granted, while of a large series of concessions of a municipal character the commission passed some and modified or rejected others. These recommendations were duly carried out, though in not a few instances greater generosity was shown than was required by strict justice or recommended by the commission. Thus in the case of the Netherlands Railway, not only were the shareholders paid, but they received an actual premium on the face value of their holding. The German and Dutch *bona fide* shareholders received £135, with 4 per cent. on the nominal value (£83), from September, 1900, to June, 1903. There were also some 4,700 shares in the hands of French shareholders, to the payment of which the British Government demurred on the ground that they had been the

The Con-  
cessions  
Commission.

property of the South African Republic, and had been made over to Creuzot's during the war in payment for armaments. The French, however, protracted negotiations and eventually, in 1906, secured £35 a share. Similar generosity was shown in the case of the Selati Railway. The Pietersburg Railway was bought out, as was also the Hatherley Distillery, in view of a doubt as to the legality of imposing an excise while it was in force.

Land  
Settlement  
Commission.

A commission to inquire into the possibilities of land settlement in the new colonies was appointed in August, 1900, and Mr. H. O. Arnold-Forster and Mr. W. R. Southey, the commissioners, reported in November. The commissioners were strongly impressed by the desirability of encouraging settlement and advocated the purchase or, if necessary, compulsory acquisition of land for the purpose, over and above the existing Government lands. The report deprecated military settlements as such, but suggested the advisability of settling the new colonists in groups, with, possibly, the inclusion of some military obligation in their tenure, and also considered the general question of the employment of ex-soldiers after the peace.

Sir D.  
Barbour's  
financial  
report.

In December, 1900, Sir David Barbour, K.C.S.I. was commissioned to visit South Africa and report on the financial prospects of the new colonies. He reported at the end of March that the Orange River Colony would be able to pay its way, but would have no surplus available to provide for its proper share of the cost of the South African Constabulary, still less for any contribution to the cost of the war. The Transvaal, on the other hand, ought within two years of peace to be able to begin laying aside something towards a war contribution. In particular Sir D. Barbour recommended the imposition of a 10 per cent. profit tax on the Transvaal mines, and the securing to the State of an adequate share of any future mining discoveries.

Prolongation  
of war.  
Decision not  
to defer  
reconstruction  
till  
peace.

Meanwhile the peace which seemed so near in August, 1900, receded steadily as the months went on. By the end of October the whole of the open country in both the new colonies was overrun by the guerilla bands, and the British administration, away from the railway lines, was confined



to a few garrisoned villages, many of which were abandoned by Lord Kitchener in the next few months. Lord Roberts's departure from South Africa was delayed till December 11, and though the commissions appointing Sir A. Milner Administrator of the new colonies were published on the 14th, the moment seemed hardly a favourable one for the assumption of his new office. Only the day before the British troops had suffered one of the worst reverses of the war at Nooitgedacht. Two days after, Kritzingen and Hertzog crossed the Orange River, and all hopes of new constructive work had to give place to the immediate anxiety of checking the spread of a second rebellion in Cape Colony. Any illusions the British Government may still have cherished must have been dispelled by the uncompromising frankness with which Milner, in a striking despatch \* dated February 6, 1901, surveyed the retrogression of the past six months. The hope of speedily reaching some definite point at which war would terminate and reconstruction begin could no longer be entertained. All the more reason, urged Milner, for making a start at once with such preparations for the resumption of civil administration as the circumstances might permit. The longer the war lasted the heavier would be the task of restoration when it ended, and the greater the necessity for the administration to be in a position to devote its whole energies to it and to deal with it promptly and effectively.

In the course of January, 1901, several of the principal members of the new Transvaal executive had been assigned to their respective departments. Mr. Fiddes became Secretary to the Administration,† Mr. (subsequently Sir Richard) Solomon, the Attorney-General in the late Schreiner ministry, was made Legal Adviser, while Mr. Wybergh was confirmed as Acting Commissioner of Mines. Mr.

Framework  
and per-  
sonnel of new  
administra-  
tion.

\* Cd. 547, no. 46.

† The titles Administrator, Deputy Administrator, Secretary to the Administration, Legal Adviser, etc., were employed as long as civil government was in a provisional state, and were only replaced after the formal establishment of Crown Colony government by letters patent by the titles Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General, etc.

Patrick Duncan, formerly Sir A. Milner's private secretary in the Inland Revenue Department, was brought out to act as Treasurer. Major (subsequently Sir Hamilton) Goold-Adams, the Administrator of Bechuanaland, was appointed Deputy Administrator of the Orange River Colony, and relieved General Pretymann at the beginning of February. Mr. (now Sir H. F.) Wilson at the same time became Secretary to the Administration, while Mr. A. Browne acted as Treasurer, and Mr. L. B. Tancred as Legal Adviser. In both colonies the Military district commissioners were now gradually dispensed with, and local administration, wherever such administration was possible, entrusted to the resident magistrates. Revenue was being collected, and budgets for the future drafted. The statute law of the Republics was studied with a view to the necessary work of revision. Mr. E. B. Sargant, who had arrived in South Africa in November in consequence of an invitation from Sir A. Milner to assist him in the capacity of Director of Education, was soon actively at work organizing education in the town and camp schools in both colonies. By the end of February the new civil administration was beginning to take shape. In Cape Colony the necessary measures for coping with rebellion were meanwhile well advanced. Milner decided that the time had come when he could safely entrust the colony to his successor. Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, and enter upon his new domain.

Milner leaves  
Cape Town  
for the  
Transvaal,  
Feb. 1901.

On February 28 he left Cape Town. The first chapter of his work in South Africa was closed; a new chapter was now opening, full of difficulties and doubts, full also with the promise of great achievement. The journey north was an anxious one. Kitchener was that very day conferring with Louis Botha at Middelburg.\* Whether peace was really intended by the Boers was to Milner a doubtful question, and one of secondary moment. What concerned him most was that nothing in the terms offered by Kitchener, whether accepted or not, should leave an opening for the revival of old ambitions, or prejudice the future of the work of reconstruction, the bold outlines of which were already shaping them-

\* See vol. v., chap. vii.

selves in his mind. At Bloemfontein, Milner and Kitchener met and travelled together to Pretoria, where Milner stayed for the next ten days, busily engaged in the abortive peace negotiations, and in discussions with the heads of his executive departments. On March 15, he moved into the house at Sunnyside, on the outskirts of Johannesburg, which he had fixed upon as his headquarters.

Having once seen his subordinates settled down to their work, Milner realized that for the next few months that work would have but little scope for expansion, and but little need of his personal supervision. Now, if ever, was the opportunity for a short interval of change and rest to fit him for the herculean task he would presently be grappling with. Other considerations besides health prompted a return to England at that moment. The study of the problem before him had ripened in his mind into a definite and comprehensive policy. But for that policy to bear fruit it was essential that it should be grasped in all its bearings by the leaders of public opinion in England. Personal exposition had proved invaluable on the eve of the crisis two years before, and was needed again. It was to secure approval and support for that policy, not only from Mr. Chamberlain and the Government, but also from the more moderate members of the Liberal Opposition, that he now applied for leave. Sailing from Cape Town on May 8, he reached London on the 24th, was met on arrival by Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain, and conducted straight to the King, who announced his intention of raising him to the peerage. This honour was followed by a Privy Councillorship, the freedom of the City, and other demonstrations of official and public regard for one whose courage and sincerity had made him a national hero in the eyes of all but the more fanatical anti-Imperialists. These, indeed—the men who even at this stage clamoured for the abandonment of the war and the re-establishment of the Republics, who to that end belittled every British success and magnified every British reverse, and who revelled in a luxury of indignation over every tale, however baseless, which could reflect discredit on British soldiers or British statesmen—invented a Milner of their

Milner's visit  
to England,  
May-Aug.  
1901.



own, a gloomy tyrant, hating freedom and rejoicing in bloodshed, a modern Alva, serving a conspiracy of cosmopolitan financiers as remorseless and cruel as the Inquisition of old. The caricature is worth giving, for all its absurdity, not only because it illustrates the temper of a section of the Opposition at the time, but also because it helps to explain their subsequent actions.

Milner's  
policy. Re-  
building from  
the founda-  
tion.

The policy which Lord Milner had come home to advocate was the direct outcome of the altered conditions of the war. In the summer of 1900 the policy of annexation with the minimum of political and social change seemed the obvious one to follow. The Boers were to be reconciled by discovering that British rule simply meant Republican rule improved, purified, and freed from racial intolerance. The natural economic development, consequent on the removal of Krugerism, would complete the reconciliation, while the steady inflow of new British population would soon make any revival of old ambitions preposterous. The guerilla war made this policy impossible. Columns and commandos between them were steadily destroying the whole apparatus of agricultural civilization, such as it was, and the end seemed unlikely to come till the destruction was complete. The old social and political framework was being dissolved as the commandos dwindled away, while in the refugee camps and in the towns a new social class, that of the surrendered Boers, was gradually acquiring coherence and self-consciousness. There could be no carrying on unchanged of what had ceased to exist, no repairing or remodelling a structure which was being razed to the ground. It was useless to deplore the terrible wastefulness of the process, or to shrink from the enormous addition of work and expenditure involved. The only thing to do, in Milner's view, was to accept the inevitable, and take to the full the opportunity given for building afresh on a sounder foundation and on better lines. If the Boer leaders chose to destroy their country, the only thing was to create a new and better country in its place. If they refused to acquiesce in British rule, the best reply was to establish in the new colonies a people actively identified with that rule. The longer they

carried on the struggle the more the new population would gain in numbers and cohesion, the more their own following would dwindle away. It was for them to decide when they had enough and would accept the new order. His concern, for the present, was not with them, but with the urgency of his own task, the building up of a new country.

The starting-point of the whole policy was the possession of the railways and, above all, of the Witwatersrand. What-  
Restarting  
the mines  
 ever possible military drawbacks Lord Roberts's rapid advance might have entailed, it had, in Milner's eyes, the inestimable advantage of having saved the mines intact. And the mines were, as far as the support of a white population was concerned, the better half—as far as English population was concerned, more than three-quarters—of the whole Transvaal. We had long ago conquered the part of the Transvaal that, for the present, mattered most. We now held securely the avenues by which its industries and population could be supplied. The obvious corollary was to restore those industries and that population without delay. There was no military danger involved. These were no unreliable burghers, bound only by oaths which they either would not or could not keep in the face of the persuasion or threats of their fellow-countrymen. They were Englishmen, thousands of whom had taken their share in the fighting—all of whom were fully prepared to take their part in the local defence of their homes and of their industry. Moreover, their return would have an enormous moral effect upon the Boers, both in impressing upon them the resolution of the British Government and in forcing them to realize that they, and not the British element, would be the sufferers by the continuance of the struggle. From the very beginning of the year Milner had urged upon Kitchener the desirability of starting the mines and getting the Rand resettled. In April he had secured his assent to the starting of three mines with a total of 150 stamps, out of a full capacity of some 6,000. An even greater step in advance was settled before Milner left for England, namely, the abolition of the military governorship of Johannesburg and the Rand, and the substitution of a civil administration which, in municipal

affairs, took the shape of a nominated Town Council, presided over by Major O'Meara, hitherto Mayor, and now Government Commissioner.

Gradual re-settlement of the land.

The next step, in Milner's view, to restarting the mines was restarting agricultural life in certain limited areas which could be cleared and defended against Boer invasion. To a certain extent such areas existed already in the districts immediately round Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, and Pretoria. If Kitchener's aggressive policy of destruction failed to bring about a general surrender by the end of the South African winter of 1901, why should not, Milner urged, a defensive policy of reconstruction wholly or partly take its place? Only a little more effort was required to clear effectively a great quadrilateral between the Vaal and the Magaliesberg, including the whole Rand and Pretoria.\* The Orange River Colony, south of the line Boshof-Bloemfontein-Ladybrand, had been such a protected area before and might be made one again. Gradually the boundaries of the protected areas might be extended. Meanwhile, in the rest of the country, the Boer commandos might be sufficiently harassed by mobile columns darting out from behind the blockhouse screens to prevent their becoming aggressive.

The surrendered Boers.

For the resettlement of the steadily growing fenced area Milner looked in the first place to the surrendered Boers, living in the occupied towns or in the refugee camps. These represented fully a third of the burgher population, and were at least as many as the burghers on commando. The bulk of these were not only weary of the war and anxious for its termination, but genuinely indignant with the leaders for prolonging, in unreasoning stubbornness or for personal ambition, a conflict disastrous to the future of their people. The persecution by the commandos of those who kept their oath of neutrality, the ill-treatment of some of the envoys sent out by the Burgher Peace Committee in the early months of the year,† only served to embitter their feelings, while the sympathetic attitude of the British authorities, their humanity to the unfortunate victims of

\* See vol. v., pp. 324-5.

† See vol. v., pp. 92-3.



the war in the camps and, above all, the certainty of British success—so much more evident within the British lines than on the open veld—all contributed to convert them by degrees into active partizans of the British cause. Already before Milner left some 500 burgher police had played an active part in the maintenance of the cordon round the Bloemfontein area. Before the end of the war several thousand Boers were serving in the field against their former comrades, and the rapid growth of the movement was one of the chief causes which precipitated surrender. As for the rest of the surrendered Boers, they could be fully trusted to show a passive, if not an active and militant loyalty within the fenced areas, and their numbers could be gradually increased by the return of the more tractable among the prisoners of war.

But it was essential to the policy that from the outset a strong leaven of British settlers should be interspersed with the surrendered Boers, so that the two elements might tend from the first to coalesce and take root together. The policy of land settlement, on which Milner laid such great stress, has often been misrepresented as a mere mechanical attempt to displace the Boer, a feeble imitation of Prussian land policy in the Polish provinces. But its real effect was intended to be qualitative rather than quantitative. It aimed at diminishing the racial factor in the politics of the future by getting rid of the sharp division between a purely British urban population and a purely Dutch farming population. It aimed, through the introduction of a class of progressive farmers, at a general raising of the standard of agriculture in the new colonies, for the benefit of Dutch as well as of British. It was, in other words, not so much a political device for swamping the Dutch vote, as an essential element in the policy of building up the new colonies with an entirely different social atmosphere and on an entirely different plane of civilization from the old Republics.

The immediate increase in the numerical strength of the British element was only a secondary consideration in the policy of land settlement. But it was the guiding principle of Milner's policy as a whole. With Lord Durham,

British land settlement.

Increase of British element Milner's guiding principle.

he held that "it must be the first and steady purpose of the British Government to establish an English population with English laws and language in this province, and to trust its government to none but a decidedly English legislature." To make sure of a substantial British population in the new colonies before the eventual grant of self-government was in Milner's eyes the one thing vital; it was the end that shaped every single act of his administration. There was in this no idea of a racial domination, of a British version of Krugerism, by which the Boers were to exchange the part of masters for that of helots. But Milner knew that if British political ideals were to prevail in the new colonies they could only prevail, in the first instance, through a British population strong enough to maintain them. In time the Boers would assimilate those ideals by contact; then it would matter less which element held the upper hand. Meanwhile it was asking too much of human nature to suppose that Boer commandants or members of Kruger's Volksraad would straightway be permeated by British traditions and British ideals simply in virtue of their reluctant acceptance of the British flag. Institutions depend on the men who work them; to Milner it was self-evident that British institutions in South Africa must start with a solid basis of British population.

Rapid expansion of the mines the master-key.

A rapid influx of British population, that was the simple and definite end Milner set before him. The means to that end were equally simple and equally clear. The master key to the whole problem was the development of the gold industry at the highest possible rate of expansion. The faster the development proceeded, the greater not only the direct increase of British population depending on the mines, but also, even more important, the over-spill\* in the way of revenue, of consuming power, of industrial ability, of

\* "The faster we get it the greater is the over-spill over what is necessary to remunerate the capital invested. . . . The faster the gold is won, the sooner will you be able to build up those permanent sources of wealth which will make you independent of the gold, and which, if you won the gold too slowly, you might never have the means of building up at all."—Lord Milner at meeting of Inter-Colonial Council, Cd. 2027, p. 26.

localized white labour, available for the development of all those other almost untouched agricultural and mineral resources which might make the Transvaal, and South Africa as a whole, a great and prosperous community long after the last ounce of gold had been extracted from the Rand. Slow development involved the eventual exhaustion of the mines just as certainly as rapid development. Meanwhile it solved no problem, economic or political. It furnished no increase to the British population in the present, and created no industries to support even the existing population in the future. It left the Dutch relatively stronger than the British, but actually weaker, for it could do nothing to lift agriculture out of its stagnation. In effect it left the inheritance of South Africa to the Kaffir. Rapid development meant not only a British South Africa, but a white South Africa. Slow development meant the recrudescence of Afrikanerdom followed by the eventual domination of the Kaffir and the half-caste. Only an abundant over-spill from the mines could generate the force required to lift South Africa above these dangers on to a new plane of economic progress and political stability. The ideas of the "over-spill" and of the "lift" furnish the clue to the whole of Milner's policy of reconstruction.

One other fact about Milner's policy must constantly be kept in view. The lifting of the new colonies on to a new plane was only a proximate end. The real end was the union of South Africa, and the union of the British Empire. The Transvaal, no longer the source of all discord in South Africa, was to become the prime factor in the movement for South African union, and was to impress upon that union a progressive and a British character. And, in its turn, South Africa, so long a weak spot in the Empire, was to become a source of Imperial strength and Imperial unity.\* The British Transvaaler, schooled by the experiences of an Uitlander to realize the preciousness of British institu-

The real aim,  
South African  
and Imperial  
union.

\* "A great Johannesburg—great in intelligence, in cultivation, in public spirit—means a British Transvaal. A British Transvaal will turn the scale in a British South Africa, and a British South Africa may go a long way to consolidate the Empire."—Lord Milner at Johannesburg, Jan. 8, 1902.



tions, tempered by courage and self-sacrifice on many a field, victorious through the Empire's help, was to become the champion as he had been the beneficiary of the Imperial idea. Milner was far from idealizing his Johannesburgers—he knew them too well for that. But he believed that with all their failings they were capable, under favouring circumstances, of being inspired with a great idea, and believed in his own power to inspire them.

Need of a  
loan for  
development.

Meanwhile the important thing was to get ahead with resettlement and reconstruction as rapidly as possible. The time before self-government would have to be granted could only be short; every month gained in starting at full speed was all to the good. The obvious way to do this was to borrow on the strength of the coming expansion. A considerable loan would be required in any case to cover the existing debts of the two Republics, the acquisition of the Netherlands Railway, and any other concessions it might be desirable to buy out. Again, the expansion of the civil administration, the resettlement of the Rand population, and the gradual repatriation of the Boers all meant money. So much was mere restoration. But over and above this, money was wanted for the immediate initiation of a policy of British land settlement on a large scale, for new railways, new roads, new public buildings, for the whole policy, in fact, of development and lift. Milner's own ideas as to the amount he would have liked to raise for this development work were very large. But he knew there were practical limits to what he could hope to induce a British Government to sanction. For the moment he was content to secure provision for his more immediate wants. On August 6 the House of Commons voted a grant in aid of £6,500,000 to the new colonies, of which £4,000,000 were for administration, £1,000,000 for new rolling-stock, and £500,000 for "relief and resettlement," an item which covered the purchase of land for settlers.

Chamber-  
lain's anxiety  
for a war  
contribution.

But while the needs of development and reconstruction were uppermost in Milner's mind, Chamberlain was also concerned about a very different claim, the claim of the United Kingdom to some contribution from the Transvaal towards

the ruinous cost of the war. From the very first Chamberlain had hoped, and induced the House of Commons to hope, that a substantial share of the cost of the war could be recovered from the wealth of the Transvaal. The idea in his mind seems at first to have been simply that of a war indemnity, and indeed the actual word was more than once used by him. Had the Transvaal been an ordinary external enemy, the levying of an indemnity would have been natural enough, and the amount levied would simply have been limited by what it was possible to extract from the vanquished, regardless of their future welfare. But the Transvaal was to be made a British colony, and, what was more, a prosperous British colony. A heavy contribution levied in the spirit of indemnity would not only check that prosperity, but fall almost wholly upon the tax-paying British section of the population, and thus directly frustrate the natural aims of British policy. There was one method indeed by which the policy of indemnity could have been logically applied, and that was the imposition of a heavy war tax directly upon the landed property of the burghers. But to such a course British statesmanship had no intention of stooping. Any idea, indeed, of such a tax had been expressly disavowed in the recent negotiations at Middelburg. On the contrary, the line adopted by Chamberlain, once he had shaken off the conception of indemnity, was to admit frankly that the burden of a contribution would fall upon the British Transvaalers and to demand it of them as an equitable return for the benefits they had gained through the war. In any case he was determined to get substantial relief for the British taxpayer somehow or other.\* Milner was prepared to admit the

\* At the bottom of the whole difficulty about the war contribution lies the anomalous constitution of the British Empire, in which one part, enjoying absolute control of Imperial policy, also bears the whole cost. Under any system of Imperial partnership, the new colonies, on attaining self-government, would have assumed some reasonable share of the burden as well as of the privilege of Empire. Under the existing system the imposition of an arbitrarily assessed contribution on a self-governing colony, however equitable the United Kingdom's claim to relief, really involved, as Transvaalers not infrequently pointed out at the time, the

general equity of the claim, even up to a large amount. His one anxiety was that it should not conflict with the prior claim of development. As long as he was not asked to saddle the Transvaal with a fixed sum to be raised at once, or to give up the whole of his surpluses, he was prepared to face a contribution ultimately mounting up to a total of £50,000,000, or even more, provided payment were only spread over a sufficiently long period, and partly taken in such windfalls as new mineral discoveries. Judging by the results of the first few years Milner's estimate of the taxable capacity of the Transvaal may appear high. But it was far below what Chamberlain at that time expected. For the present, after much discussion, the matter was allowed to stand over.

Milner's  
return, Aug.  
1901. Im-  
provement of  
the situation.  
Return of the  
refugees.

On August 10, Milner left England, taking with him the Letters Patent and other documents constituting a regular system of Crown Colony government in the new colonies, to be brought into operation whenever it was thought expedient. When he reached Johannesburg, three weeks later, the possibility of such a step already seemed far nearer than in May, and during the next few months the situation steadily improved. Summing up the situation in a despatch dated November 15\* Milner laid stress upon the "almost absolute safety and uninterrupted working of the railways," over which traffic was now carried on by night as well as by day, upon the complete and permanent clearance of the enemy out of the central region of the Transvaal "more important, economically, politically and strategically, than all the rest," and upon the great progress in the work of clearing the southern half of the Orange River Colony. Though still very reluctant to allow a beginning of agricultural resettlement Kitchener was now prepared to acquiesce in the gradual return of the Rand population and the reopening of the mines. When Milner wrote 450 stamps had resumed

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same attempt to impose taxation without representation which the British Government had once made in the case of the American colonies in order to secure some contribution to the cost of a great war fought for their advantage.

\* Cd. 903, no. 55



work and nearly 10,000 people had returned to their homes. The next few months saw a steady acceleration. By the end of the year 1,000 stamps were at work, 1,500 by the end of March, and 2,000 by the end of May. The refugees returned at an average rate of some 6,000 a month. Before the war was over 45,000 \* people had returned to the Rand, and Johannesburg had resumed much of its old activity.

The restoration of the British refugees was no easy matter. A Central Registration Committee of leading citizens, working in conjunction with the Permit Office, undertook the difficult and thankless task of selecting those who were to return as permits were sanctioned. A Refugees' Aid Department, consisting of a central committee in Johannesburg, with sub-committees in other districts of the Rand, mainly staffed by volunteer workers, looked after the comforts of the refugees on the long journey from the coast, met them on arrival, supplied them with beds, cooking utensils and other necessities, advanced small sums up to a maximum of £150 to help deserving men in refurnishing and restarting, and acted as an employment bureau for refugees—subsequently also for ex-soldiers and others who wished to secure civil employment in South Africa. A Personal and Property Inquiry Department, carrying on the work of a committee organized soon after the military occupation, undertook the task of making inquiries as to the whereabouts of missing persons, of inspecting and reporting on the property of refugees, of making inventories, of recovering looted property, † of storing and identifying property left unprotected and likely to be stolen or injured, and of supplying information to refugees as to their legal position in matters of tenancy, rates, compensation, etc. Over £40,000 worth of miscellaneous effects, ranging from commandeered cyanide to lost umbrellas, was in this way restored to their owners before the peace. Altogether this combination of gratis detective agency, furniture warehouse, and poor man's lawyer, presided over by Mr. H. J. Roberts,

The Refugees' Aid Department.

The Personal Inquiry Department.

\* The number is erroneously given as 30,000 in vol. v., p. 404.

† In Johannesburg 64 per cent., and on the Rand outside 83 per cent. of the dwellings were found to have been looted.

was not the least remarkable minor development of a unique campaign. In these and other ways an enormous amount of forethought and organizing capacity was shown, which has not usually received recognition. But, for that matter, the whole history of the British community in the Transvaal, from its expulsion on the eve of the war to its gradual return—a story of gallant performance in the field, a history also of patient endurance in refugee camps at the coast, subsisting on the charity of a Mansion House Fund, or eking out a living in casual employment—never commanded the attention paid to matters more controversial, though not necessarily of greater intrinsic importance.

Shortage of  
rolling-stock.  
The con-  
centration  
camps.

The renewal of industrial activity on the Rand, and the return of the refugee population, might have been even more rapid but for two considerations. One was the scarcity of native labour; the other was the inadequacy of the rolling-stock of the Imperial Military Railways to the steadily increasing demands upon it. Milner had already, while in England, secured from the British Government a large order for additional rolling-stock. But for the moment the deficiency was a very serious obstacle to progress. In its demands upon the carrying capacity of the railways the restoration of the mining industry had to give place not only to the requirements of the Army, but also to those of the concentration camps. The origin and unprecedented development of these camps, and the difficulties to which their formation gave rise, have already been dwelt upon in a previous volume.\* How serious was the demand made by them upon the railways may be judged from the fact that in October, 1901, their inhabitants numbered 118,000 whites and 75,000 natives, and that the figures for the burgher camps fell very little below that total during the rest of the war, while that for the natives rose to something like 100,000 before the peace. Chamberlain had urged the removal of the camps to the coast so as to leave the railways free to supply the returning British refugees, and in October, camps were started in Natal which eventually held over 24,000. Camps were also started subsequently in Cape

\* Vol. v., pp. 86 *sqq.*, 252 *sqq.*, 404.

Colony to relieve the more overcrowded of the camps in the Orange River Colony. But a wholesale carrying out of this policy was impossible. For one thing, a great part of their inmates had come into the camps voluntarily, on the understanding that they were not to be moved from their districts. For another, the removal of so large a population, weakened by privation and full of sickness, from the existing camps, which were at last beginning to get into proper order, to new sites many hundred miles away, involved risks which Milner was not prepared to run. Appalled by the heavy mortality, he determined that every other consideration should give way to the immediate improvement of the condition of the camps. Taking over the direct control of the camps in November, 1901,\* he threw his whole energy into the task of securing greater comfort, and, above all, a more generous and varied scale of rations, convinced that only systematic feeding up could prevent the otherwise inevitable consequences of the privations previously undergone by the women and children on the veld. At the beginning of 1902 he secured the services of two officers of great experience in dealing with similar camps in India, Colonel S. J. Thomson and Colonel J. S. Wilkins, who were assigned to the Transvaal and Orange River Colony respectively, the supervision of the Natal Camps being entrusted to Sir T. K. Murray, a prominent citizen of the colony. Thanks to the vigour shown by all in authority, from Chamberlain downwards, and to the devoted exertions of the staff, the mortality was rapidly and systematically reduced, and before the end of the war had fallen below the normal peace mortality of the Boer population.†

The native refugee camps, like the burgher camps, origi-

The native  
refugee  
camps.

\* The camps were put under a civil administration in February, 1901, but the Transvaal camps remained under the general control of the Commander-in-Chief till November. The account given in vol. v., p. 252, is not quite accurate in this respect.

† In October 1901 the mortality was at a rate of 344 per thousand per annum, the infantile mortality, chiefly due to measles, being as high as 600 per thousand. By January it was down to 160, by February to 69, and by May to 20. The death rate among the staff, largely due to overwork, was considerably in excess of that among the adult male inmates of the camps.



nated partly in the congregation of refugees seeking British protection, partly as a result of the policy of clearing the country, and at first differed little from them in organization. But it was thought undesirable that so large a native population should be fed in idleness, and the native refugees were moved in the course of 1901 to locations along the railway lines where they could safely grow crops for their own support, while, in the Transvaal, a great number of them were assigned to railway and other industrial work. The reorganization of these camps and their subsequent administration under a separate department was conducted by Captain G. J. de Lotbinière, R.E., with remarkable success. In this case, too, a mortality, at first very heavy, was rapidly reduced as the camps were put in order, and as the inmates recovered from the effects of their privations on the veld.

Native administration and labour regulations reorganized.

The scarcity of native labour was a more serious, because more permanent, obstacle to the development of the mines than the lack of railway facilities. How serious that obstacle was yet to prove itself and what extraordinary indirect consequences were to arise from it, could not then be foreseen. The nature of the problems involved will be more fittingly discussed in a subsequent chapter; for the present it is enough to say that Milner was fully alive to the importance of the question and concentrated all his care and forethought on measures calculated to improve the supply of native labour. Of these measures, the first and most obvious were connected with the general conditions under which the natives found their way to the mines and were treated on their arrival there. Sir Godfrey Lagden, the Administrator of Basutoland, had been appointed Commissioner for Native Affairs in the Transvaal on Lord Milner's return. With his help, and that of Sir R. Solomon, the whole of the regulations affecting native labourers were revised, while, at the same time, a quite different spirit was introduced into the administration. One of the worst evils of the old system had been the unscrupulous proceedings of labour touts and compound managers in inducing natives to come to the mines by false representations, and in tempting them to desert from one mine to another. Regulations were

issued early in December, 1901, forbidding anyone to act as compound manager or labour agent without permission from the Native Commissioner, and imposing severe penalties for misconduct. As a still further check upon misrepresentations to natives, steps were taken to ensure that no native could enter upon a labour contract without satisfying the official, from whom he received his passport to go to the mines, that he understood clearly the terms of his contract. At the same time inspectors of natives were appointed on the mines to provide an easy means of redressing the grievances, whether of natives or employers, in cases of breach of contract. The old pass system, under which a native had continually to be taking out new passes, each of which had to be paid for, was not only a source of expense and annoyance to the native, but also offered opportunities for extortion to subordinate officials, of which they had not been slow to avail themselves. At the same time it afforded little real protection to employers against desertion. A single passport was now issued, free of charge, which the native had to keep himself, and on which his movements and changes of employment were recorded. For the native the pass business was thus simplified and cheapened, while for the employer a much more effective means of identification was provided. Flogging for breaches of the Pass Law was abolished. Deductions from wages for recruiting fees or for other arbitrary reasons were forbidden. Most important of all, perhaps, in the interests alike of the native and of the employer, the illicit liquor traffic was drastically kept in check.\*

These reforms, required in any case by the more equitable spirit of British administration, were all calculated to give confidence to the Transvaal natives and to increase the available labour supply. But a peculiar feature of the situation was that the bulk of the underground workers came from Portuguese East Africa. To secure a large and permanent supply from there was of the highest importance,

*The modus  
vivendi with  
Portugal,  
Dec. 1901.*

\* For all these various measures see Lord Milner's despatch of December 6, 1901, Cd. 904, no. 20. The more tolerant spirit of the new Pass Law was also shown in a provision enabling the Native Commissioner to exempt coloured persons or natives of a certain standard of civilization from the necessity of having a pass.

and to that end the co-operation of the Portuguese authorities was essential. On December 18, 1901, Lord Milner concluded a *modus vivendi* with the Portuguese whereby the latter undertook to give every assistance to the recruiting of natives in their territory, receiving in return a sum of thirteen shillings per head to cover cost of passports, etc., and far more important, a promise that the railway tariffs from Lorenzo Marques to Johannesburg should not be raised, relatively to those from other ports, above the proportion at which they had stood before the war.

The Rand  
Water Supply  
and other  
commissions.

In other ways, too, Milner showed his anxiety to push the gold industry forward. An important commission was appointed in November, 1901, under the chairmanship of Mr. Fiddes, to consider the pressing question of the supply of water to the Rand both for industrial and for municipal purposes. The commission reported in February, 1902, and recommended the creation of a "Rand Water Board" composed of representatives of the municipalities and of the Chamber of Mines under a Government chairman. This recommendation was carried out and the Board, under the chairmanship of Mr. (now Sir W.) St. J. Carr, carried out a large scheme whereby abundant water is now supplied to the whole Rand. At the same time a commission, presided over by Sir. R. Solomon, was appointed to consider the Gold Law. This commission reported in June, 1902, the majority being in favour of accepting the existing law as a basis, and of leaving drastic changes to future representative bodies; the minority, led by Mr. Wybergh, considering the existing law too favourable to landowners and large corporations, and advocating the throwing open of private land for prospecting.

The mines a  
means, not  
an end.

With all his anxiety to push forward the development of the mines, Milner never forgot that they were a means and not an end in themselves. Thus when, in September, 1901, a large extension of the Johannesburg municipal area was proposed which would include the mines, hitherto exempt from municipal rates, Milner, in spite of the protests of the Chamber of Mines, unhesitatingly endorsed the principle of the proposal. At the same time, in order to prevent dissatisfaction and to enable the case of the mines to be



considered, he subsequently appointed a commission, under Mr. Duncan, containing representatives both of the mines and of the municipality, to work out a reasonable adjustment of the rating system. In the same spirit he now pressed Mr. Chamberlain for permission to impose the 10 per cent. profit tax recommended by Sir D. Barbour, relying on the abolition of the dynamite monopoly, the suppression of illicit liquor, and the generally helpful attitude of the administration to reconcile the mines to the heavier burden imposed upon them for the public benefit.

Meanwhile, in both colonies, the task of creating the new administrative machine had been going on actively ever since the beginning of 1901. The lift required to raise the apparatus of government from the level which contented the former rulers of the Republics to the plane from which Milner intended that the self-government of the future should start, was tremendous. More especially was this the case in the Transvaal where that apparatus had not only been inadequate to the needs of the community, but where it had been governed by inherently vicious traditions. The year and a half before the peace was none too long for the getting together and training of a competent civil service, for the consideration of all the most pressing measures of reconstruction and reform, and for the overhauling of defective statute books. From this point of view, indeed, the continuance of the war was by no means time wasted.

In the Transvaal the largest share of the work fell upon Mr. Fiddes, the Secretary to the Administration, and Sir R. Solomon, the Legal Adviser. The administrative task of the former was to some extent curtailed by the continuance of the war, but by the end of 1901 resident magistrates were established in practically all the towns in British occupation, and by June, 1902, the framework of local administration was well able to carry the extra burden imposed upon it by the sudden opening up and resettlement of the whole country. Meanwhile, there was plenty to be done. A "thoroughly rotten" prison administration was completely reorganized; a Public Health department was started. The rudiments of a Government hospital in Pretoria were

The new  
administra-  
tion.

The work in  
the Trans-  
vaal.

developed into a really useful institution, while the almost mediæval horrors of the lunatic and leper asylums gave place to a system as efficient and humane as the limited accommodation allowed. The enlargement of existing public buildings and the beginning of new work, as far as railway facilities for the carriage of material were available, were taken in hand by the nucleus of a Public Works Department under Major G. H. Fowke, R.E. Nor were public amenities neglected. Thus at Pretoria the germ of a Zoological Gardens, in the shape of a few animals in a wire enclosure, for which an enthusiastic director, Dr. J. W. Gunning, had with difficulty extorted a pittance out of President Kruger, was rapidly developed by him, under British auspices, into the best laid-out and best appointed institution of its kind in all Africa. The creation of the Johannesburg municipality has already been referred to. In Pretoria a municipality was constituted at the beginning of 1902, while in other centres Boards of Health with limited powers were established. The strain of attending to the affairs of the many departments under his control proved, however, too great for Mr. Fiddes's health, and he returned to England early in 1902, his place being first provisionally, and then definitely, taken by Mr. W. E. Davidson, who had been brought out in the latter half of 1901 to act as Assistant Colonial Secretary.

**Legal affairs.**

At the same time Sir R. Solomon, whose ability and indefatigable energy made him an invaluable helper to Lord Milner during the whole period of reconstruction, was busy organizing the administration of justice and boldly recasting the statute book. Resident Magistrates' Courts were gradually established in all the districts. Special Criminal Courts for more serious offences were temporarily constituted in Pretoria and Johannesburg, pending the establishment, in May, 1902, of a Supreme Court under the presidency of Sir J. Rose Innes, who gave up the Attorney-Generalship in the Cape Ministry in order to lend his high South African reputation to the position of the first British Chief Justice of the Transvaal. A continuous stream of proclamations—over sixty in the year 1901—flowed from the Legal Adviser's office, some dealing with current administrative questions,

others amending existing laws or introducing new laws, while one in particular made a clean sweep of an enormous batch of obsolete or unsuitable laws, Volksraad resolutions, and Government notices, including the old "Grondwet," or fundamental law of the Republic. Only the most immediately pressing legislative changes were launched by proclamation. The rest were embodied in draft ordinances which Sir R. Solomon turned out by the dozen, ready for consideration by the future Legislative Council.

The operations of the Financial Department were naturally limited by the continuance of the war. But as early as July, 1900, the Post Office had become a civil department, while a Customs Department had been organized in October. Up to June, 1901, a revenue of £513,000 was collected from these sources, from trading licenses, passes, etc., as against an administrative expenditure of £753,000, while in the next twelve months revenue and expenditure each rose to about £1,400,000. No less important than an efficient organization for the collection of revenue was a proper system of accounting for its expenditure, which had hitherto been entirely wanting, and the foundations of which had been laid by the creation of an Audit Office in November, 1900. Of the other departments, those of Native Affairs and Mines present no very special features, though each called for a great deal of organizing work. The organization of a Department of Agriculture was not taken in hand till just before the peace. But the Bacteriological Department, under Dr. Theiler, which had been started before the war, was carried on, and did invaluable service in 1901 in the prevention of rinderpest. It was destined to do even more for South Africa at a later date by the discovery of a means of immunizing mules against horse-sickness. Railways and Constabulary were still purely military departments, though civil interests were considered by Sir Percy Girouard not only in the ordering of new rolling-stock, but in the construction of a new coal line along the Rand west of Johannesburg, and in the completion to Sannah's Post of a railway to the grain districts which had been begun before the war.

Finance and  
other depart-  
ments.



The question  
of the capital.

Of these departments, the Mines, Native Affairs, Railways and Constabulary had their headquarters at Johannesburg, which was also the residence of the High Commissioner, while the rest, with the Supreme Court, were at Pretoria. The question of the future capital of the Transvaal was a subject of acute controversy in the initial stage of the British occupation. There was much to be said for breaking thoroughly with the old Pretoria tradition, and setting the capital in the midst of the industrial life of the country; much also, on the other hand, for the greater detachment of a capital not identified with a single industry, and for the building up of a second centre of British population in Pretoria instead of letting it become a purely opposition capital living on memories of a past greatness. But in practice, at any rate for the moment, the determining factor was the existence of large and costly public buildings in Pretoria which it would have seemed absurd not to utilize. In keeping certain departments in Johannesburg, Milner was influenced partly by convenience of administration, partly also by a desire to leave the question open, as far as possible, for the people of the Transvaal to decide in the future. In this matter his views were not shared by Chamberlain, who was convinced of the desirability of definitely making Pretoria the capital, and looked with great reluctance upon the division of departments, and upon Milner's personal residence in Johannesburg. The latter was due to considerations of health, and to Milner's anxiety to keep in close touch with the Johannesburg community, among whom criticism of the administration was already beginning to make itself heard months before the peace, and whose natural impatience would continually need a friendly restraining influence. But the administrative inconvenience of Milner's absence from Pretoria was evident, and led directly to his suggestion in April, 1902, that a Lieutenant-Governor for the Transvaal should be appointed, so that he himself might be free to devote his attention to broad questions of policy, and to the exercise of a general supervision over the administration of both colonies. To this Chamberlain assented, and at Milner's request appointed



THE HON. SIR ARTHUR LAWLEY, G.C.I.E., K.C.M.G.,

ADMINISTRATOR OF MATABELELAND, 1898-1901;

LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF THE TRANSVAAL, 1902-6.

*Photo by Elliott & Fry.*





Sir A. Lawley, Governor of Western Australia and previously Administrator of Matabeleland, who took up his appointment in September, 1902.

In the Orange River Colony the work of reconstruction was no less busily taken in hand, and upon much the same lines. Civil administration was extended as far as possible. Municipal life, in many cases scarcely interrupted by the war, was encouraged to renew and extend its activities. Resident Magistrates' Courts were in regular operation; pending the reconstitution of the High Court, a special Criminal Court was constituted at Bloemfontein, and, like Sir R. Solomon, Mr. Blaine, who succeeded Mr. Tancred as Legal Adviser in the course of 1901, was busy overhauling the statute book, issuing proclamations, and preparing draft ordinances for future consideration. From the first the colony had yielded a regular revenue from customs, post office, licenses, etc., amounting to over £200,000 between March, 1900, and February, 1901, and to about £270,000 for the last year of the war, which more than covered ordinary administrative expenditure.\* The problem of reconstruction in the Orange River Colony was in many respects a much simpler one. There was no highly organized industry to consider, and the administration could throw itself wholeheartedly into the work of agricultural development. In July, 1901, an agricultural department was instituted whose chief activities were at first devoted to the eradication of lung-sickness, rinderpest, and scab among the cattle and sheep taken over from the military. A fruit expert was brought out from England, and a forestry station was opened near Thaba 'Nchu.

The Orange  
River Colony.

There was no department of the national life in both colonies where the peculiar conditions of the war allowed the work of reconstruction at this period to be carried out on so comprehensive a scale, or where that work was destined to have such profound and lasting effects, as the Department of Education. The arrival of Mr. Sargant, whom Lord Milner had selected as Educational Adviser, has already been

\* Not including considerably over £1,000,000 spent on refugee camps by the Colonial Administration but covered by advances from Army funds.

referred to. In order to have his hands free for general questions of educational policy, an Assistant Director for the Orange River Colony, Mr. W. A. Russell, was appointed in July, 1901, while Mr. Fabian Ware was appointed to act in a similar capacity in the Transvaal in October. Apart from the organization of the departments themselves, the work that most obviously lay to hand was the restarting and reorganization of the Government schools in the towns in British occupation. In the Orange River Colony the attendance in these schools reached a maximum of about 2,000 by the middle of 1901. In the Transvaal the figures increased steadily with the return of the Rand population from a total of 2,000 in May, 1901, to over 10,000 in May, 1902.

The camp schools.

But the work of laying the foundations of the new educational system acquired an altogether unique character from the concentration camps. In January, 1901, while Mr. Sargant was at Cape Town, the efforts of some of the prisoners of war at Green Point Camp to start a school, brought home to him, in a sudden inspiration, the immense educational possibilities offered by the concentration camps, into which practically the whole of the children of both colonies were rapidly being collected. Taking train forthwith to Norval's Pont, with several boxes of school books, he opened a camp school, getting together such teachers as he could find among the inmates of the camps, and acting as headmaster himself. Except for the religious teaching, which was given in Dutch, all the teaching was in English. The parents were entirely content with this arrangement, and even the Dutch teachers, including some who had begun to start a Dutch camp school of their own, readily fell in with the scheme. The children flocked to the school, and a fortnight was enough to assure Mr. Sargant of the success of the experiment. Hurrying on to Bloemfontein he proceeded to make preparations for the general organization of camp schools. By May some 1,800 children in the Transvaal and 2,000 in the Orange River Colony were in regular attendance. By the end of the year the figures had risen to 8,000 and 9,000 respectively. By this time the supply of teachers with even the most rudimentary attainments had begun to

give out. Sargant decided to appeal to the Education Departments, not only of the United Kingdom, but also of the other states of the Empire, for volunteer women teachers. The daughters of the Empire were to co-operate in the task of reconciliation, as its sons were co-operating in the sterner work of the war. The response to the appeal, inspired by patriotism and a genuine desire to benefit the unfortunate victims of the war, was remarkable. In the early months of the year 200 highly-trained teachers from the United Kingdom, selected out of over ten times that number, and 100 from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as a small number of headmasters, began to arrive, and threw themselves into their new work with a devotion and an indifference to the discomforts of camp life which rapidly won for them the affection and respect both of the children and of the Dutch teachers already in the camps. With their arrival the attendance increased, and by the end of May reached a total, for all the camps, of nearly 30,000, a figure far in excess of the total school attendance for the two Republics before the war.

To exaggerate the influence of the camp schools upon the future of the new colonies would be difficult. The immediate gain educationally to the children is perhaps the smallest item. The importation of so large a number of teachers of exceptional attainments and character, many of whom afterwards decided to stay in the country, was an enormous help in permanently lifting the whole educational system on to a higher plane. From the political point of view it was no small gain that the Boer women, hitherto the bitterest opponents of British rule, came not only to realize that the British wished to help them, but gradually to acquire a feeling of affection and trust towards those representatives of British rule with whom they came in contact. Even more far-reaching in its ultimate results must have been the acquisition of English by a whole generation of children—a process whose foundations were laid at the very time when their fathers were fighting against all that the English language signifies. There were subtler social influences, too, whose effects can hardly yet be estimated. The life of the

Their great influence.



ordinary Boer child on a solitary farm was not an amusing or sociable one. In the camps it was, for the first time, brought in touch with the music, the pictures, the organized games which to-day form so essential a part in the teaching of the young. Deplorable as was the child mortality at one period, it yet probably remains true that to most of the children the life in the camps represented a degree of interest and happiness which they had never known before and which could not fail to leave a permanent impression on their characters.\*

Irrigation  
and land  
settlement.

The return of the British refugees, the improvement of the concentration camps, and the development of the administrative and legal systems necessarily claimed the largest share of Milner's attention in the months immediately following his return to South Africa. But they in no sense diminished his anxiety to get ahead with the re-establishment of an agricultural population on the land at the earliest possible moment. Determined that in agriculture, as in everything else, the new colonies should develop on an altogether different plane from the old Republics, one of his first measures was to secure a full report on the possibilities of irrigation in South Africa from Mr. (now Sir W.) Willcocks, the well-known Egyptian irrigation expert. This report, which was completed in November, 1901, embodied a number of extremely far-reaching proposals, a few of which were subsequently carried out, though the greater part proved financially, or for other reasons, entirely beyond the range of practical policy. In the same spirit Milner arranged for selected parties of well-disposed prisoners of war to be taken on tours to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, in order to study progressive methods of cattle-raising and agriculture. In this respect, however, his chief hope lay, not in the fleeting impressions of these tours, but in the permanent stimulus to be given by the presence on the land of a large body of enter-

\* "The two main objects of the Education Department were:—

"1. To provide a place in the camp where the children might be made happy.

"2. To impart instruction in English speech.

"In both these objects a high degree of success was achieved."

Cd 1551, p. 109.

prising settlers from the British colonies and from the United Kingdom. In the Orange River Colony a beginning was made early in October, 1901, by the formation of an Advisory Board for land settlement, with Major Apthorp as Secretary. Several large blocks of land were bought out of the £500,000 for relief and resettlement secured by Milner before leaving England, and early in 1902 a small number of settlers were already on the land. But Milner was far from satisfied with working on so small a scale. In a series of vigorous despatches he pressed upon Chamberlain the necessity of making ample provision for land settlement by loan—the sum he suggested was £3,000,000—and of making it quickly. That the settlers should be well established in certain areas before the bulk of the Boers were repatriated was to him an important point of policy. To do this effectively, and to avoid the disadvantages of purchase in a restricted market subject to abnormal influences, he was anxious to secure powers of expropriation such as other Colonial Governments had habitually used for similar purposes. But before any decision was come to at home the situation was completely transformed and British land settlement was definitely relegated to a subordinate position as compared with the repatriation of the Boers.

As far back as the beginning of 1901 Chamberlain had begun to realize the magnitude of the task involved in restoring the Boers to their homes, and had suggested to Milner the creation of a Land Bank which should advance money at reasonable rates for repatriation purposes. Milner was inclined to favour direct control by a Government Department, and also urged that repatriation and British settlement should form part of a single scheme of gradual resettlement. On these lines he set to work, at the beginning of 1902, to establish in each Colony a Land Board, composed of men of influence and local experience, which was to supervise and co-ordinate the work of land settlement and repatriation, each branch being under the administrative direction of an organizing secretary. By April, however, it was evident that a general peace or, at any rate, wholesale surrenders would throw a wholly disproportionate burden on the Repatriation Branch, and it was decided to treat

Preparing for  
repatriation.

repatriation as an entirely separate department. Before this a certain amount of useful preliminary work had been done. Immediately on his return to South Africa Milner had begun collecting information from all the prisoner of war and concentration camps ; a register was gradually made up in which each prisoner's district, the nature, value, and present condition of his property, the help he was likely to want, the whereabouts of his family, and his own attitude towards British rule, were all entered. The general needs of the districts in the way of stock, seed corn, implements, and building materials, and the available sources of supply, were considered and inquiries made. A certain amount of stock was in hand. In the Orange River Colony Goold-Adams had, with a view to eventual repatriation, collected the stock of refugees a year before, and looked after it since, and had similarly put aside a supply of seed corn. Everything, in fact, was ready by April for a rapid but orderly development of the policy of resettlement during the coming South African winter, aiming at the establishment of a substantial population on the land by the spring, by which time, too, there was every prospect of the Boer resistance being reduced to a very limited area, if not suppressed altogether. A few weeks later the whole situation was transformed by the surrender of Vereeniging.



## CHAPTER II

## REPATRIATION

THE cessation of hostilities was, in one sense, merely an incident in the progress of the work of reconstruction. At the same time the whole character of the work was profoundly influenced, and its environment transformed, not so much by the mere fact of peace, as by the manner in which peace had come about.\* The actual terms, indeed, of the treaty of surrender contained nothing that involved the slightest deviation from the settled policy of the British Government. But the fact that there were terms—terms formally asseverated by the British representatives and formally agreed to by the Boer leaders—created an entirely new situation. The most obvious feature of that situation was the explicit and definite acceptance of the British flag by the Boer leaders. The surrender of Vereeniging gave to the annexations, hitherto resting on force alone, the validity of a mutual compact, however reluctantly that compact may have been signed. It meant not only an earlier peace but an enduring peace. For who could henceforward dare to summon the Boers to a renewal of the struggle for a cause which its most devoted and stubborn champions had formally abandoned? Vereeniging was the grave not only of the two Republics but of the Republican idea.

But Vereeniging was no less certainly, though less obviously, the birthplace of a new political power. The surrender definitely established the commandos left in the field as the predominant section, to which the rest of the Boer population would inevitably gravitate; it established the

The consequences of the peace.

Attitude of the Boer leaders.

\* See vol. v., chap. xxi.

✓ Boer generals as the recognized political leaders of their people. While making an end of the opposition in arms, it created and endowed with leaders and with organization, a new political opposition with which the work of reconstruction would have to reckon. From the ashes of the old Republican Afrikanerdom was destined to rise a new Afrikanerdom, chastened in its ambitions, less intolerant in its racialism, less narrow in its outlook, but racial and militant for all that, drawing its inspiration from the struggles of the past, adapting old political traditions to the new environment. For the moment, however, that aspect of the new situation was in the background, and the Boer leaders devoted themselves whole-heartedly to carrying out their obligations under the treaty of surrender. Even before they left Vereeniging on May 31, Botha and Schalk Burger issued an open letter to their burghers, thanking them for their heroism and enjoining on them to acquiesce in the peace and to obey and respect the new Government. The same letter also announced the formation of a head committee, representing both the late Republics, entrusted with the task of collecting money to provide for the needs of the widows and orphans, and concluded with an earnest appeal for unity and mutual forbearance in the great struggle for the spiritual and social welfare of their people which lay before them. On Monday, June 2, Lord Kitchener and the Boer leaders went down to Vereeniging. Crowded together in a large tent the Boer delegates listened with eager and friendly curiosity to their conqueror. Briefly eloquent—General Beyers translating sentence for sentence—Kitchener praised their courage and endurance, dwelt on the prospects of the future, and explained to them their immediate duty in connexion with the surrender of the commandos. A complete programme of surrenders was then drawn up in consultation with the Boer leaders. A few hours later leaders and delegates dispersed to their districts.

The  
surrenders.

During the next three weeks the surrenders proceeded steadily and without a hitch, thanks largely to the loyal co-operation of the Boer leaders. There were practically no absentees, in the new colonies at any rate, though not a few

Cape rebels managed to evade surrender, while others made their way across into German territory. In all, 11,166 surrendered in the Transvaal, 6,455 in the Orange River Colony,\* and 3,635 in Cape Colony, or a grand total of 21,256. The surrenders formed a fitting conclusion to a struggle unique, no less for its good nature and informality than for its stubbornness. A commando or group of commandos would assemble at some selected spot, where it would be met by a British force. After speeches from their own leaders, and from the British general deputed to meet them, the burghers proceeded to hand over their rifles—mostly captured British Lee-Metfords, it must be confessed—signed the oath of allegiance or the equivalent declaration, and then passed on to draw their rations from the Army Service Corps and to fraternize with their old adversaries. Columns and commandos which had hunted and eluded each other for months met like friends long separated, and many an engagement was fought out again over the camp fire.

Throughout the Empire the tidings of peace was received with profound emotion. Only when the war was really at an end could men realize how long and heavily it had weighed upon their minds. In other countries the news met with vague and puzzled acquiescence. The generosity of the British terms, the friendliness of the Boers towards their conquerors, were equally unintelligible to those who had pictured a war of conquest waged with brutal severity and resisted with unquenchable hate. There was one at least to whom the news must have been bitter. At Utrecht, in Holland, old President Kruger learnt that the struggle to which his life had been given was over, and that his voice had ceased to count in the councils of his people. On June 8, a solemn military peace celebration was held at Pretoria and Bloemfontein. On the 20th, Lord Kitchener \* Reception of the news of peace elsewhere. Kitchener's departure. Crown Colony Government inaugurated.

resigned the South African command into the hands of General Lyttelton, and left Pretoria to spend a few months of well-earned rest in England before taking up the command which had been waiting for him in India. On the following

\* Lord Kitchener received a viscounty and a grant of £50,000 for his services in concluding the war.



day the new Crown Colony Government of the Transvaal was formally inaugurated in the old *Raadzaal* by the issue of the Letters Patent and the swearing-in of the Governor—now Viscount Milner—and his Executive Council. On the 23rd the same ceremony took place at Bloemfontein. The 25th was fixed for the celebration throughout the Empire of the coronation of King Edward VII., but a sudden and dangerous illness postponed the great Imperial ceremony to August 9.

Extension of  
the adminis-  
tration.  
Work of the  
Constabu-  
lary.

The surrenders were immediately followed by the establishment of the framework of British administration in the country districts. Everywhere the new resident magistrates hurried out to their posts, and from the ruin or the tent which served them for an office proceeded to administer justice and maintain order. In this task they were admirably seconded by the South African Constabulary, who were released from military duty in the middle of June, and distributed in small detachments all over the country. One of their first tasks was the disarmament of the natives, many of whom had possessed themselves of rifles, while some had been directly given arms by the British authorities for the defence of their districts. Contrary to expectation, the task proved an easy one. More difficult and never satisfactorily solved was the question of restoring to their rightful owners the stock looted by natives from Boers, and by Boers from natives. Even after the peace stock-thieving proved by far the most serious crime the constabulary had to deal with. Otherwise its efforts were less required for the prevention of crime than for giving general assistance in the work of repatriation, which, for the moment, thrust all other issues into the background.

The task of  
repatriation.

It was, in truth, an extraordinary and unparalleled task which now confronted the British administration. On its hands were over 200,000 men, women, and children whom it had undertaken to bring back to their homes, and for whose subsequent welfare it was morally responsible. Of these not more than 30,000, including women and children, represented the remnant of the Boer nation still at large at the end of the war. Of the rest, 24,000 were prisoners in camps over-

sea, 7,000 prisoners in South Africa or on parole, 4,500 serving with the British forces in one capacity or another, 110,000 inmates of concentration camps, and the balance living on their own means or on Government relief in the various towns. The whole of this population was to be planted out and helped till it could support itself in a country which the war had converted into an absolute wilderness. From end to end of the two colonies there was hardly a farmhouse left standing. In large areas the live stock had been almost exterminated. Except for a few dams and occasional fences which had escaped destruction the whole apparatus of rural civilization had practically been wiped out.

The first stage in the process of repatriation was one of sorting out and preparatory concentration. For some time before the peace transfers had been going on between the different concentration camps in order to bring each family into the district to which it belonged. The moment peace was signed the camps became the fixed bases and organizing centres of the whole work of repatriation. Into them flocked the surrendering burghers, well content to enjoy the luxury of tents and regular meals, delighted to rejoin their families, and surprised to find them so well cared for and on such excellent terms with the British.\* Into them also flocked, to rest and recover strength, the starving remnants of the women and children left on the veld. Later on, in a steady stream, came the prisoners. Thus, in spite of the progress of the work of repatriation, the total population of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony camps showed

Usefulness of  
the camps.

\* "The attitude of the surrendering burghers was one of surprise and relief to find their families so well cared for in the camps. The most extravagant and false rumours had prevailed among the commandos in the field as to the mortality and suffering among the inmates of the burgher camps, and when they learnt the truth large numbers hastened to express their gratitude to the local superintendents. The excellent feeling which was manifested between the women and children of the camps and the camp staffs, more especially the matrons and nurses, was a revelation to the husbands and brothers from the veld." Report of Director of Transvaal Burgher Camps, Cd. 1553, p. 5. In many cases surrendering burghers and others were rationed from the camps without actually becoming inmates.

no appreciable diminution for fully three months after the peace. As a purely military measure the camps were no doubt a mistake. But they proved invaluable for the work of repatriation—in fact, if they had not existed already they would have had to be invented for that purpose.

The return of  
the prisoners.

The return of the prisoners was a task of considerable difficulty. Those in South Africa were released as soon as the surrender of the commandos was completed, on signing the oath or equivalent declaration. Thanks to the exertions of Mr. Schalk Burger, who visited the Natal camps, and of other influential leaders, any hesitation that was at first felt about signing was dispelled. In the over-sea camps, it was very different. With characteristic suspiciousness the majority at first believed that the news of peace, and even the telegrams from the Boer generals, were merely cunning British devices to entrap them into signing the oath, and their fears were played upon by a small section of genuine irreconcilables. It was not till the middle of August, in fact, that the over-sea prisoners began to sign in any numbers. The first transports, consequently, brought back very few, except those who had already before the peace openly accepted the situation.\* These were entitled to priority in any case, the order of return for prisoners being fixed by their disposition towards the new Government, with a further preference to married men and owners of property. On arrival in South Africa the prisoners went to the rest camps at Simonstown or at Umbilo, near Durban, and were fitted out with clothes, blankets, and other personal necessities, before being sent off by train to the concentration camps in their respective districts. By the beginning of 1903, all were brought back except some 900, mostly in India, who still refused to sign. A visit from two leading Boers satisfied many of these, but there still remained some 500 who continued unconvinced, until General De la Rey visited them in person at the end of the year.

The  
Repatriation  
Departments.

The task of repatriation necessitated the improvisation in each colony of an enormous temporary organization, only

\* Several hundred of these had expressed their willingness to fight on the British side.



the rudiments of which were in existence before the peace. In each colony the organization consisted of a central department which was responsible for general policy and for the purchase and distribution of supplies and transport of all kinds, and of local commissions, presided over by the resident magistrates, and comprising the Commandant of the Constabulary and three or four leading residents of each district, which estimated the requirements of the burghers and supervised the work of relief. The actual restoration of the people to their homes was carried out by a gigantic field transport based on a vast network of depots. There were minor differences between the two colonies. In the Orange River Colony the executive head of the department, Colonel H. MacLaughlin, worked in conjunction with a Central Advisory Board presided over by Sir J. G. Fraser. In the Transvaal, the Central Board, after settling some of the more general problems connected with repatriation, fell into abeyance, and the work of the department was carried on by Captain A. M. Hughes, under the general supervision of Mr. Duncan, the Treasurer. Again, in the Transvaal, a representative of the surrendered Boers or of the National Scouts was attached to each of the local commissions, whereas in the Orange River Colony the repatriation of those Boers who had espoused the British cause was conducted by a separate branch of the department. On the whole, the local commissions proved a distinct success, especially in the Orange River Colony, where they were given much greater latitude in fixing prices and settling other details of the work. The Boer members were of the very greatest practical assistance, quite apart from the excellent political effect of enlisting their active co-operation with the new Government at the outset. The working staff of the Repatriation Departments, composed mainly of soldiers and ex-irregulars, was of very varying efficiency, as was inevitable considering the circumstances under which it was improvised and the purely provisional character of the appointments offered. On the whole, the repatriation was much more efficiently and economically conducted in the Orange River Colony than in the Transvaal. In Colonel

MacLaughlin the department had an exceptionally energetic and capable chief, while, in the absence of the many pressing problems which distracted the Transvaal authorities, Sir H. Goold-Adams was able to give himself whole-heartedly to the task of supervising the work and seeing that the fullest use was made of all available resources. In the Transvaal Mr. Duncan, in the heavy rush of other administrative work, was unable to give sufficiently close and continuous attention to repatriation, with the result that there undoubtedly was an enormous amount of wasteful expenditure which might have been kept down by more effective supervision and greater business experience on the part of some of the officers concerned. But repatriation must not be judged as an ordinary business operation. It was a gigantic campaign waged for two whole years against famine, drought, locust and murrain, and like other campaigns begun under conditions of great urgency and prolonged by unforeseen developments, was inevitably costly. The fact remains that the Repatriation Departments in both colonies carried through an immense task in the face of extraordinary difficulties, and carried it through with success.

Repatriation  
and the free  
grant.

According to Article X of the Vereeniging terms the local commissions would have at their disposal for repatriation the free grant of £3,000,000, in the distribution of which they were to take into account the evidence of war losses afforded by Boer notes or receipts.\* They were also to make advances for the same purpose, free of interest for two years, and afterwards paying 3 per cent., or less than half the current South African rate. The purport of the article was by no means clear, and a pedantic interpretation of it might have paralysed the whole work of repatriation by postponing the distribution of relief to the assessment of war losses, or might have excluded altogether those who could produce no evidence of war losses, and had no security to offer for a loan. Milner decided to carry out the task of repatriation first, limiting its scope by no other consideration than the needs of the population, and to fit in the interpretation of Article X afterwards. Every ex-burgher was to be

\* See vol. v., p. 599.

set on his feet again. Subsequent investigation should determine whether the assistance given was to be reckoned against the free grant of £3,000,000, or treated as a loan, or simply written off owing to the recipient's inability to repay. This decision opened the door to a vast additional expenditure, and subsequently furnished a handle for no small amount of misrepresentation. But its wisdom and generosity cannot be questioned. The moral responsibility of the new administration could not be limited by the terms of the treaty. A literal fulfilment of its terms would have created widespread distress, if not starvation, and would have aroused a bitter resentment throughout the people, compared with which the vigorous abuse of the repatriation work by the Boer leaders was a mere harmless and conventional expression of political disagreement.

It was the same sense of moral responsibility which led to the further decision that the Repatriation Departments should not only convey the people to their homes and provide them with money for the purchase of necessities, but should also undertake the task of purchasing and directly supplying all that the people required. Here, again, the right thing was done with complete indifference to the difficulties and the risk of misinterpretation involved. Except for a certain amount of stock and seed corn which the civil administration had been able to save for repatriation, practically the whole of the supplies, stock and transport in the two colonies was in the hands of the Army. The railways were almost monopolized by the troop movements consequent on the general demobilization, and getting through supplies from the coast was a matter of no small difficulty. Kitchener was determined, in the interests of military finance, to exercise his monopoly to the fullest. Such contractors as could have got supplies and stock up country in spite of him would have been no less interested in combining to force up all prices to the most exorbitant rates. To have left the Boers at the mercy of the "open market" at such a time would have been a criminal violation of the whole spirit, though not of the letter, of the British covenant.

Supplying  
the people.



Repatriation  
prices.

Milner alone was in a position to make even a tolerable bargain with Kitchener and the War Office. After weeks of desperate haggling he secured some 5,500 vehicles, including 47 traction trains, 80,000 oxen, mules, and donkeys, and the whole of the blockhouses and wire entanglements for £1,391,000, a first instalment of a total of £3,521,000 of Army stores eventually taken over for repatriation purposes. Even so some of the charges, more particularly for the first lot of mules and oxen, were inordinately high, considering the condition of the animals. In the matter of food-stuffs, indeed, the military demands at that moment were so exorbitant\* that the bulk of the supplies required were imported. Enormous quantities of implements, building materials, transport animals, and live stock of all kinds were also bought by skilled buyers for the Repatriation Departments in the other colonies or imported from overseas. There was no conceivable requirement of the returning population, from ox-wagons to wooden legs, which the departments did not manage to supply. Here, again, the whole weight of the civil administration had continually to be thrown into the scale in order to secure railway facilities. All these articles were offered to the Boers at cost price. There was no profit, no charge for administration, or for the enormous expenses involved in conveying the bulk of these articles out to scattered farms, often over a hundred miles from the railway. There was no charge for the keep of animals before they were disposed of, though in some instances a proportion was added to the price to cover casualties. In some cases even, where the cost price was excessive, as, for instance, in the case of the first lot of mules purchased from the Army, the issue price was at a heavy reduction. There was no compulsion upon the Boers to purchase from the department. They could always buy for themselves, taking the money on loan from their local commission, and even receiving free railway passes to Cape Colony and Natal for the purpose. But except in the case of the more prosperous farmers, who wished to select a picked team of oxen or a particularly choice breed of sheep, the vast majority found

\* See part ii., chaps. v. and xlii.

it more convenient to buy from their repatriation depot. Repatriation prices were, in fact, on the whole, below the then current market prices. They were, without a doubt, far below the level which those prices would have reached if matters had been left to themselves, and an unorganized mass of ignorant peasants, filled with impatience to get back to their homes, had been handed over to the tender mercies of the inevitable ring of speculators. It is true the prices of transport animals were considerably above the average of ordinary years of small demand and abundant supply. But then the end of the war was not a normal period. All these considerations, however, could hardly be expected to appeal to the ordinary Boer, who only knew that some of the prices charged were more than he had been accustomed to, and naturally grumbled. And the legend that the Boers were robbed of a large share of the promised relief by the extortions and extravagance of the Repatriation Departments was much too useful politically not to receive sedulous propagation from the Boer leaders.\*

\* In 1907 the Botha Government, in order to justify its own past attitude and to pacify its supporters, appointed a committee, consisting of Messrs. Loveday, Schalk Burger, and Lindsay, to inquire into repatriation prices, with a view to their reduction. The Committee reported in July, 1908, that the charges were fair and reasonable as regards rations, seeds, building material, implements, ploughing, horses, sheep, harness and vehicles, but excessive as regards oxen, donkeys, and mules. On these items it recommended the allowance of a discount of 25 per cent. for cash. The report, however, is based on the assumption that the military authorities ought to have sold their animals specially cheaply as they were selling large quantities, and that, failing favourable terms, the civil administration should have kept the people in the concentration camps for a few months longer till stock could be secured from elsewhere—a suggestion easy enough to make now, but quite inconceivable at the time. Nor does the report suggest any corresponding addition to the price of such items as, for instance, horses, which were sold at rates below those normally current, or take account of the fact that in getting their goods delivered free of carriage at their farms the Boers had in most cases paid considerably less than the net cost price. Making every allowance for overcharges in some instances, there can be no doubt that, on the whole, the Boers were not only protected from the disastrous results of leaving prices to the "open market," but, even judging by the standard of normal prices, received far more value than they were credited with under the free gifts or the loans.

Initial  
difficulties.

The restoration of the people to their homes was undertaken in the face of almost inconceivably adverse circumstances. It was midwinter, to begin with, and the veld was bare of all sustenance for the transport oxen, which in the main were the worn-out surplus of the Army transport. The mules were in a no less wretched condition, and the state of the transport animals was equalled by that of the wagons. As a climax to all these difficulties glanders, which had been kept within limits by the exertions of the Army Veterinary Department during the war, broke out with disastrous effect among the mules, and crippled the whole work for months, till the small veterinary staff of the Repatriation Departments could cope with it. \* It is easy to say that the danger should have been foreseen and provided against. It could have been done no doubt, but only at the cost of serious delay, and at the moment the one supreme need seemed to be that of getting the people established on their farms before the ploughing season.

The home-  
coming of  
the Boers.

In spite of all difficulties, however, the work went on. As transport was available each family was sent out supplied from the camp with tent, bedding, and a month's rations,† and from the adjoining repatriation depot with tools, agricultural implements, seeds, and such vehicles and live stock as could be furnished. A repatriation officer ‡ has given a vivid account of the proceedings :

"Day by day, and all day long for many weeks, clouds of dust were seen to rise as the long spans of oxen and mules, dragging wagon after wagon laden with food, tents, and a strange assortment of domestic articles, crawled snake-like out of the canvas town on to the illimitable veld, wending their way to some distant farmstead. The loading has not been so easy a task as might be supposed. The conductor knows that his wagons

\* "The district reports for many months were merely repetitions of the same story—plans frustrated, hopes blighted, supplies scarce, transport disorganized, ploughing impossible. Repatriation was frequently a thankless task; disease made it appear at times a hopeless one."—G. B. Beak: "The Aftermath of War."

† These were charged to camp funds, and thus came out of the pocket of the British taxpayer and not out of repatriation.

‡ G. B. Beak: "The Aftermath of War."



are not of the best, and his animals none of the strongest. He cannot contemplate with equanimity a breakdown on the open veld. The camp superintendent, ever mindful of the welfare of his *protégés*, insists upon the absolute necessity of taking the whole of the first equipment—the first month's rations, bedding, and a tent against the restoration of the homestead. But the old 'vrouw' has a host of broken furniture, in addition to the food-stuffs she has managed to save from liberal camp rations. Her man has his curios, collected or manufactured during his imprisonment oversea. The children are loth to leave behind their books and toys, for which they have acquired a taste in the camp school. There have been hot debates as to essentials and non-essentials.

"But eventually, by hook or by crook, and by dint of much rearranging, room has been found for all. The stodgy, expressionless, sallow-complexioned, but withal hospitable and kindly women crawl, not without difficulty and danger of upsetting, to the top of the motley pile, and at length a start is made. The crack of the long whip and the familiar shouts of the native driver as he urges forward his cattle ring out clearly on the sunlit air."

On arrival at the homestead the goods were dumped down, the repatriation wagons lumbered away for their next job, and the family found themselves alone with the heap of ruins which represented their old home. For the first time the Boers realized the full meaning of the guerilla war, and passed through the depths of despondency when faced with its results. But, for the most part, they pulled themselves together manfully, and, with great energy and resource, set to work patching up habitable rooms out of such walls as were still standing, repairing fences, dams, and kraals, and getting ready for the ploughing. From time to time they visited the nearest repatriation depot to draw a fresh supply of rations, and to inquire anxiously when ploughing cattle would be available. Every effort was made to distribute these. But the enormous demand for transport purposes stood in the way, and in spite of every effort to reduce transport requirements, in spite of large additional purchases from the military and from outside the new colonies, a serious shortage was inevitable. The difficulty

The first months. The ploughing.

was met by the bold but simple device of sending round Government teams to plough, at a very low charge, a certain number of acres on every farm which had no team of its own, including those farms whose owners had not yet returned. In this way enough was ploughed by the end of the year to provide a crop which might be calculated to keep the people going for the greater part of 1903. Nothing that the British Government had done hitherto produced so deep an impression on the Boer mind, and inspired so genuine a feeling of gratitude and confidence as the thoughtfulness shown in this matter. Throughout, even when the outlook was blackest, the attitude of the people towards the Government had not been otherwise than friendly. But it was not till after the ploughing that the despondency of the first few months began to pass away, and that they began to look more happily towards the future.

**Repatriation  
of farm  
natives.**

Closely connected with the repatriation of the white population and, indeed, from the South African point of view, an essential part of it, was the repatriation of the farm natives, the greater part of whom had been collected into the native camps or had taken service with the British. It was at first feared that there might be trouble over this. The natives had in many instances become insolent, owing to unduly high wages and to the familiarity with which the soldiers had treated them. They expected the Boers to be treated as a conquered race, to whom they would no longer stand in a dependent relation. But they soon discovered that the British conquest, though it might give the black man greater security against oppression and more clearly defined rights, involved no essential alteration in the superior status of the white man, whether Briton or Boer. Having made the discovery they quickly resigned themselves to the situation, and were soon cheerfully at work on the farms, rebuilding their kraals, labouring for the farmers, and generally playing their part in the task of restoration.

**Position of  
National  
Scouts.**

The most difficult problem, in some ways, connected with the general re-settlement was that of those ex-burghers who had espoused the British side during the war. The position of these men and their families was by no means a

pleasant one. The feeling of the "bitter enders" against them was intense. In most of the camps measures of segregation had been necessary before the peace, and special precautions were taken afterwards to prevent acts of violence. Few such acts, indeed, took place—a remarkable testimony, it may be said in passing, to the lack of vindictiveness which is one of the most favourable traits of the Boer character. But it was impossible to prevent insulting language, boycotting, or the religious ostracism enforced by the *predikants*. The British Government was bound by the strongest ties of obligation and honour to the men who had taken the momentous step of fighting for it against their own countrymen. To have treated them on exactly the same footing as those who fought against it, and to have left them exposed, not only to the hostility, but also to the contempt of their neighbours, would have been as foolish as it was dishonourable. Yet there had been more than one precedent for such dishonourable folly in the conduct of the British Government in the past, and among the bitterest enemies of England during the war were the sons of those Boers who fought on the British side in 1881. As it was, the political influence to which the leaders of the ex-military burghers might reasonably have aspired, if the guerilla war had been carried out to the bitter end, had been given away by peace negotiations which practically ignored them. The only thing remaining was to provide a material recompense sufficient to prevent any sense of injustice or betrayal; and, at the moment of peace, to see to this was nobody's business. To the military they were auxiliaries whose services were no longer needed; to the civil administration they were just ordinary Boers requiring repatriation.

Fortunately for the honour of the British Government, the ex-military burghers at this critical juncture found a devoted and resourceful champion. Major E. H. M. Leggett, R.E., one of the many able junior officers engaged on the work of the railways, had acted as staff officer at headquarters for the National Scouts and Orange River Colony Volunteers. Realizing the disastrous effect of a policy of neglect, he now decided to stay on and devote himself to the interests of

Major  
Leggett's  
useful work.



the men he had largely been instrumental in enlisting. As a first measure he secured permission from Kitchener to keep up the staff and depots of the two corps as long as might be necessary to see the men duly settled, and to extend the advantages of this organization to all ex-burghers who had served with the British forces in any capacity, as well as to those oversea prisoners who had offered to do so. For all the men who had served he further secured their pay for a month after peace, a pony, saddle and bridle, and, in the case of a considerable number, a permit for a rifle and ammunition. In addition to this he wheedled out of the Commander-in-Chief a large quantity of wagons and teams, tents and rations, which were sold at moderate prices to those of the men who could afford to buy them. The proceeds were used as a general fund for purchasing necessities at wholesale prices, and eventually applied in various ways to benefit the men. This fund was administered by their own leaders and everything was done to promote the sense of solidarity among the men, and to make them feel that they were being looked after. All this help was in addition to the ordinary repatriation on which the interests of the ex-military burghers were provided for either by representation on the district commissions as in the Transvaal, or by a separate branch of the department, as in the Orange River Colony.

The *bywoner* problem.  
The Burgher Land Settlements.

The repatriation of the ex-military burghers was from the outset complicated by a difficult problem. A very large proportion of them had been *bywoners*, i.e., squatters on the lands of farmers who now made their conduct during the war an excuse for refusing to take them back. This refusal was most marked in the case of the *bywoners* who had served the British, but was by no means confined to them. The problem, indeed, was no new one. The steady growth of a population of hangers-on, mostly poor relatives, was far from being appreciated by the farmers before the war, and after the peace many of them showed a marked reluctance to take back their former quota of *bywoners*. For a certain number of the ex-military *bywoners* Leggett found posts in the Constabulary, on the railways, and in other public departments.

For the majority it was necessary to devise special measures. The first thing was to appeal to the wealthier men in his organization to help their comrades by finding them land. The second was to make it worth their while doing so. The real evil of the *bywoner* system, so Leggett urged, was the absence of any clear arrangement between landlord and squatter. The squatter had no security of tenure to encourage him to cultivate seriously; the landlord had nothing to gain from an idle and starveling dependent. The remedy lay in substituting a system under which the squatter, on his side, should be guaranteed a certain fixity of tenure, and compensation for betterments, the landlord in return receiving a fixed proportion of the crop. On this basis a number of leading ex-military burghers formed a Farmers' Association and rented land near Standerton, on which *bywoners* were settled. The experiment promised so well at first that other associations were rapidly constituted by various private individuals, the most important at Potchefstroom. Applications poured in from *bywoners* of every shade of political sympathy, and Leggett and his fellow-workers wisely decided to accept all who were ready to live on a friendly footing with their neighbours. To facilitate the work, Leggett was made "Director of Burgher Land Settlement" in October, and in November Director of the Transvaal Burgher Camps, whose inhabitants were by then reduced mainly to members of the *bywoner* class. Over 3,000 persons were thus settled by the beginning of 1903, and the number was more than doubled eventually.

The subsequent history of the Burgher Land Settlements was, unfortunately, not satisfactory. The associations were private ventures, and suffered from bad management and, in some cases, from the actual dishonesty of their members or employees. The tenants were, for the most part, shiftless and easily discouraged by adversity. In the end, most of the settlements came to grief, and the advances for implements, stock, etc., made by the Repatriation Department had to be written off. The fact is, that the experiment, though based on an absolutely sound conception, was in some respects premature, in view of the very primitive conditions

Their subsequent failure.

of agriculture in the Transvaal, and, in any case, required far more effective supervision than it ever received. The best that can be said is that the loss was better incurred in this way than in keeping the men on in the camps, and that the experiment solved the immediate difficulty of disposing of the *bywoners* who were not wanted by other farmers.

Relief works  
in the O.R.C.

In the Orange River Colony Burgher Land Settlement was not carried out on any extensive scale. The *bywoner* problem was here attacked from an entirely different quarter by the provision of relief works. As early as July a special department was created under Lieutenant B. H. O. Armstrong, R.E., for this purpose. Special camps were formed, and in the course of the next two years a number of irrigation dams, several short sections of railway work, and some public buildings were all constructed by white manual labour. The men received 4s. 6d. a day, and their work was, on the whole, far more satisfactory than had been expected. The actual results were not, indeed, profitable from a purely business point of view, partly owing to the cost of the labour, and, in some instances, owing to the hasty selection of unsuitable sites for the works. But the true test of the success of the experiment lies, not in treating it as an ordinary commercial venture, but in a comparison with the alternative of feeding the men in idleness, and in a consideration of the ultimate social and economic consequences of familiarizing the Boers with the conception of white manual labour.

British Land  
Settlement.

Amid all the urgently pressing problems of the first few months after the peace, the work of establishing British settlers on the land was inevitably relegated to a secondary position. In the Orange River Colony, where other problems were less complex and where the agricultural value of the country was better known, the work pursued a course of quiet and steady progress under the capable direction of Major K. P. Apthorp, the Secretary of the Land Board. By the end of 1902 some 360 settlers, selected from nearly 5,000 applicants, were established, partly on land previously belonging to the Government, partly on land purchased for the purpose. In the Transvaal the history of Land Settlement was somewhat



chequered. There was a first stage, immediately after the peace, when impatient crowds of ex-irregulars, anxious to settle on the land, besieged a cautious and timid Land Board. The direct intervention of Lord Milner, through his energetic private secretary, Mr. John Buchan, galvanized the Board into a spasmodic activity. Some 300 settlers were provisionally planted out, and large quantities of land were bought, not always with judgment or discretion. The Land Settlement Departments, especially the Transvaal one, were freely criticized afterwards for gross extravagance in their purchase of lands. In some instances there was undoubtedly justification for the charge. In the main, however, the prices paid were simply those prevailing everywhere after the peace, and only seemed unreasonably high at a later time when all prices had fallen. For the first few months after the peace the one unceasing complaint against those responsible for land settlement was not their extravagance, but their slowness in purchasing land and their reluctance to pay what then seemed reasonable prices. At the end of 1902, a Department of Lands was instituted in the Transvaal, and Dr. A. Jameson, Minister of Lands in Western Australia, was appointed Commissioner. Eventually some 700 or more settlers, the survivors of a considerably larger number, were successfully established in each colony, and after many vicissitudes, were in a fair way to prosperity when self-government was introduced. Considering the scarcity of really capable settlers and the extraordinary difficulties in the way of agriculture in the first few years, before the scientific study of the problems and the development of the railway system had cleared the ground, it is doubtful whether the experiment could really have been carried out with advantage on a much larger scale. Milner, indeed, had originally hoped for a much larger number to produce any real influence on the character of the country population. But there can be no doubt that even the small number actually established, together with the settlers introduced by private agencies, has already exercised a very considerable moral and economic effect in bringing the races together, and in stimulating agricultural progress.

Ex-irregulars  
on the Rand.  
Women's  
immigration.

The repatriation of the Rand population was already in a large measure accomplished before the peace. By September, 1902, it had reached its old maximum and was still growing steadily. A large part of this increase was furnished by disbanded [irregulars who came in to Johannesburg hoping for employment, either permanently, or till land should be available for settlement. But the revival of the mining industry was checked by the shortage of native labour, and employment was scarce. As a temporary measure of relief, not only to the men but also to some extent to the labour situation, some 1,200 of these were taken on by the Rand Mines Limited to do unskilled work at a rate of five shillings a day and their keep. Another new element in the Rand population, not very large at first, but very desirable, was contributed by the women emigrants who were being sent out by the South African Expansion Committee of the British Women's Emigration Association, a body organized as a result of conversations between certain ladies and Lord Milner in 1901. Soon after the peace, Milner started a Women's Immigration Department in the Transvaal to co-operate with the Committee in providing suitable employment for the immigrants, contributing to the cost of the voyage out, receiving them at Government hostels on arrival, and generally watching over their interests. In spite of all difficulties, due to the subsequent economic crisis, some 4,000 women in all were helped out to South Africa by the Women's Emigration Association between 1902 and 1908.

Milner's work  
during the  
first few  
months.

At the headquarters of the new administration the pressure of work during these first few months of peace was enormous. Except for a flying visit in August to Lorenzo Marques to secure the assistance and goodwill of the Portuguese authorities in the recruiting of labour, Lord Milner was kept close to his desk or at the council chamber by the overwhelming rush of problems that came to him for decision. The arrival in September of Sir A. Lawley, as Lieutenant-Governor of the Transvaal, relieved him of no small part of the current administrative work, and set him free for the more important and more congenial task of initiation and supervision. The greater part of the next



three months was taken up by a series of tours through the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, which enabled him to study the progress of the work of repatriation, get into friendly touch with the Boer farmers, realize their needs and remedy their grievances. Lawley's arrival and his establishment at Pretoria may be said to have practically settled the vexed question of the administrative capital. Nevertheless, Johannesburg and the Rand remained the all-important factor economically and politically. To push forward the industrial development on which every other issue, political as well as economic, depended, to keep in constant touch with the restless, impulsive, and high-spirited community upon which the British connexion would have so largely to rest in the future, to school it in his ideas of a wider South African and Imperial patriotism—these to Milner were the main objects of his endeavours, and these inevitably determined the centre of his own activities.

The need of Milner's restraining influence over Johannesburg was, indeed, apparent from the very first. Within a month of peace, signs of discontent with the Crown Colony government began to show themselves. Johannesburg expected the peace to be immediately followed by the millennium, and in its sanguine mood deplored the peddling caution of a policy of development which it was ere long to denounce for reckless optimism and wild extravagance. With no practical experience of government it criticized the slowness and incapacity of an administration whose like for ability and persistent energy South Africa had never seen. Forgetful of its old state of helotry to the Boers, it chafed at being governed by an "imported bureaucracy" of Cape Colonists and Englishmen. At the end of June a movement, of which the leaders were Mr. Dale Lace and Mr. R. J. Pakeman, the editor of the *Transvaal Leader*, was initiated for forming a "Transvaal Political Association" which was, according to its promoters, to support the Government by criticizing it. Overtures were even made to some of the Boer leaders, who politely declined them with the just observation that the less politics were discussed at that moment the better. Fortunately the real leaders of Johannesburg, the men of

The Transvaal Political Association.



the Imperial Light Horse, as well as the representatives of the mining houses, were of the same mind, and in face of their strong opposition the agitation soon collapsed.

Milner and  
Johannes-  
burg.

In so far as anything could be done to remove the causes of discontent by greater publicity and by the introduction of a representative element into the Government, Milner was anxious to do it. As early as July 4, he had telegraphed to Chamberlain urging the immediate enlargement of the Legislative Council by the addition of nominated but representative unofficial members. But the chief conclusion he drew from the incident was the necessity of hurrying on the revival of the industry and pushing forward the work of reconstruction and development at its utmost speed. He knew that nothing could restrain for many years the inevitable demand for self-government. The only thing was to achieve his task before the demand became irresistible. For the moment his personal influence with Johannesburg was unbounded. But no one knew more clearly than he did that it was a wasting asset which was bound to dwindle with every difficulty, with every disappointment, with every delay. Personally he cared little as long as it was legitimately spent for important ends, and not needlessly thrown away. His one anxiety was that it should last long enough to let him build firm foundations against the uncertain future.

Military  
arrange-  
ments.

Little has been said in the foregoing pages about military affairs, yet the departure or disbandment of nearly 200,000 men and the redistribution and reorganization of the troops still left in the country was no small event, and for some months imposed a heavy task on the capacity of the railways. The troops left behind at first remained scattered over a large number of garrisons ; gradually as their numbers grew less, and as any lingering doubts as to the possibility of disturbance were dispelled, they were drawn together into the stations destined to be permanently occupied, of which the chief were Pretoria, Potchefstroom, Middelburg, and Standerton in the Transvaal, Newcastle in Natal, Bloemfontein and Harrismith in the Orange River Colony, and Middelburg in Cape Colony. At one time, indeed, Mr.

Brodrick had announced that the whole South African garrison was to be reduced to a strength of 15,000 men. This decision was eventually reversed, largely owing to the representations of Lord Milner and Mr. Chamberlain, not so much from fear of the inadequacy of the numbers proposed—though the unwisdom of leaving a force insufficient to cope with even a purely local rising was obvious—as on broader grounds of training and strategy. South Africa offered an ideal training ground, with a climate admirably suited to young soldiers, and was moreover a half-way house to India. In spite of the higher cost of maintaining troops in South Africa as compared with England, and of other objections arising out of the rigidity of the linked battalion system, these arguments prevailed, and the permanent strength of the forces in South Africa was in July, 1903, fixed at 25,000 men.\* Meanwhile in July, 1902, a Volunteer Force was formally inaugurated by ordinance in the Transvaal. This force was very popular, serving as it did to keep alive the organization and the name of more than one corps that had become famous in the war. At first mainly confined to the towns, the volunteer organization was gradually extended over the country districts, and was keenly taken up by many of the Boer farmers within very few years of the war. The development of cadet corps was also a prominent feature of the organization. No volunteer force was created in the Orange River Colony. In November, 1902, the state of the new colonies was considered sufficiently settled to permit of the reduction of the South African Constabulary from 10,000 to 6,000 men.† Martial law, which had continued in force, though no recourse to it was actually made, was at the same time withdrawn, and an ordinance issued granting the usual indemnity and making provision for the public safety in case of need.

\* The force at that time was still over 80,000. The figure then fixed has been gradually reduced at intervals since, more especially in the last three years. Its present strength (1909) is about 10,500.

† Reduced progressively by nearly a thousand a year during the next four years, and still further reduced after the establishment of self-government.

## CHAPTER III

## THE SUSPENSION MOVEMENT IN CAPE COLONY

Affairs in  
Natal.

At this stage we must leave the affairs of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony for a while in order to deal with the restoration of normal conditions in the older British colonies. In Natal this process was not a matter of particular difficulty or contentiousness. In the newly annexed districts the repatriation of the surrendered Boers was merely a reproduction in miniature of repatriation in the new colonies. The Boers in these districts received £100,000 out of the £3,000,000 free grant, and a similar proportion out of other grants subsequently made. In the rest of the colony the war had created no acute controversies. There had been a certain amount of rebellion in the northern districts during the first invasion, which had been dealt with at the time, and some of the rebels were still in prison. But the Natal Government saw no reason after the peace for any exceptional measures with regard to them, though some of the sentences were subsequently reduced by Lord Alverstone's Commission.

Politics in  
Cape Colony,  
1900-1902.

Very different was the state of affairs in Cape Colony. There the problem was one of immense difficulty; in its political, though not in its economic aspects, it was, perhaps, the most difficult in South Africa. To understand that problem it will be necessary to go back some length of time in order to deal briefly with certain events which found no place in the preceding volume, in which the campaign in Cape Colony was dealt with in its purely military aspect. The Schreiner ministry resigned in June, 1900, because half of Mr. Schreiner's colleagues, and the overwhelming



majority of his supporters, absolutely refused to assent to any measure imposing even the slightest penalty for rebellion.\* Sir Gordon Sprigg, who succeeded, managed by the help of a few of the late Government's supporters to pass a Treason Bill,† substantially identical with Mr. Schreiner's, in a session lasting from July to October. Beneath the outward decorum of the Assembly the bitterness was intense. The real issue was not so much the particular measure, whose extraordinary clemency could not be disputed, as the right of rebellion which the Bond leaders openly asserted. The flood of bitter oratory let loose in the House inevitably produced its effect upon the Dutch population, which had begun to settle down quietly after the expulsion of the Boer commandos. Encouraged by the prolonged resistance of the Boers, the leaders now hoped to make use of the feeling which they had generated in the colony in order to intimidate the British Government into abandonment of the policy of annexation. The agitation, vigorously worked up by infamous libels on the conduct of the British troops, culminated in a "People's Congress" which met at Worcester on December 6, and in a series of resolutions demanded the termination of the war and the independence of the Republics. Upon Milner and the Government these resolutions naturally produced no effect. But the Congress had scarcely dissolved before a response to it, or rather to the agitation preceding it, came from another quarter. On December 16, Kritzinger and Hertzog crossed the Orange River, and the second rebellion in Cape Colony began. A month later martial law was proclaimed over the whole colony, except the ports, which were not included till October 9, 1901. Thanks to martial law, and to the vigorous measures taken to utilize the loyal inhabitants of the colony in its defence, the rebellion was successfully kept within limits, though never suppressed.

Meanwhile, the Constitution of the colony was practically suspended. At Sir G. Sprigg's request Sir W. Hely-

The argument for suspending the Constitution.

\* See vol. iv., p. 497 *sqq.*

† See part ii., ch. x., for the provisions of this Act and for Martial Law questions generally.

Hutchinson prorogued the meeting of Parliament from time to time, and signed unauthorized warrants for expenditure to carry on the administration. The registration of voters, due early in 1901, was put off to a more convenient season. But it was obvious that this state of affairs could not continue unchallenged once peace was proclaimed. Parliament would have to meet. But it would meet under conditions which would make a mockery of representative institutions. Parties were equally divided; the Government could not hope to exercise effective control over the House; it was by no means improbable that the Bond would be actually in a majority.\* What prospect was there of such a majority ratifying measures of martial law directed against themselves and their supporters, and largely administered by their political opponents? What hope was there that a party whose sympathies were with rebellion, whose most active organizers and adherents were among the rebels,† would accept any legislation, however mild, for dealing with those rebels, or for preventing sedition in future? If the session of 1900 had been bitter, was the bitterness likely to have diminished? Would it not be inflamed tenfold if a deadlock in Parliament were followed by a dissolution and an election campaign in which all the issues of the war would be fought over again? And if that election resulted in an increased Bond majority, was it conceivable that the British Government could hand over the loyalists to the tender mercies of embittered rebels? Would not the suspension of the Constitution in that case become inevitable? And, if so, was it not better to suspend the Constitution at once, and save the colony all the mischief of political recrimination till the passions aroused by the war had abated and more normal issues of party disagreement had reasserted themselves? Thus argued the ordinary loyalist, and thus argued not a few of the Dutch, weary

\* In April, 1902, it was reckoned that the House would be composed of 44 Progressives, 44 Bond, and 7 doubtfuls.

† In three districts (Rhodes, Barkly East, and Dordrecht) 27 out of 83 officials of the Bond were accused of high treason; one was acquitted; two absconded; the rest were tried and found guilty.

of the endless racial agitation and of all the mischief it had brought on their people.

These arguments might not have carried great weight with the Progressives as a political party but for certain considerations of a personal character. With a leader of determination and capacity, and with a well-organized, enthusiastic party, the risks involved in the meeting of Parliament, or even in an election, might be worth running. But the Progressives were not a very effective party, and, above all, they lacked a leader. Rhodes was ill and mostly away from South Africa. Sprigg had been accepted as official leader in 1900, but without enthusiasm or confidence. His weakness, his vanity, his inordinate love of office, his very adroitness as a parliamentarian, combined to make him peculiarly unfitted to face the impending crisis. That he would give away the most vital points of principle, whether in legislation or in administration, in order to buy off Bond opposition and retain office, was the general opinion of his supporters, and his own cheerful optimism as to the future only added to their depression. The personality of Sir G. Sprigg is the key to the suspension movement in Cape Colony. Without confidence in their official leader, unable to find another in their own ranks, the Progressives looked to suspension to put the colony, directly or indirectly, under Milner, as the one leader and guide whom they could trust, until the critical period was passed.

Upon Milner himself the session of 1900 and its immediate sequels, the Worcester Congress and the second rebellion, had made a profound impression. They convinced him that the ordinary law-abiding Dutch farmer would have no opportunity of settling down peacefully so long as scope was given for the mischievous activities of the politicians and organizers who lived by perpetuating racial discord. His belief in the necessity of some extraordinary step was strengthened by Sprigg's persistent opposition to the extension of martial law, and his too evident fear of offending possible political supporters by vigorous measures. His personal inclination at first was in favour of a temporary separation from Cape Colony of those border districts which had been most deeply

Sir G.  
Sprigg's  
attitude.

Milner  
favours  
suspension.



implicated in rebellion. These might then be administered as a Crown colony, leaving the loyalist majority in the rest of Cape Colony to take care of itself. But the idea was not popular with the Progressives, many of whom were intensely suspicious of any plan which might involve the breaking up of Cape Colony. The idea of complete suspension, though it involved greater difficulties, moreover presented features which rendered it especially attractive to Milner. Brought under the same system as the new colonies, Cape Colony could be equally included in the work of development, and special measures could be taken for encouraging British immigration. When self-government was restored the colony would not only have had time for racial animosities to subside, but the racial balance might be materially altered in favour of the British element, which, in any case, would gain in political power by any reasonable redistribution of seats. It might even be possible to make the restoration of self-government in all the colonies coincide with the establishment of federation, and thus launch South Africa on a new career of prosperity with a clean political slate, from which old party war-cries had been obliterated.

Chamberlain  
strongly  
opposed.

Even before the close of 1900 Milner had endeavoured to impress his views on Chamberlain, and he repeated his efforts during his visit to England in 1901, but without much effect. Parliamentarian to the finger-tips, the Colonial Secretary instinctively shrank from any measure involving the temporary suppression of a free Parliament, however unsatisfactory and even dangerous its attitude. Far more keenly than Milner he realized the intense bitterness of the Opposition in the House of Commons, and the unscrupulous use they would make of so effective a handle for agitation as suspension would afford. Nor could he leave out of sight the effect upon the other colonies, where public opinion, even less instructed than that of the mother-country in the details of the South African situation, would be disquieted by an Imperial policy which might seem to make light of the great principle of colonial self-government. Even as regards Cape Colony itself the speeches delivered in its Assembly could, he urged, hardly be more provocative of mischievous agitation

than would months of bitter discussion in the House of Commons, echoing through the Empire, and making manifest the most serious division of opinion amongst even the staunchest Imperialists. Only in the very last extremity, or in face of a really general demand from the colony itself, would he be prepared to consider the possibility of so momentous a step.

Milner remained unconvinced by these objections, but he realized that suspension could only come, if at all, in response to a decided manifestation of colonial opinion, and made this clear to those who approached him on the subject after his return from England in August, 1901. Petitions in favour of suspension had come in from various quarters of the colony to Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson as early as June of that year, and the movement gained coherence among the more active members of the Progressive party in the next few months in spite of the opposition of the ministry, and of the difficulty of eliciting any general expression of opinion under martial law. In January, 1902, Rhodes came back to South Africa. Ill as he was he threw himself into the movement for suspension, and in consultation with him a petition was drafted urging the temporary suspension of the Constitution "to enable His Majesty to deal with the existing difficulties and afterwards restore the Constitution as amended to the colony." This petition, it was intended, should be signed by the whole Progressive party, including the Government, whom Rhodes hoped to bring into line by the pressure of their supporters. Had Rhodes been stronger this result might have been achieved—though, for that matter, had he been strong enough to lead the party and take Sprigg's place, the demand for suspension could never have arisen. But Rhodes was rapidly sinking. On March 26 he died. It would be outside the purpose of these chapters to describe the solemn funeral on the lonely granite kopje in the Matoppo, to expound the provisions of the wonderful testament in which Rhodes strove to give perennial life and strength to the ideals for which he worked, or to discuss his part in the history of South Africa and of the Empire. He was the greatest man whom South Africa could claim as wholly her own, and in

Rhodes and  
suspension.  
His death,  
March, 1902.

the history of the Empire his deep inspiration and creative force will stand out more clearly every year from the background of phrase-mongering mediocrities.

The petition  
for  
suspension.  
Milner's  
intervention.

Rhodes's death left the suspension movement without a leader. Many who had already signed the petition began to get alarmed, and wished to qualify their adhesion by every kind of condition as to the territories of Cape Colony, as to the duration of suspension, etc. Sprigg's opposition took an increasingly active form, and several wavering members of the party began to side with him. Milner, more convinced than ever of the necessity of suspension, and very reluctant to see the movement collapse—all the more so because he felt certain that, outside parliamentary circles, the overwhelming majority of loyalists was in favour of suspension—decided to intervene in person. During a flying visit to Cape Town at the end of April he privately interviewed a number of leading men, and set at rest some of their anxieties as to the consequences of suspension. Encouraged by this the suspensionists continued, and on May 10 presented to Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson their petition, signed by forty-two members of the Legislature. Hely-Hutchinson communicated the petition to Milner, who replied on May 19. While refusing to discuss the petition officially, as outside his proper sphere, he accompanied his formal reply by an unofficial letter for communication to the petitioners, in which he made clear his entire sympathy with the suspension movement. But in spite of the great impression produced by the letter Sprigg refused to be convinced. Some of the ministers wavered, but, except Dr. Smartt, the Minister of Works, none of them definitely came forward. On May 28 Smartt resigned from a ministry which he could not convert and threw himself heart and soul into the suspension movement. On June 2, after a public meeting to denounce suspension, Sprigg sailed to England to attend the Coronation and take part in the Colonial Conference. During the next few weeks Smartt held suspension meetings all over the colony which demonstrated an extraordinary degree of enthusiasm and unanimity among the loyalist element. By the end of June over 30,000 signatures, including those of a



considerable number of Dutch voters, had been added to the petition.

But Chamberlain was not to be moved by these demonstrations or by Milner's urgent private appeals. He consulted the assembled Colonial Prime Ministers, who all agreed that so grave a step as suspension should only be taken in the very last resort. From Sprigg he received unhesitating assurances of his ability to maintain a majority and see through all necessary measures. On July 2 he telegraphed to announce the decision of the Imperial Government against suspension, on the ground that incontrovertible proof of its necessity had not yet been produced. At the same time he hinted that if the Cape Parliament failed in its evident duty, the necessary legislation with regard to indemnity or the prevention of sedition would be passed over its head by the Imperial Government. The decision was received with regret by the suspensionists. But, nothing daunted, they carried on their campaign in the colony in order to be able to make clear to the ministry and to the Imperial Government the strength of the demand for effective measures. While deciding to support Sprigg on all measures essential to safeguard the loyalists, they resolved to reorganize the Progressive party and purge it of Sprigg and other "mugwump" elements at the next election, and as a step towards this end elected Smartt as leader of the party.

Meanwhile the conclusion of peace and the admirable conduct of the surrendering Boers had undoubtedly, as Chamberlain had urged, led to a diminution of racial antagonism in Cape Colony. The rebels came in quietly, and after signing a document acknowledging their guilt, went home to await such proceedings as might be taken against them. The thorny question as to the unexpired sentences imposed under martial law, in Natal as well as in Cape Colony, was taken out of the arena of parliamentary controversy by the appointment of a Judicial Commission by the Imperial Government. This Commission, consisting of the Chief Justice (Lord Alverstone), Mr. Justice Bigham, and Major-General Sir John Ardagh, landed in South Africa on August 26 and reported on October 28. Sentences were

Chamberlain  
refuses to  
suspend,  
July, 1902.

Improvement  
in the situa-  
tion. The  
Judicial  
Commission  
on martial  
law  
sentences.

scaled down to a uniform level, but on the whole the decisions of the military courts were confirmed.

The Cape session of 1902.

On August 20 the Cape Parliament met. It was evident from the outset that the Bond had an effective majority whenever they chose to exercise it, and that the ministry only existed on sufferance. The Indemnity Bills produced a heated debate. But the Bond, alarmed by the strength of the suspension movement and by Chamberlain's hints at the possibility of Imperial interference, let them pass.\* Sprigg, in return for this forbearance, abandoned all idea of any measures dealing with sedition or the importation of arms. The next few weeks of the session were occupied by fruitless discussions on suspension, boycotting, rebellion, and the conduct of the Bond, which chiefly served to bring out the practical working alliance between the Bond and the Sprigg ministry. Content to have their way on the issues that mattered most to them, the Bond showed themselves complaisant on immaterial points, and Sprigg was able to get through his estimates, and even to fulfil his pledge at the Colonial Conference by increasing the Cape naval contribution from £30,000 to £50,000.

Was the suspension movement a mistake?

Was the suspension movement a mistake? The question admits of no simple answer. To understand the strength of the case for suspension it is almost necessary to have lived in Cape Colony during the later stages of the war, and to have realized in person how intolerable was the situation which the supremacy of the Bond at that moment threatened to bring about. The event, indeed, belied those fears. But it belied them mainly because the mere menace of suspension—brandished in the face of the Bond by Milner and the Progressives, held back in reserve by Chamberlain—sufficed to induce a self-restraint which would not otherwise have been displayed. That self-restraint might not have lasted if the Bond had subsequently come back into power. But it was the same suspensionist movement, however unsuccessful in attaining its immediate object, that gave a new life and coherence to the Progressive party, and paved the way to a

\* Martial law, which had been considerably relaxed in July, was then finally declared at an end on September 16.

political victory which tided Cape Colony through the most critical years. Whether suspension actually carried out would have proved as successful as suspension merely threatened is another question. Apart from all danger of discord in England and in the Empire, or of bitter agitation in Cape Colony, the mere administrative burden, which would in practice have largely been added to Milner's over-weighted shoulders, might well have seriously interfered with the work of reconstruction in the new colonies. The unprejudiced critic may well admit that on the facts immediately before him Milner was justified in urging a measure which seemed to offer the only escape from an impossible position, and yet, none the less, believe that Chamberlain's decision was based on a true perspective and on a correct estimate of the balance of risks and advantages, not only in South Africa but in the Empire as a whole.



## CHAPTER IV

## MR. CHAMBERLAIN AND THE SETTLEMENT

The germ of party politics in the new colonies.

NOT least among the reasons which weighed with Milner in favour of suspension was the fear of the unsettling influence upon affairs in the new colonies of an acute racial conflict in Cape Colony, especially if it culminated in the victory of the Bond. That the Boers in each of the new colonies would, sooner or later, be organized into a political party in opposition to the new administration was, indeed, almost inevitable, and the future character and control of that organization were practically implied in the circumstances of the Vereeniging surrender. It seemed no less inevitable that the Bond would be in close touch with this development and exercise a decided influence over it. But for Milner's purpose it was enough if he could hope to retard that process sufficiently to give time for racial bitterness to soften, and for new political issues to assert themselves. How far he succeeded it will be for the reader of these chapters to estimate.

Visit of the Boer generals to Europe.

The loyal and helpful conduct of the Boer leaders during the surrenders has already been referred to. It would have been well if they had thrown themselves with equal heartiness into the work of repatriation. In that case they would not only have given the benefit of their authority and experience both to the administration and to their countrymen, but they would also have been in a position to realize how tremendous were the difficulties which had to be surmounted, and how great was the result which was achieved. Unfortunately, from the outset their attitude towards repatriation was affected by a controversy with regard to the free gift of £3,000,000, which, in spite of the obvious

meaning of the clause in the terms of peace, they now claimed should be confined to those who were still in the field, or prisoners of war, at the peace. Moreover, the three most influential among them, Botha, De la Rey, and de Wet, had arranged at Vereeniging to go on a mission to Europe to collect funds for the widows and orphans. That this idea should have presented itself at that time was very natural. They had as yet had no experience of British generosity, and only knew that it had taken no little bargaining to secure from Milner the promise of what, in their eyes, appeared a very inadequate grant. On the other hand, they never doubted that the wealthy nations of Europe which had followed their struggle with such intense sympathy, would respond lavishly to their appeal, all the more, perhaps, to atone for their failure to lend their armed intervention during the war. Mixed with these considerations were others of a more purely political character. A large fund collected and administered by themselves, would not only alleviate distress, but be very useful in maintaining their authority over their people and their independence of the Government. Again, though they had surrendered entirely on their own initiative, they yet were naturally anxious to get in touch with Kruger, Leyds, Fischer, and the rest of their representatives in Europe, to justify their action, and to consult them with regard to the policy to be pursued in future. Lastly, it might perhaps still be possible to secure in England, even from Chamberlain, concessions which it had been impossible to wring from Milner during the peace negotiations.

The Boer generals sailed for Europe on July 30.\* Before leaving they spent a week at the Cape, where they found themselves the object of extraordinary demonstrations of enthusiasm on the part of the Bond. At first somewhat suspicious and resentful of allies who had talked so much and risked so little, they soon yielded to the influence of their surroundings, and the week at the Cape marked a distinct stage in the evolution of the political opposition in

\* Reitz, Steyn, Lukas Meyer, and others had sailed shortly before. The last named died soon after his arrival in Europe.

Their reception at the Cape and in England.

the new colonies. On August 16 they arrived in London, and made their first direct acquaintance with the extraordinary nation which had conquered them. Cheering crowds welcomed them in the streets, while shoals of enthusiastic callers besieged them at their hotel. On the 17th they were received by the King on his yacht in the Solent, and made a tour of the fleet. But they refused to participate in the great naval review, which formed part of the Coronation festivities, and were chiefly anxious to get over to Holland. Accompanied by Fischer they left next day for Rotterdam, where they were met by Leyds and Wolmarans. President Kruger was waiting for them at the Hague, and there some ten days were spent in consultation. What passed in those days between the veteran enemy of England and his successors in the leadership of his people can only be conjectured. There could be no question, in any case, of any resumption of direct influence by Kruger, even if Botha had been willing to acquiesce in it. With this visit, too, the last surviving institution of the defunct South African Republic, its official representation in Europe, came to an end, and Dr. Leyds, talented, intriguing, unpopular, passed out of the field of South African politics.

First interview with Chamberlain, Sept. 5, 1902.

Correspondence was also, during these days, passing between the generals and Mr. Chamberlain. An interview had been arranged for the beginning of September, and on August 23 the generals sent Chamberlain a list of topics they wished to discuss. Among the demands contained in the list were complete amnesty for all rebels, full compensation for all loss occasioned by the British troops, and even for the use of properties during the war, the reinstatement or compensation of the officials of the late Republics, the payment of all Republican war debts, the recognition of the burgher rights acquired during the war by foreigners, and the restoration to the Transvaal of the districts ceded to Natal. How far the generals were inspired by recollections of Kruger's success in securing the revision of the Pretoria Convention in 1884, or were misled by the friendly welcome of the London crowd, or merely obeyed the irresistible racial habit of asking too much, it is not easy to say. Chamberlain



replied that the British Government was not prepared to substitute a new agreement for the one concluded only three months before—an agreement, as he reminded them, without a parallel in history in its generosity to the vanquished—and that there could be no interview unless they dropped all idea of reopening questions that had been settled once and for all. The Boer leaders protested that their intentions had been misunderstood, but, seeing no help for it, reluctantly accepted Chamberlain's condition that only actual grievances or practical recommendations were to be discussed. The interview took place on September 5, Lord Kitchener also being present. The grievances brought forward were, in the main, of a trifling character or due to misapprehension, and Chamberlain had no difficulty in disposing of them. To the request for a special grant for widows and orphans he declared himself unable to accede, dwelling on what was already being done by the new administration for the destitute.

Any anxieties the Boer leaders may have felt as to the condition of the widows and orphans would undoubtedly have been greatly relieved if they had remained in South Africa, and seen what was actually being done for the people. But if they still desired to appeal to charity to provide assistance for the sufferers from the war, beyond the minimum given by the authorities, there was one great opportunity open to them had they only realized it. That was to appeal to the generosity of the British public. At that moment an appeal for public sympathy, based on a whole-hearted acceptance of the new situation, and asking for relief on the very ground that the sufferers were now British fellow-subjects would, without a doubt, have met with a generous response. Unfortunately, the Boer delegates had no real friends to advise them. The friends they naturally looked to, the people who gushed over them and lionized them, were completely out of touch with the national sentiment, and too biassed against their own country even to wish to help. At heart, most of them were vexed at the acceptance of the annexation by the Boers; many were half-disappointed at the lack of rancour shown by the

The "appeal to the civilized world," and tour on the Continent.

generals; their anxiety was not to promote the settlement achieved by the war, but, as far as possible, to undo it. With no one to warn them of the mistake they were making, the generals accordingly proceeded with their original programme. Returning to Holland, they issued an appeal to the "civilized world" on September 25. The tone of this appeal, with its suppression of all mention of the help being given by the British Government to the victims of the war, and its suggestion—ludicrous in view of what had been done in the concentration camps—that education would be neglected, exercised an immediate chilling effect upon British sympathy. The tour to Paris and Berlin, during October, only accentuated the unfortunate impression created. Though Botha and his colleagues repeatedly deprecated hostility to England, and declared their intention of abiding loyally by their engagements, it was impossible to keep a check on the utterances of foreign sympathizers, or even to restrain themselves from straying into grave indiscretions in the effort to give a vivid picture of their sufferings to excited audiences. Nor was the material result of the appeal at all proportionate to the disadvantages incurred. The whole amount raised was only about £105,000, and of this a very considerable part had been subscribed months before the appeal was issued or the tour made.\* The truth of the matter was that Continental sympathy for the Boers had lost its real motive with the peace. Admiration or curiosity could still collect cheering crowds. But the intense emotion which had stirred the great nations of Europe at the thought of England's defeat by the stubborn burghers, could not be revived in favour of men who had become British subjects. On so shrewd an observer as Botha the lesson of the tour could hardly be lost. It was clear that destiny had decided that his people were included for good within the circle of the British Empire, and that it was within that circle, and

\* Of this total a sum of £20,000 was given by Mr. H. Phipps of the Carnegie Steel Trust, with a proviso that the money should not be used for any purpose unfriendly to Great Britain. Apart from the £105,000 now raised, over £60,000 had been collected in Cape Colony, mostly while the war was still in progress.

not without, that he would have to look for practical sympathy and help.

Meanwhile Parliament had met, and on November 5 Chamberlain had expounded the policy of the Government towards the new colonies in a statesmanlike and sympathetic speech which did not fail to make its impression upon the Boer generals listening in the gallery. Communications and interviews took place during the next few days in which a much better tone on their part was discernible. Though still vigorous in demands for concessions on certain points, Botha showed a readiness to recognize what had been done, and an anxiety to explain away the Continental tour which augured better for the future. As regards the widows and orphans, Chamberlain had already explained that they were being provided for. But if the generals wanted a fund of their own, he was quite prepared to let them have such Transvaal state funds as had been transmitted to Europe by Kruger and were still unspent, if they would help him to lay hands upon them. Botha expressed his readiness to do so, but strenuously maintained that no such funds existed. What substratum of fact underlay the current belief in "Kruger's millions" it is impossible to say. Certain it is that Chamberlain's offer produced no result.

Further interviews with Chamberlain.

The generals stayed on for another month, and finally sailed for South Africa on December 13.\* On the whole the good effects of their tour must be held to have outweighed the drawbacks. Their contact with the Continent made them realize foreign sympathy in its true perspective. Their personal relations with that section of British politicians which had espoused their cause during the war inevitably drew them into the orbit of the British party system. Above all, their dealings with Mr. Chamberlain impressed them, not only with the determination but also with the magnanimity and the good-will of the statesman under whose control they had fallen. From the outset they

The generals return to South Africa, Dec. 1902.

\* Messrs. Fischer, Wolmarans, and Wessels, the original Boer envoys to Europe and America, were not allowed to return till some months later.



realized that the Colonial Secretary could neither be imposed upon nor cajoled. But they soon came to see that the conception which he expounded of a free, united, and prosperous South Africa under the British flag was not a mere phrase, but a conscious aim, a living ideal in which they could acquiesce without necessarily abandoning their defence of the narrower racial interests and ambitions of the Dutch population. Nothing could have confirmed their belief in his sincerity of purpose more strongly than the announcement of his decision to visit South Africa in person.

Chamberlain  
decides to  
visit South  
Africa.

As early as the beginning of September Chamberlain had written to Milner to consult him about this project, which several reasons had combined to suggest to his mind. His health, affected by a recent carriage accident and by the incessant strain of seven years of parliamentary and administrative work, demanded a short holiday. The visit would not only enable him to settle a number of complex financial and administrative problems with Milner, and thus allow him to give the latter a freer hand in the future, but would give him an opportunity of getting into direct personal contact with every section of the inhabitants of South Africa and of using his influence to make them turn their eyes from the past to the future. Lastly, he was anxious to follow up the Colonial Conference which had just taken place by some striking step which should mark the advance in the relations between the United Kingdom and the self-governing colonies. If circumstances allowed, the tour was to be followed by others to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Milner eagerly concurred in the scheme, which was publicly announced at the end of October. On November 26 Chamberlain sailed in the cruiser *Good Hope*, taking the east coast route, so as to leave Cape Colony for the conclusion of the tour. Mrs. Chamberlain, Lord Monk Bretton, and Mr. H. W. Just of the Colonial Office accompanied him.

Arrival at  
Durban.  
Speeches in  
Natal.

On December 26 Chamberlain landed in Durban amid scenes of extraordinary public enthusiasm. From the first moment it became clear that the holiday aspect of the tour would have to be sacrificed. All South Africa wanted to see

England's greatest statesman, to hear him speak, to lay its grievances before him. To refuse was impossible. In two opening speeches at Durban Chamberlain struck the key-notes for the rest of the tour. The first was the reconciliation of all the warring elements in South Africa in the unity and freedom of the British flag. The second was the duty of the colonies to take their share in the burden of empire. At Pietermaritzburg a few days later he was able to announce that the Natal Ministry was prepared, as a recognition of that duty, to settle their own compensation claims for war losses, amounting to some £2,000,000. In the same speech he made it clear that conciliation did not mean any concession, whether to the cry for immediate self-government in the new colonies, or in any other direction, which would undo the work so painfully accomplished by force of arms. On January 2 he spoke at Ladysmith, and on the 4th met Milner and Lawley at Charlestown, and proceeded to Pretoria.

What attitude the Boers would adopt towards the visit was in doubt almost to the last moment. That doubt was solved both for the Boers and for the outside world by the friendly declarations made by Botha on his arrival at Cape Town at the end of December, and by the presence of Botha, De la Rey, Piet Cronje, Smuts, and other Boer leaders at the first reception held in Chamberlain's honour by Lawley on January 5. They attended again the following night at a public banquet. That such a thing was possible a bare six months from the Boer submission is one of the most remarkable and significant features of the situation. To make it possible required terms of peace as generous as those granted by the British Government, political institutions as free and tolerant as those of the British Empire, statesmanship as bold and sympathetic as that which brought Chamberlain to South Africa. It required no less a freedom from rancour, a magnanimity, and a broad-minded acceptance of a new situation on the part of Botha and those who followed his lead, to which it would be difficult to find a parallel. If a note of criticism was imported into the proceedings it was, characteristically, not from the Boers

Chamberlain  
at Pretoria,  
Jan. 5-8,  
1903.

that it proceeded but from an English speaker already chafing at the methods of Crown colony administration. Chamberlain himself in his speech took care to give the Boers no opening for misunderstanding. He was prepared to see that the terms of peace were carried out in the letter and in the spirit; he expected the Boers to do the same. There could be no substantial alteration of the terms, no concessions at the expense of principle or of those who had supported the British cause. The frankness of this warning was by no means uncalled for. On the 8th Chamberlain interviewed a deputation of over a hundred leading Boers. The address of welcome read out by Mr. Smuts attempted to raise again all the issues which he had refused to consider open for discussion in London. With unequivocal directness he turned upon the deputation, rated them soundly for their presumption and want of gratitude, and made it clear to them, once and for all, that while they might expect practical sympathy and help from the administration, there were certain issues which were settled and could not be reopened. The impression made by his unhesitating firmness was only enhanced by the general friendliness of his manner. At the end of the discussion Smuts warmly thanked him in the name of the deputation, and as he and Milner rose to leave Botha gave the signal for a vigorous round of applause.

Chamberlain  
at Johannes-  
burg,  
Jan. 8-22.

The same afternoon the Colonial Secretary proceeded to Johannesburg. The tremendous enthusiasm shown both on his arrival and at subsequent public functions can readily be understood and needs no special comment. The main work of the next fortnight was the settlement, in consultation with Milner, as well as with representatives of interests affected, of a number of administrative and financial questions of the very first importance.

Compensa-  
tion claims.

Of these the most pressing and troublesome was the question of the compensation payable by the military authorities for goods requisitioned and for other war losses. The investigation of claims had been entrusted, after the peace, to a military central board with subordinate local boards. Unfortunately too few officers were put on to the work to enable it to proceed expeditiously. Constant





MAJOR SIR HAMILTON J. GOOLD-ADAMS. G.C.M.G., C.B.,

COMMISSIONER, BECHUANALAND 1897-1901:

LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR, ORANGE RIVER COLONY, 1901-7

(GOVERNOR SINCE 1907).

(Photo by H. W. Barnett.)



changes of the staff resulted in a complete lack of uniformity in the decisions given, while reference to the War Office led to further interminable delays. What was still more serious was that the War Office would only admit claims for goods actually taken for use, and flatly refused to take any account of damage done, whether by British or Boers, to the property of those who had surrendered under proclamations formally promising them protection. To add to the trouble no progress could be made with the consideration by the civil commissions of the claims for relief out of the £3,000,000 free gift till the settlement of the claims against the military enabled the true losses of individuals to be assessed. A sense of grievance and injustice was rapidly spreading, which, unless promptly remedied, would have seriously endangered the pacification of the country. This sense of grievance was especially strong among those who had placed their confidence in the British Government and espoused the British cause. A deputation of these, led by Andries Cronje and Piet de Wet, met Chamberlain on January 14, and in the strongest terms insisted on the justice of their claim to compensation. They had made great sacrifices in reliance on British promises; it would be monstrous if those promises were now repudiated, and they were told that they were to be content with a fraction of the dole given to the men who had opposed the British Government to the bitter end. Chamberlain assured them they would not be neglected. As a matter of fact he had already been deeply impressed by Milner with the gravity of the situation, and with characteristic promptitude and decision had taken steps to deal with the whole question of claims for military compensation. Telegraphing to the Colonial Office on January 7 he had declared that nothing could justify the repudiation of solemn obligations incurred by representatives of the British Government. Matters would have to be put on a satisfactory footing, and at once. So far the military had paid out about £1,500,000. Over 50,000 claims were still standing, involving, it was computed, a liability of £4,000,000. Let the War Office hand over £3,000,000 to the civil administration in the new colonies, and the latter would settle the whole business itself, and

The protected  
burghers.



take all risks of having to make up any deficiency. The proposal was accepted, and the sum handed over enabled the Central Judicial Commission, which correlated the work of the local commissions,\* after paying out a further £1,000,000 for actual receipts, to devote nearly £2,000,000 to settling the claims of "protected" burghers at a rate of 10s. in the pound.

Distribution  
of the free  
grant.

Incidentally this settlement of the claims of the protected burghers practically disposed of the grievance which the "wild" Boers found in the idea of their participation in the £3,000,000 free gift. With the disposal of this latter amount it may be as well to deal here, though it was not actually settled till much later. The distribution was based on a compromise between charitable aid and compensation for proved losses. Everybody who had received relief from the repatriation commissions was credited with £25, whether he had assessed losses or not. Those who had not availed themselves of repatriation assistance, but had assessed losses, were paid the amount of those losses in full up to £25. In either case those whose assessed losses exceeded £25 received an additional dividend of 2s. in the pound on the excess.† In this way it was possible to give substantial relief to the poorer men without absolutely ignoring the claims of the more well-to-do, and to give the most equitable interpretation to the somewhat vague terms of Article X of the terms of surrender. On an average the payments worked out at between 3s. and 4s. in the pound on the assessed losses.

The free  
grant to  
British  
subjects,  
foreigners  
and natives.

As far, indeed, as the letter of Article X went, not only the protected burghers, but the British population of the two colonies might have been allowed to participate in the

\* A number of the officers who had been engaged on the military commissions were attached to the civil commissions to preserve continuity.

† About £1,000,000 was actually distributed in cash; the balance was written off against the individual accounts for goods received from the Repatriation Department. The assessed claims amounted to £16,000,000, of which approximately £1,000,000 were paid in full, and the rest at 2s. in the £, while about £400,000 went to those who had received relief but had no assessed losses.

£3,000,000 to the detriment of the ex-burghers. This was never contemplated by the Government. But the fact that a grant had been made to the Boers undoubtedly implied a corresponding claim on Imperial generosity on the part of the British population. The same applied to the natives, while there was also a case for equitable consideration as regards foreign subjects who had maintained their neutrality. A further grant of £2,000,000 was accordingly made from Imperial funds for these purposes. Of this, £300,000 was assigned to compensation of the natives, who also received a considerable amount in the way of payment of military receipts. About £120,000 went to foreign claimants, while the balance of nearly £1,600,000 went to British subjects, the payments both to British and to foreigners working out at a rate of 17s. 4d. in the pound.

Thus, apart from military receipts, of which £2,500,000 were paid for after the peace, the total free grant made by the Imperial Government to relieve the sufferings inflicted by the war in the two colonies amounted to £7,000,000, of which £5,000,000 went to the Boers, an act of generosity without any parallel in history. Yet, generous as it was, the grant from the British Exchequer only represented a portion of what was done to help our late enemies. Another £7,300,000, roughly, of which some £2,800,000 represented advances to the Boers, £583,000, free issues of supplies to widows and other indigent persons, and nearly £4,000,000, the vast miscellaneous expenditure on repatriation, was eventually devoted to the same purpose out of the proceeds of the loan raised by the new colonies. This was not Imperial generosity, but it was still British generosity, in so far as the burden of the loan fell almost wholly on the tax-bearing British community of the Transvaal. It cannot be said that this generosity evoked any direct manifestations of gratitude. On the contrary, nothing ever brought down so much abuse on the heads of the new administration as the distribution of the grants and the work of repatriation. All the Boers who had suffered losses persuaded themselves that the British had promised "compensation," and were indignant at the small fraction they actually received. Those who accepted

Total extent  
of British  
generosity.

help from the Repatriation Department took it as a matter of right, and vigorously expressed their disappointment when they found that they were not to receive an additional free distribution of £3,000,000 in cash. The difficulties and delays attending the assessment of claims were responsible for endless grumbling.\* The whole subject was incomprehensible to the Boer, whose only conclusion was that he was in some way being ill-used and swindled—a conclusion which his political leaders fostered with no little assiduity. But the real test of the wisdom of the policy pursued lies not in the extent to which it won conscious and explicit gratitude, but in the extent to which it averted the distress and bitterness which would have resulted either from a refusal to act with generosity, or from a real failure to deal satisfactorily and promptly with the immense difficulties involved. True magnanimity does not always meet with immediate response, but it always has its reward.

The guaran-  
teed loan.

The need for a large loan, not only for repatriation and relief, but also for all the various demands of the policy of reconstruction, had been pressed upon Chamberlain by Milner before. The sum of £35,000,000 was now agreed to by Chamberlain, who also concurred in Milner's proposals for its detailed apportionment. More than half of the loan was required for the clearing off of existing liabilities. There was the old Transvaal debt of £2,500,000 to be taken over. There was £1,500,000 advanced from Imperial funds towards the deficit† on the civil administration in the Transvaal in 1901 and 1902. There was some £2,000,000 estimated compensation due to loyalists in Cape Colony and Natal for the first invasion; compensation for subsequent losses was in each case borne by the colony itself. Further,

\* As a matter of fact, although a final settlement of all claims was not reached till the beginning of 1906, the work done constituted a unique record in respect of promptitude. Some interesting parallels are given in Mr. Beak's book, and in the final report, by Major T. M. McInerney, Chairman of the Central Judicial Commission, presented to Lord Selborne in March, 1906 (Cd. 3028, pp. 53-91), in which the whole subject of compensation is very fully and lucidly dealt with.

† Both this and the next item were considerably over-estimated, and a balance of some £1,400,000 subsequently became available for other purposes.



the taking over of the railways involved another £13,500,000.\* Another £5,000,000 was at that time considered sufficient by Milner to provide for the advances required by the farmers, and for the general expenditure connected with repatriation. After allowing some £400,000 for the cost of raising the loan, this left only £10,000,000 over for new development, and of this Milner proposed to devote £5,000,000 to new railway construction, £3,000,000 to land settlement,† and £2,000,000 to public works. These sums were very far from representing Milner's ideas of what could with advantage be spent, but he looked confidently to a rapid revival of prosperity to furnish him with surpluses which could be devoted to these purposes as soon as the £10,000,000 was exhausted.

The apportionment of the loan to the various specific purposes for which it was required was a comparatively easy question. But its division as between the two colonies involved great difficulties. The surplus revenue of the Orange River Colony which would be available for interest would be the merest fraction of the surplus available from the Transvaal. Any division of the loan as between the two colonies would mean that in the Orange River Colony railway development and land settlement would have to be restricted to the very narrowest limits, and repatriation carried out on a much less generous scale than in the Transvaal. From every point of view, political and economic, such a solution could only be injurious. The same considerations applied no less strongly in respect of the Constabulary; the work to be done, and not the local revenue, ought to fix the standard of expenditure. Milner urged in the strongest terms the necessity of ignoring artificial boundaries and of treating the two colonies as a single unit for the

The Inter-  
Colonial  
Council.

\* This included the purchase of the Netherlands and Pietersburg Railways, the taking over of £1,800,000 debt due to Cape Colony on the O.R.C. railways, £1,000,000 of rolling-stock, etc., bought by the Imperial authorities before the peace, and other minor items.

† Only £2,550,000 of this was actually spent, and the last £450,000 was subsequently diverted to meet the heavy increases under the headings of repatriation (£7,300,000 instead of £5,000,000, of which, however, £2,800,000 was on loan) and railways (eventually nearly £6,000,000).

purposes of the loan and of the Constabulary. To do so it was necessary to provide a common revenue. That revenue, or the bulk of it, could be furnished by the profits of the railways treated as a single system financially, as it was administratively. The deficit might be made up by contributions from each colony in proportion to its revenue. But a common budget, urged Milner, implied a common executive authority. And if the beginnings of representative institutions were to be granted to each of the colonies separately, it was impossible to exclude a representative element from an authority which embraced so large a part of their political life. These matters were settled in principle while Chamberlain was in Johannesburg. The actual creation of an Inter-Colonial Council was deferred till May 20, when the order in council constituting it was hurriedly telegraphed out to anticipate the first session of the new Transvaal Legislature. The first Council, which met in July, consisted of fourteen members, including two elected by the non-official members of the Legislative Council of each colony. In 1904 these were increased to six for the Transvaal and four for the Orange River Colony, and the whole Council was enlarged to twenty-six members.

Objects of  
the Council.

The Inter-Colonial Council was one of Milner's most original and most fruitful conceptions. It was suggested by the circumstances of the loan, but once suggested, its scope expanded rapidly in his mind. It was in the first place to be a means of utilizing the wealth of the Rand for the equal development of the whole of the conquered territories. But, over and above that, it was to be the germ of South African union. The successful unification of the railway system of two colonies might pave the way to a general railway unification, and to the abolition of the interminable railway controversies which had stood, and would continue to stand, in the way of any development on sound lines. Moreover, the Inter-Colonial Council would help to create a class of public men accustomed to look at affairs from a less parochial point of view than that of the individual colony. To open a wider political horizon, to create a South African habit of mind, as distinct from a

colonial one, was ever Milner's guiding thought, and in this new body he saw an effective instrument towards his purpose.

It was from the same point of view that he now secured Chamberlain's consent to a conference of leading men in the new colonies to discuss questions of railway development, and to a general conference of all the South African colonies at Bloemfontein in March to discuss issues of common interest, such as customs, the position of natives, the supply of native labour, and alien immigration. This latter conference was destined to serve an Imperial as well as a South African purpose. The necessity of taking a step in the direction of closer union in the Empire by means of preferential trade had been gradually forced home upon the Colonial Secretary. Contact with the "illimitable veld" and with the problems of South Africa had only intensified the impression made by the Colonial Conference a few months earlier. Milner entirely shared his views, and it was settled between them that, if possible, any customs union arranged at Bloemfontein should include a preference for British goods. Chamberlain had left England under the impression that he had secured the consent of his colleagues to the remission of the shilling corn tax on colonial corn only—a slight yet unmistakable departure from the established insularism which was bound to have a profound moral effect throughout the Empire. The effect would be greatly enhanced if the adoption of the principle of preference by South Africa could be simultaneously announced.

Chamberlain  
and Milner  
discuss  
Imperial  
Preference.

Intimately bound up in Chamberlain's mind with the development loan was the question of securing from the Transvaal some contribution towards the cost of the war.\* Determined as he was not to go back empty-handed, he realized fully that an arbitrarily imposed indemnity was impossible. But he remained none the less confident of his power to secure a substantial sum by the exercise of his personal influence with the leading men of the British community upon whom the burden of the contribution would mainly fall. Several interviews took place at which

The war  
contribution.

\* See pp. 20-22.



Chamberlain urged the claims of the mother-country to relief, the great advantages, actual and prospective, to the British community won by the sacrifices of the British taxpayer, and, not least, the direct financial help which an Imperial guarantee of the development loan would give by enabling it to be raised at a lower rate of interest. His appeal met with a genuine response, but at the same time his interviewers were able to convince him that his previous estimate of the Transvaal's capacity to bear such a burden had been set too high. Eventually it was agreed that the voluntary contribution should take the form of a Transvaal loan of £30,000,000, to be raised in instalments of £10,000,000 in the next few years, and certain leading local firms undertook at once to guarantee the issue of the first instalment. This loan was to be at 4 per cent., while the £35,000,000 loan was to be raised at 3 per cent.\* with an Imperial guarantee. This informal agreement was ratified with practical unanimity on January 17 by a meeting of some eighty of the leading men of the Rand, representing all industries and classes of society, and again confirmed in an interview with Chamberlain on the 19th. The result was a triumph for Chamberlain's powers of persuasion. But there were not a few of those who agreed to the contribution who had grave doubts as to the ability of the Transvaal to bear the burden, unless a very great change came over the prospects of the industrial situation.

Chamberlain  
and the  
labour crisis.

The tremendous economic activity and the confident optimism of the first few months of peace had already begun to give way to general disquietude, as it came to be realized that the great expansion of the mines, on which all calculations had been based, was being checked by the shortage of native labour. Unless the shortage could be got over soon a serious crisis was imminent. On every side Chamberlain was besieged by the advocates of different remedies. On the one hand the champions of unskilled white labour urged the immense possibilities of utilizing the situation to extricate South Africa from its dependence on the native. On the other a committee of the leading engineers on the Rand

\* Together with 1 per cent. for sinking fund.

presented an elaborate report on the industry pointing out the impossibility of white unskilled labour, asking for increased pressure to be put on the natives, and hinting at the importation of Chinese as a last extremity. Other business men pressed for the immediate introduction of Chinese as the only way of setting the industry on its feet. Milner himself, who had encouraged the white labour experiment and to some extent sympathized with the advanced white labour point of view, was already beginning to doubt whether the immediate difficulty could be surmounted except by a temporary importation of outside labour. Chamberlain realized at once the political unpopularity that might be roused, both in South Africa and in England, by such a step as the importation of Chinese, and at the Wanderers' dinner on the 17th made it clear that he was, as yet, unconvinced of its necessity. He suggested an increase in the proportion of white labour, and declared that in any case the Government would only act according to the wishes of the people of the Colony.

The introduction of a representative element into the Constitution of the new colonies was another question which was definitely settled during Chamberlain's visit. Milner had pressed for this immediately after the peace, and had originally hoped to have the enlarged Legislative Councils meeting by September, 1902. In the Orange River Colony the selection of the unofficial representatives offered no special difficulties, and the new Council, composed of nine members, met on January 14. With regard to the Transvaal Council, it was now arranged that it should consist of thirty members, namely, sixteen officials and fourteen nominated representatives of different classes and industries. The representation of the British community was comparatively easy to settle. In Sir G. Farrar and Sir J. P. FitzPatrick the Council would have, not only representatives of capital, but also the recognized leaders of the old Uitlander movement for political liberty. Representative members of the professional and mercantile classes and of organized labour were also available. As regards the Boers the idea was to include Botha, De la Rey and Smuts as representatives of the men

The new  
Legislative  
Councils.

The Boer  
attitude of  
abstention.



who had fought to the end, and two or three representatives of the "protected" burghers and of those who had actively joined the British side. The question of joining the Legislative Council had been discussed informally between Chamberlain and Botha at their interviews in London, and a definite offer was now made to the Boer leaders. After some hesitation and a good deal of discussion they eventually refused. The reason given was that the time had not come, in their opinion, for any form of representative institutions, and that the Government, which was in fact responsible, had better bear the whole burden of responsibility. The decision was, perhaps, unfortunate in its effect upon the progress of conciliation. But from the narrower point of view of party politics it was absolutely right. Once in the Council the Boer leaders would have found their freedom of criticism trammelled by the necessity of keeping to concrete issues of fact, and would inevitably to some extent have been credited by their followers with responsibility for Government measures. Outside they were free to say what they pleased and promise what they pleased unfettered by any consideration save that of working up and controlling a really effective political machine for the future. Their places on the Council were accordingly filled by respectable Dutchmen who played a useful part in urging the Boer point of view on practical economic issues, but who enjoyed very little political influence over their people. On the extension of municipal self-government in the Transvaal Chamberlain and Milner were equally intent, but decided to leave the working out of the question to the new Legislative Council. Meanwhile, during his stay at Johannesburg, Chamberlain had an interview with the existing nominated Town Council, who wished to benefit by the advice of one who had played so great a part in municipal affairs.

First session  
of Transvaal  
Legislative  
Council.  
Creation of  
municipal  
self-  
government.

The first public session of the enlarged Legislative Council of the Transvaal was formally opened by Lawley on May 20. From the very outset the Council proved a complete success. The nominated members threw themselves into their work with remarkable zeal. The greatest harmony prevailed and, though there was no lack of outspoken



criticism, there never was, in this or any subsequent session, that sharp cleavage of opinion or of attitude between the official and unofficial members which is often so marked a feature of similarly constituted assemblies. The effect, too, upon the general public of the full and free discussions of the Assembly was both to allay impatience and to inspire confidence. A number of issues of the first importance were discussed in this first session, including the report of the Commissions on the Gold Law and Diamond Law, and thirty-five ordinances were passed, of which the most important related to the institution of local self-government in the towns and villages of the Transvaal. There had been practically no local self-government in the Transvaal before the war, and the institution of nominated Town Councils in Johannesburg and Pretoria and of Health Boards in some other towns marked, not a reaction, but an actual advance.\* The Johannesburg Town Council proved an exceptionally capable body, and was especially fortunate in possessing in its town clerk, Mr. Lionel Curtis, a man of remarkable enthusiasm and driving power. Not content with preparing, for the special needs of Johannesburg, an important report on municipal franchise, and a series of draft ordinances dealing with the area, constitution, and powers of the municipality, Mr. Curtis convened a congress of representatives of all the nominated local bodies to discuss these draft ordinances before they were submitted to the Legislative Council. The whole of the municipal legislation passed by the Council was consequently, in practice if not in theory, the outcome of direct consultation with the people. It is characteristic of the whole spirit in which Crown colony government was administered that the Government, which at first wished to include aliens and certain qualified coloured persons in the municipal franchise, subsequently dropped the

\* There had been elected *stadraads* in Pretoria and Johannesburg, but their powers were very limited. The nominated Town Councils were not only very representative—the Johannesburg Town Council was re-elected almost *en bloc* at the first elections—but their powers were very wide. Moreover the new municipality of Johannesburg was a far greater thing than the old, sweeping into its net a large number of independent townships, and planned so as to allow of almost unlimited expansion.

proposal in view of the strong feeling of the public against it. To carry out the policy of the new legislation Mr. Curtis was made an Assistant Colonial Secretary, and under his energetic impulsion a large number of municipalities and urban district boards were constituted in the next few months. At the end of the year, barely eighteen months since the conclusion of hostilities, a general municipal election was in full swing throughout the Transvaal. In spite of the keen interest shown there were very few signs of racial feeling. A period of municipal activity followed, calling for all the energies of the leading citizens of the various townships, and contributing no little to the political education of the people. The establishment of local government in the towns was intended to be followed by the creation of elective divisional councils in the country districts, but the idea was dropped in deference to the objections of the Boer farmers, who were suspicious of any and every scheme which might involve local taxation.

Legislative  
and municipal  
activity  
in the O.R.C.

In the Orange River Colony the enlarged Legislative Council met as early as January, 1903. Its sessions proved as useful as those of the Transvaal, and a large number of ordinances was passed, the most important, not unnaturally, being those dealing with agricultural problems. The Council was still further enlarged at the end of the year by the addition of eight members, four official and four non-official. In the Orange River Colony there had been an active municipal life even before the war, which in many places had been kept going even during the progress of hostilities, and which revived and developed everywhere, under Government encouragement, after the peace.

Other  
questions  
discussed.

Besides the urgent problems of finance and of the extension of representative institutions, many other questions of importance were discussed between Chamberlain and Milner during these days, some of which were not actually settled till much later. The status of British Indians and other Asiatics; the administration of Swaziland; the cost of living in the new colonies; the closely connected problem of railway rates, and of the high charges of the shipping combine; the conflict with the Crown Agents for the

Colonies as to whether the Colonial Governments could accept local tenders — these and a whole host of other questions came up for review, and the discussions, even when not final, saved infinite explanatory correspondence and vexatious delays in the future.

On January 22 Chamberlain left Johannesburg for Krugersdorp and Potchefstroom, where he met with an enthusiastic reception. He was joined at Ventersdorp on the 24th by De la Rey, and both there and at Lichtenburg on the following day the British statesman and the Boer general addressed friendly crowds from a common platform, appealing for mutual trust and good-will. The cross-country "trek" ended on the 27th at Mafeking, where Chamberlain interviewed Khama and other Bechuana chiefs, and where he found the townsfolk vigorously discussing the question of annexation to the Transvaal. From Mafeking he went by rail to Kimberley, where a great public meeting was held in the town hall on the 30th. The main theme of his speech was the wider patriotism—the duty of South Africans to think of their country as a whole, and to prepare themselves to be active partners in the Empire—but he dealt in no hesitating fashion with the recent rebellion in the colony, and with the necessity that conciliation would have to come from the Dutch as well as from the English. The only jarring note was the hostility of the audience to Sprigg, who had come to meet Chamberlain, a hostility manifested at most public meetings in Cape Colony where the British element predominated. The next few days were spent in trekking across to Paardeberg and Bloemfontein. Here again Chamberlain's entry, on February 3, was marked by scenes of the greatest enthusiasm, while an address of welcome was presented in which all sections of the population had joined. The usual course of speeches was here varied on February 6 by a dramatic interview between Chamberlain and a deputation of extremists led by C. de Wet and Hertzog, who presented an address charging the British Government with deliberate breach of faith on a variety of counts. Chamberlain refused to accept the address, and in the most scathing fashion proceeded to pull the charges to pieces,

Chamberlain's tour,  
Mafeking,  
Kimberley,  
Bloemfontein, Jan. 22-  
Feb. 8.



and to chastise the Boer leaders for misleading their followers. His courage and uncompromising sincerity completely captured the deputation. They applauded heartily at the end of the meeting and most of them were subsequently only too eager to disavow the address. A conciliatory speech on the following evening helped to complete the profound impression the Colonial Secretary created in the few days of his stay in the Orange River Colony.

The tour in  
Cape Colony,  
Feb. 9-18.

The most delicate and difficult part of Chamberlain's mission was now to begin. To bring about a satisfactory state of things in Cape Colony, not by suspension of the Constitution, but by the sheer force of his personal influence, was his ambition, and to that task he devoted what remained of energies already taxed almost to their limit. February 10 and 11 were spent in a series of speeches at Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth. In the midst of loyalist audiences his chief concern was to preach reconciliation, and to urge the duty of contribution to the burden of Imperial defence. On the 13th he reached Graaff-Reinet, the home of militant Bond sentiment. The Bond stayed away from the reception, but Chamberlain took the occasion of a loyal address from the Mayor to recall a similar address presented to Milner five years earlier,\* and to declare in very straight terms that it was not professions of loyalty that were wanted, but definite proof of the abandonment of old aspirations and a genuine spirit of conciliation. The first indications of such a spirit were shown at Middelburg by Mr. N. de Waal, the Secretary of the Bond, though both there and at Paarl, the Bond as a whole still maintained its attitude of sulky reserve.

Chamberlain  
at Cape  
Town,  
Feb. 18-25.  
Hofmeyr's  
conciliatory  
attitude.

On the 18th, Chamberlain reached Cape Town amid scenes of wild enthusiasm, and addressed a vast concourse in Green Market Square. On the 21st, Merriman, Sauer, Hofmeyr, and a hundred members or supporters of the Bond, waited on him. Hofmeyr read out a speech in the course of which the boycotting of loyalists, the wearing of republican colours, and other actions calculated to create ill-feeling were expressly condemned. Chamberlain again

\* See vol. i., p. 207.

insisted that performance and not professions were required. But his private discussions with Hofmeyr convinced him that these professions were genuine, or, at any rate, that the only policy was to treat them as such and to hope for the best. To a loyal Dutch deputation who quoted instances of Bond intolerance and warned him against too ready an acceptance of Bond promises, he replied sympathetically, but urged that excessive mistrust was a mistaken and ungenerous policy. He even induced the Progressives to declare publicly that they received Hofmeyr's assurances in all sincerity. In private, however, he spoke very strongly to Sprigg against going too far in the Bond direction, and more especially against any such measure as the re-enfranchisement of rebels, which he was suspected of contemplating. It is difficult to say how far these negotiations with the Bond really affected the situation. For the moment the publication of Hofmeyr's speech seems to have exercised some influence on his followers, and, no doubt, in the situation as it then was, every month gained during which bitterness diminished was worth gaining. On the other hand, the fear that Chamberlain's efforts at conciliation might tend to give the upper hand once more to the "mugwump" element in the Progressive party, and weaken its effectiveness for the approaching elections, was not realized. The fact is, that on a political situation such as that in Cape Colony, Chamberlain could not impress his personality as effectively as upon the more fluid state of opinion in the new colonies. Neither he nor any one else really believed in a sudden conversion of the Bond, but such as it was, the effect of his visit was to the good. After a last buoyantly optimistic speech he sailed for England on February 25.

Thus ended a tour which played no inconsiderable part in the reconstruction. From the purely administrative point of view the visit was of the very greatest use. A number of pressing and troublesome questions were settled off-hand. On others the exchange of views between Chamberlain and Milner was so complete that Chamberlain had no hesitation afterwards in giving Milner the very widest discretion on almost every point. The difficult question of the war

Effects of  
Chamber-  
lain's visit.

contribution was adjusted on terms which did not, for the moment at any rate, seem to impose a burden which would cripple the development of the new colonies. But even more important than the immediate practical result was the moral effect produced by Chamberlain's personality and by the mere fact of his visit. In his own person he made the Empire a living reality to the Boers. His speeches brought home to them that they were not looked upon as mere subjects to be held down by force, but as potential citizens to be won over by fair argument. The note of finality with which he met all attempts to reopen the issues settled by the war, only added to the impression created by his exposition of the future of South Africa. Nothing else could have done, at that moment, what his campaign of speeches did to turn the eyes of South Africans away from the past to face the practical problems of the future. The direct results may not have seemed very great at the time. Within a few months Botha was describing the visit as a dismal failure from the point of view of conciliation, while Cape Progressives were deploring that Chamberlain had been completely hoodwinked by the Bond. Yet for all that, the visit remained, not a mere interlude, but a determining factor in the whole subsequent political development of South Africa.

The railway  
extension  
conference,  
March, 1903.

Milner, meanwhile, having once made sure of Chamberlain's support for his various schemes, economic and political, was determined to push ahead with all speed. To none of these schemes did he attach greater importance than to railway development, both as a direct means of stimulating progress in the country districts, and as a step to lowering the cost of living on the Rand, and so intensifying the efficiency of his mainspring, the mining industry. On March 3, within a week of Chamberlain's departure, the Railway Extension Conference met at Johannesburg to consider the best way of apportioning the £5,000,000 allocated to railways. The Conference, in which the unofficial members were in a majority, was composed, besides officials, of leading farmers and business men from both colonies, including Mr. Rissik, the former Surveyor-General of the South African Republic. Its deliberations were marked by



an intensely keen and practical spirit, and by an absence of all selfish particularism. A number of lines were recommended for immediate construction; other desirable lines, for which money was not available, were to be left over or taken up by private enterprise.

On March 10 the Customs Conference met at Bloemfontein. It was soon apparent that no customs agreement could be concluded without a preliminary understanding on railway rates. But after a few days' adjournment to enable the railway administrations to confer, a customs tariff was successfully framed to which all the colonies represented were able to adhere, and, for the first time, all internal tariff barriers disappeared in South Africa. The tariff was subject to considerable criticism in the Transvaal, somewhat undeservedly, considering that in remission of customs and railway rates it represented a relief of nearly a million to the Transvaal taxpayer. It included a substantial preference to the United Kingdom, amounting to 25 per cent. of the duty in most cases, and to a total remission of the duty in certain others. Besides establishing the Customs Union, the Conference passed a number of resolutions dealing with the status of the natives, and with the questions of native labour and of alien immigration, which will be more appropriately discussed in the following chapter. The only practical step suggested was the appointment of a commission to inquire into the whole field of native conditions, a suggestion carried out by Milner and resulting in the publication, in February, 1905, of a valuable report, the first report which ever treated the question from a South African and not a local point of view, and which has profoundly influenced all subsequent discussion of the problem. Lastly, the Conference unanimously passed a resolution expressing the hope that a future Conference might provide for "the union under one central federal administration of the whole of the colonies and territories under British rule, and the establishment of the Commonwealth of South Africa."

The preference to British trade was unanimously agreed upon at Bloemfontein. But there was some doubt whether Sprigg would be able to secure the assent of the Cape

The  
Bloemfontein  
Conference,  
March, 1903.  
First South  
African  
tariff. Native  
Affairs  
Commission.

South Africa  
and Imperial  
Preference.

Assembly, dominated by the Bond vote, and after the conference Milner wrote anxiously to Chamberlain for some token of encouragement from the mother-country. "It would be quite enough for South Africa if something, however slight, was done for Canada. This would recognize the principle, and South Africa might hope to benefit some day. But it is not the hypothetical mercantile advantages anybody worries about, but proof that England cares." Chamberlain, on his way back, had received at Madeira a telegram informing him of the Prime Minister's capitulation to fiscal pedantry in the matter of the corn tax. Tired out by his labours, disappointed and discouraged, he was in no mood for immediate action, and could hold out little hope to Milner in his reply.\* But the discouragement was only momentary. Neither his own physical exhaustion nor the convenience of a timid and divided ministry, could weigh against the imperious call of duty and conviction. On May 15 he spoke out. His protest, ringing from end to end of the Empire, evoked an instant response which there was no refusing. Forgetting all his weariness, the veteran statesman threw himself into the campaign with the heart and courage of a youth. Before long he relinquished office in order the more freely to spend all that remained to him of health and strength in the service of a great idea.

\* During these days Mr. Chamberlain replied in an equally discouraging strain to a similar eloquent appeal from Canada. See "The Struggle for Imperial Unity," by Col. G. T. Denison.

## CHAPTER V

## THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS SOLUTION

IMMENSE as were the difficulties with which the work of restoration had to cope, yet such was the energy with which Lord Milner and his subordinates threw themselves into it, that there seemed every hope in the closing months of 1902 that the whole population, industrial and agricultural, of the new colonies would be once more well on its feet before the middle of the following year. The only serious obstacle, apparently, to a complete revival and continuous expansion of prosperity was the delay in settling certain pressing questions of finance and general policy. Mr. Chamberlain's visit disposed of these. But instead of revival there followed depression, growing steadily acuter as the months went on, and threatening the whole Milner policy of development with financial paralysis. Unforeseen factors were at work making havoc of all calculations, imposing new financial burdens, and creating new political difficulties before they could be overcome. It is with these factors that the following pages have to deal.

The economic crisis.

By the end of 1902 the last of the burgher camps were being closed down,\* and it was hoped that the Repatriation Departments would be wound up before the anniversary of the peace. Enough land had been ploughed, by hook or

The great drought of 1902-3. Its effect on repatriation.

\* It was not till February, 1903, that the last camp in the Transvaal was finally emptied, but for some weeks before that the inmates of the camps had consisted mainly of widows, orphans, invalids and others, for whom special provision had to be made. In the Orange River Colony this special provision took the form of the creation in 1903-4 of a group of homes near Lindley called the "Hope Homes," which were managed by the Rev. Osborn Howe, to whom the institution largely owed its inception, and remained in existence till the middle of 1905.



by crook, and enough mealies sown to put the farmers beyond all danger of actual want after the approaching harvest. But no harvest worth speaking of ever came. During the war, when agriculture had been at a standstill, the seasons had been excellent. The first year of peace, when everything depended on a good harvest, was marked by the worst drought which South Africa had known for forty years. Where a scanty crop managed to struggle up, unseasonable frosts and hailstorms, locusts and caterpillars, combined to destroy it. Before the end of March it was evident that the immense effort of the last six months was largely wasted, and that a great part of the farming population would have to be fed by Government for another year. The vast and costly machinery of repatriation transport—whose sale, it had been hoped, would both help the farmers and relieve the exchequer—would have to be kept up, and would swallow up large sums already earmarked for purposes of development. For the Boers, the whole of 1903 proved a very trying time. Thanks to the efforts of the Repatriation Departments \* and to the enlargement of the scope of relief works, all danger of actual famine was averted. But the discouragement was widespread, and grumbling against the authorities was as inevitable as it was illogical.

Political and  
economic  
conse-  
quences.

For the Boer leaders, anxious to strengthen their influence as a political opposition, the opportunity was too good to be lost, and a campaign of systematic misrepresentation of the work of repatriation and relief was begun which fell upon receptive ears not only in South Africa but also in England. The farmers were told that all their hardships were due to the British authorities who had dishonestly squandered the promised relief on an extravagant and incapable horde of repatriation officers. Hopelessly confused by the whole complicated business of claims for losses, free grants, and advances, and only too glad to find some one to blame for their troubles, they readily swallowed the story in all its absurdity, and from that time onward looked to the leaders for future redress of the wrongs which they had suffered at

\* In the Orange River Colony the designation was changed to "Relief Department" after May 1, 1903.

the hands of an oppressive and inefficient administration. In England, in spite of disingenuous correspondence in the press emanating from the Boer leaders and from certain Englishmen and women still afflicted with the hysterical prejudice against their own countrymen which the war generated in a certain type of mind, public opinion was not seriously shaken in its confidence in the new administration, though even here the ceaseless drip of denunciation and depreciation was not without its effect. But for the moment the political consequences of the drought were less serious than the economic. The failure of the harvest put an end to the farmers' purchases, and, through the local store-keepers, was reflected in the accounts of the wholesale houses. The large stocks, rushed up so eagerly in the first hopeful months after the peace, were unsaleable. Imports were checked, and the general spread of economic depression was accompanied by a fall in customs and railway revenue at the very moment when the heavy financial burden of an additional year of repatriation had to be faced.

The economic depression caused by the failure of the harvest of 1903 would have mattered but little if it had been counterbalanced by a rapid expansion of industrial prosperity. But the industrial situation was even more serious than the agricultural. It was only a year's harvest that had been lost through the failure of the rains. But the failure of the supply of native labour for the mines threatened to impose a permanent check on all development, to upset for good all the calculations of capitalists and investors, and to frustrate irretrievably the expectations on which the whole of Milner's policy was based. Moreover, the ultimate serious consequences of this failure were aggravated by the natural reaction which had followed upon the tremendous activity of the first few months of peace. The peace had brought with it an enormous demand for goods of all kinds, and a great expenditure on purely temporary work in repairing the damage done by the war in various directions, accompanied by a large influx of new population. The rapid expansion of the mines to the old scale of production, and beyond, would easily have absorbed

The  
industrial  
depression

the surplus, both of merchants' stocks and of unemployed white labour, as the expenditure on temporary work fell off. The painful slowness of the actual recovery involved not merely delay or frustration of hopes based on the future, but acute and widespread distress in the present. Apart from all questions of future development and their effect upon his policy, Milner was faced with an urgent crisis in trade and employment affecting not only the Rand but the whole commercial and industrial population of South Africa.

The labour  
problem in  
South Africa.

To understand the nature of the labour problem in South Africa, it is essential to keep certain characteristic features of the situation clearly in view. The first of these was the convention, practically unbroken before the war, that all unskilled or rough manual toil must necessarily be done by coloured labourers, and that only the task of supervision or highly-skilled technical work was compatible with the dignity of the white man. There is nothing in the climate of South Africa to necessitate such a division of functions. Its explanation must be sought partly in historical circumstances going back to the old days of slavery, partly in the natural outcome of the contact of races on such different planes of civilization. But like the kindred prejudice which in England, though not in Japan, confines the task of vehicular traction to animals, the convention forbidding white men to do "Kaffirs' work" was none the less effective for being artificial. Again, if one feature of the situation was the insistence of the white man on having native labourers to do all his rough work for him, an equally marked feature was the decided disinclination of the native to play the part assigned to him in the white man's scheme of things. With few wants beyond food, free to cultivate as much land as he chose, the Kaffir was under no necessity of earning a livelihood by working for the white man; at the most he could be tempted away from his kraal for a time by a wage bearing no relation to his cost of living, but simply determined by his own disinclination and by the white man's need of him. Lastly, even if all the natives who could have been spared from their kraals had been willing to work, and to work all the year round, the total



number available would not have been very great. The whole native population of South Africa, south of the Zambesi, amounted at the most to about six millions, of whom one in ten at the outside was continuously available for the white man's purposes.

As far back as 1860 the Natal planters, unable to secure native labour even in one of the most populous regions of South Africa, had begun importing coolies from India. In spite of a continuous influx of coolies Natal still remained so short of labour that in 1901 the Legislature forbade any recruiting for the Transvaal in the colony, and that endeavours were even made to get labour from Portuguese territory. In 1870 the Cape Legislature sanctioned a project, never actually executed, for introducing Chinese to meet the needs of the Dutch farmers. A Select Committee in 1890 and a Government Commission in 1893 testified to the anxiety in Cape Colony, as did also the Act passed by Mr. Rhodes in 1894, known as the "Glen Grey Act," which imposed differential taxation against able-bodied natives who failed to work for an employer. Although the situation was perhaps less acute than elsewhere the shortage continued, and at the close of the war the importation of Italians into the Cape vineyards was being actively discussed. Even in Rhodesia the situation had become serious before the war, and the colonists were clamouring for labour from Abyssinia, Arabia, and more particularly from China. In 1900 the Colonial Office sanctioned a Rhodesian ordinance for the importation of indentured labour which included provisions of the most drastic character for the compulsory repatriation of the labourers at the end of their indenture. Under the ordinance a number of Arabs were imported in 1901, but proved unsatisfactory. To the suggested importation of Chinese Mr. Chamberlain gave a provisional refusal, but towards the end of the year consented to the recruiting of Chinese being included in the ordinance on the understanding that no action was to be taken in that direction unless the Administrator and Executive Council previously gave notice to the Colonial Office and secured its assent. That effect should be given to this qualified permission was afterwards

The problem  
in Natal,  
Cape Colony  
and  
Rhodesia.

suggested to Chamberlain by Milner in Johannesburg, both in the interests of Rhodesia, and for the sake of experiment. But Chamberlain was disinclined to move in view of the disfavour and suspicion with which the Chartered Company was still regarded in England, and the matter dropped through.

Difficulties  
in the  
Transvaal  
before the  
war.

The Transvaal mining industry had to contend with the labour difficulty from the start. For some years the stress was mitigated by the fact that it tapped a new source of native labour, partly in the Transvaal, but still more in Portuguese territory, where the natives were not only naturally more disposed to work, but where effective pressure to do so was put on them by the Portuguese administration. But after the boom of 1895 it became acute, and was intensified both by the failings of the Transvaal administration, and by the want of an organized recruiting system. Labour touts, ransacking the country in competition, ran up the price of labour to absurdly high figures, and imposed an additional burden on the industry in the shape of the most extravagant recruiting fees. The more unscrupulous of these touts did most of their recruiting on the Rand itself, inducing natives to desert from one mine and earning their fee by passing them on to another, a proceeding aided by the inadequacy of the Pass Law and its still more inadequate administration. A large proportion of the natives recruited was always incapacitated by drink owing to the open toleration of the illicit liquor traffic. The harassing exactions, and sometimes actual ill-treatment, which labourers had to endure on their way to and from the mines, contributed to discourage recruiting and to raise the cost. The labour difficulty was the question most urgently discussed before the Industrial Commission \* in 1897. The Commission recommended the creation of a board to control recruiting, but no practical results followed. Early in 1898 inquiries were made by the Chamber of Mines as to the possibility of getting miners from India, but the suggestion was not encouraged by the Indian Government. Proposals for importing Italians and Chinese were also considered but not followed up. Mean-

\* See vol. i., p. 217.

while every effort was made to secure natives, and by the middle of 1899 there were over 100,000 "boys" on the Rand, of whom fully three-quarters came from Portuguese territory.

When the war came the leading members of the mining industry occupied their enforced leisure in discussing how to organize the labour supply on a sounder footing. The outcome of these discussions was a general agreement to have all the recruiting for the mines done by a single responsible organization, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, which was now constituted. It was further decided to lower the wages, which competition had recently forced up to 45s. a month and over (exclusive of food and housing), to 30s. The result of this, it was believed, would not only be a large direct saving to the mines without reducing the labour supply, but would actually increase that supply by making the natives stay longer to earn the same amount. In the peculiar economic conditions of South Africa the belief was by no means an unreasonable one. Moreover, as the Transvaal Government had after the outbreak of the war lowered the wages of all natives left on the Rand to 20s., a rate which was continued by the military, it was hoped that the native would look upon the 30s. as a rise and not a fall. While the mine-owners were taking these measures in their own interests, everything was being done by Milner to facilitate the supply of labour and improve its conditions as soon as peace should be restored. The *modus vivendi*, by which the Portuguese agreed to assist the Labour Association in every way, the improvement in the Pass Law and in the general treatment of natives, the vigorous steps taken to suppress the illicit liquor traffic, have been referred to in an earlier passage. The effect of all these evidences of forethought on the part of the new administration, so different from the old, was to inspire the most unquestioning confidence in the future on the part of all connected with the mining industry. A return to the 1899 level of 6,000 stamps was expected almost the moment the fighting ceased, and an increase to 10,000 within the next two or three years was regarded as in the nature of a certainty.

Measures during the war. The Native Labour Association. The reduction of wages.



The shortage  
after the  
peace.

Peace came, and everybody flocked back to the mines prepared to resume work—everybody, that is, except the native labourers on whom the whole industrial structure depended. Various reasons were discovered for their absence. The length of the war had dislocated the habit of going to the mines, and a little time was needed to instil it again. Large sums had been paid by the military for various services, and these would have to be spent before the natives would want to earn any more. All that was needed was a little patience. But month after month passed without any signs of the situation improving. From nearly 30,000 at the peace the numbers at work in the mines had only risen to 40,000 by the end of the year. Gradually people began to suspect the true cause of the mischief. The labour was not forthcoming at the mines because it was being absorbed elsewhere, in the work of repatriation and restoration in the country, in the service of the military and civil population of the towns, on the railways, at the seaports, in the general expansion which followed the war, and which was itself based on the expectation of a great mining development. And the recognition of that fact involved as a corollary the much more serious conclusion that the limit of the available supply had been reached, or very nearly reached. But, if so, then, on the existing industrial basis, there could be no such thing as rapid general progress in South Africa. The mines might slowly get back to their old level, or even in time exceed it. But it could only be when the special work required after the war was done, and as long as the rest of South Africa was at a standstill. Yet from Milner down to the humblest irregular who had taken his discharge in the country, there was no one whose plans had not been based on the expectation of a great expansion of the mining industry in particular and of South Africa in general.

General  
realization of  
the true  
cause;  
suggested  
remedies.

For some time the reluctance to accept this conclusion and all it involved was intense. Men hoped against hope that there was some defect in the method of tapping the existing labour supply and that a great increase might yet be secured by additional efforts. Some clamoured for a reversion to the old touting system, and abused the new

association, which, as a matter of fact, had reduced desertion from 70 per cent. to 4 per cent., and but for which the situation would undoubtedly have been much worse. Others urged an immediate return to the 45s. wage. Whatever might have been said in the abstract for lowering the wage, the fact that every other employer was at that moment paying far more for lighter and more attractive work made the position absurd. As early as September, 1902, the wages were largely raised by the extension of piece-work, and in January, 1903, the Chamber of Mines decided on an all-round return to the higher rate. But there was no very marked increase, and by March the total of natives at work had only risen to 50,000. By this time practically the whole body of expert opinion—mine-owners, managers, engineers—had acquiesced in the conclusion that the South African supply could not meet either the immediate or the prospective demands of the industry. And this conclusion was endorsed by the Bloemfontein Conference, which, while recommending various means to improve labour conditions and render them more attractive, definitely declared that the South African supply was insufficient for the country, and that the opening up of new sources was requisite in the interest of all the South African States. These new sources, the Conference went on to suggest, should primarily be looked for in the British territories in Central and Eastern Africa. If they proved insufficient and industrial development positively required fresh labour, the Conference, while insisting that the permanent settlement of Asiatics should not be permitted, was prepared to approve of the importation of unskilled Asiatic labourers under Government control, and on the condition that they should be repatriated at the end of their indenture.

Of the two solutions referred to by the Conference, the recruiting of labour in other parts of Africa was a step on which everybody was agreed, but from which few expected really substantial results. It was very different with the other solution, that of importing Asiatic, and more particularly Chinese, labour. This measure, discussed before the war, was from the very beginning of the labour crisis

Public  
attitude  
towards  
Asiatic  
labour.

advocated as the only possible remedy by a small section of the industrial leaders. By the rest of the industry and by the Rand community generally the suggestion was received with the greatest aversion. The example of Natal, where the time-expired coolie had spread over the country and was steadily displacing white craftsmen, white shopkeepers, and even white farmers, was constantly before their eyes. The white miner objected to the introduction of labourers capable of doing his own skilled work at a fraction of his pay. The shopkeeper dreaded the letting loose of competitors who would ruin his trade. The citizen shrank from the idea of adding yet another racial problem to the complexity of South African affairs. That all these evils could be obviated by legislative precautions was at first hardly realized, or, if realized, was disbelieved. Gradually, however, as the crisis continued and the depression increased, men familiarized themselves with the possibility of an effectively controlled and restricted importation. By the time of Chamberlain's visit many of the "capitalists" and experts were known to be privately, if not publicly, in favour of Chinese, and there were rumours of a compact over the war contribution which Chamberlain's public utterances proved to be unfounded. The last strong declaration of opinion against Chinese importation by any leading representative of the industry was made by Sir P. FitzPatrick at the end of February. But by April the Chamber of Mines was practically solid in favour of Chinese labour.

The white  
labour  
solution.

Meanwhile, a small group of men were looking for a solution in an entirely different direction. The only radical cure for the perennial labour difficulty was, in their view, to be found in breaking down the mischievous tradition which made the white community live in economic dependence upon the black. That tradition not only limited industrial development, but it also even more inexorably limited the proportion of the white element in the total population, and would inevitably, sooner or later, involve the predominance of the coloured element. Nor had the existing system even the justification of economic efficiency. The bulk of its labour, indeed, was comparatively cheap. But some of it



was excessively dear. And the resultant organization could never be otherwise than extravagant. It might be true enough that the white workman could not take the place of the Kaffir in the existing industrial organization without a prohibitive increase of cost. And yet it was equally true that a mine might be worked at a greater efficiency and at a lower cost by 1,000 white workmen than by 250 white foremen supervising 4,000 raw Kaffirs. Awkward as the labour shortage might be, here was a great opportunity, they argued, for breaking with the old false tradition and making a beginning of placing the whole development of South Africa on a sounder basis.

The advocates of white labour were absolutely right in the general principle for which they contended. The ultimate future of the white race in South Africa depends on liberation from its present economic servitude to the native. Yet for that particular crisis and in the peculiar circumstances of the mining industry, the solution they recommended was a hopeless and impossible one. In the first place, the mining industry was the very last one to which the experiment could safely be applied. Whatever might be the result in the direction of ultimate economy from the placing of the industry on a white basis, the initial stage was bound to be one of increased cost. But, owing to the low-grade character of most of the reef, the total volume of the industry depended directly upon keeping down the costs of production. For a large section of the mines a rise of working costs was not a question of reducing profits but of suspending work altogether. Yet upon the mining industry depended the whole British population of the Transvaal, and a very large part of the rest of the white population of South Africa. To bring in a few thousand white labourers on the mines at the cost of throwing out of employment a much larger number of skilled workmen and shopkeepers all over South Africa was a very doubtful way of realizing the white labour ideal. Moreover, there was practically no surplus white population available on the spot to take up the work. Yet it was only with such a population that the experiment could really hope for

Not applicable to the immediate crisis.

success.\* Emigrants who are worth having cannot be secured by the prospect of hard labour at a bare subsistence wage in a strange land. The only sound and feasible way of bringing South Africa on to a white labour basis was to hasten the development on the existing basis, to increase the total white population, lower the cost of living, and then work downwards, gradually extending the scope of white labour, especially in industries producing for the home market, in the case of which the additional cost of the transition period might be covered by protective duties or relieved by bounties, or in public works where it would be equally divided among the community. The mistake of the white labour section lay not in their general principle but in their belief that South Africa could be regenerated by starving its chief industry, and more particularly an industry of so exceptional a character, in the midst of an acute economic crisis.

Mr. Creswell  
and the white  
labour party.

It is essential to keep in mind throughout that the white labour view was at that time an entirely new and unfamiliar one to South Africa. The movement was confined to a very small handful of persons, and to a very remarkable extent was inspired and directed by a single mind. When, at the close of the war, Kitchener appealed to the mines to find temporary work for discharged soldiers, Mr. F. H. P. Creswell, an ex-officer of the Imperial Light Horse, and manager of the Village Main Reef Mine, eagerly seized the opportunity to secure the permission of his firm to take on a considerable number of these men. He received every encouragement, and was able to show that it was possible, by changes in the interior organization of the mine, to make the employment of white labour considerably less costly than was generally supposed. But when he went on to claim that he could work as cheaply with white labour as with coloured, and that the general shortage of labour could be met by the importation of unskilled white labourers, the claim was rejected by every other mine manager and engineer. The

\* It is worth noting that both in the mines and on railway construction the few hundred Dutch *bywoners* who were employed did quite good work, and efficient work has been done since (1907-8) on railways and other public works by *bywoners* and British unemployed.

leaders of the industry, who had sympathized with the experiment when the shortage of native labour was still only thought to be temporary, became less sympathetic when they grasped the full seriousness of the situation and began to realize what Creswell was really aiming at. By October, 1902, they made it clear that they were not prepared to regard white labour on a large scale as a feasible solution. It is possible that they may have shown a certain impatience and narrowness of attitude. But the question was a vital one for them, and they were convinced that it would be disastrous to follow Creswell's advice and revolutionize the whole industry in the middle of an acute crisis. They could no more enter philosophically into the merits of white labour at that moment than Lancashire could have entered into the merits of wool during the cotton famine. Creswell and his friends on their side soon lost all sense of proportion, and threw themselves with frenzied zeal into an anti-Chinese, and eventually anti-capitalist agitation, in the course of which the original issues were largely lost sight of.

Milner, meanwhile, had been following the situation with growing anxiety. He had sympathized not only with Creswell's actual experiment, but with the point of view underlying it. But he was not prepared to force the white labour solution in the teeth of the great body of expert opinion which pronounced it impossible. For some time he looked to an improvement in the native labour supply, and it was not till March that he was definitely convinced that there was no native supply adequate to the needs of South African expansion. Once at that point, his mind travelled quickly to the inevitable conclusion that labour would have to be imported from wherever it was procurable, and at all hazards. For the moment, the labour question was the key of the whole Imperial position in South Africa. For without labour there could be no rapid expansion of the mining industry. But upon the "over-spill" of that expansion depended, not only the immediate British immigration to which he looked to ensure political stability in the next few years, but also the revenue for carrying out the whole policy of development by which the industrial and

Milner  
converted to  
necessity of  
importation,  
March, 1903.



agricultural future of the country was to be secured. To the capitalists the labour question was a matter of profit or loss. To Milner it meant the success or failure of British policy.

Advantages  
of restricted  
importation.

However unpleasant the prospect, the importation of Asiatics had to be faced. Unrestricted immigration was impossible. Even if South African opinion had tolerated it, it would have defeated the whole object of Milner's policy, the building up of a white, and predominantly British Transvaal. But importation restricted to certain classes of work, and limited by compulsory repatriation, was not only possible; it possessed certain positive advantages over the use of native labour. While the use of native labour limited industrial development in the present by the available total of the native population, it tended in the long run to encourage the increase of that population, and thus to increase the obstacles in the way of a white South Africa. The indentured Asiatic, on the other hand, would serve as a vector to bring a permanent white population into South Africa without becoming a permanent element himself. When the white population had grown, when the cost of living had been reduced, then the Asiatic would have served his purpose and could gradually be eliminated. As his elimination took place the scope of white labour would extend, not by the vain and undesirable attempt to introduce an unmarried white proletariat in a country where it was essential to maintain the standard of white civilization at a high level, and to preserve the purity of the white race, but by the gradual taking up of new occupations by an already established white population.\* Taken up as an

\* The following passage from a reply to a deputation from the White League on January 6, 1903, gives Lord Milner's view in a concise form: "Our welfare depends upon increasing the quantity of our white population, but not at the expense of its quality. We do not want a white proletariat in this country. The position of the whites among the vastly more numerous black population requires that even their lowest ranks should be able to maintain a standard of living far above that of the poorest section of the population of a purely white country. But, without making them hewers of wood and drawers of water, there are scores and scores of employments in which white men could be honourably and profitably employed if we could at once succeed in multiplying our

unpleasant necessity, the Chinese policy was, in fact, the true white policy. It supplied the scaffolding, unsightly perhaps but necessary, with the help of which the 'permanent structure of white industry was to be erected. There was a further incidental advantage in the policy of importation; it would not only help to free white South Africa from its dependence on the Kaffir, but also to free the Transvaal in particular from its dependence on the Portuguese.

But though Milner was now himself convinced of the necessity of Chinese labour, he knew there could be no question of its introduction before public opinion in the Transvaal was equally convinced. For one thing, it would have been contrary to the whole spirit of his administration to take so momentous a step against the wishes of the community. For another, there was no prospect of securing assent to the necessary legislation from Chamberlain and the British Government unless the demand for it came from the people. Meanwhile it was essential to do everything that was possible to relieve the situation. In March the consent of the Foreign Office was obtained for the experimental recruiting of 1,000 "boys" in the British Central Africa Protectorate. The result was not altogether satisfactory, as the newcomers suffered a great deal from lung complaints in the cold climate of the Rand, but sanction for another 5,000 was given early in 1904. Efforts to get natives from Lagos, Nigeria, and Uganda proved fruitless. Though now convinced of the uselessness of the white labour solution for the mining crisis, Milner hoped that something might be done, both for white labour and to relieve the strain on the native supply, by employing white navvies on railway construction. As a beginning some 600 were recruited in England and began to

Recruiting  
in Central  
Africa. The  
white  
navvies.  
Negotiations  
with India.

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industries and in reducing the cost of living. . . . However you look at the matter, you always come back to the same root principle—the urgency of that development which alone can make this a white man's country . . . not a country full of poor whites, but one in which a largely increased white population can live in decency and comfort. That development . . . requires a large amount of rough labour. And that labour cannot, to any great extent, be white, if only because, pending development and the subsequent reduction in the cost of living, white labour is much too dear."

arrive in June, 1903. The result was a hopeless failure. The work cost nearly four times what it would have cost if given out to a contractor employing natives, and the Government were glad to send the men back before the end of the year. At the same time Milner endeavoured to secure some 10,000 Indian labourers for the railway work, on terms of compulsory repatriation. But the Indian Government refused to sanction this step unless the Transvaal altered its whole legislation with regard to Asiatic immigrants. The proposal accordingly fell through, and with it also any hope of getting labour for the mines from that quarter.

Improvement  
in native  
labour  
conditions.

One measure to which Milner devoted himself wholeheartedly from first to last was the improvement of the general conditions under which the Kaffirs lived on the mines. Already in May, 1902, he had appointed Dr. C. L. Sansom to report on the food, housing and medical treatment of the labourers. The report showed a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs—food often unfit for human consumption, overcrowding in insanitary quarters, hospital accommodation and medical supervision lamentably inadequate. Deeply impressed by these disclosures, Milner threw the whole weight of his personal influence into the work of persuading the leading mine-owners of the necessity of sweeping reforms. In most cases he met with a ready response, and a complete revolution took place in the conditions on the mines, while effective legislation passed at a subsequent date prevented any danger of a reversion to the old state of neglect. In February, 1903, a committee of doctors was appointed to inquire into the possibility of further preventive measures with a view to the reduction of the enormously high death-rate on the mines, and reported in June. Thanks to the vigilant exertions of Dr. Sansom, as chief medical inspector, and to the continuous steady pressure exercised by Milner, the death-rate from disease, which stood at 54 per mille per annum in the first five months of 1903, and had previously in certain months risen to 120, was within a year reduced to 36 and subsequently to 30. The conversion of noisome dens into wholesome barracks, of an ill-housed, ill-fed, neglected crowd of natives, sodden with scurvy and tuber-



culosis, into a well-fed, properly tended and reasonably healthy army of workers, and the creation of a sound public opinion among those responsible for the conditions on the mines, was an achievement which, standing alone, might have made the reputation of an administrator. In Milner's case it passed almost unnoticed in the crowd of more important or more controversial issues.

The public campaign in the Transvaal on the Chinese Labour Question may be said to have begun with a comprehensive speech in favour of importation under strict safeguards delivered by Sir G. Farrar at a public meeting on March 31. On the following night the recently constituted White League held a great mass meeting at the Wanderers' Hall, which was practically unanimous in its opposition to the proposal. Apart from general expressions of prejudice, the keynote of the speeches of Mr. J. W. Quinn and other opponents was that the safeguards could not be maintained and that the Chinese would not buy in the local shops but would send their money home. Public opposition, indeed, was practically throughout confined to the general prejudice against the Chinamen and the fear of subsequent relaxation of the safeguards. The white labour idea, though sometimes referred to in speeches, was still wholly foreign to the conceptions of the ordinary South African. On June 2 a deputation of the White League\* interviewed Milner and received an answer which indicated unmistakably the direction in which his mind was working. Early in July, the advocates of Chinese labour organized themselves into a "Labour Importation Association" and began a vigorous programme of educational meetings. At the same time the first important step forward was taken by the Government in the appointment of a strong commission to inquire into the amount of labour required by the agricultural, mining, and other industries of the Transvaal, and to ascertain how far a supply adequate to those requirements could be obtained from Central and South Africa. The verdict of the Commission was almost a foregone conclusion, not because it was packed,

The public movement for Chinese labour. Appointment of Labour Commission.

\* The White League soon after seems to have been merged in the African Labour League, which urged greater efforts to secure African labour.

but because it would have been impossible to secure any commission, representative of the interests affected, whose verdict would have been different. Schalk Burger, the chairman of the 1897 commission, and another leading representative of the militant Boer section, were invited to sit on the Commission, but declined in accordance with the policy of avoiding all responsibility. Several Boers, however, including General Botha, gave evidence on the supply of labour in the Transvaal, and on the labour requirements of agriculture.

Milner's visit to England, Aug.-Dec. 1903. He refuses the Colonial Secretaryship.

Milner had little doubt as to the ultimate decision of the industrial community. But for the moment he had to wait for the issue to be fought out, just as he had waited in 1901. And once again he decided to make use of the occasion, not only to recruit from the severe strain on his health, but also to impress his views upon leading men of both parties at home. Early in August he left South Africa, and, after a short stay in England, went to Karlsbad. While he was there he received the news of Mr. Chamberlain's resignation from the Cabinet on the issue of Imperial Preference, and following close upon it an urgent invitation to accept the Colonial Secretaryship himself. To an ambitious man the temptation would have been irresistible. A self-seeking man might have welcomed the opportunity to leave South Africa at the height of his popularity and fame, rather than return to the depreciation and obloquy which, no one knew so well as he, awaited him. Milner decided that his duty was to stay at his post in the new colonies. He alone enjoyed the influence which could guide them safely through the crisis. It might be all but expended in the process; if so, that would only show how much it was needed. For nearly three weeks Balfour and Chamberlain endeavoured to shake him, but to no purpose. It was a splendid decision, and unquestionably the right decision.

He discusses the Chinese question with Lyttelton.

On his return to England Milner devoted himself to expounding to the Cabinet, and more particularly to Mr. Alfred Lyttelton, who had succeeded to the Colonial Secretaryship, the necessity both for Chinese labour and for the special legislative safeguards by which its introduction

would have to be hedged. Lyttelton, who had already had some experience of South African affairs, was in entire sympathy and prepared to do anything that was necessary in the interests of the South African situation, even though it might result, as he feared it would, in serious political trouble at home. There had been signs of an attempt to work up an anti-Chinese agitation on the part of the Radical extremists, and Lyttelton was convinced that the opportunity for making political capital was one which the Liberal leaders would find too precious to leave unused. Milner, on the other hand, was inclined to treat the political difficulty less seriously. He had still, to a considerable extent, kept in touch with the more moderate wing of the Liberal party, and was under the impression that his friends could once again be relied upon to exercise their influence against any purely mischievous agitation.

On December 19 Milner was back in Johannesburg, where he was met by addresses of welcome from every town in the Transvaal, delivered at a great public meeting at the Wanderers'. During the five months of his absence a remarkable change had come over public opinion, the result, partly of vigorous propagandism, but still more of the irresistible pressure of facts. In spite of every effort the mines had been unable to secure more than 65,000 "boys" by the end of November—less than half their immediate requirements—and even with the most uneconomical use of white supervision, these figures would not allow of employment for 13,000 white workers, including considerably over 1,000 employed in unskilled work.\* To ease the strain Sir A. Lawley had suspended a great part of the programme of railway construction, but with no appreciable results. The Transvaal revenue in the latter half of 1903 was falling off at the rate of £100,000 a month, as compared with the figures of 1902; the unpleasant process of "retrenchment" was already beginning in the Government departments;

Milner's  
return.  
Intensity of  
the crisis.  
Growth of  
Chinese  
movement.

\* An attempt to extend this number by employing some Italians on one of the mines in November promptly led to a strike of the skilled miners. A similar strike had interfered with Mr. Creswell's efforts at reorganization a year earlier,



the Constabulary had to be heavily reduced. One of the first things Milner had to do on his return was to telegraph to Lyttelton to ask that the raising of the first £10,000,000 of the war contribution loan should be postponed. Most serious of all, a steady emigration of impoverished and disappointed men was now beginning. At least 30,000 newcomers, over and above the returning Uitlanders, had entered the Transvaal in the first few months after the peace. The census in April, 1904, showed that the loss in the last six months had at least balanced the previous gain. All through August, September and October, the Labour Importation Association had been holding meetings with steadily increasing effect, not only on the Rand, but in other parts of the Transvaal. The movement met with considerable support from the Boer farmers who were, in many cases, hardly less short of labour than the mines, and dreaded the consequences to themselves if the mines were compelled to raise their wage still higher. Botha and the other political leaders were hostile, in accordance with their general policy of criticism, and in order to play up to their political sympathizers in England. But they confined themselves, in the main, to advising their people to take no responsibility in the matter.

Report of  
the Labour  
Commission,  
Nov. 1903.

On November 19 the Labour Commission published its report. All but two of the commissioners were agreed that the expansion of South African industries had far outstripped the supply, and to an extent which they had not realized themselves till they had weighed all the evidence which had been presented to them. The mines alone stood in need of 129,000 labourers above the existing supply, and would require 196,000 in the next five years. The deficiency in agriculture and other industries was almost as great, and would increase proportionately. There was no adequate supply in Central or Southern Africa for these requirements.\* The idea of compulsion, whether direct or indirect, which was suggested by some witnesses, was rejected, not only on general grounds,

\* This finding was subsequently endorsed by the Native Affairs Commission, whose report, published on February 8, put the shortage of native labour at 800,000.

but also as unlikely to effect its object. The minority report, signed by Messrs. Quinn and Whiteside, was based partly on criticism of the actual estimates of the majority, partly on a plea for white unskilled labour. Underlying it throughout was the refusal to admit any necessity for the immediate rapid expansion of the mining industry.

The publication of the report and evidence was the turning-point in the campaign. On December 2 a meeting of the Chamber of Mines declared unanimously for Chinese labour, and was followed by equally unanimous meetings of the Stock Exchange and of the Chamber of Trade. Mr. Monypenny, who had ably and consistently championed the white labour view in the *Star*, now resigned his editorship, feeling the uselessness of continuing the struggle.\* On December 14 the anti-Chinese party made a last effort on a large scale in the shape of a meeting at the Wanderers' to ask for a referendum. The Labour Importation Association urged their followers to attend, with the result that the meeting was wrecked, while a large crowd outside demonstrated for Chinese. There was no objection in principle to a referendum, but it would have involved serious delay in getting out a voters' list, and the temptation to discomfit the administration, regardless of personal views or even interests on the question at issue, might have proved too strong for the Boers to resist. A petition for Chinese labour was, however, got up, and by the end of January was signed by over 45,000 out of a total of 90,000 male white adults in the country. As the 15,000 Government employees and the bulk of the Boers abstained, the total number of active opponents can by then have only been

Conversion  
of the public.  
The petition.

\* Another resignation which took place at the same time, and which caused some stir, was that of Mr. Wybergh, Commissioner of Mines. The appointment had not proved altogether a success, and complaints of the want of sufficiently businesslike organization in the department, confirmed by official inquiry, had decided Sir A. Lawley to insist on Mr. Wybergh's resignation, leaving the latter, however, some latitude to choose the occasion. This Mr. Wybergh now did, unfortunately in such a manner as to convey the suggestion that he was resigning out of sympathy with the white labour view, and in distrust of the capitalist influences which were swaying the Government.

very small. The attempt to get up a counter-petition fell through.

The Labour Ordinance, Feb. 1904. Its special features.

Meanwhile, on December 28, Sir G. Farrar introduced a motion in the Legislative Council asking the Government to prepare a draft ordinance for the importation of unskilled labourers. After three days' debate the motion was carried by twenty-two to four. The majority included nine unofficial members, four of whom were Boers, and all the official members, the latter being free to vote entirely according to their individual convictions. The ordinance, a draft of which had, as a matter of fact, already been prepared by Sir R. Solomon for the consideration of the Colonial Office, was introduced in the Council on January 19. The second reading was moved by Solomon on the following day, and the ordinance finally passed on February 10. In its main features the ordinance conformed to the ordinary type devised for the regulation and protection of indentured labour in other British colonies, though its provisions were in several respects more favourable to the labourer than those of other similar ordinances.\* Of its special provisions, compulsory repatriation had formed part of the Queensland Act of 1886 and of the Rhodesian Ordinance of 1900.† The really novel feature was the definite restriction of the indentured labourer to unskilled labour in the exploitation

\* *E.g.*, than those of the British Guiana Ordinance sanctioned by a Liberal Government in 1894, or of the very similar Trinidad Ordinance of 1899. Under the former the indenture was for five years, and only at the end of ten years was the labourer entitled to three-quarters of the cost of his passage home. If he wished to leave before his indenture expired he had to refund the whole cost of his outward journey, as well as pay his journey home. Under the Transvaal Ordinance the indenture was for three years only, at the end of which time the labourer could claim a free passage home, while, if he wished to return before, he only had to refund a proportion of the outward fare corresponding to the unexpired period of his indenture. In many minor details, too, the position of the immigrant under the Transvaal Ordinance was much more favourable than that of the Indian coolie in British Guiana or any other colony where indentured labour was employed.

† Repatriation was, in practice, insisted on by the Portuguese authorities in the case of labourers from their territories, and is in future to be directly enforced by the Transvaal Government as well, as a result of a recent agreement superseding the *modus vivendi* of 1901.



of minerals within the Witwatersrand district, the nature of that unskilled labour being still further defined by a schedule of some fifty skilled occupations from which he was specifically excluded. It was precisely in this limitation and the provision for repatriation that the ordinance marked a real advance towards the solution of a difficult problem. For the first time a white community was enabled to secure abundant labour for a certain specific purpose, for which cheap labour was essential, without danger to its racial integrity, and without giving employers any opportunity for enlarging the scope of that labour for the sake of private profit. Once set, the example is one which—in spite of all that may seem temporarily to have discredited it—will almost inevitably be followed wherever similar circumstances may happen to arise.

The interest in the Chinese question was by no means confined to the Transvaal. Natal, whose trade was suffering acutely from the Transvaal depression, and Rhodesia, where the labour crisis was almost as serious, relatively, as on the Rand, were both in favour of the Chinese. In Cape Colony, on the other hand, opposition was at first intense and almost universal. Resolutions were passed in the Assembly, and a large number of meetings of protest held all over the colony. Based on a general anxiety lest the Chinese should be allowed to settle permanently and spread over the country, the opposition would probably have died down quickly, as the true character of the proposed measure became known, but for political reasons. An election was in prospect, and both parties were anxious to secure the coloured voter, who not unnaturally looked upon the importation of Chinese as an interference with his profitable monopoly of the labour market. In the case of the Progressives the opposition was tempered by a realization of the injury Cape Colony was suffering from the Transvaal depression, and by a reluctance to interfere in Transvaal affairs. It practically resolved itself into an anxiety for a special measure, subsequently passed, to prevent any Chinamen getting into Cape Colony. On the other hand the Bond, and still more its English allies, revelled in the favourable opportunity for denouncing

Attitude of  
other  
colonies

Lord Milner and all his works. In Australia and New Zealand the news that Chinamen were to be imported wholesale into a British colony was received with indignation and dismay. Resolutions of disapproval were passed in the Legislatures, and both Mr. Deakin and Mr. Seddon sent urgent protests to the Colonial Office and to the Transvaal Government. The exclusion of the Asiatic, and the maintenance of a purely white community has been, alike for Australians and for New Zealanders, a vital principle of national self-preservation, for which they have in the past successfully contended against the opposition of Downing Street, and in the face of the disapproval of Mr. Gladstone and of all the *laissez-faire, laissez-passer* school. Of the peculiar social and economic conditions of South Africa, of the exceptional restrictions by which importation was to be safeguarded, they knew nothing. They conceived the conditions to be like their own, and regarded the proposal as simply a betrayal by the Imperial authorities of the national future of South Africa. A complete revulsion of feeling set in against the whole Imperial policy in South Africa. That this should have occurred was profoundly regrettable. But it only illustrates the need for fuller mutual knowledge between the different portions of the Empire, and for constant consultation on matters of Imperial policy. It is interesting to notice that in Canada, where no Asiatic problem had, as yet, arisen, the question failed to arouse the slightest interest, while the Canadian Government refused to join in any remonstrance on the subject.

Public  
opinion in  
England  
during 1903.

In England the importation of Asiatics was at first strongly deprecated by many thoughtful students of Imperial affairs, who hoped much from the white labour solution as a means of strengthening the British element in the new colonies. It was not till the situation had become really acute in the Transvaal that the practical obstacles to such a solution were generally recognized, and that opposition gave way to a readiness to acquiesce in any measure which Lord Milner considered necessary and which was supported by public opinion in the colony. This, in the main, was the attitude taken by Mr. Chamberlain, both before and

after leaving office, and maintained with consistency and courage by Mr. Lyttelton after him. But there was another section which, at an early stage, began to manifest a very keen concern in the question. The extreme element in the Liberal party took no direct interest in the white labour solution. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman had protested against the policy of land settlement, and any other measure for strengthening the British population of the Transvaal would, as far as it went, have been equally distasteful to men who had committed themselves to an unreasoning advocacy of the Boers, and a no less unreasoning dislike of British South Africans. But by a natural instinct they at once ranged themselves in opposition to a proposal which they believed to be instigated by the designing capitalists of the Rand and supported by their misguided tool, Lord Milner. Nor were they slow to discover that the subject, suitably handled, was one on which a very effective popular agitation might be worked up against the Unionist Government. During the session of 1903 their efforts were mainly confined to accusing the colonists of wishing to impose forced labour on the natives and to general denunciation of the Chinese. The more moderate men in the Liberal party as yet held aloof, divided between their better judgment and their natural reluctance to reject such good material for making party capital. Milner, at any rate, left England at the end of the year convinced that they would support him again on this issue, as they had supported him on the general issue of the war.

But when the session of 1904 opened, party feeling had become intensified as the prospects of a general election seemed nearer, and the temptation to use every stick with which to belabour an already unpopular Government was too strong to be resisted, even by those who had hitherto maintained a prudent reserve. The Chinese question was raised on the Address on February 16, and on February 22 the adjournment of the House was moved on the promulgation of the ordinance in the Transvaal. On March 12, after prolonged telegraphic discussion of details, Lyttelton announced the British Government's sanction of the ordinance. On March 21 Campbell-Bannerman accordingly moved a formal vote of

The Liberals  
in the session  
of 1904.



The anti-Chinese agitation in England. Its unreality and dishonesty.

censure, which was rejected by 57 votes, while yet another debate was worked up on March 24. The tone throughout these debates and at public meetings was one of intense bitterness.

The extraordinary feature of the whole anti-Chinese agitation in England was that it bore very little relation to the real issues which were agitating South Africa. It was not primarily inspired either by the white labour view or by the ordinary South African fear that the safeguards against the spread of the Asiatic might not prove effective. Its one theme was the denunciation of those provisions of the ordinance which were common to it and a score of other ordinances passed, without discussion, by both parties, or which only applied to the imported labourer the ordinary restrictions enforced upon the Kaffir. These provisions were held up to execration as constituting slavery by gentlemen who had sanctioned, or were destined to sanction in the future, provisions of a much more drastic character elsewhere. When this was pointed out there was sometimes a shuffling attempt to make out that the slavery lay, not in the conditions under which the labourers worked, but in the fact that they were not allowed to do other work or become permanent residents in South Africa. But in the main, and as far as the general public were concerned, the agitation was based, then and subsequently, on hysterical denunciation of regulations which were at that time, and still are to-day, in force over a great part of the British Empire, to the benefit and satisfaction of all parties concerned. It was the banners with gangs of fettered Chinamen that provided the chief ornament and supplied the chief oratorical argument of the great demonstration in Hyde Park on March 24. It was the chain, the lash, and the "compound," \* which

\* As a matter of fact the labourers were not confined in a closed compound as at Kimberley, but were only forbidden to go beyond the mine premises without a permit. These premises were in no sense enclosed and often very large—those of the East Rand Proprietary, for instance, were three miles long, and included the town of Boksburg. The permits were always procurable when the labourers were not actually at work, and were available for forty-eight hours. The real defect of the regulations, as subsequent events showed, was their extreme laxity, due undoubtedly to an anxiety to leave no handle for agitation in England.

formed the main theme of the Liberal platform orator and of the Liberal cartoonist, and which reinforced the bitter eloquence of the Free Church divine. Mixed up with all this irrelevant fiction there was, among working-men at least, a confused notion of something nearer to the true issues of the controversy, a belief, ignorant perhaps, but sincere, that the Government were helping greedy capitalists to supplant Englishmen by underpaid Asiatic labour. This belief was naturally encouraged by the politicians, even to the extent of suggesting that the importation of Chinese into the Welsh slate quarries would be the next step to be taken by the Unionists. But the slavery cry remained the dominant one throughout, and it was on that cry that the honest indignation of the British public was roused against a Government which it believed to have soiled the fair name of England by the establishment of "slavery under the Union Jack." As for the movers in the agitation, many of them were no doubt honest, in the sense, at least, of being blinded by emotionalism or intense party prejudice to any clear consciousness of dishonesty. But as regards the responsible party leaders, the men who knew or could have known the facts, it is difficult, after making every allowance for the temptation to which they were exposed, to believe that they can have been unconscious of the dishonesty and hypocrisy, as well as of the danger to Imperial interests, involved in the agitation which they countenanced and encouraged.\*

For the moment, however, the Liberals were powerless to interfere either with the sanctioning of the ordinance or with the negotiations which the Foreign Office now carried on with the Chinese Government in order to secure its consent and good offices for the recruiting in China. These were finally embodied in a Convention signed on May 13, and included on the one hand arrangements for the

Impatience  
of the Rand  
to secure the  
Chinese.  
The Anglo-  
Chinese  
Convention.

\* The best excuse that can be made is the one given in Swift's essay on Arbuthnot's "Art of Political Lying": "It happens very often that there are no other means left to the good people of England to pull down a ministry and government they are weary of but by exercising this their undoubted right: that abundance of political lying is a sure sign of true English liberty."

co-operation of Chinese local officials and British consular agents with the emigration agents, and on the other a number of further provisions safeguarding the interests of the labourers.\* In China, at any rate, no one seems to have considered the conditions of the ordinance as tainted with slavery, or, indeed, as otherwise than extremely favourable to the labourers. Meanwhile the depression in the Transvaal was steadily continuing, and the Rand community was getting more and more impatient with the delay. Many, too, who had hitherto opposed Chinese labour were turned in its favour by their resentment at the campaign of slander directed against Johannesburg and against Lord Milner in England. On March 10 a large deputation representative of every class and practically every public body on the Rand, including the churches of all denominations, waited upon Lord Milner to protest against the delay in sanctioning the ordinance. A month later a second deputation from the Chambers of Mines, Trade, and Commerce came to deliver a further protest against the delay in negotiations with the Chinese Government.

Arrival of  
the Chinese,  
June, 1904.  
The  
industrial  
revival.

On June 22 the first lot of 1,000 Chinese labourers reached the Rand. By the end of the year there were 20,000, and the total rose to over 40,000 by the end of June, 1905, and eventually exceeded 50,000. Meanwhile the efforts to secure native labour were carried on with undiminished energy. During 1904 the gain was very small, barely 8,000 in the whole year. But by the middle of 1905 the figures had risen by some 20,000 to a total of over 100,000 employed.† With this great increase in the unskilled labour employed a consequent increase in the number of skilled white workmen naturally followed. The

\* Thus the labourer was not to be transferred from one employer to another without his consent or the approval of the Chinese consul, who was to be appointed to watch over the interests of the emigrants. In the case of indentured labour in other British colonies such consent was not required. The Chinese Government were also assured that no corporal punishment would be inflicted on the labourers, save for such offences as entailed it upon everybody by the ordinary law of the colony, and after trial by a magistrate.

† *I.e.*, about 90,000 at work at any moment.



average number employed in the year preceding June, 1904, was under 13,000. In the next year it rose to 15,000, and in the year after to 18,000. The output of gold which in 1903 was some £12,000,000, rose to £16,000,000 in 1904, to £20,800,000 in 1905, and to £24,579,987 in 1906. Here at last was something to provide that "over-spill" on which Milner had relied to make his policy effective. Revenue, indeed, was slow in recovering, and the stock market, thoroughly alarmed by the political uncertainty, refused to improve, and thus imposed a certain check on new development. But even so the general economic expansion in the Transvaal during the three years that followed the introduction of Chinese labour was truly remarkable. Between the census of April, 1904, and the end of 1905, the adult male white population of the Rand alone was estimated to have increased from 43,000 to 56,000, an upward leap of nearly 30 per cent. How far the estimate was accurate it is difficult to say. But it was confirmed by the voters' lists prepared at the latter date, and the fact that in the same period the Johannesburg municipality sanctioned new buildings of a capital value of £4,000,000 and capable of accommodating over 40,000 people, is at least indicative of a remarkable economic development. Nor was progress confined to the Rand alone, and the growth of Pretoria and of many other smaller places was hardly less amazing.

Above all, the work of reconstruction could now be pursued unhampered by anxiety as to means, or by fear of diverting labour indispensable to the mines. In fact, though the Chinese labourer was actually employed at the mines, it was his labour which, by a process of economic substitution, really made possible the public works, the roads and railways which made a new South Africa out of the old. By doing this the Chinese experiment most effectually fulfilled its primary purpose of meeting the stress of an abnormal situation. And if the function of the Chinaman to act as a vector for British immigration was prematurely curtailed by political causes, yet he was able to exercise it long enough to influence materially the balance of population and of ultimate political influence in South Africa.

Place of  
the Chinese  
in the re-  
construction.

General  
acquiescence  
in the  
Transvaal  
subsequently  
disturbed  
by Chinese  
outrages.

Meanwhile with the revival of industry the local opposition to the Chinese rapidly disappeared. The white skilled worker and small shopkeeper realized that the restrictive provisions of the ordinance amply safeguarded them against Chinese competition. The Johannesburg trader was gratified to find that the Chinaman, instead of remitting his wages to his native country, spent them freely on the Rand. The Boers, generally, were well content; only their leaders kept up a mild profession of opposition to the experiment in case of political changes in England. Even in England there was a lull in the agitation, and in the autumn of 1904 Chinese slavery scarcely figured in the speeches of Liberal leaders. It was not till more than a year after the first arrival of the Chinese that a more genuine ground for opposition was afforded the critics in a series of robberies and murders committed by Chinese vagabonds at outlying stores and farms. The fact was that the Chinese, so far from being slaves shut up in "compounds," enjoyed an almost excessive liberty. Their good behaviour at first gave a sense of security to the authorities, and the police measures taken proved quite inadequate when these outbreaks first occurred. The establishment of a special body of mounted police along the Rand, in September, 1905, and the repatriation of some of the bad characters who had made their way to South Africa in recent shiploads, checked the evil. But isolated outrages occurred at intervals for several months, and though no more frequent or more serious than those committed by Kaffirs, inevitably attracted more attention. Occasional instances of ill-treatment of Chinese workers by their foremen received a similar adventitious notoriety, and both the misdeeds and the sufferings of the Chinese, duly embellished, effectively served their political purpose in England and in South Africa.



SIR RICHARD SOLOMON, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.,  
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF CAPE COLONY, 1898-1900;  
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE TRANSVAAL, 1902-7.  
*Photo by Elliott & Fry.*



SIR H. F. WILSON, K.C.M.G.,  
COLONIAL SECRETARY OF THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY;  
1902-1908.  
*Photo by Deale, Bloemfontein.*





## CHAPTER VI

## THE WORK OF RECONSTRUCTION

THE revival of industrial activity on the Rand, due to the solution of the labour crisis, had already been preceded by an improvement in the agricultural situation. A plentiful rainfall in the closing weeks of 1903 not only promised a good crop, but also encouraged the Repatriation Departments to sell a considerable proportion of their transport animals to the farmers for ploughing, thus rendering possible a large increase in the area under cultivation. By the end of June, 1904, the Orange River Colony department was finally closed down. In the Transvaal also the work was now reduced to very small dimensions, though a good many months were still to pass before all the business of the department was completely wound up. A small residue of men physically incapable of work, of widows and orphans, still remained, and were provided for in orphanages, through poor relief, and in other ways. As a whole, the farming community were still some way from attaining the level of prosperity—such as it was—which had prevailed before the war, and cattle disease and locusts were still destined to delay the process of recovery for a considerable time. But the farmers were once more on their feet, and in a position to avail themselves, in the near future, of all the advantages which the policy of development was intended to confer upon them.

Close of the  
repatriation  
work, 1904.

Of the questions of administrative policy discussed with Swaziland. Mr. Chamberlain, two still urgently pressed for solution after labour and repatriation were disposed of. Swaziland was in a state of peaceful anarchy—a political no-man's-land. The British Government, which in old days had posed

as upholding the independence of the Swazis against the encroachments of the Transvaal, could not for some time make up its mind whether it should set up the country as a separate protectorate or continue its close connexion with the Transvaal. Whichever decision it came to, it would have to deal with the hopeless tangle of conflicting and overlapping concessions which Umbandine and the Queen-Regent, his successor, had given away to companies and to individuals. In June, 1903, an Order-in-Council was signed giving the Governor of the Transvaal all his Majesty's powers over Swaziland, and empowering him to appoint a Resident Commissioner and other officials. This apparently settled in principle the point that Swaziland was to remain closely attached to the Transvaal.\* But it was not till October, 1904, after prolonged correspondence with the Colonial Office, and after much labour and toil by Milner and Solomon upon the legal and administrative problems involved, that the proclamation establishing civil government in Swaziland actually came into force. The proclamation also made provision for the appointment of a Concessions Commission. The commission, which set to work soon afterwards, came to the conclusion that, in the interest alike of the Swazis and of the concession holders, the only way of straightening out the tangle of conflicting claims was drastically to cut down the area of the concessions, at the same time giving the holders full proprietary rights over the territory left to them. It was not till 1907, however, that the actual task of delimitation could be taken in hand.

The British  
Indians.  
Former  
attitude of  
Imperial  
authorities.

Far more difficult and contentious was the question of the treatment to be accorded to British Indians in the new colonies. Before the war the British Government had steadily supported their claim to considerate treatment in the Transvaal, more especially in regard to the attempts of the Transvaal Government to compel all Asiatics without distinction of class or manner of living to reside and trade in locations. In making these representations its primary

\* This decision was, however, reversed when self-government was granted to the Transvaal, and Swaziland was transferred to the sphere of the High Commissioner.



duty was to assert the treaty rights of its own subjects; whether those rights conflicted with local interests or local prejudices was a question with which it was not directly concerned. But in any case its attitude was perfectly consistent with its traditional policy of objecting to any discrimination against British Indians, whether in self-governing colonies or elsewhere, which was based on purely racial grounds. The annexation altered the whole situation. It for the first time brought the British Government into direct responsible contact with the difficult problem created by the economic competition of European and Asiatic civilization in a new country. And even if it was prepared to ignore the problem, the declared policy of granting self-government at an early date made it impossible for the new administration, on so vital a question as the position of Asiatics in the community, to take any step which would in practice be irrevocable against the wishes of the whole white population. As far, indeed, as the official action of the Government had gone there was no reason why the new administration should not have contented itself with securing considerate treatment of individuals, while at the same time maintaining the general *status quo* as regards Asiatics. Unfortunately the speeches of supporters, and in some cases even of members of the Government, had created an impression among the British public, and still more among Indians in South Africa and elsewhere, that one of the objects of the war was to liberate British Indians from all restrictions in the new colonies. Contrasted with this impression the actual policy pursued by the Government could not fail to appear inconsistent, and, what was more serious, to create a sense of grievance on the part of the Indians which has led to a continuous conflict in the Transvaal, and has undoubtedly afforded a handle to opponents of British rule in India.

In the Orange River Colony no difficulty arose, for the simple reason that the old government had never allowed any Asiatics into the country at all. The continuance of the old law consequently created no concrete grievance and disappointed no definite expectations. In the Transvaal the

The location  
question,  
1902-1904.

old laws were provisionally retained after the occupation. But Milner was anxious to secure as quickly as possible such modifications as would diminish Indian grievances without giving the Indians a substantially stronger position in the country or exposing the colony to the danger of a large influx of undesirable immigrants. On April 3, 1902, he telegraphed home a series of proposals which included the compulsory registration of the general body of Asiatics, their confinement to locations both for residential and business purposes, and the refusal of registration or admission to undesirables. The proposals differed from the old system mainly in the exemption from registration and other disabilities of those whose education and manner of life differentiated them from the ordinary coolie or petty trader. Chamberlain was not at that time prepared to accept legislation on this basis as consistent with his previous attitude. After his visit, however, in April, 1903, a Government notice was issued in which practically the same policy was announced, though no actual steps were taken to carry it out. During the next few months the hope of securing Indian labour for the railways led to abortive negotiations with the Indian Government on the general status of Indians in the Transvaal, while the subject was at intervals discussed in the Legislative Council where the very strongest feeling against any relaxation of the measures against Asiatics was manifested. An outbreak of plague in the Indian quarter of Johannesburg in March, 1904, aggravated the anti-Asiatic feeling in the Colony, and led to vigorous despatches from Milner and Lawley urging the necessity of legislation acceptable to local sentiment. Meanwhile, the practical effect of the old laws which were still in force was entirely altered by a decision of the Transvaal Supreme Court, which, reversing a previous decision, ruled that Asiatics were not compelled by the existing law to trade in the locations, but only to reside there. In July Lyttelton announced that in view of this decision the proposed legislation would have to be limited to regulations confining lower-class Asiatics to residential locations on purely sanitary grounds, but allowing perfect liberty of residence as well as



of trade to men of a superior class.\* The location question was accordingly disposed of on these lines.

But the question of the locations was in reality a minor one compared with that of restricting the influx of fresh immigrants. Most of the Indians previously resident in the Transvaal had left before the outbreak of war or during the course of the campaign. Their right to return was undisputed. But the new administration rightly considered itself bound not to prejudice the position in the future by allowing further immigration. The object in view was secured provisionally through the permit machinery established under the Peace Preservation Proclamation† issued in 1902 to deal with returning refugees and other immigrants. Both Chamberlain and Lyttelton, however, were prepared to accept legislation on the basis of the Natal and Australian Acts imposing certain so-called civilization tests, such, for instance, as the test of dictation in a European language. But for various reasons nothing was actually done during the period of Crown Colony Government, and it was not till the end of 1907 that an Immigrants Restriction Act, passed by the new Transvaal Legislature, received the sanction of the British Government. This Act effectively excluded all Indian immigration whatsoever, and its sanction by a Liberal Government is a striking indication of the extent to which the old official attitude on the question has been abandoned. Meanwhile from 1904 onwards public opinion in the Transvaal grew steadily more alarmed as it

The struggle over the Registration and Immigration Acts, 1906-1909.

\* "His Majesty's Government are unable to sanction legislation which will curtail the rights urged with great earnestness and for many years by his Majesty's Government both here and in South Africa which have now been established by high judicial authority, the correctness of whose decision has not been challenged. The second Ordinance proposed, which will take the place of Law 3 of 1885, should therefore not interfere with the right of those now in the country to obtain licences to trade outside locations, but should be limited to creating the necessary machinery, by means, I assume, of municipal regulations, for placing Asiatics in locations in accordance with the law, and should provide in the case both of present residents and of newcomers that those required to live in locations or bazaars should be so required for sanitary reasons in each case, whilst those of a superior class should be exempted and allowed to reside anywhere." Mr. Lyttelton to Lord Milner, July 8, 1904.

† Amended by the Peace Preservation Ordinance of 1903,



came to be realized that large numbers of unauthorized Indians were smuggling themselves into the country, relying on the forging or transfer of registration certificates, and on the difficulties of identification, in order to escape detection. An ordinance amending the old registration system and providing for identification by the infallible method of finger-prints, was introduced in 1906, but held over pending the institution of responsible government. The moment self-government was established, a law on the same lines was passed and received the assent of the British Government (May, 1907). This was the signal for the Indian community, who had hitherto confined themselves to meetings and protests against the various measures proposed or passed, to challenge the whole policy of the Transvaal administration by a campaign of "passive resistance" carried on with the utmost determination and self-sacrifice under the skilful direction of Mr. M. Gandhi. Into the various phases of the conflict it is unnecessary to go. The underlying issue has really been the same throughout, the objection of the Indian leaders to any legislation which they consider imposes a stigma upon their race, and the absolute determination of the white community in the Transvaal to allow no loophole for any increase of the Asiatic element in their midst. The campaign is still continuing, and it remains to be seen whether, by sheer pertinacity in refusing to obey the law and going to prison, the Indians will succeed in improving their status in the colony, or only provoke even severer measures.

True  
character of  
the Asiatic  
controversy.

Of the many problems that urgently call for solution in the British Empire there are few more difficult or controversial than those which deal with the economic competition of the different races within the Empire. The difficulty is in its essence not so much one of fact as of political theory. For a century the British Government has been dominated by the individualist notion that race is a mere personal accident, a matter of complexion, which the law cannot and ought not to take into account. The right of every British subject, of whatever colour, to sojourn where he likes in the Empire, and follow unhindered what trade or profession he will, is one that the British Government has consistently

advocated. That attitude has brought it into constant conflict with the self-governing white colonies. The latter have been compelled by the inexorable law of self-preservation to restrict the entry of Asiatics whose competition would rapidly oust the white race from large areas of commerce and industry as completely as the brown Hanoverian rat has ousted the black rat in England. That conflict between Colonial necessity and British theory has hitherto been compromised by measures ostensibly of a general character, based on education tests, or sanitary regulations, but so framed as in practice to exclude Asiatics. But, as the Indian controversy in the Transvaal has shown, a system based on such subterfuges is bound to work unsatisfactorily for all parties and to create a legitimate sense of grievance on the part of the excluded and harassed race which may have grave consequences in the future. The only satisfactory solution lies in a frank recognition of the economic nature of the competition, and of the right of any part of the British Empire to frame economic regulations directly aimed at protecting its industries and the population dependent on those industries from the competition of immigrants of a different race. It is this recognition which constituted the essential and most valuable feature of the Transvaal Labour Ordinance of 1904. That ordinance allowed unhampered entry to the Asiatic for certain specific work desired by him and necessary for the public welfare, and yet effectively protected the white community by directly forbidding the immigrant to ply certain trades. The extension of that principle on a wider scale, by legislation prohibiting to members of competing races all national industries from which it is held desirable to exclude them, would give a far more effective protection, and do away with all the absurd restrictions which the existing system places on travellers, or on those immigrants whose presence for particular purposes may be desired. But whatever be the method adopted for excluding Asiatic competition from certain regions of the Empire, it can only be justified on two conditions. The first is that the community which takes the responsibility of shutting out British subjects of another race should do so in no dog-in-the-manger



spirit, but with a serious determination to build up a great nation of British blood and speech. The second is that the Imperial Government should recognize that its acceptance of the principle that its Asiatic subjects may be excluded from certain areas of the Empire involves a corresponding obligation to take positive measures to develop the economic resources of their own territories and to assist their migration to other areas where no valid objection to their presence exists.

The railway programme.

The point has now been reached at which it is possible to give some account, however brief and inadequate, of the actual carrying out of the policy of lifting the new colonies on to a higher plane of economic and political civilization. In that process, the first and most important stage was the development of the railway system. With his unerring grasp of essentials, Milner saw from the first that it was through railway construction that the power generated by the over-spill of the mines could be most effectively applied. Without railways to bring the country districts in touch with their natural market on the Rand there could be no really progressive agriculture, no true community of interests between the two main elements of the white population, no hope for a more intimate fusion of races and points of view through the establishment of successful British farmers on the land. And the same railways which fostered agriculture would in the very process reduce the cost of living on the Rand, thus adding to the volume and the life of the mining industry, rendering possible the establishment of other industries, and generating a fresh over-spill available for yet further development. To no task did Milner apply himself with more whole-hearted enthusiasm, or, after the labour question was once out of the way, with more minute attention to detail than to the development of his railway schemes. The one obstacle against which he continually fretted was the inadequacy of the £5,000,000 available out of the Guaranteed Loan. But the deficiency was to some extent supplemented by various expedients. The De Beers Company was persuaded to finance the line from Fourteen Streams to Klerksdorp, which provided a direct route from Kimberley to



Johannesburg, and opened up the south-western Transvaal. The Natal Government was induced to finance and build a line from Bethlehem to Kroonstad by the hope both of securing access to the northern part of the Orange River Colony, and of facilitating the building of the "grain line" through the eastern portion of the colony which would give it a direct route to Bloemfontein. Another important line from Springs to the Witbank coalfield was subsequently financed by the Transvaal Post Office Savings Bank. By these devices it became possible to lay down a programme involving the construction, in one way or another, of over a thousand miles of railway, in other words the practical doubling of the existing railway mileage of the new colonies. The programme was not completed till 1907, and its full effects in the development of agriculture and in the reduction of the cost of living are only now beginning to make themselves felt. But the Central South African Railway system remains as one of the chief monuments of Milner's practical genius, and as one of the most effective and enduring instruments of his constructive policy.

In addition to the construction of new lines £2,500,000 were spent in the improvement of the old lines, and in the introduction of more powerful engines and larger rolling stock. The reforms introduced in this direction by the initiative and enterprise of Sir P. Girouard, who, as Commissioner of Railways, continued after the peace to occupy the position he had held during the war, added in no small degree to the effectiveness of the railway system. Unfortunately, the qualities most essential to railway administration in war are not the only ones required for the ordinary commercial running of a railway system in times of peace. The working of the railways was the subject of continuous criticism, not only from the public, but from the business members of the Inter-Colonial Council, and towards the end of 1904 Girouard, unable to convince the Council that his office was effectively organized, felt obliged to retire. The commissionership was subsequently abolished and its place taken by the Railway Committee of the Council, an arrangement which proved in every way satisfactory.

Sir P.  
Girouard's  
retirement,  
1904.

Roads and  
other public  
works.

An indispensable complement to the railway system was the improvement of the roads and the substitution of bridges for drifts on the most important roads. Thousands of miles of roads repaired in the two colonies and the construction of some thirty or forty bridges helped to transform the whole character of the country districts. Large sums were spent on the development of the telegraph and telephone systems. The water-supply of most of the towns and villages was improved. At the same time an immense amount of actual building was done by the Public Works Department in each colony. Government offices, court-houses, colleges, schools by the hundred, orphanages, hospitals, lunatic asylums, gaols, post offices, police barracks, magistrates' and teachers' residences, provided the necessary plant of a civilized administration, and have left an enduring mark on the face of the country.\*

The develop-  
ment of  
agriculture.

The mere opening up of the country by railways and roads was not sufficient in itself to lead to a rapid development of South African agriculture, in view both of the ignorance and apathy of the farming population and of the exceptional difficulties created by climatic conditions and by the prevalence of stock diseases. It was essential to supply the direct assistance and stimulus of fully equipped and progressive agricultural departments. Milner was determined that these departments should equal the best of their kind in any other country, and he was fortunate in finding the right men to carry his ideas into execution. In the Transvaal Mr. F. B. Smith, who arrived just before the peace, successfully built up an organization, which, alike on its scientific and on its practical side, was, from the very outset, far in advance of anything which South Africa had hitherto known. The only form of state assistance to agriculture with which the Boers had been familiar was the direct granting of doles. The essence of the new system, at first by no means popular with the Boers, was generous ex-

\* The remarkable building activity of these few years, both public and private, acquired a distinctive architectural character from the work of Mr. Herbert Baker, who from the old Dutch mansions of the Cape had evolved a genuine South African style, the finest example of which is the handsome Government House at Pretoria, completed soon after Milner's departure.



penditure on the acquisition of knowledge. The best expert investigators and teachers in every branch of agriculture were appointed, experimental farms were started at Potchefstroom\* and other places, and for the first time a really systematic effort was made to discover the capacities of the country, and the ways of overcoming its peculiar difficulties. Dr. Theiler's valuable bacteriological work has been referred to earlier. The results of his researches were applied by an army of veterinary surgeons posted all over the country who waged unceasing warfare against stock diseases, and gradually succeeded, not only in getting the diseases under control, but in winning the confidence of hostile and suspicious farmers. A network of intelligence agents in every district reported on the movements of locusts and enabled the forces of the department to be concentrated to deal with them at any point. Every effort was made to induce the farmers themselves to take a more active interest in agricultural improvement, to form associations for discussion and cooperation, and to organize agricultural shows. An admirable quarterly magazine diffused the results of the department's researches. In the Orange River Colony an Agricultural Department had been started a year before the peace, and a good deal of useful work was done. It was not, however, till the arrival from Canada in January, 1904, of Mr. W. J. Palmer, as Director of Agriculture that the Department attained a complete and effective organization. As in the Transvaal, stud-farms, experimental farms, and creameries were instituted; the cattle and sheep of the country were improved by careful importation; new varieties of fodders and cereals were introduced. It is no exaggeration to say that in the few crowded years after the war a complete agricultural revolution was inaugurated in the new colonies, whose fruits are already beginning to be reaped, and the foundations laid of a wealth which will in time far exceed the wealth of the mines.

\* Subsequently developed into an agricultural training college. Another interesting experimental station was established at Tzaneen in the sub-tropical low veld of the northern Transvaal. A tobacco factory was started there and tobacco, cigarettes, and even cigars of very fair quality were produced.



**Irrigation  
and forestry.**

Milner's interest in irrigation has already been referred to. An experienced irrigation expert was brought over from India, and much useful work was done in organizing the department, collecting information, and preparing schemes for the future. For the present the want of reliable data, the uncertain state of the law as to water rights,\* and the necessity of devoting the bulk of the proceeds of the guaranteed loan to railways and public works, made any really ambitious irrigation policy impossible. A considerable number of minor works of a useful character were, however, carried out, especially in the Orange River Colony, where the building of dams was the commonest form of relief work for indigent burghers, while in some districts great assistance was given to the farmers by the operations of a special branch of the department devoted to boring for water. In any case the need of great parts of South Africa is not so much for irrigation works as for the natural conservation of moisture by the soil. The real solution of that problem is afforestation. A forestry branch was created in each colony and an enormous impetus given to tree-planting, as compared with anything that had preceded. Milner's ideal, it is true, was far more ambitious. Could he have had his way, vast tracts of the treeless veld along the watersheds would have been planted as permanent forest in order not only to lay down a great future source of wealth, but also to transform the whole surface drainage of the country and increase its agricultural possibilities. But here, as in other directions, the want of means opposed an impassable barrier to his schemes. The afforestation of South Africa remains a legacy to be carried out by some future inheritor of Milner's creative spirit.

**Education.**

In no department of the Administration was the result achieved more striking, or are the ultimate consequences likely to be more important than in that of education. Reference has already been made to the work done during the war. At the peace, over 42,000 children were receiving

\* A commission of inquiry into this question was appointed, but no legislative action had been taken on its report before self-government was introduced.

instruction in the two colonies—nearly twice as many as ever received instruction in the old Republics. As in every other department, peace brought a heavy increase of work. The first and most pressing necessity was the provision of proper school accommodation in the towns and more populous districts. But it was also the easiest to provide for, and by the end of the year the demands of the population were fairly completely met. The provision of primary education in the outlying districts was a much more difficult task. As the Boer families left the concentration camps, the teachers followed them up and pitched their tents wherever a sufficient number of children could be got together. In the course of 1903 over two hundred farm schools were opened in the Transvaal alone, though it was not till nearly two years after the peace that the total number of children attending school in the two colonies exceeded the figure attained during the war. Meanwhile, a definite educational policy had been formulated by Mr. Sargant and was laid down in two practically identical ordinances promulgated in both colonies in 1903. Under these ordinances primary education was made free but not compulsory. The religious teaching in the state schools was undenominational, though a right of entry was provided for denominational teaching. No state aid was given to denominational schools, except in the case of institutions for natives. English was the medium of education, but Dutch was taught, where the parents desired it, for five hours a week, including two hours of Bible teaching. Provision was also made for the institution of purely advisory local committees, pending the development of a system of local contribution and local control. Having established the general principles of his educational policy Mr. Sargant handed over the executive control, and confined himself to the more congenial rôle of educational adviser to the High Commissioner. Mr. Ware, who as acting Director had been responsible for the whole of the work in the Transvaal since the peace, was definitely made Director of Education in July, 1903. In the Orange River Colony, Mr. Hugh Gunn was appointed Director in February, 1904.

The opposi-  
tion schools  
in the  
Transvaal.  
Eventual  
settlement.

The new educational system was keenly resented by the Dutch Reformed Church which had been accustomed, through the old school committees, to exercise a predominant influence in educational matters, more particularly in the selection of teachers. The political leaders were by no means in whole-hearted sympathy with the frequently narrow-minded *predikants*. But they joined in the outcry, laying special stress on the need for more Dutch teaching. An attempt was made to set up a series of opposition schools, the "Christian National" schools, of a purely Dutch and nationalist character, and at one time some 4,000 children attended these schools in the two colonies. But the movement lacked sufficient vitality. The vast majority of the Dutch parents preferred their children to be taught in English, and the Hollander teachers and inspectors brought out by the opposition schools were not popular. In February, 1904, after some months of preliminary negotiations, a conference took place between Milner and the leading members of the Transvaal Government on the one side and Botha and Smuts on the other. The Government offered to entrust the control of education to local boards containing a majority of elected members if half the cost of education were raised locally; the boards to nominate teachers from a list of qualified teachers kept by the Education Department. But the *predikants* refused to accept this concession, and matters remained as they were. Subsequently, in November, 1905, Lord Selborne issued a minute advocating district advisory boards, two-thirds of whose members should be elected, the retention of the control of the Director of Education over the appointment and dismissal of teachers, and the giving of elementary instruction in the *taal*, where the parents wished it, English becoming the medium of instruction from the third standard upwards. The scheme thus outlined was denounced by the Boers as unacceptable, but practically formed the basis of the Education Act introduced by Mr. Smuts in 1907.

Opposition in  
the O.R.C.  
The 1905  
compromise.

In the Orange River Colony the opposition schools were even less successful than in the Transvaal, in spite of an attempt to raise funds on their behalf in England and on the Continent by the despatch of two delegates, Messrs. Van



Heerden and Kritzingar. Eventually, thanks to the more statesmanlike attitude of Mr. Marquard, the Moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church, a concordat was arranged in March, 1905, and the opposition schools were amalgamated into the state system. On the issue of local control the compromise followed the lines of the proposal declined by the Dutch Reformed Church in the Transvaal a year earlier, except that only one-sixth of the expenditure was to be raised locally. The language difficulty was settled on the basis that equal time should be given for the teaching of English and Dutch as languages, English remaining the medium of instruction. Education was at the same time made compulsory as far as conditions allowed it. The arrangement worked most satisfactorily till 1908, when the new Government of the colony, influenced by the extreme element which had come into office after the grant of self-government, abolished it in favour of a system which, while nominally putting Dutch and English on an absolute equality, practically made Dutch the compulsory medium of instruction in most parts of the colony.

Meanwhile, secondary and higher education were also vigorously fostered. In January, 1903, a Commission of leading business men was appointed in the Transvaal to inquire into the subject of technical education, and on their report a technical and engineering institute was started in Johannesburg, largely with the help of funds collected for educational purposes before the war. This institute was intended to be ultimately incorporated in a Transvaal University, and with a view to this latter purpose Mr. Alfred Beit, towards the end of 1904, presented to the Government a large estate at Frankenwald some twelve miles from Johannesburg. No definite step towards the creation of a university has, however, been taken up to the present time. In the Orange River Colony the Grey College at Bloemfontein was developed into a completely equipped residential University College, with a college school attached, whose handsome buildings have since been completed. Very useful work in the direction of developing domestic and industrial education in cooking, dressmaking, knitting, lace-making, etc., was

Higher and  
technical  
education.

begun during the war by Miss Wilson, sister of the Colonial Secretary, and was continued on a larger scale afterwards. Similar work in the way of schools for instruction in weaving, mat-making, and embroidery, was also initiated by Miss Hobhouse. Throughout the whole period in both colonies the organization of the educational departments was steadily perfected. From the very first, Mr. Sargant laid great stress on the importance of securing a really efficient local supply of teachers in the future, even though for immediate needs it might still be necessary to bring in a certain number of trained teachers from Cape Colony and from the United Kingdom. In both colonies normal colleges for training teachers were started soon after the peace. At the same time classes were provided for the large number of teachers taken over from the old *régime* whose qualifications were inadequate, while frequent teachers' congresses were held to promote the exchange of progressive educational ideas. Whatever legislative changes have been made, or may yet be made, for political reasons, in the educational system of the two colonies, the efficient organization created in the period of reconstruction and the high standard set are bound to exercise a continuous influence upon the future.

The other  
departments.

To deal adequately with the work of the Law Departments in the two colonies would be impossible in the limited space of these chapters. The task of reducing the statute books to reasonable proportions and an orderly form had largely been accomplished before the peace. But the policy of "lift" necessitated an enormous amount of new legislation, the drafting of which imposed no small burden on Sir R. Solomon in the Transvaal, and Mr. Blaine in the sister colony. It would be little exaggeration to say that a whole generation of legislation was packed into those four or five years. Nor is it possible to deal with all the mass of miscellaneous administrative work of the other departments—the creation of a civil service alike efficient and clean-handed, capable of coping with equal success with the highly industrialized community of the Rand, and with the primitive Kaffir tribes of the Zoutpansberg; the building up of the whole complicated framework of local administration, police and



**SIR GODFREY Y. LAODEN, K.C.M.G.**

RESIDENT COMMISSIONER OF BASUTOLAND, 1898-1901;  
COMMISSIONER FOR NATIVE AFFAIRS, TRANSVAAL, 1901-7.

*Photo by Elliott & Fry.*



**MR. PATRICK DUNCAN, C.M.G.**

COLONIAL TREASURER OF THE TRANSVAAL, 1901-8;  
COLONIAL SECRETARY OF THE TRANSVAAL, 1908-7.

*Photo by Maull & Fox.*



**MR. W. L. HICHENS,**

COLONIAL TREASURER OF THE TRANSVAAL, 1904-7.

*Photo by Gillman & Co., Oxford.*



**MR. G. V. FIDDES, C.B., C.M.G.,**

IMPERIAL SECRETARY, 1897-1901.

SECRETARY TO THE TRANSVAAL ADMINISTRATION, 1900-2





justice ; the establishment of a system of taxation equitable in its incidence, and economical in its collection, and of a system of finance and accountancy rendering impossible the transactions which had discredited the old administration ; the infusion into every department of a new spirit of order and method, of a new zeal for progress, of a new sense of public duty. It is the sheer quantity of work compressed into those crowded months that is perhaps the most astonishing feature in the reconstruction, as Milner himself claimed in one of his parting speeches : \*

The enormous mass of work done.

"I for one have no fear whatever of the verdict which any impartial chronicler will pronounce on our work as a whole. Mistakes have been made—no doubt, not a few. I myself could point out more mistakes than any of the cavillers. But it has been truly said that the man who never made a mistake never made anything, and we have made a great deal. What strikes me about the band of workers, of whom I have had the inestimable privilege of being the chief, as I look back on the years of restless constructive activity since the restoration of peace, is the enormous mass of their achievement and, considering the fearful pressure under which it had to be done, the general solidity of the work. It is rough work, no doubt, a great deal of it. There has been no time for trimming or polishing. But if rough and showing many traces of haste, it is solid and bears few signs of scamping. Much of it has been costly work, but then one has always to pay extra for extra pace, and we have been going full steam ahead the whole time. The one thing essential, the one thing imperative when we took over this country, a total wreck, with half its population in exile, with no administrative machinery whatever, and, as far as the plant of government was concerned, with the scantiest equipment of any civilized country in the world, was to make it a going concern as soon as possible.

"We could not stand fiddling over small economies while people starved. We could not pause to think out the precise form and size of our future permanent establishments. We had to restart everything at once, to get the indispensable material at any price, to employ as many hands as were necessary at the time and the best we could get—there was no possibility for elaborate selection—and to leave the drilling, the grading, the

\* Pretoria, March 22, 1905.

weeding out, for a period of greater leisure. I say the work has been rough and the work has been costly. But after all, the great feature of it, the fact that will stand out in history, and which has, in our day at any rate, no parallel, is the colossal amount which has been done in the time."

Milner's  
personal  
part in the  
work.

The centre and mainspring of all this amazing activity was the High Commissioner himself. Whether at his desk at Sunnyside or in the saddle inspecting the work of restoration on the veld, Milner worked day after day, and night after night, without ceasing. The one thought always with him, ever conquering weariness and ill-health, was the need of haste. The time at his disposal before the inevitable grant of self-government was brief—a mere moment in the life history of a country. Before those few months were over, the foundations for the whole future of the new colonies would have to be laid, and to be laid truly. Besides, the more quickly the work was done, so long as it was done well, the more time would be given it; every delay, every failure increased the natural impatience of the community to undertake the full control of its own destinies. The constitutional conditions added enormously to the burden of the work. Every important development had to be fully explained to the Colonial Office: that was the inevitable price of the free hand which Milner was given in the execution of his policy. The mere volume of his despatches and confidential letters over this period constitute in themselves an amazing monument of industry. In the same way the work of the administration had continually to be justified to the public in the new colonies, whether by speeches or in private interviews. Yet all this was mere surplusage: the real task, and the greatest task, still remained the work of creating and impelling the new machine of government. Almost every characteristic feature of the new Government was a direct emanation from Milner's brain; almost every troublesome question, however minute, came back to him for decision. The charge of over-centralization was often laid against the administration, not wholly without reason. Great minds and strong wills inevitably tend to attempt too much. But Milner's own activity never discouraged the efforts or



paralysed the initiative of his subordinates. If he did too much it was not because he interfered but because they insisted on coming to him. To most of them his example was a constant encouragement, his ideas a constant inspiration. In the words once used of Chatham, no one of them ever "left his Cabinet without feeling himself a braver man."

For his personal staff, for the work of the High Commissioner's office, of the Inter-Colonial Council, and, to a lesser extent, of the two colonial administrations, Milner relied mainly on the services of young men who had only left college within the last few years. He was anxious to avoid a cut and dried administrative system; he was determined to enlist the very best brains and the greatest possible energy and adaptability for the unique task before him; he could not hope in every case to secure ripe experience as well. Officialdom shrugged its shoulders; local criticism made merry over the viewiness or the inexperience of the "Balliol Kindergarten." Disappointed office seekers vented their spleen on the importation of boys from Oxford who thought they could teach South Africans everything, from the writing of despatches to the management of trek oxen. But the result abundantly justified Milner's faith in youth and brains. The "Kindergarten" often made mistakes. Their ideas about money were sometimes overgenerous. Their manner was occasionally too cocksure. But their sheer ability, their enthusiasm, their unselfish devotion to duty, far outweighed all minor defects. They achieved a gigantic task under Milner's guidance. Since that guidance has been removed most of them have remained in the country, have identified themselves with its future, and have continued to work for it in Milner's spirit of creative effort. They have disarmed the critics by their achievements. They have broadened by experience. They are to-day the moving spirits in the public life of South Africa.

The various members of the Transvaal administration have been referred to from time to time in these chapters. At its head stood the Lieutenant-Governor. Sir A. Lawley's strong good sense and tact, and his entire agreement with

Milner's  
"Kindergarten."

The Transvaal and O.R.C. administrations.

Milner on all important points, made him admirably fitted for a position of some delicacy. His conciliatory manner and his eloquence proved invaluable in dealing with the Boers. Next in precedence came the Attorney-General, Sir R. Solomon. The establishment of the whole legal machinery of the colony, and the drafting of the immense mass of legislation required by the policy of reconstruction owed everything to his ability and untiring industry. Upon him and upon Mr. Patrick Duncan—the *doyen* of the “Kindergarten,” if such a description is permissible—who, towards the end of 1903 succeeded Mr. Davidson as Colonial Secretary, fell all the most responsible work of the administration from the peace down to the grant of self-government. The important department of finance, organized on broad and sound lines by Mr. Duncan, was, after his promotion, transferred to Mr. W. L. Hichens,\* another of the most capable of the young Oxford men. Each head of department was independent and practically in the position of a minister in a self-governing colony. In the Orange River Colony, on the other hand, the ordinary Crown colony system was followed, and the Colonial Secretary exercised a general control over all the other departments. The whole task of government was simpler. The absence of a great industrial population with all the problems which it entailed left the Government free to devote itself whole-heartedly to agricultural development and to the improvement of the ordinary framework of administration, and the record of its steady progress has called for little comment in the foregoing pages. For the purely administrative side the main credit of the success of the Orange River Colony belongs to Mr. Wilson who, as Colonial Secretary, † was responsible for driving the whole machinery of government. The work of Mr. Blaine, the Attorney-General, has already been referred to, and the administration owed much to the efficiency of the financial organization established by Mr. Browne. But no account of the reconstruction in the Orange River Colony

\* Mr. Hichens was not officially appointed Treasurer till May, 1905.

† Owing to Sir H. Goold-Adams's ill-health, Mr. Wilson also acted as Lieutenant-Governor for a very considerable part of 1903 and 1904.

would be adequate which failed to assign its full value to the extraordinary personal influence of Sir H. Goold-Adams, the Lieutenant-Governor. From the very outset Goold-Adams won the affection of the people by his courtesy, by his Irish good-humour, and by his keen interest both in the general development of the colony, and in the personal well-being of each individual farmer. Before the end of the period of Crown Colony Government he had become an almost indispensable institution, and the very first act of the "irreconcilables" whom the grant of self-government brought into power at the end of 1907 was to assure him of their affection, and of their anxiety to carry on the government to his satisfaction.

The detailed story of the work of reconstruction still remains to be written. For the purpose of this history it is sufficient to have touched on a few of its aspects and to sum up its results. What was achieved in that brief space was not a mere series of useful reforms but the creation of a new country. The Transvaal and Orange River Colony of 1905 differed almost as much from the Boer Republics of six years before as the Canada of to-day differs from the old Canada which passed away with Montcalm. Upon that work South Africa can no more go back than England could have gone back upon the Norman Conquest.



## CHAPTER VII

## THE PROGRESS TOWARDS SELF-GOVERNMENT

Spirit of  
British rule  
in the new  
colonies.

THE attitude of the new administration towards those over whom it ruled was no less remarkable than the actual work which it achieved. Even during the war the British authorities, military as well as civil, never forgot that their enemies were to be their fellow-citizens. They fed the Boer women and educated the Boer children. No sooner was peace declared than the Government devoted all its energies, as well as millions of money, to the task of repairing the destruction rendered inevitable by the guerilla war. From the very outset the conquered Boers found themselves in the enjoyment, if not of every political right, yet of practically every political liberty. Freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom of public meeting, freedom of the press—in all these respects England straightway gave her stubborn enemies privileges that, even to-day, are not granted to its citizens by every European Government. By the very terms of peace the Boers were invited to cooperate in the work of restoration. Their leaders were from the first in constant consultation and contact with the authorities. They were offered a voice in the control of legislation, and, even after they refused to accept the responsibility, the Government, while appointing others to take their place on the councils, was at all times ready to listen to them as the recognized spokesmen of the majority of their people. In the towns the Boers received complete municipal self-government within eighteen months of the peace; and if they had wished it could have had an equal degree of local self-government in the country districts. Farmers' associations, local committees for enforcing measures against cattle disease,

educational committees, every form, in fact, of public activity, short of the actual election of the Government, was directly encouraged. From Chamberlain and Milner down to the resident magistrates in the districts the representatives of the conquering power treated the Boers as fellow-citizens whose interests they wished to forward and whose views they were anxious to hear and, if possible, comply with, and not as mere subjects to be over-ridden. Every deference was shown to the sentiments and historical traditions of the Boers. A single instance is sufficient. On July 14, 1904, England's old enemy, President Kruger, breathed his last at Clarens in Switzerland. Flags were flown half-mast on all the Government buildings. In the Legislative Council a resolution of deep sympathy with his relatives was suggested by Sir A. Lawley and moved by Sir R. Solomon. When, five months later, the body was brought back to the Transvaal, British guards of honour were drawn up at the stations through which the train passed, representatives of the Imperial and Colonial Governments attended the funeral on December 14, while at the King's special request a salute of twenty-five guns was fired as the coffin was lowered into the grave. Everything was put at the disposal of the Boer leaders to enable them to lend dignity and impressiveness to the ceremony. At the same time there was not the slightest attempt to interfere with their arrangements. For the moment the governing British element deliberately effaced itself, and Kruger was buried by his own people after their own fashion, just as if he had died at the height of his power, and as if the *Vierkleur* were still flying over Pretoria.

Kruger's  
funeral,  
Dec. 14, 1904.

Never in the course of history has a conquered people been treated with such friendly confidence, with such true magnanimity. And never, perhaps, has it accepted the verdict of war with such loyal and good-humoured acquiescence. Within eighteen months of the peace a Boer critic of the Government declared to a Boer meeting that freedom of criticism was no indication of irreconcilable hostility to British rule. "There has been no case of sedition since the peace . . . no instance has been heard of in which a Boer

The Boer  
response.

has uttered an insult either to his new flag or to his king. We have not exactly wrapped Union Jacks round ourselves, but could any sane man expect that?" Substantially the boast was justified.\* From the very first the relations between the Boers and the local representatives of the British authority, magistrates or constabulary, were of the friendliest. There was no sulking, still less any false pride as to making use of the services of the Government. Everywhere the British officials were received with courtesy, often with apologies for the inadequate hospitality which a ruined homestead afforded. In the towns differences of social habits to some extent contributed to keep Boer and British apart. But at the club and elsewhere the men met on a perfectly friendly footing. The atmosphere of impotent hatred, so intense in Italy under Austrian rule, or in the Southern States of America after the Civil War, was entirely absent, except, perhaps, among a few of the narrower-minded ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church.

Position of  
the National  
Scouts.

Real bitterness was displayed only towards the National Scouts, and even here its maintenance was due largely to the *predikants*, who, in the Transvaal, imposed a ban of excommunication upon them, and refused to admit them to church unless they made a public confession of guilt. The National Scouts retorted by starting churches of their own in districts where they were most numerous. The recognition of this new religious community by the Government, and its receipt of a proportion of the grants given to the Dutch Reformed Church, seriously alarmed the bigots on the Transvaal synod.

\* The one exception was in the Lydenburg district, where subsequently, in April, 1904, one Durand and half-a-dozen others were arrested on a charge of treason. Durand had used the names of the Boer leaders to try and get together a gang for objects at least as much criminal as political, and the Government showed its confidence in the loyalty of the Boer leaders by bringing Botha, Schalk Burger, and Kemp forward as Crown witnesses. The only other attempt at sedition after the war was in Cape Colony, when in November, 1906, an ex-rebel, Ferreira, who had taken refuge in German territory, crossed the border of the colony with ten men, proclaimed a general rising, and succeeded in dragging a few reluctant *bywoners* with him. After a ten days' hunt the rebel "commando" was dispersed or taken prisoner by a party of Cape Mounted Rifles and Cape Police.



The ban against the National Scouts was soon waived in practice, though never formally withdrawn. In some cases, however, a perfunctory expression of regret in private was still insisted on. The new church, having no further reason for its existence, and finding great difficulty in securing satisfactory ministers, speedily dissolved.

The attitude of the Boer leaders immediately after the surrender and during the negotiations with Chamberlain has already been fully dealt with. Once they realized that it was useless to attempt to secure any alteration of the terms of peace their line of policy was perfectly clear and consistent. They were prepared to accept the situation, but they were determined to make the very most of it consistent with that acceptance. Refusing to give the administration the benefit of their counsel, for fear of sharing the responsibility for its actions, they confined themselves wholly to the field of irresponsible criticism, to consolidating their influence over their countrymen, and to building up the framework of a political machine on racial lines, with a view to the inevitable advent of self-government. They played the part of a political opposition with a will, with no over-scrupulous regard for accuracy, and with decided success. Their conduct may often have seemed ungrateful and ungenerous. But could gratitude and generosity really have been expected in greater measure from men still smarting under defeat, and determined to retrieve through the ballot-box some part, at least, of the power they had lost in the field? After all, what they had promised at Vereeniging was to accept the British flag and the British constitutional system, and that promise they were ready to fulfil. They were under no obligation to make a bed of roses for the administration, or to subordinate their racial interests to the general welfare. At the worst their misrepresentations were venial compared with those indulged in, with infinitely less justification, by the Opposition in England.

In its relations with the British population of the new colonies the administration was a Crown colony government in form only; its spirit was the spirit of self-government and not of bureaucracy. Discussion and consultation were

Attitude of  
the Boer  
leaders.

The adminis-  
tration and  
the British  
element.

the very life-breath of the Milner *régime*, whether in the Legislative Councils, on the Inter-Colonial Council, at conferences, at public banquets, at private interviews, or in the columns of the press. In many respects, indeed, the administration was far more susceptible to the influence of public opinion than a party government bound by rash promises made in opposition and pledged to the principle of cabinet solidarity. That Milner's personality dominated everything, that his will prevailed on every important issue, was true. But it was a feature of the situation for which the man, and not the constitutional system, was responsible. Nor was Milner content only with consultation. From the very outset he invoked the interest and help of all who were willing to lend their time or their experience to the work of reconstruction. That help was given in abundant measure. Men like Sir G. Farrar or Sir P. FitzPatrick in the Transvaal, or Sir J. Fraser in the Orange River Colony—to mention only the most prominent—were not mere casual advisers, but became integral and responsible elements in the administration. By thus enlisting their services Milner could hope to give the future leaders of the British community the experience which would enable them to govern with success, to inspire them with his ideals, and to leave them as the executors of his policy.

Milner's  
aims not  
bureaucratic  
but political.

No term of abuse was applied more persistently to Lord Milner throughout all this period by his English detractors than that of "bureaucrat." The term seemed to find justification for the ignorant in the facts of his previous official career. Yet no description could have been more fantastically untrue. It was not only the mere absence of the formalism, of the love of administrative machinery, of the dogmatic temper which mark the true bureaucrat, which made it absurd. It was that the whole essence of his mind was not bureaucratic, but political. His thoughts were constantly focussed on the political conflict of the future. The work of reconstruction was never, in his eyes, an object in itself, but only a means. The object was always the triumph, under self-government, of British political ideals in the Transvaal, and in a united South Africa. And it was to the British

community in the Transvaal, to its prosperity, to its increase, to its unity, that he looked for the force which was to make those ideals prevail. He had been its champion and defender against Kruger and against its detractors in England. Its welfare in the present, its political effectiveness in the near future, were throughout his chief concern. His one anxiety was lest it should fail through its own internal weakness and want of coherence.

That anxiety was fully justified. The misrule of the Kruger oligarchy and the intense emotion of the war had temporarily united the Uitlander community. For three years and more it had displayed a unity, a courage, and a patience which deserved all praise. But it was essentially an unorganized aggregation, barely in process of acquiring a real collective sentiment, and entirely unschooled by political experience. The great mass of it lived concentrated upon the Rand, wholly occupied with its own affairs, and in a purely British atmosphere. As long as the armed "Zarp" swaged through its streets, as long as the commandos held the field, it could not help being reminded of the need of unity. The moment the war was over it began to forget the very existence of the Boer; the return of the old domination seemed to it inconceivable; the inherent British instinct towards political division began to assert itself. From the very first, signs of impatience with the Government began to manifest themselves. The good sense of the community was still strong enough immediately after the peace to suppress the campaign of the Transvaal Political Association. But nothing could check the inherent tendency to criticize. At first, the critics in full chorus denounced the ridiculous slowness and timidity of an unenterprising bureaucracy which did not dare to rise to the height of its great opportunity. When the depression came they veered round and blamed the administration for its reckless extravagance and headstrong optimism. Ruined speculators and over-stocked shop-keepers bitterly blamed the Government for their own miscalculations. The long struggle over the Chinese introduced another dividing line, and threw the opponents of Chinese labour into the ranks of the critics. Of leaders the

Impatience  
and disunion  
of the British  
community.



growing opposition had no lack. There were not a few who had hoped for office, or at least for a place on the Legislative Council, and whose disappointment vented itself in denunciation of an "unsympathetic imported bureaucracy," or of "capitalist influences." Others, again, were genuine fanatics of self-government, to whom considerations of Imperial security or even of the future success of self-government itself were nothing compared to immediate compliance with their shibboleth. By the beginning of 1904 the feeling of impatience was increasing perceptibly among the British in the Transvaal. What was even more serious, they were rapidly approaching a condition of political disintegration.

Milner urges  
need for bold  
advance  
towards self-  
government,  
May, 1904

Milner realized that some definite step would have to be taken, and taken speedily. Such a step was essential, not merely as a means of allaying discontent, but even more in order to discipline the British community by contact with practical problems, more especially with the practical problem of the Boer vote. He confided his views at length to Lyttelton in a secret dispatch sent on May 2, 1904. Though the agitation for self-government had not yet taken an aggressive and organized form, it would inevitably do so, he urged, unless something were done. Once openly launched, the agitation would spread rapidly among the British, and even those who realized the dangers involved would find it difficult to oppose the movement. Immediate acceptance of the demand for self-government in its entirety involved the danger of placing a still unreconciled Boer majority in power. Prolonged delay, on the other hand, would inevitably throw many of the British on the Boer side, and create an anti-Imperial majority all the more formidable because largely composed of British elements.

"It should be our policy to try to defer responsible government until the Boers, or at least a large proportion of them, had learned to acquiesce—it must needs be many years before they rejoice—in membership of the British Empire, or until the British element is so strengthened as to make separation impracticable. But while recognizing the necessity of deferring responsible government, I also feel, and every day that passes impresses on me more and more, the extreme undesirability of

deferring it too long, especially in the case of the Transvaal. There is no white population more impatient of control, or more lacking in the political experience and training which self-government is best calculated to teach, than the people of that Colony, and in particular the British inhabitants. . . . No British population in the world would be more benefited by being forced to realize to the full the meaning of the responsibility which they are so anxious to assume, if only the experiment were not so fearfully dangerous."

To abandon all safeguards forthwith was unwise. But it was essential to take some step in the direction of complete self-government without delay. And Milner was convinced that the step should be as bold a one as was compatible with the reasonable protection of Imperial interests. It was not enough to substitute an elected, in place of a nominated, element in the legislature; it was essential to give that element a substantial majority and real power. To quote Milner's own language in a subsequent despatch :

"I am quite satisfied that it is wise to adopt a liberal measure of representation. . . . The representatives of the people must be numerous enough not only to voice popular opinion, but to determine the character of the laws, and, except where vital Imperial interests are concerned, practically to direct the policy of the administration."

In the same spirit he urged that the property qualification for the new legislature should be low, "just sufficient to exclude the absolutely indigent," and suggested that the elected members might be eligible for appointment as members of the Executive Council in order to provide for an easy way of transition to complete self-government.

As a matter of fact, even before Milner wrote, the question was actively exercising Lyttelton's mind. The general arguments which weighed with the Colonial Secretary in favour of some definite step towards self-government were, moreover, confirmed by practical considerations of a somewhat different character. At that moment it seemed very doubtful to the Unionist leaders whether they could stay in office beyond the spring of 1905. That being the case it was very

His despatch crosses one from Lyttelton.

desirable that they should, as far as possible, complete the task they had undertaken in South Africa by putting affairs in the new colonies on a footing which would give least excuse for any ill-considered change of policy on the part of their successors. A carefully regulated advance towards self-government in the Transvaal, which, without endangering Imperial interests, gave substantial representation to public opinion, would both serve as a strong argument against immediate further change, and yet, at the same time, provide the incoming Liberal administration with a sufficient buffer against the pressure of its own supporters. On April 26 Lyttelton stated this aspect of the position to Milner briefly but comprehensively :

“ When the other side come in they will be confronted with their dishonest and insincere utterances about Chinese labour by the ignorant and sincere of their followers, and I am convinced that they will extricate themselves from a painful dilemma by granting self-government to the new Colonies *sans phrase*. Under these circumstances I should very much like to know whether you think it in any way desirable that we should make a cautious move in that direction. . . . The question is whether it would not be better that the first steps should be taken under your and our guidance than under that of men who seem very reckless of the essential interests of South Africa.”

Lyttelton  
announces  
impending  
grant of  
elective  
institutions,  
July, 1904.

Further correspondence followed, and on July 4 Milner telegraphed suggesting the urgency of some public declaration of policy to appease the growing restlessness which was already manifesting itself in a vigorous press discussion. On July 21 Lyttelton announced to the House of Commons that the time had arrived in the opinion of the Government for giving effect to the pledge contained in the Vereeniging terms by granting elective representative institutions to the Transvaal. This announcement was again endorsed in the King's speech at the prorogation of Parliament on August 15.

The announcement undoubtedly had the effect upon the British community which Milner hoped. From vague general criticisms of the administration the mind of the public was now turned to a keen discussion of the form which the new constitution should assume. But the announcement also



served to bring out the extent to which the process of political disintegration had already gone. A very definite party cleavage showed itself from the very outset between those whose chief anxiety was to safeguard the results of the war, namely, the British flag and the principle of political equality, and the malcontents with whom British ideals, though not disavowed, were yet subordinate to minor divergences of opinion, personal grievances, or mere impatience of all real or fancied restraint. The former, an avowedly British and Imperialist party, were comparatively indifferent to the actual extent of the constitutional change introduced, and were quite content that the Milner administration should, for some years to come, continue its work of developing the country and paving the way for a large British immigration. Their one concern was that, in establishing a new elective system in the Transvaal, the British Government should do nothing which could diminish the legitimate influence either of the existing British population, or of future immigrants; nothing which could whittle away the principle of "equal rights" for which they had contended in the past, or which could afford an opening for the revival, in however attenuated a form, of the old distinction between "burgher" and "uitlander." To secure this end two points were in their opinion essential: an equal distribution of seats according to voters, and automatic redistribution.\* The "voters' basis," as it was called, is the only strictly logical method of maintaining the principle of "one vote, one value." The ordinary rule, indeed, has been to distribute seats in proportion to population, simply because in most communities the proportion of voters to population is practically the same in different constituencies. In the Transvaal, however, such a distribution would have defeated the principle, because, owing to the excess of unmarried men, the proportion of voters, whether under a high or a low franchise, was much higher on the Rand than in the rest of the country. The census taken in April, 1904, indicated that while out of a total white population of 290,000 the

British divisions.  
The Imperialist section's insistence on the voters' basis and automatic redistribution.

\* It is interesting to note that these two demands had been formulated by them even before the war.

Rand only contained 115,000, it held over 40,000 out of a total of 90,000 adult males. A population basis would thus have been a decided handicap to the British, already severely handicapped by the fact that under any ordinary system the considerable British element scattered throughout the country towns would be unable to exercise any effective vote.\* On pure grounds of expediency there was thus a strong case, other things being equal, for selecting the basis of distribution which would give the British element its proper weight under the peculiar circumstances of the colony. But the case was all the stronger when the proposed basis was so simple, logical and equitable that, once established, it was bound to be permanent, and to assert itself, not only in the Transvaal, but in the neighbouring colonies. In concentrating their whole energy upon the principle of "equal rights" the leaders of the British party displayed a political sagacity destined to have an important influence on the whole future political development of South Africa.

The malcontents and the demand for immediate responsible government.

The malcontents were a much less influential and more heterogeneous body. They represented no single definite point of view, and, as a matter of fact, endorsed the general political principles laid down by the majority, though with no great enthusiasm or clear conviction. Their real distinctive feature was just that they were malcontents. As such they felt bound to criticize adversely the policy announced by the Government and to proclaim an alternative. Hitherto they had clamoured for representative institutions, and their principal spokesman, Mr. E. P. Solomon, brother of the Attorney-General, had definitely indicated that what they wanted was an elected legislature such as Cape Colony had possessed for nearly twenty years before the grant of full responsible government. When they found that this was precisely what they were to receive, Mr. Solomon and his friends declared that it was insufficient, and that nothing less than full responsible government would be acceptable to

\* This drawback might, indeed, have been obviated by the introduction of a system of proportional representation with three-member constituencies. Milner strongly favoured this personally, but the idea was too unfamiliar to enlist support from any section of Transvaal public opinion.

them or prove workable in practice. When the more cautious members of the community dwelt on the necessity of safeguarding the Imperial position, they protested that for their part they were not afraid of trusting the Boers, and deprecated all references to the British flag as unnecessary jingoism. Stripped of rhetorical generalities on the blessings of freedom the demand for immediate responsible government was, in its essence, mainly an expression of discontent, largely personal, with the administration, and with the individuals who were the recognized leaders of British public opinion. This is the key to the whole subsequent development of the political situation.

For the Boer leaders criticism and denunciation of the Government were as much a matter of deliberate policy as they were a matter of incurable instinct in a section of the British community. To object to the proposed grant of representative institutions and clamour for full responsible government was the natural and obvious thing for them to do, once the cue had been given. If the agitation failed they would be no worse off, and would probably find the British malcontents all the more eager to help them in discrediting the Government. If it succeeded there was always a chance of their being returned to power. One minor difference of attitude between them and the British malcontents is, however, characteristic. Their denunciation of the Government proposal at public meetings was based, not on its inadequacy or unworkableness—after all the system proposed was not so very unlike the old Republican constitution—but on the by now stereotyped charge that it was a violation of the terms of Vereeniging. The charge was, of course, absurd. Article VII of those terms expressly indicated that self-government would be introduced by successive steps,\* and the nature of those steps was made

Attitude of  
the Boer  
leaders.

\* "Military administration . . . will, at the earliest possible date, be succeeded by civil government, and, as soon as circumstances permit, representative institutions leading up to self-government will be introduced." By an unfortunate oversight the text of the terms given in vol. v., pp. 597-599, was taken from an inaccurate retranslation into English of the Dutch version, and there reads "tending towards autonomy" in place of "leading up to self-government."



quite clear to the Boer negotiators at the time, and by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons soon after. But to have admitted that the Government was handsomely fulfilling its promises would have been bad political business, and the Boer audiences believed what they were told. In other respects, too, the Boer leaders were by no means at one with the advocates of responsible government in Johannesburg. "One vote, one value," was not a principle which appealed to them, and they were opposed to automatic redistribution and to the voters' basis, though prepared to accept a distribution of seats according to population if they could not get better terms. A further grievance and opportunity for denouncing the bad faith and mistrust shown by the Government was also found by them in the fact that representative institutions were not to be given simultaneously to the Orange River Colony.

Formation of  
Progressive  
and  
Responsible  
Government  
Associations,  
Nov., 1904.

Towards the end of the year political discussion rapidly crystallized into political organization. Among the British, indeed, the former element continued to predominate, and organization remained very rudimentary almost to the end. On November 22, the "Transvaal Progressive Association" took the field with a manifesto embodying a definite party programme in six clauses, of which the maintenance of the British flag and the recognition of equal political rights for all voters formed the really important items. The immediate introduction of representative government, followed, at as early a date as might be expedient, by responsible government, a firm and just native and Asiatic policy according to South African ideas, the support of every measure tending to make the Transvaal a white man's home, and the opposing of interference in Transvaal affairs by party politicians elsewhere, completed the list. The last clause expressed the general indignation of the British community with the campaign of misrepresentation carried on by Liberal politicians in England, and their determination in case of a change of government, to resist any interference with the Labour Ordinance. On November 25, the opposition took definite shape in a "Responsible Government Association" whose programme consisted of a declaration that political

stability and contentment could only be assured by letting the wishes and interests of the people prevail, and that the growth of a vigorous and independent spirit in political life would inevitably be retarded by the establishment of any system short of complete responsible government. Both sides during the next few months were busy holding meetings and enrolling adherents. The Progressives, who subsequently selected Sir G. Farrar as their leader, were from the first very much the larger and more effective body. They embraced most of the keenest spirits of the old Reform Committee and of the Imperial Light Horse. They had with them most of the big mining firms, which were afraid of violent political changes, as well as the great bulk of the industrial middle class. In the broad strategy of politics they had the advantage of a definite and consistent policy. In minor tactics, however, all the advantage for the moment lay with the "Responsible," who had an easy theme for platform eloquence in the virtues of free government, and in the unwisdom of "flag-wagging" and distrust of the Boers. Political cooperation with the Boers was, indeed, from the outset one of their declared objects. The *personnel* of the party was very miscellaneous. It included what may be called the "Afrikanders," those who resented the importation of British officials and the influence of the British-born element in the general population. Of these Mr. Solomon and Mr. Hull, the leaders of the party, were the ablest and most typical representatives. Besides these were opponents of Chinese Labour, like Messrs. Creswell and Wybergh, Labour leaders,\* miscellaneous capitalists, all and sundry in fact who were discontented with the existing situation. Last, but not least, in Pretoria and in the smaller towns, many Englishmen also tended to drift into association with the "Responsible" from jealousy of Johannesburg and fear of its predominance.

While the British were discussing, the Boers concentrated

Organization  
of Het Volk,  
Jan. 1905.

\* The formation of a small Labour Party, or rather of several labour groups, though of interest in view of possible future developments on the Rand, was not of sufficient effect upon the situation in the period covered by these chapters to require separate treatment.



their attention upon organization. The process really began as far back as April, 1904, with the preparations for a Boer congress which met at the end of May, and discussed the grievances of the Boers against the Government both among themselves and with Sir A. Lawley. At the close of the Congress a small committee, consisting of Messrs. Botha, Schalk Burger, De la Rey, Beyers, Esselen, Smuts, and A. D. Wolmarans, was appointed to draw up an organization. The work went on quietly and without fuss for the next few months, but no occasion was neglected for working up the national sentiment of the Boers. For this purpose no event could have lent itself better than President Kruger's funeral. The solemn and impressive ceremony, the sermons and addresses delivered, all contributed to raise the spirits of the Boers and to give new life to their national consciousness. A last letter from Kruger, warning his countrymen of the danger of division, and urging them to continue the work he had begun, and with unity of mind to build up that which had been thrown down, only gave solemn emphasis to aims which already animated the assembly. The growing political agitation had already been quickened by a conference of the Orange River Colony Boers just before, at which the Government had been vigorously denounced, and responsible government demanded. But it was not till the end of January, 1905, that "Het Volk" was formally constituted at a large meeting at Pretoria. The name, "the people," indicated sufficiently the character of the new organization. It was not a political party in the British sense, based on the advocacy of certain principles, but the organization of a specific population for political purposes. Characteristically the statutes recommended by the select committee, and endorsed without question, contained no programme beyond an opening clause referring to harmony, co-operation and progress. On the other hand there was a complete and elaborate organization in ward and district committees, culminating in an absolutely autocratic head committee, empowered to dissolve any committees which in its opinion were "subject to hostile influences," and apparently the sole exponent of the rules and obligations which all members

Character  
of the  
organization.



were bound faithfully to obey. The select committee, without more ado, declared itself to be the first head committee, and as only two members, at most, could be changed by the annual congress of the party there was practically no danger of the control passing out of the hands of the original holders. In addressing the meeting Botha declared that the question of the flag was settled for all time. The Boers would abide loyally by their acceptance of the British flag, and if the Imperial Government only showed its trust in them he was assured they would make an honourable response. But representative government was not trusting the people—it was a shadow without a substance, and he could not advise them to accept it. The peace treaty had promised responsible government and they stood by its terms. Resolutions were passed declaring that if a change were necessary no other form than complete self-government should be established, and that it should be established in both colonies simultaneously. After a most successful opening meeting the Head Committee at once divided its forces, and for two months its members were busy all over the country forming branches of “Het Volk,” addressing meetings and passing resolutions identical with those passed at Pretoria. Botha’s speeches consistently followed the line he had laid down at Pretoria, and displayed alike his astuteness as a party leader in working up the racial feelings of his hearers, while at the same time skilfully angling for the support of the British malcontents, and his underlying statesmanship in insisting firmly upon his final and irrevocable acceptance of the British flag and of British institutions. Other speakers, more particularly General Beyers, showed less discretion and less judgment as to where to draw the line between party criticism and sedition, and had to be vigorously disclaimed in public and rebuked in private by their leader.

All through this period, meanwhile, interviews had been going on between Milner and the representatives of the different parties who were anxious to urge their views upon him, while frequent communications passed backwards and forwards between Milner and Lyttelton. It was not till the

The campaign in the country, Feb.—March, 1905.

The Lyttelton Constitution, March, 1905.

end of March that the new constitution drafted by Lyttelton was embodied in Letters Patent and sent out to South Africa. On the question of the form of government it was decided that the whole of the Legislature, except the Executive officers, should be elected, the Assembly to consist of some thirty to thirty-five elected members and some six to nine officials. The franchise was a low one, excluding practically only the casual labourer and the poorest class of *bywoner*. As a special concession, moreover, all ex-burgers over 21 whose names were on the voting lists under the Republic were to have the right to vote irrespective of any pecuniary qualification. Seats were to be distributed on a voters' basis, and an automatic redistribution was to be held every four years. A special commission was to be appointed to mark out the districts, giving due consideration to existing divisions, and being allowed a margin of ten per cent. on the normal quota of votes for this purpose. In his covering despatch, Lyttelton announced that the British Government had wisely decided to leave the question of the war contribution loan to the new legislature, "in the assured belief that they will do what is right and just," and also indicated that a short period would intervene before similar institutions were granted to the Orange River Colony.

Its character  
and objects.

The framework of the Lyttelton constitution was laid on broad and statesmanlike lines. The franchise was liberal, and at the same time fair between the two races. The principle of equal rights was consistently and logically applied in the distribution of the seats. Though not granting complete self-government, the Constitution yet marked an advance which, considering the circumstances, was both bold and generous. To use Milner's words, it was the greatest single stride in the march towards full responsible government. As such the Constitution was in accordance not only with the specific undertakings of the British Government in the case of the Transvaal, but with its settled practice in the case of every other colony. That it contained possibilities of deadlock, and the certainty of eventual breakdown and supersession was obvious from its form and from previous experience. But neither the

example of other colonies nor the indications afforded by the experience of the existing nominated Council, warranted the fear that it would prove unworkable from the start, or engender serious and lasting friction between the people of the colony and the Imperial authorities. As a permanent settlement it would, no doubt, have been a failure. But then it was not meant to be permanent. Its whole object was to gain a certain limited time, three or four years at the most, for certain specific purposes. It was to set political life in motion in the colony without emphasizing and stereotyping the racial division by making it the basis of an immediate struggle for the prize of administrative power. It was intended, in Lyttelton's words, "to be a school for self-government, a means of bringing citizens together in political co-operation, and a sphere for the natural selection of the men most fit to lead and ultimately to undertake the responsibility of administration." And in the interval, during the precious years gained, the work of administrative consolidation and economic development was to continue, while a steady increase of the British population would insure that, however much that population might subsequently be divided on local issues, its latent strength might always be relied upon to thwart any policy which deliberately aimed at separation from the Empire.

The completion and despatch of the Letters Patent had been held back intentionally so that they should not reach the Transvaal till after Milner's departure. That departure had been discussed between Milner and Lyttelton from the middle of 1904 onwards. The economic difficulty had been solved; the work of the administrative development could now proceed unhindered on the lines Milner had laid down; the constitutional question was on the way to settlement. The task for which Milner had returned to South Africa was accomplished, and he could at last with a clear conscience claim relief from the immense burden of work and anxiety which he had borne for so many years. To find a successor to carry on the work in his own spirit was not easy. His own choice would have been Lyttelton. But it was hopeless to expect that a Liberal Government would

Milner's  
departure.  
Lord  
Selborne's  
appointment.



retain him. Eventually Lord Selborne was persuaded to take the post. His experience as former Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office and his high position as First Lord of the Admiralty, added to his personal gifts of moderation and good sense, made him equally acceptable to Milner and to the South African public, while his recent absorption in a sphere removed from party controversy gave good reason for hoping that his appointment would not be affected by a change of government. The closing months of Milner's High Commissionership were marked by few incidents but by little relaxation of the pressure of work. At last the welcome hour of relief came. Under the frequent disappointments and continuous controversy of the last two years his once immense popularity with the British community in the Transvaal had been gradually ebbing away, as he had always foreseen it would. At the very end it surged up again in a wave of profound emotion. Men forgot their grievances and differences; they only remembered what they owed to the man who had fought their battle, and laid, solid and true, the foundations of their national life. What they felt is well summed up in a few sentences from "a nobody's tribute" in one of the papers :

"To us he has brought uprightness, erectness. From being Outlanders we have become of the land and of its folk—no longer pilgrims in political tents, but dwellers in a city which hath foundations. . . . From the Milner minimum of demand to the Milner maximum of political power and achievement, how great our growth, how comparatively assured our future national life! . . . We have had two great poets—makers—in South Africa in our time. Both men dreamed dreams. Both half realized them. Both at least have compelled other men to go on realizing the other half."

Milner's  
farewell to  
South Africa.

Milner's farewell to the Transvaal was given in three speeches, delivered at Germiston, Pretoria and Johannesburg on the eve of his departure. The first two were a review of the work accomplished. The third was a confession of political faith, and an appeal to those who had looked to him for guidance in the past to continue his work in the

future—an appeal strangely eloquent in its simplicity and restraint. Only a few sentences and the concluding passage need be quoted here :

“I shall live in the memories of men in this country, if I live at all, in connexion with the struggle to keep it within the limits of the British Empire. And certainly I engaged in that struggle with all my might, being, from head to foot, one mass of glowing conviction of the rightness of our cause. But, however inevitable, however just, a destructive conflict of that sort is a sad business to look back upon. What I should prefer to be remembered by is the tremendous effort subsequent to the war, not only to repair its ravages, but to restart these colonies on a higher plane of civilization than they had ever previously attained. . . .

“If you believe in me defend my works when I am gone. . . . I care for that much more than I do for eulogy, or, indeed, for any personal reward. . . .

“And this I care most about of all, because it is over all and embracing all. What I pray for hardest is that those in South Africa with whom my words may carry weight should remain faithful, faithful above all in times of reaction, to the great idea of Imperial unity. The goal of all our hopes, the solution of all our difficulties, is there. Shall we ever see the fulfilment of that idea? Whether we do or not, whether we succeed or fail, I for one shall always be steadfast in that faith, though I should prefer to work quietly and in the background, in the formation of opinion, rather than in the exercise of power.

“This question, as I see it—the future of the British Empire—is a race, a close race, between the numerous influences so manifestly making for disruption and the growth of a great but still very imperfectly realized political conception. Shall we ever get ourselves understood in time? The word Empire, the word Imperial are, in some respects, unfortunate. They suggest domination, ascendancy, the rule of a superior state over vassal states. But as they are the only words available, all we can do is to make the best of them, and to raise them in the scale of language by a new significance. When we, who call ourselves Imperialists, talk of the British Empire, we think of a group of states, independent of one another in their local affairs, but bound together for the defence of their common interests and the development of a common civilization, and so bound, not in an alliance—for alliances can be made and unmade, and are never

more than merely nominally lasting—but in a permanent organic union. Of such a union, we fully admit, the dominions of our Sovereign, as they exist to-day, are only the raw material. Our ideal is still distant, but we are firmly convinced that it is not visionary nor unattainable.

“And see how such a consummation would solve, and, indeed, can alone solve, the most difficult and most persistent of the problems of South Africa, how it would unite its white races as nothing else can. The Dutch can never own a perfect allegiance merely to Great Britain. The British can never, without moral injury, accept allegiance to any body politic which excludes their motherland. But British and Dutch alike could, without loss of dignity, without any sacrifice of their several traditions, unite in loyal devotion to an empire-state, in which Great Britain and South Africa would be partners, and could work cordially together for the good of South Africa as a member of that great whole. And so you see the true Imperialist is also the best South African. The road is long, the obstacles are many. The goal may not be reached in my lifetime, perhaps not in that of the youngest man in the room. You cannot hasten the slow growth of a great idea of that kind by any forcing process. But you can keep it steadily in view, lose no opportunity of working for it, resist like grim death any policy which draws you away from it. I know that to be faithful in this service requires the rarest of combinations, that of ceaseless effort with infinite patience. But then think of the greatness of the reward—the high privilege of having in any way contributed to the fulfilment of one of the noblest conceptions which have ever dawned on the political imagination of mankind.”

On April 2 Milner slipped away quietly from Johannesburg to Delagoa Bay, and took the boat to Europe. A great era in South African history was over.



## CHAPTER VIII

## THE REACTION IN ENGLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA

It is difficult to imagine a political situation more humiliating or fraught with graver possibilities than that which Milner found when he landed in South Africa in April, 1897. In the Transvaal an ignorant and corrupt Boer oligarchy, armed to the teeth on the proceeds of British industry, was defiantly asserting its right to treat the British as an inferior race, and was making little concealment of its ultimate ambition of expelling the British flag from South Africa. Its network of intrigues embraced the Courts of Europe and extended into almost every farmhouse in Cape Colony. It was not long since a foreign government had calmly informed Great Britain that it objected even to a customs union between the Transvaal and the adjacent British colonies as an infringement of its own interests in the *status quo*.\* That same power had subsequently, on the occasion of the Jameson Raid, indicated its readiness to despatch troops in defence of the existing *régime* in the Transvaal. Within the borders of South Africa the Orange Free State was engaged in concluding with its neighbour an offensive and defensive alliance which could only be aimed at the Imperial Power. In Cape Colony itself a large section of the population sympathized, tacitly or overtly, with the Transvaal ambitions. The most powerful political party in the colony was committed heart and soul to thwarting all the efforts of the British Government to bring President Kruger to reason, and was soon to be returned to power after an election avowedly fought on the Transvaal issue. The British community throughout South Africa was

South Africa  
as Milner  
found it.

\* See vol. i., p. 150.

depressed and disorganized, without confidence either in itself or in the Imperial authorities. South Africa's one great statesman of British birth, Cecil Rhodes, was discredited by the Raid, and his vision of a united South Africa within the Empire seemed an idle dream. Everywhere the star of Republican ambition and Boer racial supremacy was in the ascendant, and in imagination the confident young Afrikaner already saw the *Vierkleur* planted aloft on Table Mountain.

South Africa  
as Milner  
left it.

Eight years later Milner left behind him a South Africa over which, from Cape Town to the Zambesi, the British flag flew unchallenged. In the place of the Boer Republics he left two progressive British colonies, equipped with all the plant of modern civilization, and on the eve of a great industrial and agricultural expansion. Provision had been made for the speedy resumption of their political life, a political life no longer founded on racialism and narrow privilege but on equal rights. At the same time the continuance of the existing administration was safeguarded for a few years longer in order to enable it to take firmer root, and to secure an influx of British population sufficient to protect it against any subsequent reaction. The field would soon be clear for the union of South Africa into a single commonwealth, not necessarily dominated by a purely British majority, but flying the British flag and governed on British lines. Beyond and above all was the hope which inspired all Milner's constructive work, that a united South Africa, the latest born of the nation states within the Empire, saved as it had been by a great Imperial effort, and inspired by the memories of that effort, should repay the sacrifices made on its behalf by taking the lead in the movement for Imperial unity.

Was Milner's  
work  
enduring?

Immense as was the achievement of those few years it was transcended by the hopes built upon it. Were those hopes justified? Was the achievement itself enduring, or was it all a vain effort to raise, in defiance of invincible permanent forces, an unnatural structure destined to crumble to pieces the moment the scaffolding was taken away? The future alone can give a final verdict. Yet enough has passed, since Milner left, to allow of at least some answer being given

to that question, and given not without confidence. To deal in detail with the political history of South Africa or of the United Kingdom in the last four years is beyond the scope of these chapters. All that will be attempted in the following pages is to sketch an outline sufficient to complete the task essayed in the present volume by providing the reader with the materials for a reasoned judgment on the results alike of the war and of the work of reconstruction.

On May 23, 1905, Lord Selborne arrived in Pretoria and was sworn in as Governor of the Transvaal. The Boer leaders attended the ceremony, as well as the banquet given in his honour on the following day. The next few months were fully occupied for the new High Commissioner in administrative work and in getting into touch with the people. He travelled in every direction, and soon won the confidence of the farmers by his simple direct speeches and his keen personal interest in rustic affairs. Towards the end of the year Sir A. Lawley left the Transvaal for Madras, and was succeeded as Lieutenant-Governor by Sir R. Solomon. Meanwhile, the work of development progressed steadily. The renewed activity of the mines, due to the solution of the labour difficulty, was reflected in the general expansion of commerce and industry and in a steady improvement in the revenue returns. The British population of the Rand and of the smaller towns was increasing rapidly. Progress would have been even more rapid, but for the political uncertainty which depressed the share market and discouraged new investment. A change of Government at home was imminent, and no one could foretell what the character of the new Government would be or what course it would pursue in South African affairs. But the conduct of a large and noisy section of the Liberal party both during and since the war, and the declarations of some of its leaders on the subject of Chinese labour and on the new Transvaal constitution, fully justified the gravest apprehensions.

The political situation in the United Kingdom was, indeed, extraordinary and disquieting. The Unionist coalition had, to all intents and purposes, been in power for nearly twenty years. Originating in a mere negative

South Africa  
in 1905.  
The political  
uncertainty.

The situation  
in England.  
The Unionist  
party; its  
disorganiza-  
tion.



alliance of Conservatives and Liberals against Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule proposal, it took up by degrees, largely under the influence of Mr. Chamberlain, a more positive and constructive attitude both on Imperial and on domestic affairs, which contributed greatly to the remarkable electoral success of 1895, and sustained the popularity of the Unionist Government in the years that followed. The unpatriotic conduct of a considerable section of the Opposition, headed by the official leader of the party, and the general feeling that the task of reconstruction in the new colonies could only be entrusted to Chamberlain and Milner, renewed the Unionist majority almost unimpaired in 1900. But from that time onward public opinion began to turn. The deficiencies of our military system, and the enormous cost of the war, with its consequent burden of increased taxation, were naturally, and not altogether unreasonably, charged against the Government of the day. The important educational reform of 1902 offended the Nonconformists without creating enthusiasm on the part of the Church. More serious still, the Unionist party had by 1902 lost all the original impulse which called it to power in 1895. It had no positive constructive policy in Imperial affairs with which to follow up the South African war. It was without definite ideas on social problems and had hopelessly lost touch with working-class sentiment. Vaguely and uncertainly it was groping for some broad principle which should give new life, new purpose and cohesion to all its actions, which for disconnected items of social reform should substitute a comprehensive policy of dealing with the condition of the people, which should direct the moral forces enlisted in the stubborn defence of the existing integrity of the Empire in Ireland and South Africa in a general forward movement towards closer Imperial union. That principle was discovered for it when Mr. Chamberlain stood up on May 15, 1903, to raise his famous protest against the paralysing tyranny of Free-trade dogmatism. But to realize the full meaning of the discovery, to become united in acceptance of the principle, and to convert public opinion to it—these things were only possible to a party in opposition. Mr. Balfour, who had

succeeded Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister in July, 1902, decided to remain in office. Every month gained for the continuance of the work of reconstruction in South Africa was of consequence. A momentous departure in foreign policy—the alliance with Japan—was to be negotiated and maintained in an immensely critical international situation. The internal disunion of the party might, he feared, be irretrievably stereotyped by an immediate election, whereas delay and discussion would gradually bring all but a few extremists into line. These reasons against a dissolution, both in the autumn of 1903, and subsequently, were certainly not without weight. But the retention of office involved disadvantages hardly less serious. The Government, stale with over-long tenure of power, weakened by the withdrawal of its most prominent men, living from hand to mouth, fell more and more into discredit. The deliberate refusal of the Prime Minister to pay any attention to the unmistakable trend of public feeling, only increased the impatience of the public and the irritation and recklessness of the Opposition. The want of clear direction on the great issue raised by Mr. Chamberlain paralysed all enthusiasm in the Unionist party, and weakened its organization, without greatly promoting the desired unity.

Even more curious was the state of the Opposition. The great Liberal movement which filled the middle years of the nineteenth century had largely spent itself in England before the end of the seventies. Most of its useful objects had been attained; its *doctrinaire* principles were losing vitality; new circumstances, new points of view were asserting their influence. The momentum of the two-party system and the immense personal popularity of Mr. Gladstone sustained the position of the Liberal party for a time. Home Rule precipitated a break-up which, in some form or other, was inevitable. For nearly a decade the Party continued the frontal attack on the Union. In 1895 it fell back exhausted, discomfited, leaderless, and, what was more serious still, without definite purpose and with no central principle to give coherence to its ideas. Nothing was left to it for the moment but negative criticism, and upon that task it

The Liberal party. Its lack of policy. Ascendency of the extreme wing.

concentrated its efforts, at first feebly, but with steadily growing intensity and bitterness as the years went by and the hopes of a speedy return to power continuously receded into the future. From the first criticism was intensified by personal animosity against Mr. Chamberlain, to whom the whole ruin of the Party was attributed. It consequently fastened with peculiar and unreasoning vehemence upon the South African policy which he inspired and directed. With no clear-sighted, purposeful leader to restrain them, the more violent and reckless elements in the Liberal party let themselves loose during the war in a campaign of denunciation of their country and its representatives in council or in the field which neither love of peace, nor misguided sentimentalism, nor any other pretext could excuse. A large and influential section of the party had disapproved throughout of the excesses of the "pro-Boers." Had the Liberal Imperialists possessed a real leader, or been inspired by any positive political conceptions, they might have secured control of the Party after the disastrous electoral defeat of 1900, and brought about its regeneration. They included several men of great capacity. But the one man who might have led them, Lord Rosebery, only weakened them by his fitful and confusing intervention. Even more fatal was their lack of any constructive ideas. Their Imperialism was a pale reflection, with no distinctive character or programme of its own. Their views on domestic questions contained nothing outside the current Liberal creed of the last generation. Cautious, respectable, unsympathetic, they were the last people to give a new life and a new purpose to their party. So there was nothing for it but to fall back on the old policy of negative opposition, in which those who denounced most freely and were bound by fewest scruples inevitably took the lead. The "Chinese Slavery" agitation marked the final surrender of the moderates and the complete ascendancy of the extremists. Henceforward the Liberal party was dominated by the men who had justified Kruger alike for misgoverning the Uitlanders and for declaring war, who had greedily swallowed every libel upon the British troops and upon their British fellow-countrymen in South Africa, who



had encouraged rebellion and urged the abandonment of the war, who had denounced the annexation of the Republics, who had carped at the work of reconstruction, and who had finally organized the hysterical mendacity of the Chinese campaign.

Except as regards the denunciation of "Chinese slavery," the country had sympathized with none of these things. But it was utterly wearied of the Unionist Government, and as yet unconvinced of the advisability of abandoning Free Trade. Nonconformity was burning to chastise the authors of the Education Act. Trades Unionism was determined to reverse a certain legal decision of which the Government's supporters had generally expressed approval. And in the existing mechanism of English and Imperial political life there was no alternative but to place the Liberals in control, not only of the United Kingdom, but of the general policy of the Empire. It would be difficult to find a more conclusive instance of the hopeless inadequacy of a constitutional system which leaves the vital interests of the Empire at the mercy of the irrelevant squabbles of local parties in a local electorate. Yet, without some great and comprehensive constitutional change, the situation is bound to recur, and with disastrous result.

Early in December, 1905, Mr. Balfour resigned office. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman had no difficulty in forming a Government which, as far as individual ability went, could compare very favourably with its immediate predecessor. A month later followed the general election. The Unionist party was almost swept off the face of the country.\* The new Government met Parliament with the largest majority any government had commanded since the Reform Act. It would, perhaps, be truer to say it was confronted with that majority—for at that moment the discomfited remnant of Unionists scarcely counted—and had yet to discover which of the two was to command and which to obey. The natural tendency of the Government, once in office, was to face the

The failure of  
the existing  
Constitution.

The General  
Election.  
The new  
Government  
and its  
supporters.

\* The figures in 1900 were : Unionists, 402 ; Liberals, 177 ; Labour, 9 ; Nationalists, 82—majority, 134. In 1906 : Unionists, 156 ; Liberals, 379 ; Labour, 52 ; Nationalists, 83—majority, 358.

actual facts of the situation, whether in Imperial or in domestic affairs, and to forget the wild denunciation and extravagant statements made in opposition now that they had served their turn. Unfortunately not a few of the ministers, including the Prime Minister, were still to such a degree obsessed by the past that even contact with facts could not wholly dispel the fictitious beliefs into which they had worked themselves up.\* As for the great bulk of the Liberal majority, their concern was not with facts at all. Intoxicated with success they were in no mood to swallow their own words, or to go back upon their self-imposed mandates, simply to suit mere facts or the mere convenience of Ministers. All that concerned them, for the moment, was to make good their platform speeches, and to satisfy the accumulated bitterness of opposition by destroying the works of their predecessors and heaping contumely upon their persons.

The vote of  
censure on  
Lord Milner,  
March, 1906.

This spirit of vindictive insolence was freely displayed towards Mr. Chamberlain and other Unionist leaders. But its most extraordinary and wanton manifestation was not given till a few weeks after Parliament assembled. On March 21 a member of the name of Byles moved a formal vote of censure on Lord Milner for having authorized the flogging of Chinese in violation of treaty pledges and in defiance of the law. The facts were that, shortly before Lord Milner's departure, the official protector of Chinese, Mr. Evans, had given permission for the infliction of a limited amount of corporal punishment for certain offences against discipline. Mr. Evans's impression was that he had mentioned this to Lord Milner in the course of general conversation. If so, the technical illegality of his action

\* For this mental condition, and indeed for the whole political situation at that moment, it would again be difficult to find a more fitting description than that given in Swift's essay on Arbuthnot's "Art of Political Lying": "Towards the end of this chapter he warns the heads of parties against believing their own lies, which has proved of pernicious consequence of late; both a wise party and a wise nation having regulated their affairs upon lies of their own invention. The causes of this he supposes to be too great a zeal and intenseness in the practice of this art, and a vehement heat in mutual conversation whereby they persuade one another that what they wish and report to be true is really so."

passed unnoticed by Lord Milner, who, in any case, had no subsequent recollection whatever of the matter.\* To found a vote of censure upon so trivial an incident was a grotesque travesty of one of the most solemn of Parliamentary traditions. But some pretext was needed for holding up to execration the man who in the eyes of the whole gang of malignant anti-Imperialists stood as the embodiment of all that they detested, and apparently no better one was discoverable. This discreditable and ridiculous performance was deliberately encouraged by members of the Government. At the last moment, indeed, the new Colonial Under-Secretary, Mr. Winston Churchill,† moved an official amendment which, while endorsing the substance of the motion, expressed the desire of the House "to refrain from passing censure on individuals." But his speech, framed in terms of contemptuous insolence towards Lord Milner, only emphasized the sympathetic subservience of the Ministry to the malignants. The motion as amended was carried by 355 to 135, in spite of the dignified and eloquent protests of Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Balfour. The petty malice of the whole proceedings created widespread indignation. A week later the House of Lords, on the motion of Lord Halifax, recorded its high appreciation of Lord Milner's services to the Empire. A similar tribute of admiration was paid soon after in the shape of a remarkable gathering at a banquet in his honour on May 24, at which Mr. Chamberlain presided. The feelings of the general public were shown in a testimonial, signed by nearly 400,000 persons,‡ which was organized by Sir Bartle Frere—the son of one who, like Milner, had spent himself in the Empire's cause in South Africa, and who, like Milner, had suffered from the persecution of partizan vindictiveness.

Meanwhile the decisive struggle between the Government

The Government driven by the anti-Chinese extremists.

\* The permission was subsequently withdrawn by Sir A. Lawley in view of certain instances of ill-treatment which had taken place, and Mr. Lyttelton, on hearing of the action taken by Mr. Evans, expressed his strong disapproval.

† Mr. Churchill had been elected as Unionist member for Oldham in 1900, but had subsequently changed sides over the fiscal question.

‡ Including nearly 29,000 signatures from South Africa.



and its supporters had taken place over Chinese labour. The cry of "Slavery under the Union Jack" had been worked with extraordinary fertility of invention, with intense moral fervour, and conspicuous practical success at the election. Nothing short of the immediate liberation of the "slaves" could justify it. But two months of office were more than sufficient to make the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Elgin, realize that no sudden change was possible without creating incalculable financial disaster in South Africa, and that no change whatever was possible unless a responsible government in the Transvaal was prepared to endorse it. These conclusions were tentatively indicated to the House of Commons by Mr. Churchill on February 22. They were received with consternation in the Liberal ranks. To describe the slavery cry as "a terminological inexactitude," and to discuss the possible limitations which the British Government might put on the decision of the Transvaal Legislature to continue employing Chinese labour might be very well for Mr. Churchill. But how were the stalwarts who had been lashing themselves into a fury of moral indignation on countless platforms to be expected to face their constituents and explain that the whole agitation had been a fraud? The thing could not, and would not, be done. Faced with open mutiny, the Government hurriedly capitulated. On the following day Mr. Asquith carefully explained Mr. Churchill away, and announced definitely that the Chinese Labour Ordinance would have to come to an end before any responsible government in the Transvaal could be allowed to make its decision on the question of imported labour, and that no new ordinance would then be sanctioned which did not differ radically from the existing one.\*

Subsequent  
development  
of the  
Chinese  
question.

In the meantime all further importation had been forbidden—except for some 11,000 for whom licenses had already been issued before the change of government—and the impatience of the Government's supporters was allayed by various devices. A proclamation was issued that any Chinaman who wished to go home before the expiration of

\* At the end of 1907 the Government agreed to the renewal of the Chinese Labour Ordinance, word for word, till 1910.

his indenture could secure repatriation at the expense of the Imperial exchequer. The "slaves" had not the slightest wish to leave their employment, and the sensitive conscience of their would-be liberators was thus satisfied without serious inconvenience either to the mines or to the Imperial exchequer. An ingenious scheme was concocted between the Colonial Office and Mr. J. B. Robinson, a South African mining magnate, and an old ally of Kruger's. Mr. Robinson held out visions of a great white labour experiment which he hoped to initiate if the Colonial Office meanwhile enabled him to recruit natives in Portuguese East Africa with his own touts in competition with the Witwatersrand Labour Association, whom he accused of slackness in recruiting in order to justify the need for Chinese. Great pressure was put on the Portuguese to secure Mr. Robinson exclusive\* privileges for private touting, but the venture was not as successful as that gentleman had hoped. The white labour experiment receded into the background after serving its purpose of quieting the Government's supporters, and the only practical result of the scheme was a baronetcy for its promoter. An attempt to revive the whole anti-Chinese agitation on the ground of the immorality of the Chinese fell flat after an official inquiry. The conclusion of an agreement with France over the New Hebrides, embodying provisions for indentured labour which showed very much less regard for the welfare and liberty of the labourers than the Transvaal Ordinance, helped to put the whole business in its proper perspective. Gradually interest in the question subsided in the Liberal ranks, and there only remained the anxiety lest a self-governing Transvaal, by retaining the Chinese, should cause political embarrassment to the champions of liberty.

When the Unionist Government resigned, the various measures, such as registration and the demarcation of constituencies, required before the Lyttelton constitution could come into force, had not been quite completed. But there was no reason why the new representative Assembly should not have been elected at an early date in 1906. From the

The decision to grant full responsible government. General arguments in favour.

\* Other firms applied but were refused.

very outset, however, the new Government announced its intention of proceeding directly to full responsible government without any period of transition. In favour of that decision certain broad arguments could reasonably be urged. The Lyttelton constitution had been freely denounced, not only by the Boers, but by a section of the British. There was always the danger of that opposition developing into a systematic effort to make the constitution unworkable. If that effort proved successful, after a conflict more or less prolonged, self-government might start on its career with a tradition of opposition to the Imperial authority. The unexpected grant of full self-government, on the other hand, would be welcomed as a generous act of confidence, and would create a feeling of good-will towards the Imperial connexion among all classes, but especially among the Boers, which would prove an even better guarantee for the future than another two or three years of increasing administrative efficiency, or than a few thousand more British voters. The line of argument was by no means conclusive. That a form of constitution which had worked for twenty years in Cape Colony was bound to break down at once in the Transvaal was a very doubtful assumption, especially as the actual constitution of the Assembly made it at least probable that the Executive with its supporters would command a majority. That any friction between the Executive and the Assembly would have long survived the subsequent grant of self-government is extremely unlikely. On the other hand, all past experience in South Africa justified a profound mistrust of any "conciliation" which was based on concessions made to political opponents at the expense of political supporters, and a strong preference for confiding the safeguarding of Imperial interests in South Africa to the ingrained instincts of a safe British majority rather than to the uncertain hope of gratitude from the Boers. Nevertheless, the argument in favour of the direct grant of responsible government was one which, on general grounds, could reasonably appeal to the most sincere Imperialist. It was true that the risks involved were tremendous. Still, the most venturesome policy might sometimes prove the wisest.



It is only fair to assume that these considerations and that hope played their part in deciding the policy of the Government. But it would be impossible to deny that considerations and motives of a very different nature entered largely into the decision. It must be confessed that few of the men who at that moment dominated the Liberal party were seriously concerned to safeguard the position won by the war and by the work of the years which had intervened. The majority had insensibly come to look upon the British element in South Africa as political opponents deserving punishment for their admiration of Milner and Chamberlain, and upon the Boers as political allies, deserving every reward for the obstinacy with which they had opposed in arms the Imperialism which they themselves had only denounced on the platform and in the press. In so far as emotion governed the decision, it is to be feared that the emotion of political partizanship and the irresistible craving to undo or alter the work of their predecessors, played at least as large a part as the desire to make that work permanent by a bold stroke of political genius. But more decisive than any political emotion, so far at least as the Government was concerned, was the practical argument Lyttelton had indicated two years before. Responsible government, once granted, would interpose the most effective possible buffer between the Government and its own extremists on the question of Chinese labour. Moreover, there was always the hope that the grant of responsible government might bring into power in the Transvaal a ministry whose decision on the Chinese question would relieve the Liberal party from its embarrassment.

It is necessary to take account of these peculiarly commingled motives to understand why the Ministry decided not only to proceed directly to full self-government, but also to abandon the existing political framework of the Lyttelton constitution, and to reopen the whole question of the franchise and the distribution of seats. On March 21 a Committee was appointed to investigate the whole question of representation in the new colonies. The only definite directions given to the Committee in their letters of instruction were, to consider the substitution of manhood suffrage

Motives  
entering into  
the decision.

The  
Ridgeway  
Committee.

for the electoral qualification in the Lyttelton constitution, and the possibility of a wider marginal discretion for the sake of respecting existing boundaries, and to frame their recommendations for the Transvaal with a view to a House of about sixty members. But they were also given to understand that they were to avail themselves of any opportunity which might present itself for negotiating an amicable settlement between the various parties in the Transvaal. The Committee, which consisted of Sir West Ridgeway, Lord Sandhurst, Sir Francis Hopwood, and Colonel D. A. Johnston, R.E., reached South Africa on April 24, and held their first sitting in Pretoria on May 1.

Transvaal  
politics in  
1905. Het  
Volk and  
the new  
Government.

To understand the situation with which they had to deal it is necessary to summarize the political development of the preceding year. The Lyttelton constitution had been promulgated on April 25, 1905. Only a few days before, Het Volk and the Johannesburg Responsible Government Association had concluded a definite alliance. The Het Volk leaders agreed on their side to accept roughly equal electoral districts and to allow Chinese labour to remain operative for five years; the Responsibles made concessions on the questions of education and the use of the Dutch language. Both parties promptly issued manifestoes denouncing the new constitution, following up their action with public meetings and deputations to Lord Selborne. The Responsibles freely hinted that they would use their efforts to make the constitution unworkable, while Botha and the Boer leaders threatened complete abstention. It is difficult to believe that the threat was seriously intended. In any case, when the Het Volk congress met in July, Botha, who had worked up the whole campaign against the constitution, used his influence to prevent his followers passing a resolution directly refusing co-operation in the forthcoming legislature. By thus keeping the threat still suspended, while posing himself as a restraining factor, Botha skilfully placed himself in the best possible position for bargaining if an occasion arose. That the approaching advent to power of a Liberal Government in England would furnish such an occasion was a conviction freely expressed

both at this Congress and at a similar one at Bloemfontein immediately afterwards. When the change of government came at last, Smuts promptly sailed for England to exercise what influence he might to secure a constitution more favourable to the Boers from those who had hitherto consistently championed their interests, and to reconnoitre the general political position. The exact nature of the communications between him and the Liberal Ministry is not known, nor is it important. What is important is that from that time onwards the British Government and Het Volk worked in an alliance, none the less effective for being informal and unavowed. There is no reason to imagine that any definite bargain was ever concluded, then or later, over Chinese labour or over any other issue. But each partner knew what the other wished to secure, and played his cards accordingly.

Meanwhile, the Progressives, after formally declaring their acceptance of the Lyttelton constitution, had been comparatively quiescent, devoting their main energies to securing the rudiments of an organization and to registering their voters. The announcement of the Liberal Government's decision to proceed directly to full self-government was generally welcomed by them as offering effective protection against home interference, especially in the matter of Chinese labour. But their alarm became intense when they realized that the Liberals not only intended to abolish the representative stage, but openly threatened to alter the whole electoral basis on which the Lyttelton constitution was framed. Meetings of protest against any change were held. At the same time efforts were made to bring the Responsibles into line. These were no longer now divided from the Progressives on any real political issue. But the personal factors which had been mainly responsible for their existence as a party still survived. They resolved to maintain their separate organization and emphasized their independence of the Progressives by freely denouncing them as a party of "jingo" and capitalists, while claiming for themselves the title of Moderates or Nationalists. Incapable of realizing their own weakness, both in leaders and in voting strength, they

The Progressives and Nationalists.



Attitude  
of the  
Committee.

aspired to hold the balance between the Boers and the Progressives, and to control the coalition ministry which they hoped would be the outcome of the first elections.

To deal in detail with the protracted discussions between the Ridgeway Committee and the various parties in the Transvaal is beyond the scope of this chapter. To the courtesy, accessibility, and reasonableness of the Committee all parties bore cheerful witness. Its inherent weakness lay in the task tacitly though not overtly imposed upon it, namely, that of somehow or other altering the basis of the Lyttelton constitution in favour of the Boers, and against the Progressives. Every page of the Committee's somewhat inconsequent report bears witness to the difficulty of reconciling this task with the real facts of the South African situation and with the safeguarding of British supremacy. That a British majority in the first legislature was desirable was a conclusion to which the Committee unhesitatingly subscribed. Yet its whole efforts were directed to diminishing the possibility of such a majority. In order to salve its conscience the Committee successfully contrived to persuade itself of two things: firstly, that the Boers were not only quite unlikely to secure a majority in any case, but had not the slightest desire to do so; and secondly, that the Responsibles represented a great body of moderate British opinion profoundly concerned about the British connexion, but jealous of the excessive subservience of the Progressives to capitalist influences. The hope was that by diminishing the representation of the Rand this "moderate" body might be given an effective balance of power and form the controlling element in the first ministry. There can be little doubt that this conception of the situation was strongly encouraged by Sir R. Solomon, whose views were becoming more and more pronouncedly anti-Progressive, and who was generally considered as likely to be called upon to form a coalition ministry. The flaw in the argument lay in the fact that the so-called moderates were essentially not moderates, but malcontents, men too ambitious, or unstable, or restless to cooperate with the main body of their fellow-countrymen, and that they had no really solid backing in the constituencies.

Fortunately the Lyttelton constitution was founded on principles whose fairness could not easily be questioned. And in the Progressive leaders those principles had earnest and able champions, who were determined to make no surrender on vital points. Except as regards the substitution of manhood suffrage for the low Lyttelton franchise, the arguments of the Progressives in favour of the essential principles of the voters' basis and automatic redistribution prevailed with the Committee, and were reluctantly acquiesced in even by the Boer leaders, who contented themselves with minor concessions in the nature of the retention as constituencies of the old magisterial districts, and the exclusion of the military from the vote. The real struggle concentrated on the attempt to beat down the Progressives with regard to the number of seats to be allotted to the Rand. According to the voters' roll prepared for the purposes of the Lyttelton constitution, the Rand was entitled to 35 seats out of a total of 69, and this proportion would not have been affected materially by allowing for the change to manhood suffrage. The Committee, on the other hand, began by taking as their basis the census of 1904. That census was taken at the very lowest point of depression before the relief of the labour situation, and would have given the Rand a much lower figure; in fact, the voters on the Lyttelton roll exceeded by 3,000 the total adult male population of the Rand as given in the census. Doubts were freely cast by the Responsibles and Boers on the genuineness of the voters' roll, and Mr. E. P. Solomon's cry of "9,000 bogus voters" was even echoed by Mr. Churchill. But there is no ground for questioning the accuracy of the voters' lists, which simply reflected the influx of white industrial population consequent on the introduction of the Chinese. When the Committee left the Transvaal on July 4 they had not managed to secure agreement between the parties. But they were prepared themselves to advocate 33 seats for the Rand, 6 for Pretoria, and 30 for the rest of the Transvaal, and this distribution was adopted by the British Government. The loss of two seats, counting four on a division, in so small an assembly was a considerable handicap on the British element. But

The Progressives deprived of a few seats but successfully uphold their principles.

when the attitude of the Liberal Government, and the original ideas of the Committee are taken into account, it must be admitted that the Progressives managed to defend their main position with undoubted success. And it may always be legitimately urged that even the temporary loss of seats was not without some compensation. The prolonged negotiations brought the parties together, and made each more satisfied at the end with what it had managed to secure or preserve. The Boers, at any rate, were now prepared to accept gratefully, as coming from their friends, an arrangement differing but little from that which they had denounced before when it came in the names of Milner and Lyttelton. If it was necessary to make any alteration in the basis of the Lyttelton constitution, then it may well be admitted that the Ridgeway Committee carried out their task in a reasonable and conservative spirit, and made the best use of their opportunity to play the part of "honest brokers."

Other recommendations of the Committee. The new Letters Patent, Dec. 1906.

Of the other recommendations of the Committee the most important was one in favour of the creation of a second chamber of fifteen members, to be nominated in the first instance by the Governor, leaving it open to the legislature at the expiration of six years \* to create an elective second chamber in its place. As an ingenious means both of pacifying Liberal sentiment on the Chinese question, and still more of safeguarding the Transvaal against another campaign of misrepresentation, the Committee suggested that some clause should be introduced into the constitution providing against slavery, or labour partaking of slavery, the decision to be left to the Supreme Court of the Colony.† In view of the natural anxiety of civil servants, the Committee, though convinced that there was no real danger of their being deprived of their posts by the new Government in either colony, strongly urged that their position should be

\* Subsequently changed to four years in the Letters Patent.

† It need hardly be said that the members of the Committee, like all other reasonably open-minded visitors to South Africa, were soon convinced of the entire absence of any foundation of fact for the Chinese slavery campaign.



safeguarded.\* In subsequent reports the Committee dealt with the Orange River Colony, where a similar constitution was recommended,† though certain of the smaller townships were grouped together apart from their surrounding districts, and with the special claims of the settlers introduced under the Land Settlement Ordinances. On December 12, 1906, the new Letters Patent‡ for the Transvaal were issued. In the main they followed closely on the lines of the Committee's report, and, indeed, were based on draft Letters Patent prepared for the Committee by Sir R. Solomon. Both English and Dutch were to be used in transacting the business of the Legislature, but the official records were to be in English. The suggestion with regard to slavery was given a somewhat different turn, a reference being inserted to "conditions of employment or of residence of a servile character" as justifying the reservation by the Governor of any law providing for the introduction of indentured labour from outside South Africa. The settlers were safeguarded for five years by the establishment of Land Settlement Boards, independent of the Colonial Governments. Provision was made for the temporary continuance of the Inter-Colonial Council, and for its subsequent partial or complete winding up at the discretion of the two colonies. But no provision whatever was made for the protection of the Civil Service which had worked so loyally and devotedly to build up the framework of the new administration.

With the publication of the new Letters Patent the Transvaal election campaign may be said to have begun. As was inevitable it was marked by a considerable recrudescence of racial animosity, and the Boer leaders, in order to work up the enthusiasm of their followers made many rash

Further political evolution in the Transvaal. Position of Sir R. Solomon.

\* One suggestion made by them was that, in case of dismissal on the ground of incompetence, they should have a right of appeal to a judge of the Supreme Court, and, in case of reduction of salary or retrenchment, a right of appeal to the British Treasury, which should decide the adequacy of the compensation given.

† The number of members was fixed at thirty-eight for the Assembly, and eleven for the Legislative Council.

‡ Cd. 3250. The Letters Patent for the O.R.C. (Cd. 3526) were published in June, 1907.

promises whose fulfilment would have meant the complete overthrow of the whole work of reconstruction. It is unnecessary to dwell on these not wholly unprecedented features of electioneering. More interesting and significant was the rapid disintegration of the so-called "Moderates" or "Nationalists." A few of their more representative men left their ranks and either joined the Progressives, or preferred to be called Independents, and their example was followed by many of their followers. The rest gravitated with increasing speed into the arms of *Het Volk*, and by the date of the election were either actual members of that organization or avowedly its dependent allies. In no case was this process more rapidly or more curiously manifested than in that of Sir R. Solomon. After a visit to England, where his services were freely used by the Colonial Office in the final drafting of the Constitution, Solomon returned in December on the eve of the election, and on landing resigned his office in order to become a political candidate. He was generally regarded as the almost inevitable first Prime Minister of the Transvaal. He was a South African born. He had been a minister in a self-governing colony. He had been the leading member of the Crown Colony government. The obvious and natural part for him to play was that of a defender of the Milner administration, detached from party issues, but pledged to continuity on the main lines of policy. Unfortunately, he had been nominated in his absence for a Pretoria seat already being contested by Sir P. FitzPatrick, and had not had the decision to extricate himself from a hopelessly false position. Standing as a Nationalist against one of the most loyal supporters and champions of the Milner administration, and forced, day by day, to rely more for his election upon the *Het Volk* vote, he drifted with amazing rapidity into the practical disavowal of all he had worked for in the last five years.

Feb. 1907.  
The election.  
Botha  
ministry  
formed.

The election took place on February 20. The result was an overwhelming victory for *Het Volk*, whose well-drilled battalions swept the country districts and, helped by British divisions, carried not a few seats in Pretoria and on the Rand. Altogether *Het Volk* secured thirty-seven seats,



as against twenty-one won by the Progressives. Only six Nationalists were returned, not counting five Independents or Labour candidates, and Sir R. Solomon was not among them. His defeat by Sir P. FitzPatrick was not only the most dramatic and unexpected, but in some ways the most important result of the election. Lord Selborne had now no reasonable alternative open to him but to call upon General Botha to form a ministry. Botha had little difficulty in forming a government with the help of some of his Nationalist allies or converts. He himself took the department of Agriculture; Mr. Smuts became Colonial Secretary; Mr. Hull, Treasurer; Mr. E. P. Solomon, Minister of Public Works; Mr. J. de Villiers, Attorney-General and Minister of Mines; Mr. J. Rissik, Minister of Lands and Native Affairs. Sir R. Solomon, who had not seen his way to joining the ministry in a subordinate position, was appointed Agent-General in London. Behind Botha sat, in solid phalanx, the commandants who had held out to the end, mingled with a sprinkling of young Afrikaner lawyers. Within four years the military surrender of Vereeniging was converted into a great political victory.

The Orange River Colony elections followed on November 20. Here there was no question of any but an overwhelming Dutch majority. The only question was as to its character. On the one side was the Moderate or "Constitutional" party led by Sir J. G. Fraser, Mr. Steyn's old rival for the Presidency. This, the direct inheritor of President Brand's policy, comprised the mainly English town populations of Bloemfontein and Harrismith, and a considerable proportion of the more prosperous Boer farmers, including most of the early surrenders and the "ex-military burghers" such as Piet de Wet and Vilonel. Its programme was in the main the carrying on of the existing administrative system. On the other side was the "Orangia Unie," led by Messrs. Abraham Fischer,\* Hertzog and Christiaan de Wet, and including all the uncompromising

Nov. 1907.  
O.R.C.  
elections.  
Mr. Fischer  
Prime  
Minister.

\* Mr. Steyn's health did not permit of active participation in politics, though his influence in the councils of the Unie was naturally very great.



"bitter-enders." Its policy was one of appeal to racial animosity, to the memories of the war, and to the hope of the overthrow of the existing system, especially in such departments as education and agriculture. At one time it seemed as if the Constitutionalists might secure, at any rate, a strong minority, capable of acting as a check on the Government. But in the end they were swept away by the tide of racial emotion, and only secured two members outside of Bloemfontein, where they managed to hold all five seats. Sir H. Goold-Adams sent for Mr. Fischer, who took the position of Prime Minister together with the office of Colonial Secretary. General de Wet—like Botha exchanging the sword for the ploughshare—took the Ministry of Agriculture; Dr. Ramsbottom, the Treasury; Mr. Hertzog became Attorney-General and Director of Education; and Mr. C. H. Wessels, Minister of Public Works, Lands and Mines.

Cape Colony  
in 1903-4.  
The 1904  
elections.

A few weeks later the flowing tide of political reaction submerged Cape Colony also. Nothing has been said of the political developments in Cape Colony since Mr. Chamberlain's departure, and a short digression is necessary in order to complete the narrative in this respect. Chamberlain's visit had made no profound change in the general situation, though the tone of the Bond was, on the whole, somewhat less bitter in consequence of his efforts with Mr. Hofmeyr. The Progressives, united and strengthened by the suspension movement, and undeterred by Chamberlain's rejection of their proposal, went on actively organizing themselves as a party definitely pledged to an uncompromising maintenance of the results of the war, and eliminating all weak-kneed elements. When Parliament met (June, 1903), Dr. Smartt, who had acted with courage and vigour in the capacity of party leader, retired in favour of Dr. Jameson, whose energy, ability, and breadth of view had rapidly brought him to the front as Mr. Rhodes's successor, and were fast overcoming the prejudice created by the Raid. Sir Gordon Sprigg, meanwhile, hung on to office, trusting somehow to maintain his position by balancing between the two parties, and to increase his popularity by a vigorous policy of expenditure

on public works. But repeated rebuffs from the Bond at last convinced him that his position was untenable, and, unable even to get through his appropriation bills he hurriedly closed the session at the end of August and decided on a dissolution. The elections to the Legislative Council in November gave a Progressive majority of one. The elections to the Assembly began in January, 1904. Unanimous, well-led, well-organized, materially helped in certain districts by the disfranchisement of rebels, the Progressives just managed to secure a victory which was of the utmost consequence for the whole of South Africa. With regard to the Bond, or South African party—the name adopted by the united party consisting of the Bond and the small wing of anti-Imperialist British attached to it—the chief feature in its campaign was the determined, and not altogether unsuccessful effort made to win over the native vote. The actual Progressive majority was only five, but the defeat, not only of extremists like Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, but also of “mugwumps” like Sprigg and Douglass added greatly to the prestige of the victors. Without a single follower, without a seat himself, Sprigg could hold on no longer, and on February 18 resigned office. Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson called for Jameson, who formed a ministry with Dr. Smartt as Minister of Railways and Public Works; Mr. Walton as Treasurer; Colonel Crewe as Colonial Secretary; Mr. V. Sampson as Attorney-General; Mr. A. Fuller as Minister of Agriculture, and Sir Lewis Michell, Minister without portfolio.

For the next four years Jameson remained in office and in their course displayed qualities of statesmanship and power which few had suspected. His uncompromising firmness on the main issues of British supremacy, combined with his generously conciliatory attitude on all minor points and his exceptional personal tact, gradually softened the bitterness left by the war. In his efforts at conciliation Jameson did not stand alone, and some reference, however cursory, is necessary to the personal influence and popularity of Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson with the Dutch population. Nor could the Dutch farmers cherish indefinitely a personal

The Jameson  
Ministry,  
1904-8.

grudge against a Prime Minister who made the fostering of agriculture the main end and object of his administration, and who did far more to help them than had even been attempted by any of his predecessors. Unfortunately, Jameson's efforts at a policy of development were from first to last hampered by an empty purse. On the strength of a great increase in the Cape revenue due to the abnormal expansion of traffic to the Rand following on the peace, Sprigg had launched on an ambitious policy of railways and public works. To this Jameson succeeded at the very depth of the depression. And as far as the Cape Colony revenues were concerned the depression lasted throughout Jameson's term of office, for the effects of the revival on the Rand in 1905 were counteracted by a steadily increasing deviation of traffic to Delagoa Bay. With a fall in revenue from £11,000,000 to £7,000,000 there was little opportunity for expenditure on development, and no other policy but one of fresh taxation and drastic retrenchment was possible. Retrenchment is always unpopular, and in this case the burden of the retrenchment and of the general depression fell most heavily upon the urban British community which composed so large an element in the Progressive majority. Under these influences the political reaction among the British community set in rapidly. By the middle of 1907 Jameson realized that he could not stay on much longer, and a complete deadlock between the evenly balanced parties in the Upper House only precipitated his decision. Convinced that the old fighting spirit of the Progressives could not be roused again, his chief anxiety was to enlist the support of all moderate elements, including, if possible, that uncertain factor, Mr. Schreiner,\* in defence of the existing racial peace against the vindictive attitude assumed by Merriman and other Bond leaders, and thus to secure at any rate a strong conservative minority as a bulwark against violent reaction. As an indication of this passage from the aggressive to the defensive—as well as with a view to South African and Imperial Union in the future—he persuaded his followers to rechristen themselves as the Unionist

\* Mr. Schreiner had stood as an Independent in 1904 and had been beaten by a Bond candidate, but was returned for Queenstown in 1908.



party. For the immediate purpose of the elections this policy, however wise in its general conception, cannot be said to have been particularly effective. The trend of public opinion was shown unmistakably by the Legislative Council elections in January, 1908, from which the South African party returned with seventeen members as against eight Unionists and one Independent. At the beginning of February Jameson resigned, and Merriman formed a ministry, retaining the Treasury himself, and assigning the portfolio of Public Works to Mr. J. W. Sauer, the Department of Agriculture to Mr. F. S. Malan, the Colonial Secretaryship to Mr. de Waal, and the office of Attorney-General to Mr. H. Burton, Mr. Currey and Mr. de Villiers Graaf being ministers without portfolio. The elections for the Assembly, which followed in March, gave the new government an overwhelming majority. Only thirty-three Unionists were returned against sixty-nine members of the South African party.

The Bond  
victory. Mr.  
Merriman  
Prime  
Minister.

From one end of South Africa to the other, except in Natal,\* the triumph of the reaction was complete. In Cape

The triumph  
of the  
reaction.

\* The history of Natal during these years, though not without importance, does not bear directly upon the great political crisis of which the war was the decisive point. Sir A. Hime's ministry, re-elected in 1901, finally resigned in August, 1903, and was succeeded by a ministry under Mr. (now Sir) G. M. Sutton, who held office till May, 1905, and was then succeeded by Mr. C. J. Smythe. A native rising, connected, it would seem, with the "Ethiopian" missionary movement, broke out early in February, 1906, beginning with the murder of an inspector and a trooper of police at Byrnetown, and was apparently suppressed by the middle of March. The wilder elements in the Liberal Party in England vigorously espoused the cause of the natives, and under their influence Lord Elgin on March 29 took the singularly ill-advised step of instructing the Governor, Sir H. MacCallum, to postpone the execution of twelve natives who had been duly tried for the Byrnetown murder. The Smythe ministry promptly resigned as a protest against this unprecedented interference. On March 31 the Colonial Office, realizing that feeling, not only in South Africa but elsewhere in the Empire, was against it and that it had committed a mistake, climbed down, explaining that it had only meant to ask for information. The Natal ministry withdrew its resignation, and the executions took place on April 2. Meanwhile the rising began again under a chief called Bambaata, who early in April fled to Zululand and succeeded in enlisting the support of the aged chief Sigananda. Assisted by volunteers from the Transvaal, the Natal forces under Colonel McKenzie operated in Zululand the whole of May and June before finally crushing all resistance. Dinuzulu, who was arrested on a charge of complicity in

Colony the former defenders of Krugerism were returned to power with an overwhelming majority by the votes alike of re-enfranchised rebels \* and of discontented British. In the new colonies it almost looked as if the Boers had regained at the ballot-box all that they had lost on the field and conceded at Vereeniging. To many British South Africans it seemed as if the ground had given way under their feet, and as if all the cost and sacrifice of the war, all the thought and effort of the reconstruction had been thrown away utterly. Once more their own divisions and the recklessness of party politics in England had led to the repetition on a larger scale of the disastrous folly of the Majuba surrender. What hope was there that England's fortune should retrieve such folly once again ?

Signs of  
political  
retrogression.

There was much to lend colour to this gloomy view of the situation. Compared with the prospect of the future as it appeared when Milner left, the catastrophe seemed at first appalling. Even judged by the standard of what had been achieved before 1906 the signs of retrogression were unmistakable and were naturally taken to be merely the first precursors of a continuous and inevitable decline. Under the plea of continuing the retrenchment which had been begun before the grant of self-government, British officials were being dismissed right and left in the new colonies. Meanwhile occasional fresh appointments of men possessing no other qualification but that of race and political zeal seemed to mark the first steps in the wholesale destruction of the efficient civil service built up with so much care and effort, and the return to the worst traditions of the republican *régime*. In all the legislatures the champions of militant Afrikanerdom ruled supreme and could apparently afford to ride rough shod over all opposition. Even the slight barrier

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the rebellion, was after a long trial acquitted on all counts except that of harbouring rebels, for which he was sentenced to four years' imprisonment. In November, 1906, the Smythe ministry resigned and was succeeded by one formed by Mr. F. R. Moor, the present Prime Minister of the Colony.

\* A general Amnesty Bill carried by Dr. Jameson in August, 1906, re-enfranchised all the rebels, most of whom would in any case have regained the franchise before the end of 1907.



which in the Transvaal was furnished by the nominated council was removed by the simple device of tempting away two weak-kneed British members by official appointments and filling their places with Het Volk stalwarts.

With the political reaction came a renewal of the economic crisis. Once more the whole industrial situation on the Rand was thrown into confusion and uncertainty. No one knew what disastrous measures might at any moment be carried by the Boer majority, and the composition of the various commissions appointed to inquire into questions affecting the industry was not calculated to increase confidence. The chief ground of uncertainty, however, still remained the labour question. During all the negotiations preceding the grant of self-government, and up to the general election, the Het Volk leaders posed alternately as opponents of Chinese labour or as prepared to give the experiment a further reasonable extension, according as their speeches were intended for the Liberal party in England, for Boer farmers alarmed by Chinese outrages, or for the "Moderates" on the Rand. Even after their accession to power their attitude still remained very undecided. Apart from the genuine objections to Chinese labour entertained by some members of the ministry, motives both of political gratitude and of interest made them anxious to help the Liberals in England by dispensing with the Chinese, and thus avoiding any possible friction which might arise over the reintroduction of the Labour Ordinance. The arguments for pushing on the development of the mines at the highest possible speed which had weighed so strongly with Lord Milner, could hardly be expected to appeal to them with the same force. On the other hand the administration had to be carried on and the lavish promises made before the election had to be redeemed by some form of public assistance to the farmers. It was, therefore, obviously impossible to do anything which seriously injured the revenue. Accordingly Botha made it clear from the first that nothing like wholesale or sudden repatriation was in view. What his ultimate policy might be remained undisclosed till his visit to England in April, 1907, for the Imperial Conference. His public speeches, more particularly

Renewed economic crisis. The £5,000,000 loan. Its significance. Abandonment of the war contribution.



one at the Savoy Hotel on May 1, were generally interpreted as indicating an intention not to interfere with the labour supply, and created no little alarm in Liberal circles. But the announcement on May 9 that he had arranged with the British Government for a guaranteed loan of £5,000,000 to be spent on a land bank, agricultural railways, and similar purposes, made it plain to all the world that he had found a way of making himself independent of the immediate prosperity of the mines, and that the Chinese would go. It was an ingenious solution, and most satisfactory to both partners in the tacit agreement. But it would be hard to find a more striking instance of interference in the internal affairs of a self-governing colony than this lending of financial aid to a colonial government in order to enable it to act wholly independently of possible opposition from its own electorate.\* For the British opposition in the Transvaal nothing was left but impotent indignation at a transaction of which they would not only have to bear the immediate economic consequences, but the actual price of which would eventually come out of their own pockets. There was one substantial consolation, indeed, which they might have found in the alliance between their Boer rulers and the British Government. The war contribution of £30,000,000 was now definitely dropped. Chamberlain's policy in this respect had always been open to question, and, as he realized himself, the contribution was only possible as a voluntary token of gratitude from the British community in the Transvaal. For the Liberals to claim it from the men whom they had consistently maligned, and who regarded them as the authors of all their misfortunes, was flatly impossible, even if Botha had consented, and the Government wisely made a virtue of necessity in waiving all claims in the matter.

Termination  
of Chinese  
labour  
announced.  
The  
depression.

On Botha's return the decision on the Labour question was made public. All Chinese labourers were to be repatriated on the expiration of their indenture, and no new importation or renewal of indenture was to be permitted. This meant a

\* In a speech delivered at Standerton in March, 1909, General Botha admitted that if a referendum had been taken on the question of the Chinese they would never have left the country.

gradual reduction spread over three years, and consequently no immediate labour crisis. But, even so, the effect upon the industry was most serious. For the next few months Johannesburg and all commercial and industrial South Africa with it went through the acutest depression which it had ever experienced. From the Rand and from the seaports the British population began to dribble away from South Africa in a constantly increasing stream.

## CHAPTER IX

## THROUGH REACTION TO UNION

Grounds for  
hopefulness.

COMPARED with the actual condition of things which Lord Milner left behind him in 1905, and still more when compared with the political and economic development which could reasonably have been expected from a wise continuity of policy, the state of South Africa at the end of 1907 may well have seemed one of disastrous retrogression, and may well have given occasion to the gloomiest forebodings. Yet even at that moment the wider perspective of history not only afforded a large measure of consolation for the present, but also justified a reasonable degree of hopefulness for the future. Serious as was the loss judged only by the immediate standard of 1905, it was yet, after all, but little compared with the gain that could still be reckoned by the standard of all the past years—the standard of the years of depression which followed Majuba, the standard of those anxious months of 1899 when peace and war still hung in the balance. The British flag in the new colonies, political equality for both white races, an efficient and honest administration—the main objects for which the war was fought—these as yet remained unaffected by the reaction. It is true there was the fear that, the balance of political power once shifted, all the work achieved would gradually be undone, the standard of efficiency lowered, political equality nullified by a permanent Boer ascendancy, the British flag reduced to a meaningless symbol. Yet here again the wider perspective might suggest a doubt whether the reaction, either in England or in South Africa, could truly be regarded as the beginning of a continuous downward movement. The progress of British institutions and ideas in



South Africa, the cause of Imperial unity, had more than once in the past asserted themselves over the most violent and apparently disastrous fluctuations. In the enfranchisement of the British inhabitants of the Transvaal, in the creation of a high standard of government, they now possessed a better foundation and a greater source of strength than at any previous period. Why should they not assert themselves again? Much ground had been lost, unnecessarily and unwisely abandoned it might be. But with a good heart and good fortune, the lost ground might yet be regained, and progress be resumed once more at the point where it had been checked.

The event has justified the more hopeful view. Looking back, even though it be only over a few months, the reaction begins to assume its truer dimensions in relation to the progress achieved. Looking forward, the signs of recovery, and even of new progress, which have already shown themselves warrant a reasoned confidence in the future. However disastrous the political revolution in South Africa may have seemed at the moment, the main results of the war and of the reconstruction remained unaffected by it. The acceptance of the British flag by the stubborn burghers at Vereeniging had been the recognition of a moral as well as of a merely physical conquest. That conquest was confirmed in countless direct or subtle ways during the years that followed. The Boers became accustomed to their position within the Empire, familiar with its constitutional framework, and responsive to the attraction of its party system. The very skill with which the Boer leaders made use of British divisions both in South Africa and in England in order to strengthen their political influence in local affairs committed them all the more deeply to the acceptance of the general situation. And that acceptance became something more than mere acquiescence when their Liberal sympathizers came into office, and the once dreaded and hated Imperial factor became an active ally whose intervention helped them to triumph over their local British opponents. The motives which inspired the grant of self-government may have contained but little trace of the generous intuition and far-seeing

The Boer  
acceptance of  
the Empire.

statesmanship sometimes claimed for the Liberal policy. It would be a mistake to minimize the risks run, or to ignore the actual unfortunate consequences of the whole policy of violent interference with the political and economic development of the new colonies. But it would be no less a mistake to leave out of account the gain involved in the speedier and fuller reconciliation of the Boers to the main conclusions of the war. That reconciliation would, no doubt, have come equally in time as the result of a more gradual progress towards complete political liberty. Still, the fact remains that it did come earlier and more spontaneously in response to the confidence shown.

Statesmanship of Botha and Smuts. Botha at the Imperial Conference.

Moreover, if true statesmanship and wise magnanimity played but little part in determining the grant of unfettered power to the Boers, the exercise of that power showed that in the Boer leaders the undeserved good fortune of the British Empire had found men capable of displaying those qualities in no small measure. From the first Louis Botha had accepted loyally and unreservedly the verdict of the war. Even as an irresponsible party leader he had rarely failed to draw a limit between the license which he claimed as a critic of the administration and the obligations which he considered involved in his acceptance of British sovereignty. Once in office he let the partizan sink into the background, and gave evidence of a sagacity and breadth of view which few had suspected. The Boer general, the organizer of *Het Volk*, had become a minister of the British Crown, conscious not only of his power, but of his responsibility. It was a recognition of that responsibility which, within a few weeks of his taking office, decided him to take part in the Imperial Conference which assembled in April, 1907. By the London populace none of the Prime Ministers present was received with such demonstrative enthusiasm as the victor of Colenso and Spion Kop, while the moderation, tact, and brevity of his public utterances won the favour even of the most critical. At the Conference itself his part was, in the main, that of a watcher and student. But his occasional interventions were to the point, and on such a subject as Imperial defence he could speak with a peculiar knowledge. From that assembly



he can hardly have failed to carry back a profound impression of the greatness of the community of free states into which he and his countrymen had entered, or to realize, from an example like that of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, how high was the position in the councils of the Empire to which men of other blood than British could hope to aspire. And if to General Botha the British Empire was a conception gradually to be realized, he had in Mr. Smuts a colleague to whom the working of British institutions was familiar from the outset. A British subject by birth, the son of a member of Parliament in a British Colony, educated at Cambridge, the ex-State Attorney and guerilla leader could not but feel at home in his new position as a British Minister. Invaluable as he was to his leader in debate, his counsel and information can have been no less valuable on all constitutional issues. In the history of South Africa during the last two years the dominant factor has been the combination between these two men: the keen-witted, resourceful, imaginative young Afrikaner lawyer, and the shrewd, broad-minded Boer general. They have exercised their moderating influence over the reaction, not only in the Transvaal, but in the Orange River Colony, and even at the Cape. And it is in no small degree due to them that South Africa is settling down to a normal position in the Empire, a position less satisfactory, no doubt, in certain respects than it would have been if British policy had shown a wise consistency throughout, but infinitely more satisfactory than it well might have been if the power entrusted so recklessly had been exercised in an equally reckless and bitter spirit.

But if the main achievement of the war, the definite incorporation of the Boer Republics in the Imperial system, remained unaffected by the late reaction, the same was no less true of the work of reconstruction. The retrenchment of British officials which followed the advent of the Boers to power involved many instances of hardship to individuals.\*

Permanence  
of the ad-  
ministrative  
system.

\* In the Transvaal some retrenchment was undoubtedly warranted as the pressure of work in various departments diminished. A special commissioner, Mr. Marris, of the Indian Civil Service, had been appointed to consider the question before the grant of self-government, and in the majority of cases, though not in all, the reductions were based on his



But it did not change the essential character of the administration. However freely Botha and his colleagues had denounced the Crown Colony administration, they were wise enough to realize the value of a good instrument once it was in their hands. They had no desire to go back to the dishonesty and inefficiency of the old days, or to fill up the departments of state with the discarded hangers-on of Krugerism. Indeed, but for the determined pressure of the "back-veld" members, and for the failure of the British Government to make even the least provision for those who had served it, it is doubtful whether the changes would to any serious extent have gone beyond such reductions as were financially inevitable, and would have taken place in any case. As it was, the changes were greatest in the police and in local administration. But the admirable machinery of justice, the sound finance, the efficient railway administration, the scientific supervision of agriculture—the whole Milner system, in fact—went on substantially unchanged. After the first period of uncertainty and alarm, the Civil Service rapidly recovered the normal influence which any well organized and capable civil service exercises over its political chiefs, and gradually established with them those relations of mutual loyalty which are so marked a feature of the British system. The wise example set by the Transvaal undoubtedly exercised its influence on the Orange River Colony, and even there the changes, many of them regrettable in themselves, have not been sufficient to destroy the main features of the reconstruction.

Agricultural  
development.

In many respects, indeed, the work of reconstruction has only begun to bear its fruits since the change of government. It is only in the last two years that the scientific researches of the Transvaal Agricultural Department have passed the experimental stage and begun to yield practical results. These

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advice. In the Orange River Colony, where the *Unie* speakers had been exceptionally vigorous in denouncing the over-staffing and inefficiency of the Crown Colony administration, a special Civil Service Commission, appointed in 1908, found the charge of over-staffing unwarranted, and reported in high terms of the devotion and ability of the members of the service.

results in their turn would have been of comparatively little commercial value but for the linking up of veld and town by the completion of the Milner railway programme. The intense industrial and commercial depression of the last two years in South Africa has been to some extent compensated by a genuine agricultural revival, the mere beginnings of a great development to follow. The foundations of that development were laid by Milner and Jameson. But their successors have continued the work in the same spirit. And if the policy of land settlement has been discontinued by the British Government, the increasing prosperity of agriculture is gradually bringing independent British settlers on to the land, and thus helping to break down that isolation of the two white races which has underlain so much of the difficulties of the past.

Even the industrial situation has passed the worst stage of depression and shows signs of a steady recovery. The unsympathetic and at first almost hostile attitude of the new Government towards the mining industry gradually gave way to a friendlier spirit as they were brought into closer contact with the actual problems, and by degrees the confidence of the leaders of the industry and even of the investing public began to revive.\* The production of the gold mines has continuously increased till in 1908 it only fell short by a few pounds of £30,000,000. It is, unfortunately, true that the recovery has to a large extent been due to the general stagnation all over South Africa, to depression in the diamond industry, and to the completion of the public works and railway programme, all of which circumstances released large numbers of native labourers to take the place of the Chinese as their contracts expired.† The hopes of a

The industrial revival.  
Possible limitations.

\* No small share of the credit for the establishment of better relations between the Transvaal Government and the mining industry, and so between the Boer and British leaders, is due to Mr. Lionel Phillips, who devoted himself with great single-mindedness to this task throughout the early period of the reaction when racial and party feeling were still at their height.

† In December, 1908, over 150,000 natives, 12,000 Chinese, and 18,600 whites were at work on the Rand, as compared with 94,000 natives, 54,000 Chinese, and 17,000 whites in January, 1907.

really great expansion on the Rand and of the building up of other industries, which Milner had always before him, and which have begun to capture the imagination of the new rulers of the Transvaal, may well find themselves once again seriously checked by the difficulties of the labour question. South African statesmen may yet come to regret that they cut themselves off from an assured and abundant source of unskilled coloured labour before the conditions were sufficiently ripe for an attempt to shift the existing framework of industry to any large extent on to a white basis. When they come to be as eager to build as Milner was, they may yet wish that the useful, if unattractive, scaffolding to which he was compelled to take recourse, had not been removed so prematurely. Still, even so, progress, though possibly hampered, will nevertheless continue. Even the depression itself has not been without its good effects in compelling improved methods and a great reduction in working costs, involving not only better profits, but adding enormously to the extent of the reef worth mining and prolonging the life of the mines. The British population has stopped dribbling away from the Transvaal, and the tide already shows signs of turning.

The  
dominating  
influence of  
equal rights.

When that tide sets back the new-comers will automatically and of right receive their share of political power. The old distinction between Boer master and British helot exists no longer. That festering sore was cut out of the body politic of South Africa by the clean surgery of war. The principle of equal rights, asserted by the Uitlanders before the war, confirmed by the Lyttelton constitution, and endorsed in principle, though not consistently applied, in the final grant of self-government, exercised its influence over the situation in the Transvaal from the very first. Due credit has been given, and deservedly given, to Botha and his colleagues for their moderation and statesmanship. But it is also essential to bear in mind that the necessity of enlisting the support of a large section of the British voters contributed in no small degree to steadying their policy both before and after the elections, and that their administrative and legislative performances might have been far less satis-



factory but for the persistent and effective criticism of an opposition weak in numbers but strong in conviction and practical experience. From the moment the Transvaal Assembly met, the Progressives showed that they had no intention of being a negligible quantity, and it was not long before Botha discovered that, on many questions at least, he could not afford to disregard their interests or their wishes. Even without any substantial addition to the British element in South Africa that element is bound to assert itself with increasing effectiveness in the future. The late reaction no more represents the normal balance of political forces or the normal tendency of political development in South Africa than in England. There is one great difference, indeed, between the two cases. The Liberals in England, like the Bourbons, seem, so far at least, to have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. The Boer leaders in South Africa have learnt much and wisely forgotten more. They have accepted many of the principles against which they once contended, and in doing so have strengthened their position and prolonged their tenure of power. Yet, sooner or later—far sooner, perhaps, than any one could have thought possible even a few months ago—the men of British birth to whom those principles embody a living faith for which they have fought and striven, will share that power with them. New issues have already sprung up to obliterate the sharp edge of the racial division. As the great struggle of the past recedes into the background the intense racial cohesion of the Dutch will weaken, as surely, though not, perhaps, as rapidly as the cohesion of the British weakened after the assertion of Imperial supremacy by the surrender of Vereeniging.

Equal rights under the British flag, honest and efficient government and material progress, these were the abiding achievements of the war and of the reconstruction. Yet, in the eyes of those whose courage and whose efforts secured them, they were but the necessary groundwork for a nobler superstructure. The creation of a united South African nation, taking its place as an equal among the free nations of the Empire, that was the goal which from the outset

The field  
clear for  
union.

Chamberlain and Milner kept steadily before them. Without haste and without rest they pressed towards it, content to lay the foundations well and truly, less concerned whether the more imposing superstructure should stand to their credit or to that of their successors. When Milner left South Africa, union was unachieved, indeed, but it was already in full view. The revolution which followed no doubt affected the conditions under which union could come about. But it created no fresh impediment to union. As an ideal, union had been looked forward to by Dutch no less than by British. Fifty years before, the Free State had approached Sir George Grey with a proposal for union which the Home Government in its unwisdom rejected. Since then, it is true, the Dutch had come to dream of a union under the Republican flag and on the basis of Afrikaner domination. But the conflict over the flag and over the political foundation once removed, the aspiration for union remained common to both parties. To both the war had brought a wider outlook and an intenser devotion to the land whose possession had been so stubbornly contested. Meanwhile the internal boundaries of South Africa had lost all real significance and only their practical inconvenience remained. The native rising in Natal emphasized the need for a common native policy. Customs and railway agreements, temporarily secured by Milner's personal influence, threatened to break down and end in acute political conflict and in general economic disorganization. The severity of the commercial depression itself increased the dread of so disastrous a result, and brought home to the grumbling taxpayer the extravagance of a multiplicity of governments in a single small community.

The  
"Kinder-  
garten"  
and the  
movement  
for union.

Yet the vague stirrings of discontent with the existing situation might by themselves have availed little against the deep-rooted particularism of South Africa. What was needed was some driving and inspiring force to convert aimless aspirations into definite action and empty professions into a true South African patriotism. Such a force Milner had in part supplied himself. But the stern duty of clearing the ground for union had inevitably severed him from the Dutch,



THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF SELBORNE, G.C.M.G.,  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR S. AFRICA AND GOVERNOR OF THE TRANSVAAL,  
MARCH, 1905.





while the immense and urgent task of laying a true foundation in the new colonies necessarily excluded the devotion of time and energy to the actual work of the further stage. But Milner did not disappear from South Africa without leaving heirs to his policy, men imbued with his conceptions and inspired by his creative spirit, but freed from his burdens and his difficulties, and ready to take up the work where he had left it. Mention has been made before of Milner's band of young Oxford men whose brains and energy played so large a part in the work of reconstruction. When the revolution came some of them stayed on in the administration, a few left South Africa, others determined to remain in the country, and as private citizens to give themselves to its service. To work for the union of South Africa was one of the most natural and obvious tasks before them. That it would have enlisted a great part of their energies in any case is probable. Their inclination was confirmed and their interest concentrated by one of those events which sometimes influence the course of history as profoundly as the decisions of statesmen or soldiers—the publication of a book. Appearing early in 1906, at the very moment when the triumph of reaction seemed most complete in England, Mr. Oliver's "Alexander Hamilton" sounded a note of fresh inspiration and renewed courage to Englishmen who still believed in constructive statesmanship and in Imperial unity. To the young men in South Africa its account of the compacting of American union, in circumstances so similar to those around them, was no mere narrative with a moral, but a direct command.

In the course of 1906 the active campaign for South African Union may be said to have begun with private discussions got up by Mr. Curtis, whose part in the organization of municipal life in the Transvaal has been described in a previous chapter. These gradually developed into an informal committee, which comprised Mr. Duncan, the Colonial Secretary, and other members of the "Kindergarten." A comprehensive and forcible statement of the case for union, in the main the handiwork of Mr. Curtis, was drawn up. The next step was to give authority to its

Mr. Curtis's  
Committee.  
Lord Sel-  
borne's mem-  
orandum,  
1906-7.

conclusions, and to secure its favourable reception. At an early stage in the work the leading men in South Africa on both sides had been drawn into consultation. In the Transvaal the effort to grapple with the question of union met with support, not only from the Progressive leaders, but also from Mr. Smuts, who throughout proved one of the keenest, as he certainly was one of the ablest and most influential workers in the cause. In Cape Colony, Dr. Jameson and Mr. F. S. Malan, editor of *Ons Land*, and parliamentary leader of the Bond, were equally well-disposed and anxious to further the movement. But there was no one more deeply impressed by the disadvantages and dangers of the existing disunion, or more convinced of the desirability of union, both for its own sake and in order to draw the minds of South Africans away from the narrower racial struggle to the conception of a wider national life, than Lord Selborne. Fully recognizing that union could only come as the expression of the deliberate wish of the statesmen and of the people of South Africa, Lord Selborne wisely determined to keep in the background as far as possible throughout, and to avoid everything that might look like an attempt at management or dictation. But he also realized that there was one thing which, in his position as High Commissioner, he could do more effectively than anyone else, without transgressing the limits of non-interference which he had set himself. And that was to call the attention of South Africa to the problem. With this purpose in view he was prepared to undertake the responsibility of adopting the statement prepared by Curtis's committee, and of incorporating it in a memorandum of his own. The approach of a conference to deal with the interminable squabble over railway rates gave Jameson a pretext for inviting an expression of opinion from the High Commissioner on the whole subject of the mutual relations of the British Colonies in South Africa. In July, 1907, Lord Selborne's memorandum appeared, and created a profound impression. He had secured his object and had made union a question of practical politics.

For the next twelve months, indeed, the general revolu-



tion in the several colonies threw the question into the background in the public mind. But the time was used to the full by Curtis and his allies. The original committee, now considerably expanded, devoted itself to clearing the ground by a close study of all the problems involved and by presenting the result of their researches to the public. An exhaustive account of the whole machinery of government in the various South African colonies, and of the issues involved, was brought out in successive instalments in the course of 1907-1908 under the title "The Government of South Africa." Another volume, "The Framework of Union," embodied an account of the genesis and working of various federal constitutions.\* Together with the original memorandum these publications had an enormous influence, and largely determined, not merely the movement for union, but the actual provisions of the constitution subsequently drafted. At the same time a private campaign of interviews and discussions was carried on all over South Africa, and Closer Union societies were organized in all the leading centres. The men who count for political purposes in South Africa are but a handful at the best, and few of these held out long against Curtis's buoyant and infectious enthusiasm, or against the steady influence exercised by the political leaders on both sides in the Transvaal and in Cape Colony. The test of the progress made came in May, 1908, when an Inter-Colonial Conference on Customs and Railways, assembled at Pretoria, faced with the prospect of an absolute breakdown of the existing arrangements, frankly declared the problem before them insoluble without political union, and passed resolutions affirming the principle of union and pledging the governments concerned to obtain the assent of their parliaments to the appointment of delegates to a National Convention at which a constitution for a united South Africa should be drawn up.

The Union campaign, 1907-8. The Pretoria Conference declares for union, May, 1908.

From that moment South Africa lost all interest in every other question but union. But South Africa was by no

Agreement between political leaders in the Transvaal on a common policy.

\* The author of this was Mr. B. K. Long, a member of the Cape Assembly. The considerable expenditure involved in these publications was defrayed by the generosity of Mr. A. Bailey and other sympathizers.

means clear as to what form of union was preferable, or even convinced as yet that immediate union was desirable at all. Among the Boers in the Transvaal local protectionism was clamouring for the break up even of the existing customs union and for a return to the old policy of isolation, and there were many on the Rand who were perfectly prepared to fall in with this as long as they could get cheap freights from Delagoa Bay. Among the British element all over South Africa there was a widespread and not unnatural suspicion that the Afrikaner governments at that moment in power meant to rush through union with no other motive than to buttress up their present predominance for all time. The number of delegates to the Convention allotted to the opposition in the different colonies seemed to suggest an intention of conducting affairs on strict party lines. Some understanding on the lines to be followed at the Convention, and on the political basis of the future union, was essential if the British element was to take any part in it. But except in the Transvaal, no attempt to arrive at such an understanding seems to have been made. At the beginning of September, within six weeks of the meeting of the Convention, Sir P. FitzPatrick approached General Botha and his colleagues and urged the advisability of a policy of absolute unreserve between the Transvaal delegates, and the desirability of deciding on a common policy before going to the Convention. Botha agreed, and a few days later the leaders on both sides met to discuss the situation. From the start FitzPatrick and his Progressive colleagues made it quite clear that unless the union were based on the principle of "equal rights," including the adoption of the voters' basis, they would consider it their duty to prevent it by every means in their power. Botha and Smuts had drafted a proposal on a population basis. But they realized that without the cooperation of the British delegates the Convention would inevitably end in failure. Possibly, too, the fact that the voters' basis would give the Transvaal a larger number of seats may not have been without its influence upon them. In any case they fell into line, and on that and every other important issue complete agreement was arrived at between them and their

Progressive colleagues before the Convention assembled. Meanwhile, Smuts, fully alive to the enormous advantage possessed by the man who is armed with a definite detailed plan over people whose minds have not been made up, had set to work with Duncan and two or three of the younger men to draft a constitution, largely based on the previous labours of Curtis's committee. The result was that while every other colony sent to the Convention a certain number of individuals with general ideas on the subject of union, the Transvaal delegates went down as a solid body, not only agreed on their general policy, but with a complete South African constitution in their pockets—a constitution which, in its main features at least, they succeeded in carrying through the Convention.

The Convention met at Durban on October 12. It was a purely parliamentary convention, composed of representatives of the government and opposition in each colony. The original moving spirits of the agitation for union were not directly represented. But two of them, Mr. Duncan and the Hon. R. H. Brand, played a most important part, as advisers to the Transvaal delegation, in the actual framing of the draft constitution, while Curtis and some of the others were already busy organizing opinion all over South Africa in readiness for the result of the deliberations of the Convention. There were thirty-three members, twelve from Cape Colony, eight from the Transvaal, five each from the Orange River Colony and Natal, and three from Rhodesia. It was, however, generally understood that no immediate inclusion of any part of the Chartered Company's territories was in contemplation. The High Commissioner was not invited to preside, as at previous Inter-Colonial Conferences. But his advice and guidance were throughout at the disposal of the Convention, and his help was freely called upon in the framing of that part of the constitution which dealt with the eventual assumption of authority by a united South Africa over the native protectorates. The other South African Governors were also freely drawn into consultation. As its president the Convention selected Sir H. de Villiers, Chief Justice of Cape Colony. As a sign of the interest

Smuts  
prepares a  
constitution.

The National  
Convention,  
Oct. 1908-  
Feb. 1909.



and good-will of the British Government, a cruiser squadron under Admiral Sir Percy Scott was sent out to attend the opening of the Convention. It was not the first time that its commander had hurried to Durban in view of an anticipated visit from General Botha and his colleagues.\* But the circumstances had changed since the days when the guns of the *Terrible* were hurriedly unshipped and mounted for the defence of the Berea. After a short adjournment in November the Convention reassembled in the cooler climate of Cape Town and sat till February. The proceedings throughout were kept absolutely secret and, except for a few rumours, practically nothing was known to the outside world till the publication of the complete text of the draft constitution on February 9.

Its most  
striking  
features.

To attempt to give any account of the work and achievement of the Convention would be to travel beyond the scope of the present work. It is only necessary here to dwell on a few points. The most striking and significant feature was the remarkable absence of all racial or political animosity. That men who had faced each other in the field but a few years ago, who had only just come through a series of bitter elections contested largely on racial lines, should be able to confer at all was a triumph of good sense. That within a few weeks many of them should become intimate friends, as they did, is little short of marvellous. The discussions, though keenly contested, were throughout inspired by a common desire to secure a permanent settlement. On few important points were divisions actually taken, and in most cases some workable compromise was found and unanimity reached by sheer force of argument and friendly persuasion. The other most striking feature was the way in which the Transvaal delegation dominated the Convention by its ability, its power of cooperation and the completeness of its preparations. Of individuals perhaps half-a-dozen stood out above the rest. Foremost on the British side was Jameson,

\* See vol. ii., pp. 282, 302. A strong detachment from the ships was on this occasion sent up to Johannesburg and Pretoria, where it was received with immense enthusiasm, and helped to remind the people of the Transvaal of the vital interest of South Africa in British sea power.

tactful and conciliatory, yet always intervening with decisive effect at the critical moment. With him stood Farrar and FitzPatrick, the former keen, persistent and businesslike, the latter large-hearted and sympathetic, but unshakable on the one vital issue of equal rights. Among the Boers Botha and Smuts naturally played the leading part, Smuts in virtue of his industry and unrivalled knowledge of detail, Botha by his shrewd good sense and remarkable personal influence over the delegates. But no single figure at the Convention was so impressive as that of ex-President Steyn, half-blind and half-paralysed by the privations and exposure of the war, but bringing to the work of union and reconciliation that same intense moral exaltation which for so long sustained the stubborn struggle for republican independence.

Between Boers and British two main questions were at issue: equal rights and the position of the Dutch language. By concentrating all their determination on the former the British, loyally supported by Botha and Smuts, secured a striking victory. The draft constitution embodies not only a division of seats in proportion to the adult male white population,\* and automatic redistribution every five years, but emphasizes the principle of equal rights still further by the adoption throughout all elections of the method of proportional representation.† That method had been vainly urged by Milner four years earlier; it remained for his young men to convert South African statesmen to its merits. In return the British agreed to the absolute official equality of the English and Dutch languages, a concession to Boer sentiment the practical results of which will depend entirely upon the spirit in which it is made use of.

Equal rights  
and equality  
of languages.

No such reciprocal concession was possible on the question of the place of the native in the constitution. For Cape Colony it was impossible to go back on the grant of the franchise to the qualified native. The representatives of the other colonies could make no concession, however slight, to the principle of a coloured franchise. The only thing was to

The status  
quo on the  
native  
franchise.

\* With a margin of fifteen per cent. either way. The actual delimitation is to be made by a judicial commission.

† I.e., the Hare system of the single transferable vote.

leave the franchise unchanged in each province till, at some future time, a united South Africa should have fully studied the question from a national, and not a provincial point of view, and should have arrived at a common native policy.

Unification  
not  
federation.

The ground thus cleared, the next problem was the nature of the constitutional framework to be built upon it. What were to be the boundaries between the powers of the new central authority and those of its constituent states? Was Australia, with its loose federation, or Canada, with its strictly defined provincial powers and strong national executive, to supply the model? Here, again, the dominant factor was the power of an idea, one of the many fruitful ideas thrown out by Milner in private conversation to take strong root in the imagination of South Africans. Everyone had always spoken of federation as the goal. "But why stop at federation," Milner had asked, "why saddle a country with barely a million white people and no natural divisions with the complicated machinery of a federal constitution? Why not simply unify South Africa as New Zealand or the United Kingdom was unified?" From the first the little inner circle of workers for union aimed at unification. In the Transvaal they had, before the end of 1907, secured the unqualified support of Botha and Smuts as well as the approval of the Progressive leaders. The one idea in Smuts's mind throughout was to secure a constitution as near as possible to that of the United Kingdom. But when the Convention met, the advocates of unification still had a hard battle to fight. Natal was solidly opposed. The Orange River Colony remained doubtful. Cape Colony was divided. In the end by sheer argument and determination unification carried the day. In the draft constitution all powers are vested in the Government of South Africa. The existing colonies are retained only as provinces, exercising such functions of local government as the central government may assign to them. The constitution is thus not only effectively centralized, but, like that of the United Kingdom, absolutely flexible. Except for certain specific clauses such as those dealing with the native franchise or the dual language, for the alteration of which a two-thirds majority of both Houses



sitting together is required, all other features of the constitution may be repealed or altered at the unfettered discretion of the South African Parliament.

The first House of Assembly is to consist of 121 members, namely 51 from Cape Colony, 36 from the Transvaal, and 17 each from Natal and the Orange River Colony, henceforward, at Dr. Jameson's suggestion, to be called the Orange Free State Province. These numbers may be increased, as the result of the growth of population, to 150. After that the total number of seats will remain fixed, but the seats allotted to each province will be determined by its proportion of adult male whites.\* The proposal for the constitution of the Upper House or Senate is novel and interesting. The two Houses of each constituent colony, in the first instance, and afterwards the members of the Provincial Council and the members of the Assembly for the province, sitting together, are by proportional representation to elect eight senators. Another eight are to be nominated by the Government of the day, four of them by reason of their special knowledge of native affairs. The senators are to be appointed for ten years and vacancies are to be filled by the Provincial Councils. Parliament may, however, at the end of the first ten years decide on a new method of constituting the Upper House. Provision is made for a joint sitting of both Houses in case of the rejection of a Bill by the Senate at two sessions, or in the same session in the case of a money Bill. The Provincial Councils are to be chosen by the same constituencies and on the same system as the Assembly. Their limited executive functions are to be carried on by an Executive Committee of from three to five members, elected from the members by proportional representation, together with the Administrator appointed by the central Government. The titles "Administrator" and "Executive Committee," and the peculiar composition of the latter, clearly indicate both the modest scope of the provincial powers, and the desire to exclude the local administration from the field of active party politics. A schedule attached to the Constitution provides

The Assembly  
and the  
Senate.

The Provin-  
cial Councils.

\* No province is, however, to have its original representation reduced before the expiration of at least ten years.

Administra-  
tion of the  
protectorates.

for the future administration of the native protectorates, if transferred to the South African Government, by the Prime Minister, assisted by a Commission of three appointed for ten years and only removable upon an address by both Houses. By this and other provisions every reasonable precaution has been taken against the danger of rash and ill-considered parliamentary interference. The same anxiety

Civil Service  
and railways.

to lessen the dangerous influence of political motives in spheres where that influence can only be disadvantageous, is shown in the provisions for the creation of a permanent Public Service Commission, and of a permanent administrative board, with a minister as chairman, in control of all railways, ports, and harbours, and effectively secured by its constitution and regulations against parliamentary pressure.

The com-  
promise on  
the capital.

One question at the last moment threatened to wreck the whole work of the Convention—the question of the capital. Cape Town could claim its unique beauty, its pleasant climate, its historic associations, its position as the gateway of South Africa. Pretoria insisted on its more central position, especially in view of the subsequent inclusion of Rhodesia. Neither side would give way. But even here a compromise was discovered. Pretoria was made the seat of Government and Cape Town the seat of the Legislature, Bloemfontein being consoled with the possession of the Court of Appeal. South Africans travel readily, and all dwellers on the high veld welcome an occasional change to sea level. But experience alone can test the feasibility of such an arrangement.

Greatness  
of the  
achievement.

As a pure piece of constitution-making the work of the Convention is sufficiently remarkable. Only men of exceptional ability and open-mindedness could have devised and accepted a constitution so original, so flexible, and of such bold simplicity. But it is far more remarkable as an achievement of statesmanship. When the Convention met the cleavage between the two camps—but lately in arms—which divided South Africa seemed as deep as ever, the differences of view as irreconcilable. The Convention has dispelled that view. The cleavage still exists and will long exist. But the Convention has made manifest the existence of a common

patriotism, transcending all differences, whose strength few had ventured to suspect. It has shown the Boers, for the sake of that patriotism, accepting all the principles against which they had fought so long. It has shown the British, for the sake of that same patriotism, placing an absolute and unqualified trust in their old adversaries. Upon that achievement there can be no going back, even if the constitution should fail of acceptance from the South African Parliaments. But it is hard to believe in the possibility of failure, hard to believe that South Africans can turn their backs on the glorious vision of a full national life, and face once more the dreary prospect of interminable racial discord and petty colonial squabbles. There may be amendment of the constitution, though there is not likely to be great improvement. There may be delay. But there can be little doubt of the final result. Within the present year, perhaps, certainly within very few years, South Africa will see the close of the long chapter of conflict which began with the Great Trek, and enter on a new chapter of greater hope, of a brighter and more peaceful glory.

In the Union of South Africa, in the birth of a new nation among the British nations, the war and the reconstruction alike find their completion and their final justification. To the conflict of irreconcilable ambitions and incompatible principles of government war brought the only possible solution. So long as the main issues remained unsettled, bitterness, prejudice and intolerance were for ever kept alive by the inconclusive strife. With the war racial passion blazed up in an intenser flame. But the war did its work. The terms imposed at Vereeniging—terms as magnanimous as they were uncompromising—left no fuel for fresh hatred to feed upon. All that remained of bitterness lay in the memory of the past. And as the struggle receded that bitterness was softened, while other features, hardly realized at the time, began to stand out in stronger relief. After all there never was a war fought so obstinately and yet with such humanity and such essential chivalry. Neither side had cause to reproach itself or its adversaries. Both had good cause for just pride and mutual respect. The war

War the  
reconciler.



silenced alike the braggarts who would march to Pretoria in a fortnight, and those who would make a breakfast of the British Army. It taught the Boers, face to face with the unshakable resolution of England, to realize the essential justice and reasonableness of her claims. It taught the British to recognize that if the Boer pretensions were inadmissible, Boerdom itself was no mere imposture, but a stubborn, abiding fact in the life of South Africa. It taught each to acknowledge the other's right in the land for whose sake both had shed their blood. South Africa could have won no peace but through the reconciling sword.

The influence  
of the re-  
construction.

The reconciling influence of the war was made good by the work of restoration and reconstruction. The generosity, the care, and the forethought shown in the repatriation and relief of the vanquished, the justice and sympathy of the new administration, its integrity, its unwearying and successful efforts to promote the well-being of the country without regard to race or class, the freedom of British rule broadening swiftly from stage to stage—these things evoked no loud protestations of gratitude. On the surface of things, indeed, it may have seemed as if their only reward was impatient criticism and even misrepresentation. But their effect was none the less profound and none the less enduring. True reconciliation is shown not in professions of satisfaction but in conduct. Sympathy, justice, firmness alone can bring it about. Selfish complaisance, weak-kneed compromise may seem to yield an easier and more immediate result. But the reconciliation is counterfeit. It is soon tarnished, and before long nothing of it remains to conceal the ugliness of surrender.

The part  
played by the  
grant of self-  
government.

After the work of reconstruction came the grant of self-government, as it was always meant to come. And when it came it produced the result it was always meant to produce. That it came two or three years earlier, without an intervening period of transition, without due precautions for safeguarding Imperial and other interests affected is a relatively minor matter. No one, however profoundly impressed by some of the unfortunate consequences of the Liberal interference in South African affairs, need deny the

genuineness of the gratitude evoked in the Boers by an action with whose motives they were but little concerned, or the value of that gratitude as a contributory factor in the subsequent reconciliation. It may be equally readily admitted that the grant of self-government was a necessary condition of South African Union, and that but for the decision of the Liberal Government to take the short cut to self-government, union might well have been delayed for some years. But granting all this, there is nothing to justify the claim, so sedulously put forward, that all that is of hopeful augury in South Africa to-day is the fruit of Liberal policy in reconciling the Boers, and showing "trust in the people." Those who are loudest in making this claim, it must be remembered, are the men who applauded the surrender after Majuba as an act of magnanimous conciliation, the men who at every stage of the negotiations before the war were anxious to show their trust in Krugerism, the men who, when the weary months of guerilla warfare dragged on, clamoured for the reversal of the annexations and the recognition of republican independence as the only way to reconcile Dutch sentiment in Cape Colony. Is it possible that a judgment so consistently false in the past has in this instance proved unerring? Is it possible that the counsellors of folly have suddenly shown themselves the true sons of wisdom? Is it not more natural to assume that the springs of conciliation lie deeper, in the work of the past, and that the effect, for good or ill, of the subsequent spasmodic anticipation of a settled policy has been but incidental and transitory? Assuming that the earlier grant of self-government has, in fact, produced every good result that can reasonably be claimed for it, assuming that all these good results can fairly be credited to the conscious statesmanship of those upon whose decision they followed, yet, at the most, they are entitled to the distinction of having played a contributory, though no doubt useful, part in the work of union and reconciliation. Even among the contributory causes their action cannot claim, for a moment, to rank as equal with the work of those in South Africa, Boers and Englishmen, whose continuous efforts, day by day since the grant of self-govern-

ment, have averted the disaster that at one moment seemed so imminent, and have helped South Africa to find herself. Still less can it rank with the great primary causes, with the work of the men who have laid the foundations of the new South Africa, and laid them well and truly: It is the men who faced without flinching the stern but inevitable issue of war, the men who gave themselves, body and soul, to the building up of the new colonies, who are the true friends of South Africa, the true reconcilers. Those who shrank from the struggle, who threw doubts on its justice and obstructed its conduct, who found fault unceasingly with the labour of the builders, but had no other policy save that of tearing down the scaffolding whose orderly removal had already been decided on—they are at the best South Africa's fair-weather friends. Of the sacrifices and of the toil required they have known little; they could not otherwise have been so ready to risk all their fruits in the fashion they did. But they are now eager to claim the credit. And it is well that they should. For thus the work becomes a common political heritage.

*Finis coronat  
opus.*

But history must give the credit where it is due. To Chamberlain the Empire owes the decision which preserved it from dismemberment. To him again, with Milner, South Africa owes not only her membership in the Empire, but the broad lines of the settlement in which she has found her peace. To Milner South Africa owes the work of reconstruction which will enable her to take her equal place among the sister nations. That work lives because of its inherent truth and sincerity. There were mistakes in it, not a few, perhaps. But there was no make-believe. It was good work and true to the facts, and therefore it lives and bears fruit to-day. The reaction lopped off some of the branches that showed the fairest promise. But it could not uproot the mighty trunk, or destroy the life which is already sending out new branches and clothing them in fresh verdure and with the promise of abundant harvest. To Milner and to those who worked with him the disaster may well have seemed irreparable at first. But they had planted better than they knew, and their roots had struck deeper and wider than they had suspected.



Milner's work will endure, not only because it was truly done, but because it lives in the minds and hearts of South Africans, even of those who loved him least, and who in this generation can hardly be expected to recognize their debt to him. And it lives because it was not the work of a stranger but of one who was himself a true South African. Great and sympathetic natures do not need to be born in a country to become its lovers, and to be thrilled with the hopes and fears of its destiny. To Milner, indeed, during those eight years of striving, the destiny of South Africa could be all in all, just because to him it was an essential part of the wider destiny which claimed his continuous allegiance. "The true Imperialist is also the best South African." Milner's place in the history of the Empire is yet unknown. His place in South African history is assured for all time by his works. *Si monumentum requiris, circumspice.*



PART II

TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE  
CHAPTERS





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## CHAPTER I

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
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THE RIGHT HON. ST. JOHN BRODRICK,  
(NOW VISCOUNT MIDLETON),

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR, 1900-1908.

*Photo by Elliott & Fry.*



## CHAPTER I

THE MOBILIZATION AND IMPROVISATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN  
FIELD FORCE \*

## THE REGULAR ARMY

THE strength of the British Regular Army has fluctuated enormously at different times, both according to circumstances themselves and according to the predominance of varying tendencies in the House of Commons, which ever since the reign of William and Mary has had the unquestioned power of granting or withholding money for military purposes. Thus, while in 1814, towards the close of the great struggle with Napoleon, the strength of the Regular Army at home, in India, and in the colonies was 301,731, it had dropped to one-third of that strength in 1823. In 1853, notwithstanding a great increase of Imperial liabilities in India and elsewhere, the total only stood at 149,089. During the Crimean War the original Field Force of less than 24,000 was hurriedly increased; in the course of eighteen months nearly 83,000 of all ranks proceeded to the seat of war, partly in organized units and partly in drafts, and the strength of the Regular Army as a whole rose to 220,228. In 1871 the strength of all ranks with the colours was 187,746. Exclusive of contingents from India and elsewhere, 16,416 left England in 1882 for the Egyptian War, and 10,972 in 1885 for the Sudan Campaign. These expeditions involved no serious strain on our resources. It is, however, interesting to note that, had

Strength of  
Regular  
Army at  
different  
periods.

\* With this chapter should be read vol. ii., chaps. i. and iii.; vol. iii., chap. i.; vol. iv., chap. i., p. 15 *sqq.*; vol. v., chaps. iii. and x.

it been thought desirable in 1881, after Majuba, to put out the full strength of the British Army against the Boers, it would have been possible, by denuding the colonies and drawing on India to exactly the same extent as was done nineteen years later, but without improvising further levies, to have kept in the field a force of about 42,000 Regulars of all ranks. By October, 1899, owing to the constant increase of Imperial responsibilities, the total had risen to 241,679, of whom 107,739 were at home.

Growth of  
the Reserve.

As long ago as 1843 there was a reserve of enrolled pensioners which at one time reached as many as 17,000. It was twice reorganized, in 1859 and in 1867, but this reorganized reserve never even reached 4,000 and gradually died out. It was not until 1871 that the First Class Army Reserve, as we know it, took shape as a result of the introduction of what was called the "short-service system." In that year it numbered 2,676. At the time of the Egyptian expedition in 1882 it had risen to 24,000, of whom 11,032 were mobilized, and at the time of the Sudan Campaign of 1885 to 34,000, of whom 2,348 were mobilized. The growth of the Reserve was most carefully watched; when recruiting was brisk, soldiers were invited to join it before the expiration of their colour service, so that other recruits might be taken to be trained in their places, and the practice of allowing soldiers, once in the Reserve, to rejoin the colours, was only permitted on the rarest occasions. In 1884 a supplemental or "Section D" Reserve was formed of soldiers who, having completed twelve years with the colours, or partly with the colours and partly in the Reserve, re-enlisted for four more years in the Reserve.\* No men of the supplemental Reserve could be called out until the whole of the remaining sections of the Reserve were exhausted. So long as the Reserve was looked upon as a sort of general "pool" to be drawn on indiscriminately, no serious inconvenience was anticipated from this limitation. If, however, it should be decided to treat the Reserve

\* The original object of this section was to keep the Reserve up to the arbitrary figure of 80,000; it was consequently shut or opened to enrolment according as the numbers of the Reserve approximated to or fell short of this total. In 1899 it was only open to Reservists having special qualifications,

created by each unit as inalienable from the corps to which that unit belonged, and to waive the power of utilizing it for any corps of the same arm, it is clear that, in the cavalry and infantry, some units would exhaust their reserve long before others and so want to draw on Section D earlier, in which case the conditions under which alone these Reservists could be called up might well cause a great deal of trouble. In October, 1899, the First Class Army Reserve numbered 81,133,\* of whom 62,432 were liable to be called out at once, the remaining 18,701 being in Section D. About 3,000 Reservists were residing, with permission, out of the United Kingdom. It was doubtful in 1899 whether legal power existed to compel them to proceed from their places of residence to South Africa, so only those actually residing in South Africa were called up.

One other source of reserve existed for the Regular Army, The Militia Reserve. namely, the Militia Reserve. This Reserve consisted of Militiamen, serving with their Militia units, who accepted an annual retaining fee to cover a liability of transfer to the Regular Army, if the Reserve was called up. The numbers of this Reserve were limited to one-quarter of the establishment of each Militia unit. As the Reserve was popular and always full, this figure in practice, owing to the weakness of Militia units, often far exceeded one-quarter of the actual strength. In 1899 the strength of the Militia Reserve stood at 29,174. The deductions for physical unfitness were found to amount to about double the deductions made from the Army Reserve and in some cases even more. Useful from the point of view of the Regular Army, the Militia Reserve represented no real addition of strength to the total armed forces of the Crown, and its existence was keenly resented by many as destructive of the character and efficiency of the Militia as a distinctive force. It was abolished by Mr. Brodrick in April, 1901.

To sum up: on October 1, 1899, the War Office had, Strength of home forces, Oct. 1899,

\* This total was smaller than it should have been owing to two fresh Guards and six fresh line battalions having recently been formed. In order to assist in their formation and to give the new units a stiffening, Reservists were invited back from the Reserve, and 4,751 Reservists responded.



serving at home, the following gross assets on which to draw. The net assets were of course much lower.

Regular Army (including immatures, units allotted to coast defence, etc.). . . . .	107,739
Army Reserve (without any deductions for those medically unfit, those residing with permission out of the United Kingdom, and absentees) . . . . .	81,133
Militia Reserve (without deductions) . . . . .	29,174
Total . . . . .	218,046

Mobilization<sup>1</sup>  
schemes.

Up to the year 1886 no machinery in the shape of a mobilization scheme existed for putting this material to the best use for service at home or abroad, and up to the year 1888 no definite pronouncement had even been made as to what was the *raison d'être* of a British Army at all and what were its functions. In 1886 Major-General (now General Sir Henry) Brackenbury, at that time Director of Military Intelligence, initiated a mobilization scheme for co-ordinating our existing military forces into war organizations. Two years later the Mobilization Section was separated from the Intelligence Division and was placed under the Adjutant-General, at that time Lord Wolseley. Its work was at first directed to the planning of an organization for oversea expeditions. Subsequently, in view of the fact that a mobilization for home defence, in which every available unit would take part, would include any such partial mobilization as might be required for expeditionary purposes, and also because it was thought easier on this plea to get the House of Commons to sanction the expenditure for the necessary preparations, including the accumulation of stores, it was decided that the mobilization regulations should be dealt with primarily as a measure for home defence which could, with a few amendments and additions, be made adaptable to service in any portion of the globe. A consideration of the existing units of the Regular Army, which were supposed, under "normal" conditions,\* to be at home, showed that there were enough to form two, but not enough

\* As a matter of fact, from that date to the present time the "normal" peace distribution of units of the Regular Army has never been reached. See vol. ii., ch. i.

to  
real  
mobilization  
plan

for three Army Corps. An examination of the ground on which an army for the defence of London would take up its position indicated that three Army Corps were the least to which such a task could be entrusted, so that, for purposes of home defence alone, three Army Corps were considered absolutely necessary, and this force, which necessitated the employment of a certain number of Auxiliaries to make up deficiencies in the Regular Army, was accepted as the basis of the arrangements for home defence.

Having thus taken stock of their assets, and having estimated what sort of force they could produce, the military authorities in 1888 went one step further and endeavoured to ascertain exactly what was expected of them and of the force which they were organizing. Accordingly, on June 8, the Duke of Cambridge, then Commander-in-Chief, caused a memorandum to be addressed to Mr. Stanhope, the Secretary of State for War, putting forward certain suggestions on this most material point, and requesting a definite ruling. At the same time he asked for an increase to the Army of 21,279 men, so that the three Army Corps might be composed entirely of Regulars. In his reply of December 8, embodying the views of the Cabinet on all the proposals put forward, the Secretary of State for War dismissed all the proposals for an increase to the Army except a small increase to the Garrison Artillery, and actually proposed a reduction of the cavalry. On the other issue the Commander-in-Chief was more successful. For the first time in history a responsible minister laid down authoritatively the definition of the objects to be provided for by the British Army.\* These have such an important bearing on subsequent events that they must be quoted *in extenso*.

The Stanhope  
Memorandum, 1888.

“As regards the first head, her Majesty’s Government are not able to concur in the proposed definition of the objects to be pro-

\* The memoranda and minutes leading up to and containing this decision were for years regarded as confidential office papers, but were eventually published in the Appendix to the Report of the Royal Commission on the South African War. The general conclusions however, *e.g.*, as to the force assigned for oversea service, were well known and constantly referred to in Parliament.

vided for, nor can they accept the proposal to aim at forming three Army Corps of Regular troops instead of two. They have examined this subject with care, and are of opinion that a general basis for the requirements of our Army might be more correctly laid down by stating that the objects of our military organization are :—

(a) The effective support of the civil power in all parts of the United Kingdom.

(b) To find the number of men for India which has been fixed by arrangement with the Government of India.

(c) To find garrisons for all our fortresses and coaling-stations, at home and abroad, according to a scale now laid down ; and to maintain these garrisons at all times at the strength fixed for a peace or war footing.

(d) After providing for these requirements, to be able to mobilize rapidly for home defence two Army Corps of Regular troops, and one partly composed of Regulars and partly of Militia, and to organize the Auxiliary Forces, not allotted to Army Corps or garrisons, for the defence of London and for the defensible positions in advance, and for the defence of mercantile ports.

(e) Subject to the foregoing considerations and to their financial obligations, to aim at being able, in case of necessity, to send abroad two complete Army Corps, with Cavalry Division and Line of Communication. But it will be distinctly understood that the probability of the employment of an Army Corps in the field in any European war \* is sufficiently improbable to make it the primary duty of the military authorities to organize our forces efficiently for the defence of this country."

Oversea  
operations  
ignored.

Truly an extraordinary document, even when all allowance is made for the political circumstances of the time. The mere order in which the objects are given is very suggestive as to the mental attitude of the British Government of the day towards military problems. Troubles in Ireland, threatening meetings of the proletariat in London,

\* There is no reference to a European war in the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum, which, in so far as it alludes to overseas possibilities, appears to be devoted exclusively to the consideration of "national objects," of which a European war was not one.



are the things which bulked largest in its mind. War figured far less prominently and was mainly conceived as a matter of passive defence. More than that, it was as a passive defence of the United Kingdom only; the existence of the Empire, the possibility of its requiring to be defended, were completely ignored. No one would imagine from a perusal of the memorandum that it referred to an army which for two centuries had been engaged in oversea operations, and oversea operations only, an army which had helped to win, and which was no less essential to defend, the greatest Empire in the world. Whatever else it may have done, the Stanhope Memorandum set a limit for the time being to preparations for oversea expeditions. Between 1888 and 1899 there were changes of Government and changes of party, but the Stanhope Memorandum remained throughout the basis of British military policy.

Having obtained a decision the military authorities proceeded to work out their plans for mobilization. As already stated, the Mobilization Section was placed in 1888 under the Adjutant-General. In the reorganization of 1895, when the Adjutant-General was removed from the control of the Commander-in-Chief, the "Mobilization Subdivision," as it was now called, was placed directly under the Commander-in-Chief himself. The *personnel* of this important office consisted of one Assistant Adjutant-General (a Colonel), two Staff Captains, an attached officer, and three clerks. Its function was the planning of what was to take place on mobilization. It had no executive functions. All executive action was intended to be taken on mobilization by the various existing executive branches. In order, however, to insure that the plans which the Mobilization Subdivision formulated were not impossible of execution, there was frequent intercommunication with the various executive branches affected, and from time to time Mobilization Committees, consisting of one member from each of the various executive branches concerned, met for the purpose of co-ordinating the proposals put forward. The regulations published by this subdivision provided for the mobilization of the whole of the Regular Army for home defence. The

The  
Mobilization  
Department.

The  
maximum  
oversea Field  
Force.

procedure for mobilization for service abroad was practically similar; the only alterations necessary were those incidental to the particular size of force required and to the locality in which the contemplated operations would take place. The composition and numbers of the maximum oversea Field Force contemplated were as follows:—\*

Detail.	In the Field.		At the Base.		Total.	
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.
2 Army Corps †.	2,414	70,104	74	6,598	2,488	76,702
Staff of Cavalry Division . . }	13	39	..	..	13	39
2 Cavalry Brigades }	228	4,766	6	484	234	5,250
Total . . .	2,655	74,909	80	7,082	2,735	81,991

Total of all ranks, exclusive of Army Staff, 84,726.

This included the following complete units of cavalry, artillery, and infantry: 10 regiments of cavalry; 6 batteries of Horse Artillery; 30 batteries of Field Artillery; 50 battalions of infantry. To this total line of communication troops might add another 5,000.

The South  
African Field  
Force.

As early as 1897 preparations were being made for the mobilization of a field force for South Africa. The scheme was circulated round all the branches, and on May 5, 1897, a Mobilization Committee was convened to consider how long each head of a department, division, or subdivision would take to carry out his allotted task.‡ In June, 1899,

\* These figures are calculated at the strength of the war establishments of units in 1899 and including excess numbers, or the first drafts.

† The British Army Corps, based more or less on the German model, consisted of three divisions, each comprising a squadron of cavalry, three batteries of artillery, and two infantry brigades of four battalions apiece, together with six batteries of artillery, one battalion of infantry, and one cavalry regiment as corps troops. The Cavalry Division consisted of two brigades of three regiments each, and of six batteries of Horse Artillery.

‡ A short minute embodying the conclusions of this committee is contained in the Appendix to the Minutes of Evidence of the Elgin Commission. It is interesting to note that after each military head had

the Mobilization Subdivision took in hand the preparation of a pamphlet, bringing the mobilization regulations for home defence into harmony with South African requirements, and the details of the South African Field Force were prepared.

Needless to say, in the absence of a General Staff, no special considerations of the strategical problem in South Africa were responsible either for the strength or for the composition of the Field Force. The strength was based on a general impression, the composition on an existing organization for home defence copied from Continental models. The force selected was one complete Army Corps, one Cavalry Division, and line of communication troops, a force large in comparison to the numbers usually employed on our oversea expeditions, but one which fell short by a whole Army Corps of the extreme force for such purposes contemplated in the Stanhope Memorandum. Its detailed numerical strength, exclusive of officers, was as follows :

Cavalry . . . . .	4,586
Mounted Infantry . . . . .	1,163
Artillery . . . . .	4,917
Engineers . . . . .	1,600
Infantry . . . . .	31,386
Other Services . . . . .	3,429
Total . . . . .	47,081

*South African Field Force - for much infantry*

or, including officers and staff, a grand total of about 48,800. This total included 8 regiments of cavalry, 8 companies of mounted infantry, 4 batteries of Horse Artillery, 15 batteries of Field Artillery and the necessary ammunition columns and park, 25 battalions of infantry for the Army Corps itself, and 7 battalions for lines of communication.\* The mobilization

handed in his estimate of the time that it would take to complete his preparations, the Admiralty representative handed in a statement of the time that it would take to provide the necessary transport far in excess of the longest military estimate.

\* On October 1 the force of 107,739 serving at home included 18 cavalry regiments, of which 3 were Household, 10 batteries of Horse Artillery, 46 batteries of Field Artillery, and 64 battalions of infantry ; it will therefore be noticed that the Field Force only included 8 of the 18 cavalry regiments, 4 of the 10 horse batteries, 15 of the 46 field batteries, and 32 of the 64 battalions available in the United Kingdom. The batteries left at



was partial in more senses than one, for it did not include the mobilization of the necessary transport. It is necessary, throughout, to bear in mind that the real mobilization was not intended to be completed till some time after the troops landed in South Africa.\* Moreover, it must not be forgotten that owing to the upsetting of the British plans by the Boer initiative, the mobilization was never completed as originally planned. The original formations were broken up, and successive improvised forces were mobilized, the first real mobilization on a large scale being that carried through by Lord Roberts at the beginning of February, 1900.

Service  
qualifications  
and grouping  
of units.

The service qualifications for this force were, in all arms except the artillery, a minimum age of twenty years and a minimum service of twelve months. In the artillery these qualifications were reduced to nineteen years of age and nine months' service respectively. This reduction was necessitated by the fact that the artillery had not produced a sufficient Reserve to complete the batteries and find the necessary *personnel* for the ammunition columns as well, and it was justified on the grounds that service with batteries and ammunition columns was not, except on rare occasions, so arduous as the duties which constantly fell to the lot of the other arms. The experience of wastage caused by the war amply justified this anticipation. Even as regards the infantry and cavalry, the qualifications decided upon made it impossible for a large number of units to come up to war strength without either having access to their Section D Reserve, which was not legally available till all the rest of the Reserve had been called out, or else transferring Reservists from stronger units. This latter course was perfectly legal, under the Reserve Act of 1882, but involved a serious inroad upon regimental feeling. It was consequently decided to pick out those units which could be mobilized up to war

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home were, however, freely drawn on for the formation of the ammunition columns and ammunition park. Such a proceeding would have been impossible in a general mobilization, and its disadvantages became very evident when the batteries which had furnished officers and men for the ammunition columns were called up for service in South Africa.

\* See chap. v.

strength with their own Reservists of the junior sections, of which there was a sufficiency for the force then contemplated. To do so it was necessary to depart from the grouping of units for home defence, which was based on the distribution of their barracks. Advantage was taken of the necessary re-grouping to foster in the infantry territorial and regimental traditions. Thus, the 1st Brigade was a Guards' Brigade, the 3rd Brigade was a Highland Brigade, the 4th a Light Brigade, the 5th an Irish Brigade, and the 6th a Fusilier Brigade, while the 2nd Brigade was drawn from battalions which had for some time been brigaded together at Aldershot. Moreover, the commanders of these brigades were, generally speaking, selected because of their connexion with the traditions underlying this grouping. The composition of this force was, on August 18, 1899, circulated confidentially throughout the military commands concerned, and commanding officers of units, and officers in charge of records, mobilization stores, etc., were warned of what might in certain eventualities be required of them. The 'Regulations for the Mobilization of a Field Force for Service in South Africa' were issued on September 8.

We must now turn back for a moment to the preparations made for strengthening the forces in South Africa and otherwise preparing for war, pending the decision for the mobilization of the Field Force.\* By June 1, 1899, the Regular units in South Africa amounted to 2 cavalry regiments, 3 batteries of Field Artillery, 1 mountain battery, 2 companies of Garrison Artillery, and  $6\frac{1}{2}$  battalions of infantry. After the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, the necessity for reinforcing the weak South African garrison became no less urgent than the preparations for mobilizing an expeditionary force. To send unmobilized units from home was out of the question. In certain corps, indeed, such as the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Army Service Corps, etc., a limited number of units could be made available by transfers from other units. But it is obvious that the process, if repeated too far, would have seriously weakened the remaining units and interfered with subsequent mobilization on a large scale. The same

Preparations  
for war.

\* See vol. ii., chap. iii.

objection applied to the proposal to send out a force of about 10,000 men by calling up Section A of the Reserve, a force which, in return for an extra 6*d.* a day, accepted the obligation to return to the colours, if required, without the formality of a mobilization proclamation. Such a proposal was formulated in June and July, 1899, as an emergency measure, but was strongly opposed by Sir Redvers Buller, who at that time had been designated for the chief command, and was not pressed.

The first reinforcements.

The first units to embark were 3 companies of Royal Engineers and 2 of Army Service Corps, which were made up to strength by borrowing from other units, and which left England in June and July; 24 additional companies of Army Service Corps, 5 companies of Army Ordnance Corps, and 3 hospitals also left before mobilization, as well as a Brigade Division (3 batteries) of Field Artillery which, being the first for foreign service, had its proper proportion of trained and mature men. This preponderance of Army Service Corps in the earlier stages was due to the fact that, as already stated, the transport of the Field Force was not furnished by the existing home service which was unsuited for South African purposes. A battalion just about to leave on a tour of foreign service, and another temporarily at home owing to a deficiency of barrack accommodation in the West Indies, were the only infantry units which could be sent from England without mobilization. Four additional battalions were despatched from Gibraltar, Malta, Crete and Egypt respectively, and the half battalion at Mauritius was also ordered to South Africa. At the request of the Home Government the Government of India consented to lend 3 cavalry regiments, 3 batteries of Field Artillery, and 4 battalions of infantry. The majority of the force from India had landed in South Africa by October 12, and the whole of the remainder had reached there by the 26th. Before the mobilization of the Field Force was completed, the garrison in South Africa had thus been raised to 5 regiments of cavalry, 9 batteries of Field Artillery, 2 companies Garrison Artillery, 1 mountain battery, 5 companies and a balloon section of Royal Engineers, and 17 battalions of infantry.



It was not until nearly the end of September—after long controversy between the military authorities, anxious to have everything in readiness, and the political authorities, no less anxious not to prejudice negotiations by any overt act suggesting war—that financial authority was given for carrying out the preparations necessary for the equipment and mobilization of the Field Force. On October 4 the schedules of Reservists, which were required to complete the placards already in the possession of the local military authorities, were sent out with instructions that no action was to be taken on them until the receipt of telegraphic orders, and at the same time copies of the Army Order, authorizing mobilization and calling out the Reserve, were circulated confidentially ready for issue.

Delay in  
sanctioning  
expenditure.

Everything was now ready. On October 7 a council was held at Balmoral, and the Royal Proclamation required by law before the Reserve could be called out was duly signed. A telegram to this effect reached the War Office at about 11.35 A.M., the order to proceed with mobilization was telegraphed to the districts, the placards were affixed as directed in public places, and the act of mobilization was complete. About noon an official of the Mobilization Subdivision went round to the various executive branches of the War Office and notified to them that the work of the Mobilization Subdivision was over and that theirs had now begun.

The Reserve  
called out.

There were many changes in *personnel* at the War Office in consequence of the war. Apart from Sir George White,\* Quartermaster-General, who had recently left to take command of the troops in Natal, Sir Francis Clery, Deputy Adjutant-General, had taken command of a division; Colonel Wynne, Assistant Military Secretary, and two Assistant Adjutant-Generals, Colonels Stopford and Allen, had been provided with staff appointments; while many other minor officials proceeded in various capacities to the seat of war. The result was that the War Office entered upon its task with a considerable proportion of the military side of the House new to the duties which they had to perform.

War Office  
changes.

\* See vol. ii., p. 108 note.

Success  
of the  
mobilization.

The Army Order authorizing mobilization named October 9 as the first day of mobilization, and laid down that the 17th was to be the last day for Reservists to rejoin, thus giving them nine days' law. Later, when more experience had been gained in mobilizing, this was reduced to seven and even to five days. This was the first real experience of a mobilization, and, notwithstanding that they had been consulted at every step by the Mobilization Subdivision, the officers in charge of executive branches feared, up to the last moment, the possibility of something having been forgotten, or of a hitch occurring through ambiguous instructions. All such fears proved unfounded. There were no hitches; few questions from the districts were necessary; everything worked smoothly, and the period of mobilization of the Field Force was one of the quietest times ever known at the War Office—very different from what was to come when all organized units had gone and more had to be improvised. Daily a summary of the progress of mobilization in the commands was telegraphed to Army headquarters. The only source of anxiety that arose was that at first but few Reservists rejoined. The majority deferred rejoining until the last allotted day, a fact which will have to be reckoned with in future mobilizations. In one extreme case the bulk of the Reservists of a unit, which took out 512 of them, only rejoined their depot after nightfall on the last day. The medical officers conducted their examinations without intermission the whole night through by artificial light, with the result that a large number were passed as fit who, on further examination, were found to be suffering from serious disabilities. In the aggregate, although 15 per cent. had been estimated in all mobilization calculations as a possible shortage of the Reserve from all causes, it was found that the actual shortage amounted to rather less than 10 per cent. Consequently there was a net gain of about 4,000 men over the number expected. It had been intended that each unit should have been made up to its war strength plus excess numbers, *i.e.* an additional 10 per cent. intended to make up any losses which might occur before the arrival of the first drafts. Owing, however, to the decision of the authorities

to deal with the Reserve on regimental lines, the impossibility of calling upon Section D before the rest of the Reserve was called up, and the undesirability of depleting Militia battalions by drawing on the Militia Reserve, this intention was not fully carried out and the Field Force left some 1,700 short. One or two battalions were moreover specially weak, as the normal trooping season had commenced and they had already parted with their draft to the linked battalion abroad. With the exception of two battalions of Guards, which were quartered at Gibraltar, and whose Reserve were sent to them from England, the whole Field Force embarked from the United Kingdom and Ireland. Its embarkation commenced on October 21, and all except one cavalry regiment, whose horses were sick, had embarked by November 16. A composite regiment of Household Cavalry was detailed in its place, the original regiment leaving on December 12, thus adding to the Field Force an additional regiment. The mobilization, as far as it went, was thoroughly successful. But it must always be remembered that it was only a partial mobilization. The actual making mobile of the force was done out in South Africa, and the experience of 1899 furnished no test of our power of rapid complete mobilization in this country.

It was not long before the Mobilization Subdivision discovered that its work was by no means over. The loss of a mountain battery and about one and a half battalions at Nicholson's Nek led to the immediate mobilization of a mountain battery and of three battalions (one from Malta); these had all left by November 16, that is, before the last unit of the Field Force. As soon as it became obvious that more substantial reinforcements were required, an additional division was collected at Aldershot. The troops in Lady-smith under Sir George White had been grouped into a Fourth Division, so this new division was numbered the Fifth. The 9th Brigade of this division was arranged as a York and Lancashire Brigade, and was the last to have any special grouping. Simultaneously a siege train was organized, and three fresh batteries of Horse Artillery were mobilized. These further reinforcements had all left by December 21.

Additional  
reinforce-  
ments.  
Fifth, Sixth,  
and Seventh  
Divisions,  
Fourth  
Cavalry  
Brigade.



While these reinforcements were mobilizing, a Sixth and Seventh Division were got ready; the former had all left by January 1, 1900, the latter by January 18. In all these cases mobilization was complete ten or eleven days from the date of the issue of the order to mobilize; the embarkations were completed about three weeks later. In addition to the Field Artillery, which accompanied the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Divisions, four more Brigade Divisions (twelve batteries) had left by January 27, and about the same time an additional cavalry regiment, two batteries of Horse Artillery, and some mounted infantry were sent from India. The cavalry already in South Africa when war broke out was numbered the 3rd Brigade; towards the end of December a 4th Cavalry Brigade was mobilized at home and had left by February 17. The Cavalry Reserve was in excess of mobilization requirements, and, as recruiting for that branch was very brisk, there was no object in husbanding the surplus. This, amounting as it did to about 700 Hussars, was formed into the nucleus of seven remount companies and left during February.

Remainder of  
the Reserve  
called out.

Up to the time of the mobilization of the Sixth Division, there were still too many men left in the junior sections of the Reserve to make it advisable to call them out in order to legalize drawing on Section D. The Sixth Division was therefore very weak. When, however, it was decided to mobilize a Seventh Division, so few of the Reservists of these junior sections would have remained in the Reserve that this objection disappeared; so the whole of Sections A, B, and C were called up on December 20, 1899, in time for the Section D Reservists of the Seventh Division to accompany it. This division, therefore, embarked at greater strength than the Sixth. Before Section D was called up, invitations had been issued to the Reservists composing it to rejoin the colours voluntarily, and a very fair number responded. The calling up of Section D practically marks the moment when the force contemplated by the Stanhope Memorandum, for which alone preparations had been made, had left the country. With the departure of the Seventh Division, when the war had only been three months in progress, the

work of improvising reinforcements may be said to have begun.

Preparations were made on January 19 for the mobilization of a further division—the Eighth; two of the battalions composing it had been brought from the colonies. The embarkation of this division was spread over a considerable period, and the last unit did not embark until April 18, 1900. Meanwhile, in the beginning of February, two more battalions had been despatched from the Mediterranean.

*Eighth  
Division  
mobilized.*

With the embarkation of the Eighth Division, the last organized mobilized Regular formation left England, and the work of the Mobilization Subdivision in preparing a field force for South Africa came to an end. By the third week of April, 1900, 12 regiments of cavalry, 8 batteries of Horse Artillery, 36 batteries of Field Artillery, 1 mountain battery, 9 companies of Garrison Artillery, and 61 battalions of infantry in organized formations, besides other units which reached (exclusive of officers) a total of about 18,000 men, had proceeded from home to South Africa, in addition to the garrison which existed there on the outbreak of the war, and to units sent from India and the colonies. In all, the War Office sent out in just over six months, from home alone, and exclusive of drafts, over 100,000 warrant officers, N.C.O.'s, and men of the Regular Forces, as against the 81,952 contemplated by the Stanhope Memorandum. Very few Regular units reached South Africa after this date. Four more cavalry regiments left the United Kingdom, and two left India for South Africa during 1901, and three more battalions of infantry proceeded there from home, one from the West Indies, and four from India in the winter of 1901–02. Seventy-one formed companies of mounted infantry in all landed in South Africa, of which 10 were raised in Malta, 2 in Egypt, and 3 in Burmah. In all, 24 cavalry regiments, 10 batteries of Royal Horse Artillery, 45 batteries of Royal Field Artillery, 2 batteries of Mountain Artillery, 16 companies of Royal Garrison Artillery, and 94 battalions of infantry took part in the South African War.

*Strength of  
Regular  
Forces sent  
to South  
Africa.*

The following Table gives the composition of the force embarked from home and the Mediterranean between October 7, 1899, and April 18, 1900, excluding officers, re-mount companies, and sundry minor administrative services :

—	Men serving with the Colours.	Reservists.	Total.
Cavalry . . . . .	4,962	1,996	6,958
Mounted Infantry . . . . .	1,594	—	1,594
Artillery . . . . .	6,643	6,181	12,774
Engineers . . . . .	2,389	1,209	3,598
Infantry . . . . .	35,870	32,066	67,936
Army Service Corps . . . . .	2,258	253	2,511
Army Ordnance Corps . . . . .	522	200	722
Royal Army Medical Corps . . . . .	2,181	849	3,030
Army Pay Corps . . . . .	134	—	134
Army Post Office Corps . . . . .	—	253	253
Total . . . . .	56,553	42,957	99,510

It will be noted that the Reservists amounted to 43 per cent. of the whole, the proportion rising to nearly 50 per cent. in the infantry and artillery, and falling as low as 28 per cent. in the cavalry. In individual units the proportion of Reservists often greatly exceeded 50 per cent.\*

Necessity of  
drafts.

During the time that these formed bodies were proceeding to South Africa, the necessity for their being kept up to strength was not forgotten. It would be an ideal condition for an army in war if all units composing it were kept constantly at their war establishment.† The constant provision of drafts, as long as the war lasted and men were available, was regarded by the military authorities as a mere matter of course, an inevitable consequence of the despatch of a field force. Yet at the very commencement

\* See vol. ii., pp. 17-20, and vol. iii., p. 5, for a criticism of the system under which the Reserve largely replaced the standing Army instead of supplementing it.

† There is much, indeed, to be said from the tactical, if not from the administrative, point of view for actually increasing the strength of units above war establishment as a campaign progresses, in preference to organizing new units. Officers after a few weeks can handle a much larger number of men with equal facility; at the same time the new arrivals learn much more quickly from incorporation in existing seasoned units. This was to some extent done by the Japanese in Manchuria.



of the war, Lord Wolseley and Sir Evelyn Wood had considerable difficulty in convincing Lord Lansdowne of the necessity of such an obvious service, and to the very end of the campaign this difficulty often recurred. ?

The number of drafts required by units in the field naturally depends on the number of casualties in action, on the climate of the locality, the conditions, arduous or otherwise, of the campaigning, the season of the year, and other factors. When war became imminent, two separate estimates of draft requirements were made, the one by the medical authorities, who based their calculations on the experience of our recent small expeditions in tropical countries, the other by the Intelligence Division, based on the losses in recent European wars. The two estimates based on such different data necessarily varied considerably. In the former the requirements were fixed at 10 per cent. every three months, while the latter proposed a 10 per cent. draft every month. In practice it was found that the first was too low and the second too high. Although 10 per cent. each quarter was originally decided on as a tentative basis, drafts succeeded one another at shorter intervals than three months throughout the first year of the war, and most units received during the year their fifth 10 per cent. Estimated number of drafts required.

Now, under the original mobilization scheme, after the departure of the maximum Field Force, a certain number of units (in the cavalry about 8 regiments, in the infantry about 14 battalions) should have been left at home, so that, after each unit of the Field Force had used up its own Reserve, there would still be the Reserve of those remaining behind to draw on. Moreover, as it was no part of the scheme that the Militia should go abroad, the entire Militia Reserve would also be available. On January 1, 1899, it was estimated that, deducting unfits, etc., this surplus Reserve amounted to a net 34,000 for infantry alone. In addition to the sources of supply for drafts already indicated were the young soldiers who month by month attained the minimum standards of age and service to fit them for South Africa. The numbers so maturing in the infantry varied from eight to fifteen men per battalion a month, according to the season The available supply.

of the year. In the cavalry, owing to brisk recruiting, the proportion was nearly twice as high.

The  
abnormal  
strain.

In the circumstances of 1899 and 1900, however, instead of the 10 regiments of cavalry, 36 batteries of artillery, and 54 battalions \* of infantry contemplated in the Stanhope Memorandum, 18 regiments of cavalry, 55 batteries of Horse and Field Artillery, and 86 battalions of infantry † were mobilized. There was therefore far less Reserve left in the United Kingdom to draw on than had been contemplated in the mobilization scheme. Moreover, most of the Militia battalions which proceeded to South Africa and the colonies took with them their Militia Reserve, thus curtailing this source of supply. To add to the draft difficulties, there were in South Africa, in addition to the mobilized units, the units of the original garrison and the unmobilized reinforcements which had joined it before the outbreak of war, both of which not only had to have their casualties replaced but had, in the first place, to be made up to war establishment. The difficulty of supplying the normal annual drafts to India and the colonies was met by a proclamation retaining soldiers with the colours during the war, and, after its close, by liberal bounties to those who extended their colour service to twelve years.

Difference in  
strength of  
establish-  
ment of  
units.

The first draft duty was to bring all units up to the same establishment—the inconvenience of having units in the same command on different establishments is too obvious to need explanation. In the cavalry the establishment of a mobilized regiment from home was for all practical purposes identical with that of the cavalry regiment already in South Africa. Not so the establishment of regiments from India, which were nearly 100 less. In the artillery the difference between establishments was negligible. In the infantry the establishments of battalions already in South Africa or sent from the Colonies fell short by about 100 of the units of the Army Corps, while the battalions from India were 240 short. All these units had to make up to the highest, *i.e.* the Army Corps establishment.

\* Including 4 battalions on lines of communication.

† The strength in South Africa in the summer of 1900.

The embarkation of the original Field Force and of the subsequent organized reinforcements, up to and including the Eighth Division, extended over about six months. It is therefore obvious that the units which left in the earliest ships required drafts long before the units composing the later divisions had left the United Kingdom. Throughout this period drafts were despatched uninterruptedly; indeed, drafts of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, amounting to about the aggregate of those arms in a complete Army Corps, had left home for the seat of war before the Eighth Division embarked.\*

Despatch of drafts.

As regards the cavalry, their drafts never failed. This was largely due to the fact that, at the time that the Cavalry Reserve of 1899 was formed, each cavalry regiment, whether at home or abroad, was a reserve-creating unit. Many of the 700 surplus Cavalry Reservists formed into remount companies eventually got posted to regiments at the front, which were kept over establishment, and their places were taken by surplus Army Service Corps drivers, whose proper services were dispensed with in consequence of the employment of native drivers. Constant cavalry drafts were required as horse attendants to remounts on the transports.

Cavalry drafts

The draft requirements of artillery were peculiar. The wastage in this arm was never so serious as in the other two. But the fact that the artillery arm at home was practically doubled during 1900 at first made a heavy call upon the draft-supplying resources of the corps. When no further Mounted Artillery drafts were available, volunteers were called for from the Garrison Artillery to work the guns, and more of the surplus Army Service Corps drivers above referred to were detailed to drive the wagons. Later on, when there was no longer any Boer artillery left, drafts to our own artillery in South Africa were no longer necessary. A few drafts were, however, still sent in order to obviate closing down recruiting in newly-formed batteries at home, and were incorporated in the Artillery Mounted Rifles which Lord Kitchener now formed. This example was imitated at

Artillery drafts.

\* The student will find much information on the subject of drafts in an Appendix to the Minutes of Evidence before Lord Elgin's Commission.



home, and 1,050 Horse and Field Artillery men were sent out in 1902 as Mounted Rifles.

Infantry  
drafts.

In the case of the infantry, it is impossible to do more than touch on a few salient points. As was anticipated, the first drafts to fall short of requirements were those for regiments of which more than the normal number of battalions were engaged in the war. One four-battalion regiment had at first three and latterly four battalions at the seat of war, another had at first two and latterly three, and thirteen two-battalion regiments had at some period of the war both battalions serving there. Thus in fourteen cases, and later in sixteen, the "details" left at home, which were the only infantry draft-producing bodies left, had a double task imposed upon them. Some of these failed after the war had been only six months in progress. Later it was impossible to send drafts to battalions of regiments engaged in forming 3rd or 4th battalions at home; while, on the other hand, in one regiment, the Grenadier Guards, the Reserve never failed, and some was actually in hand at the end of the war.\* The line battalions, whose linked Militia battalions were in South Africa, had no Militia Reserve to be included in their drafts from home, but this was rectified in the summer of 1900, when all the Militia Reservists were pushed forward from the lines of communications and their places there were taken by young soldiers of the Regular Army from home. The strength of units soon varied considerably. More equality could have been achieved by appointing from the Reserve of other corps, but the price of inequality was paid as a tribute to regimental sentiment. From the very outset, in drafts as in mobilized units, the endeavour was to foster regimental feeling, and to avoid, as far as possible, "appointing" or transferring Reservists out of their corps. In the artillery the corps limits are widest; they embraced in 1899 the whole artillery, Horse, Field, and Garrison; in the cavalry the corps limits embrace Dragoons, Lancers, and Hussars, that is, every soldier enlisted for Dragoons is liable to transfer to

\* It must be remembered that the Guards, with a three years' colour service and no responsibility for furnishing drafts to battalions abroad, naturally had a much larger reserve.

any regiment of Dragoons or Dragoon Guards, and similarly with Lancers and Hussars. In the infantry the corps limits are, as far as the Regulars are concerned, much narrower than in the other arms, and are limited by the regiment. On mobilization, however, as already pointed out, authority existed to break through the "corps" limits and post a Reservist anywhere in his own "arm." Throughout, however, there was the fixed intention that, until it was absolutely unavoidable, no advantage would be taken of any existing power to interfere with regimental feeling. In all the earlier drafts, although certain regiments soon ran out of their own reserve, the legal power to provide them with drafts from other regiments was not exercised, and even at a later period and in the case of the Regular Reserve it was never exercised at all. The power of transfer was only resorted to in the case of about 3,000 of the Militia Reserve.

As a rule, each draft was given about three weeks' notice before the date of embarkation, but in some urgent cases it was necessary to curtail this; in one instance some cavalry drafts only had three days' notice.

In all the following number of men were sent out in drafts: Total of  
drafts.

Dates.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Total.
From August 1, 1899, to September 30, 1900	4,386	1,690	46,459	52,535
From October 1, 1900, to September 30, 1901	5,815	1,189	10,104	17,108
From October 1, 1901, to May 31, 1902 . . . . .	3,169	1,991	15,286	20,396
Total . . . . .	13,370	4,870	71,799	90,039

Altogether drafts of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, equivalent to well over two Army Corps, proceeded to South Africa between the commencement and termination of operations. Of the 52,535 who went out during the first year, 21,107 were men with the colours (chiefly those who became available as they matured), 8,845 were Reservists of Sections B and C, 9,569 were Reservists of Section D, and 13,014 were Militia Reserve. At the end of the first year the Reserve was

practically exhausted and few Reservists of any section were included in subsequent drafts. It has never been possible to obtain conclusive information as to the extent to which these drafts kept the units in South Africa up to strength. This is not surprising when we consider that units were so scattered and broken up by the peculiar conditions of the campaign that in several cases it was necessary for them to advertise in the local press to ascertain where their men were serving. Roughly speaking, the drafts sent out amounted to an annual percentage on strength of 60 per cent. in the cavalry, 26 per cent. in the artillery, and 35 per cent. in the infantry. The comparatively small number of infantry drafts which proceeded in the second year is very noticeable. So impressed, indeed, were the political heads of the War Office with the initial mistake of sending too few mounted troops to the seat of war, that later the military authorities had great difficulty in persuading them that infantry drafts were as important as ever, and although men were available, and Lord Kitchener telegraphed asking that some might be sent, none were placed under orders for several months.

Quality of  
drafts.

In all, 857 drafts of the three arms of the Regular Army proceeded to South Africa, and it is recorded that only one adverse report was received as to their quality. The majority of men composing these drafts fulfilled the conditions of service in South Africa, viz., a minimum of twenty years of age and twelve months' service. Some drafts of young soldiers were, as already stated, sent to take the place of Militia Reservists pushed further to the front, and later on, when the war had been in progress about a year, and was believed to be nearing the end, some young soldiers were sent out to join, under normal conditions, those units which were destined to form the peace garrison. These young soldiers were, however, kept on lines of communications. In the last three months of the war, the military authorities urged that, as the healthy season was approaching, and as young and only partially-trained Militiamen were not found unsuitable for duty in the blockhouses, and, indeed, developed remarkably in health and physique in the South African climate, the qualifying standard of age and service for infantry drafts





MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. F. KELLY, K.C.B.  
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIELD FORCE S. AFRICA 1900-1902.  
*Photo by London Stereoscopic Co.*



might be reduced. For some time they had considerable difficulty in convincing Mr. Brodrick of the wisdom of this course, but eventually their views prevailed.

In addition to these drafts there was towards the end of the war an interchange of 150 men per battalion between India and South Africa in all cases in which there was a linked battalion in each country. One reason for this course was to obtain fresh men from India in the place of men who were stale and who were due to proceed to India on the declaration of peace; the other reason was to give to a proportion of those who had been detained in India with the colours a chance of seeing active service. Those units in South Africa which had linked units in the Mediterranean drew their drafts from that unit, the places of the men composing the drafts being taken by young soldiers from home. With this exception all drafts proceeded from the United Kingdom.

Drafts from  
India and  
Mediterranean.

The strength of the Regular Army in South Africa gradually rose to 176,278, and never subsequently dropped below an average of 151,000 till peace was declared. The actual number of Regulars who from first to last took part in the operations was 256,340, more than three times the number who set foot in the Crimea.

Strength of  
Army in  
South Africa.

But while these measures were being taken to provide *personnel* for the Regular Army in South Africa, the authorities were no less concerned about the safety of the United Kingdom. The successive mobilizations of the first six months had absorbed practically all the organized Regular units, and it was thought essential to add a "stiffening" of these to the force provided by the embodiment of the Militia and the incorporation in it of the "details" left behind by the Regular units.\* Two battalions were brought home, one from Ceylon and another from Singapore, where they were relieved by Indian native troops. As a further emergency measure, it was decided to endeavour

Home  
defence.  
The Royal  
Reservists.

\* See vol. iii., chap. i., where, however, the function of the Militia in taking over the Regular details in the period 1899-1901 is not taken into account, and the extent of the disorganization consequently somewhat overstated.



to make use of the large number of men engaged in civil occupations who had previously completed a period of service in the Regular Army. In February, 1900, a Royal Warrant was published authorizing the re-enlistment of ex-soldiers for home service. Enlistments were not to take place until after March 7, by which date it was expected that the regimental cadres of the improvised units would be ready. Only well-behaved men between the ages of 22 and 45 were to be accepted. The inducement to re-enlist was a bounty of £12 on enlistment and a further bounty of £10 on discharge; the period of enlistment was for one year only. As a matter of fact, the expectation that the cadres would be ready by March 7 was not justified. Many of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers who were relied on to form them were found not to be available, owing to failure of health and other causes. Consequently, by the time the enlistments commenced the staffs were only partially formed and there was some confusion, which threw additional work upon the War Office. However, in a short time, the staffs were provided and the units settled down and became fairly serviceable for home defence. In all, 24,130 re-enlisted. In the cavalry and infantry they were formed into "Royal Reserve" units, and in all four regiments of cavalry (one of Dragoon Guards, one of Dragoons, one of Lancers, and one of Hussars), one Guards and 18 line battalions were raised. In the other arms the "Royal Reservists," as they were called, were distributed among existing units. At the end of their year's service the Royal Reservists took their discharge. A large number of them subsequently enlisted into the Royal Garrison regiment.

Increase of  
the Regular  
Army,  
especially in  
Artillery.

At the same time a permanent increase of the Regular Army was decided upon. The infantry of the line was augmented in March, 1900, by 12 battalions, mostly in the shape of third and fourth battalions added in districts where recruiting had been brisk. In place of two of these an additional regiment of Guards, the Irish Guards, was sanctioned in April, 1900, to commemorate the valour and loyalty of the Irish regiments in the field.\* The most important

\* Only one battalion was actually raised.

increase, however, was in the artillery. In March, 1900, the formation of 36 new batteries of Field, 7 of Horse Artillery, and 12 of howitzers was sanctioned, thus increasing by half the establishment of that arm, whose serious weakness had long occupied the attention of military reformers. The guns for these batteries were procured from Germany.\*

The raising of fresh Regular units in 1900 and the necessity of anticipating the wastage which would naturally result from the war created a further demand for old soldiers. Accordingly a Royal Warrant was published on April 28, authorizing re-enlistment of ex-soldiers, with the additional liability to foreign service, in those infantry regiments which were raising fresh battalions, in the Field and Horse Artillery, and in some other services. In the case of the Royal Reservists the inducement to enlist had been a liberal bounty; in the case of those re-enlisted for general service the inducement was a still more liberal prospective pension. Previous service in the Army and Army Reserve were both to count towards it, a minimum service of four years was to be given, and (consistent with this provision) discharges were to take place at the age of forty-one. How liberal these terms were may be judged by the fact that it was calculated that in some cases the pension rights conferred on a private soldier in return for these four years' service could not have been purchased in the open market for much less than £400, while the pension rights of a non-commissioned officer were worth far more. In order to prevent ex-soldiers first enlisting for home service and later for general service, in order to get both inducements (bounty and pension rights) those who had re-enlisted in the Royal Reserves were only allowed to re-enlist for general service on condition that a portion of their bounty was refunded. In all 1,465 old soldiers re-enlisted for general service. It seems curious that while old soldiers were thus taken for home defence or for the raising of the general service units at home, no effort was made to call upon the material available in the shape of old soldiers to serve in South Africa either with their old corps or in new units.

Re-enlist-  
ment for  
general  
service  
authorized.

\* See chap. viii.

Formation  
of provisional  
units at  
home.

With the gradual disembodiment of the Militia between the autumn of 1900 and the summer of 1901, and the disappearance of the Royal Reserve regiments and battalions, only few units of cavalry and infantry remained at home of which immediate use could have been made for home defence. The reserve squadrons of cavalry regiments had become seriously unwieldy—in one case one of them had reached the total of 850—and recruiting for cavalry was still brisk. It was therefore decided to form the reserve squadrons of cavalry and the “details” of infantry into provisional units, and some of the staff of the Royal Reserve regiments was utilized for this purpose. In all, 8 provisional regiments of cavalry (4 of Dragoons, 1 of Lancers, and 3 of Hussars) and 15 provisional battalions were formed, and these continued to exist until the units, to which the squadrons and “details” belonged, returned home and absorbed them, or until the squadrons and details rejoined their proper units at peace stations abroad. These provisional units were makeshifts pure and simple, and they were very far from satisfactory organizations.

Improvement  
in recruiting.

While these various special measures were being carried out, the normal recruiting for the Regular Army showed a considerable improvement. Before the outbreak of the war the average annual number of enlistments for the Regular Army, taken over a period of seven years, was 33,815. In the last quarter of 1899 13,063 enlisted. During 1900 and 1901, 47,700 and 45,157 joined the colours respectively, and the first five months of 1902 yielded 20,229. The net annual gain over the average during the period of the war is estimated at 13,500, or rather more than four months' normal take. The advantage of any increase on normal recruiting does not make itself at once felt in an army in the field. The minimum age for enlistment being 18, the average 19, and the age to qualify for foreign service being 20, it is not until two years after the war fever has made itself apparent that the entire effect of the increase makes itself felt in the units on service, so that the Regular Army did not reap the full benefit of this gain until 1902.

The usual source of supply of commissioned officers was



from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, and through the Militia. On mobilization there was in addition the reserve of officers to draw on, consisting partly of officers who had voluntarily accepted an obligation to serve in case of emergency, and partly of officers who had served in the Regular Army on whom there was a lien for further service up to a certain age, either in respect of the previous grant of a gratuity or the present issue of a pension. To quote the total number of this reserve would be illusory. It obviously included a large number of men who were medically unfit, who possibly had lost their nerve, or were otherwise unsuited for re-employment. It was, however, considered that those in this reserve who were fit for re-employment could, with the other normal sources of supply open and the doors of normal wastage closed, keep up to strength, during a campaign of average duration, the force laid down in the Stanhope Memorandum.

When, however, it became necessary to find officers for a field force of Regulars not far short of double the utmost contemplated, in addition to a very large increase, partly permanent and partly temporary, of the home establishment, and to the large number attached to improvised forces of all kinds, British and Colonial, it is obvious that the recognized sources of supply were unable to meet this increased demand. First, notwithstanding the transparent objection to taking officers away from units of auxiliary forces at the very time that the units or a portion of them were preparing for service, the Militia and Volunteers were turned to for an increased supply. This source of supply was soon exhausted and other sources had to be improvised. The various University authorities were approached, and on their recommendations a large number of direct commissions were granted. Similarly, in order to get into touch with the large number of public school men who had not proceeded to a University, headmasters of the recognized public schools were allotted a certain number of nominations to direct commissions, to be given to past schoolboys who were considered suitable recipients. A large number of Regular commissions were also conferred on officers of the Militia,

Supply of officers.

Direct commissions granted to make up deficiency.

Imperial Yeomanry, Volunteers, and Colonial contingents in South Africa on the recommendation of the military authorities on the spot.

Increase in  
commissions  
in Regular  
Army.

The total commissions in the Regular Army gazetted in a normal year averages about 660, of which some 300 are from the Royal Military College, 115 from the Royal Military Academy, 155 from the Militia, 20 from the Universities and Colonies, and 70 from the ranks. During the year 1900 the total reached 2,412, of which 318 were from the Royal Military College, 273 from the Royal Military Academy, 1,259 from the Militia, Yeomanry, Volunteers, public schools, and other sources, 384 from the Universities, and 70 from the Colonies. The total in 1901 had dropped to 1,192, and in 1902 it was again practically normal. But it has been calculated that during the first eighteen months of the war over 3,000 direct first commissions were gazetted in the Regular Army in excess of normal requirements.

### THE MILITIA

The Militia  
and foreign  
service.

Since the Militia was reorganized in 1757 it has frequently been embodied in whole or in part. Between that year and 1816 it was embodied four times for thirty-six years in all. In later times there was an embodiment during the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny, and during the operations in the Sudan in 1885. Before the Crimean War it was illegal to send the Militia abroad even with its own consent; during that war, however, a short Act of Parliament was passed making it legal for Militia units, if they volunteered, to serve in Gibraltar and Malta, and ten battalions proceeded there, thus enabling the Regular units quartered there to proceed to the seat of war. This power was still further increased in 1898, when it was made legal for Militia units to serve with their own consent at any place out of the United Kingdom. The change was not introduced with a view to enabling Militia battalions to serve abroad as units, but in order to legalize the formation of a Special Service section of Militia for service abroad which was then in contemplation.

It was part of the established military policy that when

an expeditionary force left the kingdom, a Militia battalion was embodied for each battalion which proceeded abroad. In each territorial district in which there was more than one linked Militia battalion, the general principle of selection for embodiment was that, if the battalion for the Field Force was the 1st, the 3rd Militia battalion was embodied; if the battalion for the Field Force was the 2nd, the 4th Militia battalion was embodied. The intention was that, as each Militia battalion was embodied, it should proceed to the station at which the line battalion which it was replacing had been quartered, and should there take over the "details" left behind by the line units; these were formed into separate companies and helped to swell the numbers of the Militia units, which were in many cases very weak. At first the embodied Militia units were moved about a good deal, owing to constant changes which occurred in consequence of successive divisions being mobilized at Aldershot. The disadvantage of this was considerable, for much of the baggage left behind by the line battalions was in the custody of the details, and a good deal was lost owing to these constant moves.

Embodiment  
of battalions.

At the time of the outbreak of the war the Militia consisted of 32 regiments of artillery, 2 regiments of Engineers, 10 divisions of Submarine Miners, 124 battalions of infantry, and 5 companies of the Medical Staff Corps.\* The establishment of these units varied considerably; some were as strong as 10, others as weak as 4 companies each. As the establishment of the whole Militia was 132,493 and its strength only 107,753, or nearly 25,000 short, it will be readily understood that many units were extremely weak. At first, as no Garrison Artillery had left the country, it was unnecessary to call up any Militia artillery, nor were any Engineers or Submarine Miners required. The Royal Proclamation, authorizing the embodiment of the Militia, was dated October 26, 1899; the first order issued in pursuance of this proclamation was dated November 3, and ordered the embodiment of 35 battalions and 5 companies of the

Strength on  
embodiment,  
Oct. 26, 1899.

\* Three more companies of the Medical Staff Corps were raised in the spring of 1900.



Militia Medical Staff Corps. The latter were embodied at once, but before the infantry were embodied the Nicholson's Nek disaster had occurred and three more battalions were added. These 38 battalions were called out between December 4 and 13. Eight more battalions were embodied on the departure of the Fifth and Sixth Divisions respectively, the first eight came out in the middle of December, the latter in the beginning of January, 1900. After this units had not only to be embodied to take the place of line units as they left the country, but also to replace Militia units as they embarked. One regiment of artillery and 20 battalions of infantry were called out between the end of January and the beginning of March, and the whole of the remainder of the Militia was embodied during the first half of May.

Conditions  
imposed for  
service in  
South Africa.

In view of the fact that no Militia unit could be sent out of the country without its consent, it is obvious that the despatch of Militia units to the seat of war or to coaling-stations did not enter into any scheme for the defence of the Empire. Nevertheless the previous history of the Militia justified the belief that, in case of emergency, they would volunteer their services. Four Militia battalions proceeded to the Mediterranean between the beginning of January and the middle of February, 1900, thus taking the place of an equivalent number of line regiments which had proceeded to the seat of war. As there were no age-limits imposed and nearly the whole of the battalions volunteered, they left practically up to their existing strength. When, later, it came to asking the Militia to volunteer for service in South Africa, a difficulty arose as regards the conditions of age and service. To have insisted on the line qualifications in the Militia would have so reduced the units that it would not have been worth sending them. On the other hand, it was difficult to justify the retention at home of so many Regular soldiers who were far more qualified for active service than the bulk of the Militia. It was decided, however, that, as the duties of the Militia were not intended to take them beyond the lines of communications, it was sufficient to insist on an age qualification of 18, which held good throughout the campaign. Why the same reasons should not, from the first,

have allowed the Regular "details" to go out with their Militia battalions, does not appear.

The conditions regarding volunteering were strictly laid down, and commanding officers were cautioned that every man must be left to decide of his own free will, and that no pressure whatever was to be brought to bear on him. In all 35 battalions (including 10 Irish) were asked if they volunteered. Of these four declined. One of these was a Highland battalion composed of fishermen, whose industry would have been so seriously dislocated that the trade might never have returned. The other three were Irish battalions, and in their case the pressure brought to bear by the Nationalist party is sufficient to account for the result. It may be mentioned that one other Irish Militia battalion volunteered in such small numbers that at first it was doubtful whether the offer could be accepted. However, it had two other linked Militia battalions which had not parted with their Militia Reserve; accordingly the offer was accepted, the Reserves were called up from their homes and sent out to join the battalion in South Africa. This, however, was the last occasion on which an Irish battalion was asked to volunteer for service in South Africa, although later on one was asked to volunteer for service in the Mediterranean and went there. Altogether, by April 2, 1900, 36 Militia battalions had left the country, of which 30 battalions proceeded to South Africa. There was no rôle in South Africa for large Militia units of artillery or Engineers, but by June, 1900, 4 artillery companies, and 2 companies and 2 sections of Engineer Militia had left for the seat of war.

Number of  
battalions  
that  
volunteered  
for service.

By the time of the hay harvest in the summer of 1900, the shortage of labour, caused by the absence of so many able-bodied men in South Africa, and the embodiment of the Militia at home, made itself seriously felt, and in other industries the supply of labour was represented to be falling short. Accordingly, on the earnest representations of employers of labour, a large number of Militia men in units at home were allowed to return on furlough to resume their occupations subject to immediate recall. The system was not satisfactory. As soon as the camping-season of 1900

Militia  
disembodied.

was over, the whole of the artillery and Engineer Militia, and 24 infantry battalions were disembodied, and 12 more battalions were disembodied by the end of the year. This left only 18 battalions embodied at home during the winter. By the summer of 1901 the whole Militia had received such a thorough training and could be re-embodied at such short notice, that no danger was anticipated from allowing the remainder to go to their homes, and they were disembodied in July.

Relief  
battalions  
sent out.

In the spring of 1901, after the war had been about a year and a half in progress, it became evident that both officers and men of the Militia battalions abroad would be seriously handicapped in resuming their civil avocations and might suffer pecuniary loss if advantage was taken of their patriotic act of volunteering for foreign service at a time of crisis to keep them abroad indefinitely. Other Militia battalions were therefore asked to volunteer to serve abroad in relief; with only one exception, each unit, as it was embodied, volunteered in sufficient strength to be able to take the place of a battalion which had borne the heat and burden of the day abroad. These reliefs were begun in May, 1901, and continued till March, 1902. Twenty-six battalions proceeded in relief from home and one from Malta; of these, 3 battalions proceeded to the Mediterranean and one to St. Helena, the remainder to South Africa. In addition to those proceeding abroad, 4 battalions accepted the voluntary duty of garrisoning the Channel Islands.

Total Militia  
embodied  
during the  
war.

In all, of the Militia, 32 artillery regiments, 2 Engineer regiments, 10 divisions of Submarine Miners, 124 battalions of infantry, and 8 companies of the Medical Staff Corps were embodied for varying periods during the war. Of these 6 companies of artillery, 3 companies and 2 sections of Engineers, and 68 battalions of infantry volunteered for service abroad, of which the artillery and Engineers, and 60 of the infantry battalions saw service in South Africa. Two battalions proceeded to St. Helena, and two others stayed there on the homeward journey. Seven battalions went to the Mediterranean, of which one afterwards went to South Africa.



Four sets of drafts left England to keep Militia units Drafts. up to strength; 874 men left about the beginning of May, 1900, 906 left at the beginning of the following July, and 984 more went two months later; 1,622 left in January and February, 1902, bringing the total up to 4,386. Altogether 45,566 of all ranks of the Militia were taken on the strength of the South African command during the war.

The war fever appears to have had no tendency to Recruiting. increase the number of enlistments for the Militia, owing, no doubt, to the competition of other forces such as the Yeomanry. The average number of recruits taken during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war was 39,500, while the total number of enlistments in 1900 and 1901 were only 37,853 and 37,644 respectively.

In the Militia, prior to the war, about 300 commissions Shortage of officers. a year were normally gazetted; against this number, however, must be set an average annual loss of 155 officers who passed to the Regular Army. The outbreak of war found the Militia short of officers, and this shortage was increased by heavy calls made by the Regular Army. Strenuous efforts were therefore necessary to induce a sufficiency of candidates for commissions to come forward. As long as the war lasted the annual number of first commissions rose to an average of 400. This rise appears insignificant when compared with the figures for the Regular Army. The Militia was seriously handicapped in its competition with the Imperial Yeomanry and by the easy opportunities offered for obtaining direct commissions in the Regular Army; and though this latter circumstance reduced the number of aspirants to commissions who only regarded the Militia as a stepping-stone, and so diminished the wastage of the Militia, yet there was considerable shortage of Militia officers throughout the war.

The quality of the Militia varied considerably in different Quality of the Militia. units; in some cases it was reported as excellent. A large number of those who proceeded to South Africa were untrained in musketry. Generally speaking, it was not to be expected that they would bear critical comparison with the Regular Army. Still, on the whole, the force came favourably

out of the test to which it was subjected. It improved considerably as the campaign progressed, and it did invaluable service at home in enabling Regular units at home and in the colonies to proceed to the seat of war, and in South Africa in freeing them from duties on lines of communication and in blockhouses, and thus making them available for more active duties.

### THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY AND VOLUNTEERS

The decision  
to sanction  
the Imperial  
Yeomanry  
and  
Volunteer  
companies.

The various offers of service at the seat of war made by representatives of the Volunteers and Yeomanry have been related elsewhere.\* The day that the news of the reverse at Colenso reached London the passages of the War Office were thronged with individuals all eager to offer their services, some on behalf of themselves alone, others on behalf of the units they represented, others with recommendations as to how this mass of willing workers might be best utilized. With such a multitude of counsellors there was, as could only be expected, much contradictory advice. The general consensus of opinion was that the civil avocations of the majority of Volunteers would make it impossible for whole corps to volunteer for active service. Moreover, units of matured and trained men were required, and these were exactly what did not exist. So there was nothing to do but to set to work and improvise them. The step now taken was one which had never been contemplated before, and no schemes had been previously worked out with a view to it. As regards mounted men, it was decided to let a Committee of Yeomanry and retired Regular officers raise a corps to be called the "Imperial Yeomanry." A Royal Warrant creating this corps was signed on December 24, 1899. As regards dismounted men, it was decided to raise a 9th Company to each battalion in South Africa from the Volunteer battalion affiliated to it. As far as the City of London was concerned, an offer by the Lord Mayor to raise a force, to

\* See vol. iii., chap. i., for these and for a full and critical account of the crisis at the end of 1899, and of the measures adopted.

be called the City of London Imperial Volunteers, was also accepted.

The conditions relating to the Imperial Yeomanry were published in an Army Order on January 2, 1900. The Committee undertook to raise and equip the force, the Government in the first instance only supplying rifles, camp equipment, and ammunition. A capitation grant of £25 was allowed for each Imperial Yeoman who was clothed, equipped, and provided with saddlery and stable necessities. When once equipped and taken over by the military authorities he came under the same conditions as all other soldiers. In addition £40 was allowed to him if he brought a suitable horse. Candidates for enlistment were to be between twenty and thirty-five years of age; it was not necessary for them to have had previous military training provided that they could satisfy the military authorities that they were good riders and marksmen up to Yeomanry standard. Preference was to be given to unmarried men, and all were to draw cavalry rates of pay. They were organized in battalions of four companies each with a machine-gun section; the company establishment was 121 of all ranks; the battalion establishment, including machine-gun section, was 526. At first the officers were attested and given commissions from the ranks. Afterwards it was found that this was unnecessary, and commissions were granted direct. Both officers and soldiers for this force were made subject, for the time being, to the same liability to military law as officers and soldiers of the Regular Army. Most of the battalions were raised through the existing Yeomanry centres; in Ireland, where at that time there was no Yeomanry, recruiting agencies were formed at Belfast for the north of Ireland, and at Newbridge for the south; four London agencies for special corps were also formed. At first the formation of the Imperial Yeomanry caused a good deal of congestion and centralization at the War Office. Individuals who desired to join did not in the earlier days understand that the arrangements for raising the force had been decentralized, and were out of the hands of the War Office altogether. Willing candidates came to Pall Mall in

Yeomanry.  
Organization  
and con-  
ditions of  
enlistment.



hundreds, crowded the passages, and seriously hampered the officials at their work.

Total  
strength.  
Departure of  
first contin-  
gent, Jan.-  
April, 1900.

In all, 20 battalions (79 companies) were raised, giving, together with the base depot, a total of 10,731 of all ranks. The first company embarked on January 27, twenty-five days after the issue of the Army Order which authorized the raising of the force, and thirty-four days after the conditions under which it was to be raised were first made public, and practically the whole of this first contingent had left by the middle of April. No drafts were sent out, though they could easily have been raised, and though the organizers of the force anxiously urged this necessary step. The result was that within very few months many units were reduced to a mere fraction of their establishment.

Second  
contingent  
raised,  
Jan. 1901.

The first contingent was enrolled for "one year or for the war." The intention was that every Imperial Yeoman should engage for the war, but that the Government accepted him for a year if, as was thought likely, the war lasted less, and he desired to serve on and complete it. However, when the first contingent of Imperial Yeomanry approached the completion of their year's service the ambiguity of the conditions of their service made itself felt, and claims were made that Imperial Yeomen could not legally be retained in service beyond a year. There was also considerable discontent owing to the temporary colonial levies, raised on the same footing, receiving the higher colonial rates of pay. It was accordingly decided to let the whole of the now sadly attenuated force go, and to raise an entirely fresh contingent of Imperial Yeomanry, at the same time increasing the pay of the warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers to colonial rates, viz., five shillings a day and upwards.\* The officers continued to draw cavalry rates, but the allowance to which they were entitled brought their total emoluments up to a higher daily rate than those of their subordinates. At the request of Lord Kitchener, that the training and organization of this contingent should be carried out in South Africa, it was agreed to send it out in drafts and not in companies. The drafts were organized in

\* See vol. v., pp. 79-82.

sections of about 110 privates—certain temporary ranks were granted for the journey, and their confirmation was left to the discretion of the military authorities in South Africa. This time the terms of enlistment were made quite clear; the engagement was “for one year or, if the war lasted longer, for the war.” Imperial Yeomen of the first contingent were allowed to draw the higher rates of pay from the date of completion of one year’s service. The men of the second contingent were served out with equipment in the same manner and on the same scale as the Regular Army.

The order authorizing the raising of this contingent was issued on January, 17, 1901, and the first drafts left on February 9. Some of the later recruits were organized into companies and battalions instead of drafts, and four battalions were raised, the last of which left on April 11. The original strength of this contingent was fixed at 5,000. In view, however, of the demand for more mounted men, 16,733 were raised and despatched before recruiting was closed. As already pointed out, drafts to regular units of infantry had practically ceased at this period. There is no doubt that this contingent, which was raised at the rate of some two hundred a day, could have been considerably increased—the high rates of pay offered acted as a great stimulus to recruiting. The second contingent of Yeomanry was very severely criticized at the time. But it is difficult to see how more could have been expected of it. It consisted largely of men who had received no previous training. The intention of training and organizing the force on its arrival in South Africa was disregarded by Lord Kitchener in his urgent need for mounted men. A sufficiency of capable officers was not available. But the material was good enough, and in many cases men learnt their work very quickly.

No drafts were sent to the second contingent to keep it up to strength, and notwithstanding the very precise terms of its enlistment, it was apparently not considered advisable to retain it in South Africa beyond its first year of service; accordingly it was decided towards the end of 1901 to raise a third contingent to relieve it. As the system of organizing

Its strength  
and quality.

Third  
contingent  
sent out.

the second contingent in drafts had not proved satisfactory, the original system of forming battalions was again resorted to, with the additional provision that, except in special cases, every man was to have two months' training, including a musketry course, before leaving home. The pay conditions were again slightly altered; henceforth cavalry rates of pay only were paid in England, South African rates from the date of embarkation. The first idea was to send out a reinforcement of men who had already served in the first Yeomanry or other emergency corps. An Army Order to this effect was issued on September 9, 1901, and two battalions, or 921 of all ranks, re-enlisted. In view of this inadequate response an Army Order, opening the door to all comers, was issued on December 19, 1901, and fourteen battalions and one company, in all 7,135 officers and men, proceeded to South Africa between April 16 and June 5, 1902.

Total  
Yeomanry  
sent out.

Altogether 35,520 Imperial Yeomanry went to South Africa. Of this number probably at least 2,000 went out a second time and so have been counted twice over. On the other hand, after October 29, 1901, when it was made permissible, a certain number of enlistments for Imperial Yeomanry took place in South Africa, while 833 officers and men were raised at home under Imperial Yeomanry conditions for a corps raised partly in South Africa and partly at home.

Volunteers,  
Organization  
and strength  
of corps  
raised.

Simultaneously with the formation of the first contingent of Imperial Yeomanry, the first series of Volunteer Service companies were raised. The conditions of service in these companies were in many respects similar to those for service in the Imperial Yeomanry. A capitation grant of £12 per Volunteer was allowed to cover the cost of providing the first outfit, and a similar sum per company was allowed to cover the cost of camp equipment. Each company was raised from the Volunteer battalions affiliated to the Line battalion with which it was to serve. In addition to the Service companies, the formation of a waiting company was authorized as a feeder to the Service company. Volunteers enlisted into it were at once passed into the Reserve, receiving ordinary



Reserve pay until their services were required. As there are no Volunteer corps in Ireland, most Irish battalions had to do without these companies; in two cases, however, Irish Volunteer corps in England furnished companies to Irish battalions.\* In some cases in which two battalions of the territorial regiment were abroad, the second company was not raised, and some of the Metropolitan Volunteer corps, who would otherwise have sent contingents to the King's Royal Rifle Corps and Rifle Brigade, sent them to the City of London Imperial Volunteers. In all 64 companies were formed. The full establishment of these companies was 7,424, the actual numbers which embarked were 7,337. The first company left on February 10, 1900, the last on May 11. For the waiting companies only 2,983 enlisted. During May drafts to the extent of 1,074 were formed, chiefly from the latter, and went out to reinforce the Service companies. Later, when the second contingent of Volunteer Service companies was raised, it was found that many who had originally enlisted for the waiting companies were, for various reasons, anxious to be relieved of their liability, and were absolved from it. On the whole the waiting companies were not looked upon as a satisfactory organization, and the experiment of raising them was not repeated.

The raising of these companies, carried out as it was under existing organizations, gave comparatively little trouble. What friction there was arose from small local jealousies. Counties in which strong feeling existed between different localities resented the Volunteers of one locality serving under officers of the other, and *vice versâ*; in one instance local feeling ran so high against the idea that a machine gun presented by one town should be under the supervision of an officer from another town that Parliamentary interference was invoked and, as a result, a separate officer was sanctioned to take charge of it, although it was only a sergeant's command.

Local feeling  
on question  
of command.

Simultaneously, quietly and rapidly, the City of London Imperial Volunteers were raised under nearly identical

City of  
London  
Imperial  
Volunteers.

\* Some Scottish Volunteers in England were also allowed to join Scottish battalions.

conditions. The corps embraced a four-gun battery, two companies of mounted infantry, and a battalion. The chief difference between this corps and the Volunteer Service companies was that instead of being clothed under a capitulation grant paid by Government, everything, except arms and ammunition, was paid for out of the Lord Mayor's Fund. The strength of this command was 1,275 of all ranks; in July, 1900, drafts amounting to 150 of all ranks left to keep it up to strength. The mistaken idea that the war was near its end, and a very natural desire that, if its services were no longer required, the corps should re-enter the City of London before the Lord Mayor on whose initiative it had been raised had ceased to hold office, caused it to be brought home somewhat prematurely.

Second  
contingent  
of Volunteers  
sent out.

It is needless to repeat the considerations which led to a second contingent of Volunteer Service companies being raised to relieve the first, or to a third being raised to relieve the second; they were identical with those which have been adduced in the case of the Imperial Yeomanry. It is sufficient to say that, in response to an Army Order issued on January 25, 1901, 43 fresh Volunteer companies were raised. In all cases in which the numbers fell short of 90, drafts were permitted to take their place, and 13 such drafts were formed. The total of all ranks in this contingent amounted to 5,363. The first company left on February 23, the last draft on May 23. Eight companies were not replaced. In the third contingent, raised under an Army Order dated January 9, 1902, the numbers fell off even more seriously—in all, only 8 whole companies and 40 drafts were raised, which totalled only 2,410 of all ranks. Of these the first left home on February 15, the last on April 17. Thus, of the original 64 companies, 16 had practically died out and 8 only were kept up to strength.

Cyclists,  
Artillery, and  
Engineer  
corps.

In March, 1901, in consequence of a request from Lord Kitchener for 1,000 cyclists, it was decided to appeal to the Volunteer force throughout the United Kingdom to raise 8 companies of cyclists. An Army Order to this effect was issued on March 6, but only sufficient responded to raise 2 companies. In addition to the above a Volunteer battery

of artillery, 33 sections of Engineers, and some Electrical Engineers Volunteers proceeded to South Africa. The number of Volunteers who proceeded to South Africa, as such, in response to calls for Volunteers, was 19,856 of all ranks, out of a total Volunteer force of about 270,000. Total of  
Volunteers  
sent out.

The war was marked by a great increase in the recruiting and the efficiency of the Volunteers and Yeomanry as a whole. Between October, 1899, and October, 1900, the total strength of the Volunteers rose from 230,402 to 282,732. During the same period the Yeomanry increased from 10,354 to 10,491. In the summer of 1900, 189,158 Volunteers went into camp for periods varying from three days to four weeks, and of these 179,020 joined the special twenty-eight-day camps formed only for that year; 8,657 Yeomanry also went into camp for eight days. By July 1, 1901, the Volunteers had increased to 297,162, and by October the Yeomanry to 14,993. These figures stood at 271,895 and 22,042 in June, 1902. The Yeomanry, it may be mentioned, were reorganized and enlarged in 1901 by Mr. Brodrick as "Imperial Yeomanry." The old imitation cavalry tradition was prudently dropped, and the force organized as Mounted Rifles and trained on practical lines corresponding to the experience gained by the Yeomanry Corps in South Africa. Increase in  
recruiting,  
1899-1902.

### THE COLONIAL CONTINGENTS

About one-sixth of the whole force and nearly two-fifths of the mounted force which participated in the South African War was contributed by the Colonies. Of these the South African contingent was naturally by far the largest. The forces raised in South Africa fell roughly into three categories. There were first of all the permanent Regular or Volunteer forces of the British colonies. Secondly, there were the special emergency corps raised in South Africa, composed not only of inhabitants of the British colonies, but also of the exiled British of the Transvaal, and, in some of the later corps, to a large extent of non-South Africans of all kinds, including even some foreigners. Thirdly, South  
African corps.



there were the purely local defence forces raised in the various districts of Cape Colony and in Northern Natal to repel the raids of roving commandos. The first and third category of forces were colonial, properly speaking; the second was directly raised and organized by the Imperial military authorities. It is extremely difficult to arrive at any definite statistics as to the real strength of these various forces. Units varied enormously in strength from time to time; some corps died out; others were dissolved and reappeared under new names; in other cases a new corps simply represented an amalgamation of existing ones. Individuals served successively in all three categories of corps, or in various units of the same category. The official number recorded as serving is 52,414, but the real net figures may have been anything from 45,000 upwards.\*

Irregular  
corps.

With regard to the special emergency corps, the raising of the first of these was taken in hand as early as July, 1899. The various corps were enlisted for varying periods and for different rates of pay and other emoluments, though, generally speaking, they received the ordinary South African rate of five shillings a day, subsequently known as "Imperial Yeomanry" rates. The average period of enlistment was six months, with the result that these corps were constantly in a state of change and that practically the whole force had to be reconstituted every six months. The quality of the irregular corps varied enormously. The best could challenge comparison with any troops in the field, probably with any mounted troops in the world. The worst were execrable—the sweepings of the seaports, and the bar-loafers of Kimberley and Johannesburg. Almost invariably, those corps did best which had a good leaven of officers who had received a regular military training.

Conditions of  
service for  
the first  
overseas  
contingents.

As early as July, 1899, offers of help were being received at home from the various self-governing colonies in case of war. As long as there was any chance of peace being

\* See vol. iii., chap. v. See also vol. v., appendix ii., for a complete list of South African corps. In December, 1901, Cape Colony had 18,000 men in the field, and another 18,000 (including 3,000 natives) enrolled in town guards, while 7,000 natives were guarding the frontiers of the native districts.

maintained these offers could not be definitely accepted, but on October 3, 1899, the Colonial Office telegraphed to the various colonies concerned the conditions under which the War Office would accept the services of contingents. Briefly they were to be raised, equipped, and landed in South Africa at the expense of the colonies; from the date of disembarkation they were to receive pay from the British Exchequer at British Army rates, and were to be provided with return passages, and when necessary, with pensions and compassionate allowances at British Army rates. In addition to these emoluments the British Army rates of pay were supplemented by grants contributed sometimes by Colonial Governments and sometimes by private subscription. In one case a whole corps was raised by and at the expense of Lord Strathcona, who also defrayed the difference between British and Canadian rates of pay throughout the duration of their service.

Later contingents were raised entirely at British expense and paid at Imperial Yeomanry rates of pay. There was no difficulty in obtaining the required numbers; in some cases four or five times the total of the contingent volunteered. The majority of the earlier contingents had had some training, either in the local Militia or Volunteers, but the proportion of these trained men diminished in the later contingents, and the supply of properly-trained and suitable officers presented considerable difficulties.

Canada despatched in all three contingents, aggregating 7,289 \* of all ranks. The Australian contingents reached the total of 16,378. Of these New South Wales was credited with 6,274, Victoria with 3,641, Queensland with 2,852, South Australia with 1,524, Western Australia with 1,229, and Tasmania with 858. Besides these, 250 men were recruited in Australia for the Scottish Horse. At first the contingents were organized by individual colonies. After the departure of the fourth contingent, the last three contingents were contributed in the name of the Commonwealth. New Zealand contributed in all ten contingents, aggregating 6,416

Late contingents.

Total strength of the various contingents.

\* Including 30 officers and 1,208 N.C.O.'s and men for the South African Constabulary.

out of a population of only 773,000 (exclusive of pure-bred aborigines). Ceylon sent two contingents amounting to 228, and India furnished Lumsden's Horse, 307 strong. Thus, in all 30,868 oversea Colonials left their homes to assist the mother-country.\* Some of these joined the South African Constabulary and other corps, and others reached the seat of war after the declaration of peace, but 29,395 were taken on the strength of the South African Field Force before the cessation of hostilities. When the numbers contributed respectively by the colonies and mother-country are compared with their respective resources, the strength of the contingents sent to the seat of war will assuredly stand out as a splendid example of spontaneous loyalty to the idea of Imperial unity. As a whole, the oversea Colonials did excellent work, and, after a short experience of service, rapidly adapted themselves to military conditions for which most of them were admirably suited by the circumstances of colonial life.

#### SUMMARY

Summary of  
forces sent  
to, or raised  
in, South  
Africa.

The table on the following page shows a summary of all ranks, except staff, who took part in the campaign, and it will therefore be observed that, including the latter, the gross total did not fall far short of 450,000.

Demobiliza-  
tion.

In the Mobilization Regulations of 1898 only two pages were devoted to the subject of demobilization, and only the outlines were defined; it was felt that the details would vary in each campaign. As the war progressed regulations were framed to meet the requirements of each class which had proceeded to South Africa, and by the time that peace was declared the Demobilization Regulations had expanded from two to forty-two pages. They chiefly dealt with untying the knots which had been tied; separating the Reservists and Militia Reservists from the Regular units with which they had been incorporated, and placing them once more in communication with their original commanding officer. They

\* See vol. iii., chap. ii.; see also vol. v., appendix i., for complete list of Colonial corps.



	Officers, excluding Staff.	Warrant, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men.					Total all ranks.
		Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Others.	Total.	
Original Garrison . . . . .	318	1,127	1,085	6,428	1,032	9,622	9,940
Sent out or raised—							
Regulars—							
(a) From Home and Colonies . . . . .	9,206	22,348	18,426	156,288	21,908	218,965	228,171
(b) From India . . . . .	568	8,483	1,029	13,133	16	17,661	18,229
Total Regulars . . . . .	10,092	26,958	20,490	175,849	22,951	246,248	256,840
Other than Regulars—							
From Home—							
Militia . . . . .	1,691	..	906	42,610	359	43,875	45,566
Imperial Yeomanry . . . . .	1,408	..	..	..	..	34,945	36,353
Volunteers . . . . .	539	..	..	..	..	19,267	19,856
South African Constabulary . . . . .	19	..	..	..	..	7,254	7,273
From Home . . . . .	3,707	..	906	42,610	359	105,941	109,048
From India and Ceylon							
Volunteers . . . . .	26	..	..	..	..	509	535
From the Colonies—							
Colonial Contingents . . . . .	1,452	..	..	..	..	27,893	28,845
South African Constabulary . . . . .	30	..	..	..	..	1,208	1,288
Scottish Horse . . . . .	..	..	..	..	..	250	250
Total from Colonies . . . . .	1,482	..	..	..	..	28,851	30,383
Raised in South Africa . . . . .	2,924*	..	..	..	..	50,090*	52,414
Total from all sources . . . . .	17,646	..	..	..	..	431,079	448,725

\* Estimated. The above figures are taken from the Appendix to the South African War Commission Report, with the exception of those relating to the Colonial Contingents, which are based on later evidence and agree with those given in vol. V., p. 611.

also dealt at length with the gratuity to which all were entitled on relegation to civil life (in the case of the Reserve and Militia this amounted to 25 per cent. on the whole pay which they had drawn since they came up), and with the steps to be taken for obtaining civil employment. The demobilization of this large force proceeded with the same method as the original mobilization, and there were practically no administrative hitches except that in some cases the gratuities were over-estimated.

Inadequacy  
of War Office  
staff.

It is hardly surprising that the efforts recorded in this chapter of placing and maintaining in the field a force of Regulars just double the maximum for which provision had been made, in addition to the various measures of improvisation for irregular forces or for home defence which the emergency demanded, had taxed the resources of the War Office to the utmost. Whatever reserve might exist for replenishing the various forces of the Empire, there was no reserve to bring the department up to the strength required for such a task. Trained higher division civil servants, capable of at once taking charge of their proper number of subordinate clerks, are not easily improvised. On the military side of the office matters were even worse, for all available staff officers being required at the seat of war, many of the most experienced officials had left for South Africa, and those who had taken their place were entirely new to the work, and were merely *locum tenentes* of those who had gone. The only source of increase was in second division clerks, of whom over 200 were gradually obtained from the Civil Service Commission. Here, however, the chief difficulty arose from the fact that, sooner or later a limit arises to the number of clerks whom the principal of a branch can control, and increase in the number of principals was out of the question. And so throughout the war all hands, civil and military, worked at the highest pressure.

Importunity  
of the public  
for information.

Not least among the causes of overwork at the War Office was the importunity of the public for information, chiefly of a personal character, its conviction that such information must be centralized at headquarters, and its determination to have its queries dealt with by heads of

departments only. So constant were the demands for the return of soldiers from the war, for inquiries to be made for letters missing in a country disorganized by military operations, and for other cognate matters, that reply forms were printed to meet the most usual applications. Even this course was of small avail to reduce the pressure, for many recipients refused to accept as a reply anything short of a letter dealing only with their own particular case and signed by a responsible official; if then the reply was not deemed satisfactory, the matter again found its way to the office, this time through the medium of the local Parliamentary member. In future wars it is absolutely essential that from the commencement there should exist a properly organized inquiry bureau to relieve the executive officials from the importunities of callers whose business is more frequently than not of no public import whatever. Even more troublesome were the Parliamentary questions. Before the war 550 was the largest number of War Office questions ever asked in both Houses during a year. In 1900 they rose to 1,379, in 1901 to 1,439, and in 1902 to 1,588. It might prove interesting to analyse these and consider what percentage of them were in any way intended or calculated to further the successful prosecution of the war.



## CHAPTER II

## THE SEA TRANSPORT OF THE ARMY

A good piece  
of work.

In the very chequered records of the war there is one chapter at least that we can look back on with unmixed satisfaction. In the enormous work of transporting troops to and from South Africa during a period of three years, of carrying their stores, their material of war, and their animals, there were no breakdowns or regrettable incidents, no improvisations or makeshifts. The long-drawn operation was adequately, efficiently, and, in part, brilliantly performed from first to last. But while we congratulate ourselves on the success of our sea work, it is as well to remember that any other result would have been utterly discreditable to the greatest naval and maritime power in the world. It would be a mistake to lay an exaggerated stress upon the number of men and animals that crossed the sea, the number of ships engaged, the great distances covered. The mere transport of so many men and horses and so much freight per month over a long period is not necessarily a difficult task, nor is its successful achievement a triumph. After the first effort of organization it is a process that can be continued indefinitely with no great difficulty, and is a measure of little more than the perseverance of the embarkation and disembarkation staff and of the professional skill of the *personnel* of the Merchant Service. That part of the work which does demand close attention and criticism is the preliminary preparation and the transportation of the first striking force to the scene of war. We have to consider how far that preparation was adequate and how far it was susceptible of improvement. The true lessons of Imperial strategy are to be found, in so far as the South African War has any

to provide in this connexion, in the period immediately preceding and following the declaration of war.

The marine transport of the British Army was entirely in the hands of the Admiralty. The Transport Department of that office was practically created by Admiral Mends during the Sudan campaign of 1884-5. In time of peace its duty was to study the possible problems of transportation, to keep and revise lists and particulars of ships of the Mercantile Marine suitable for the various branches of the work, to know their movements and whereabouts, and to make preliminary arrangements with the steamship companies for taking over and fitting up the selected vessels. A considerable stock of fittings for horse transports was kept in store, and the Department was in touch with firms capable of undertaking rapid work of this description. It had to be prepared to appoint and distribute naval transport staffs at the selected ports of embarkation and disembarkation, and it was at all times to work in harmony with the War Office and to be prepared in good time to meet the sudden demands of national strategy. When war broke out the Department took entire control of the work of transportation. It chartered and fitted transports and engaged freight ships, set its organization to work at all the ports employed, and was responsible for the safety and the carriage of men, animals and stores from high-water mark to high-water mark. The work of the War Office was limited to letting the Department know what troops and cargoes it wished to send and when they were to go, and to appointing military embarkation and disembarkation staffs to work hand in hand with the naval staffs at the ports of departure and arrival.

Admiralty  
transport  
organization.

Vast as were the resources of the British Mercantile Marine, the task of transporting an army to South Africa was not one that could be undertaken by it at a few days' notice. Only ships of special qualifications could usefully be employed, and these had all to be specially fitted up for the accommodation of men and animals. They had to be withdrawn from their regular work, in many cases their cargoes had to be discharged, and they had to be ballasted,

Department  
handicapped  
by political  
delay.

coaled, and moved to the ports of embarkation. However complete were the arrangements of the Admiralty Transport Department this final work necessarily took much time and labour. The rapidity with which a large striking force could be moved from England depended mainly on the margin of time for preparation given by the War Office to the Admiralty. Here an admirable system was hampered by political timidity and procrastination. All through the summer of 1899 the possibility of war was foreseen, and as early as July troops were being sent to the Cape. In August and September possibility had become probability and was verging on certainty, yet until the very eleventh hour the Admiralty could not secure the authorization to spend a penny to expedite its preliminary arrangements for the sea transport of the Army Corps. All that could be done it did. It overhauled its organization, revised its lists, and prepared its staffs. A little money was spent without authorization and with the certainty of repudiation by the Treasury if war had not followed. But it was not till September 23 that it was at last allowed to spend the sum of £25,000 for the purchase of horse fittings and other essential material which it had been demanding for years. The delay was serious; in other circumstances it might well have proved disastrous.

Transport of  
first rein-  
forcements.

Before the transport of the Army Corps is described, a word must be given to those reinforcements which sailed for South Africa before the outbreak of war. The Indian contingent for Natal was despatched by the Director of Indian Marine with admirable rapidity in transports engaged at Indian ports, and their disembarkation at Durban was carried out before the arrival of the principal transport officers by the Indian Marine Transport officers sent out with the force. The first Colonial contingents were despatched in freight ships engaged locally by the Colonial Governments.

Naval Trans-  
port Staff.  
Appointment  
of Sir  
Edward  
Chichester.

On September 16, 1899, Captain Sir Edward Chichester, R.N., who had been appointed Principal Transport Officer, sailed for South Africa. He took with him a small staff which was afterwards increased so as to enable him to station a naval transport staff at each of the base ports—Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban. Captain



Chichester himself, after a flying visit to Durban, established his headquarters at Cape Town, which was indicated by circumstances as the main base of the Army and the chief port of disembarkation. The Principal Transport Officer was a man peculiarly well adapted both by experience and character for the work now laid upon him. His knowledge of transport service began in 1881 during the first Boer War and was added to by the first Egyptian campaign. His personality was a remarkable one. He was an example of the best type of naval diplomatist—a combination of bluff humour, practical energy, fearless authority, and tactful courtesy. His work at Cape Town during a year of command was one of the brightest incidents of the war.\* The Transport Staffs in South Africa were paralleled by the Divisional Transport Officers and their staffs at the chief ports of embarkation in England. These were Southampton, the Royal Albert Docks, and Liverpool. Side by side with the naval staffs were the military embarkation staffs, and A.A.G.'s for embarkation were stationed at the above-mentioned South African and English ports with assistants in proportion to the amount of work to be done.

The first task laid upon the Naval Transport Department was to convey to South Africa some 47,000 men, with horses and guns. Mobilization was ordered on October 7, the first infantry transport sailed exactly a fortnight later, and the entire Army Corps was landed in South Africa in forty-five days from the sailing of the first ship. The distance from Southampton to Cape Town is over 6,000 nautical miles. The average duration of the passage for the infantry transports was 21·61 days; for the horse transports it was 23·65 days. The times taken varied from sixteen days in the case of one run by the *Majestic* to twenty-nine days taken by the *Cephalonia*. The voyage was distinguished by a remarkable immunity from accident or loss, not a single life being sacrificed by sea peril or mishap.

The troops were carried in transports specially engaged for unlimited service from the White Star, Union-Castle, Cunard, Allan, Leyland, Anchor, North Atlantic Steam

The transport of the Army Corps.

The transport fleet.

\* Sir E. Chichester died in 1906.

Navigation, and other lines. These troop transports included several of the finest ships then afloat, the *Majestic* (9,965 tons), the *Cymric* (12,647 tons), the *Bavarian* (10,376 tons), the *Kildonan Castle* (9,652 tons), and the *Canada* (8,806 tons) being among the best-known vessels on the Government list. In allowing these ships to enter on this work, some of the companies concerned rendered a patriotic service at considerable risk to their own interests, for the sudden withdrawal of such vessels from their regular work could not but have a dislocating effect on their business relations generally. The special service required of them determined the class and character of the ships employed. For the troops themselves swift ships of large tonnage were demanded. It was soon found that for this service the great passenger liners were not so convenient as the large cargo boats. The former required far more internal adaptation and reconstruction to fit them to carry the largest possible number of men, while the roomy, unencumbered cargo spaces of the latter could be quickly and cheaply adapted. Liners of medium size were also more generally suitable than the largest class of vessel, as they proved to be healthier, and it was an advantage to have one complete unit and perhaps a few details in each ship, while their lighter draught and shorter length gave them greater handiness for berthing purposes in the limited accommodation of the South African ports. Horse transports had to be selected for exceptional height between decks, and as the installation of horse fittings was a slow and expensive operation, cattle ships were used as much as possible. These had the additional advantage of captains and crews with special qualifications for handling large numbers of animals on a long voyage. Freight ships had to be adapted to the character of the cargo they carried, and the urgency with which it was needed. The distinction between the "transport" and the "freight ship" was that the former was a ship wholly taken up by the Admiralty on a time charter, while in the freight ships the whole or a portion of the ship's accommodation was engaged at a fixed rate per head, for a lump sum, or for a definite voyage. The latter system was,

as a rule, cheaper than the time charter, but many of the ships could not be obtained from their owners except on such charters.

The fitting of the transports was done, for the most part, at the Government expense by the regular Government contractors, or by the shipowners on behalf of the Government. The freight ships were fitted by their owners at a fixed rate per head of men or horses carried. The victualling of the transports was at first done by the Admiralty from their own stores, but after two months the system was changed and the owners contracted to feed the men at a fixed rate per head. This was more popular with the troops, relieved the Admiralty of a considerable labour, and prevented the depletion of their stores. Special arrangements had to be made for the coaling of the great transport fleet. At the termini in England and South Africa and at the intermediate ports of call extra coaling facilities were provided, and in most cases the bunker accommodation in the ships themselves was increased to enable them to make faster passages and reduce the time devoted to coaling during the voyage.

The harbour accommodation at the South African ports for the reception of the great fleet of transports was varied in character. At Cape Town seven transport berths were permanently available in the harbour, four on the south arm of the docks and three on the other side. At Port Elizabeth the ships could not come alongside the quays owing to lack of water, and the disembarkation had to be entirely carried out by tugs and lighters. The roadstead is an open one, and the uncertain weather was a frequent obstacle to the work of landing stores and horses. At East London and Durban the sand-bars, constantly silted up by bad weather, were a considerable hindrance to the entry of large vessels, and the disembarkation had frequently to be carried out by means of lighters.

The work of disembarkation was carried on by a system established by Sir E. Chichester in co-operation with the military authorities. At Cape Town transports coming from England were sighted fifteen miles away. Each troop transport was boarded by a military officer of the embarkation

Fitting,  
victualling,  
and coaling.

The South  
African ports.

Method of  
disembarka-  
tion.



staff before she entered the harbour ; full particulars of the troops and stores carried were sent to the Chief Staff Officer at Cape Town, and as soon as the destination of the troops and the urgency of the stores were decided, the naval staff arranged for the berthing and unloading of the ship to suit the wishes of the military staff. The work of unloading was entirely controlled by the naval transport officers. Up to high-water mark, or in the case of a quay, up to one hundred feet from its edge, they were supreme. Under their superintendence the stores were got out by a large gang of coloured stevedores whom they had organized. At Cape Town and Durban horses and mules were led out over specially constructed gangways by parties from the Remount Department, while at Port Elizabeth and East London they were slung into lighters and towed ashore. At the dividing line between naval and military control, troops, stores, and animals were handed over to the military embarking staff. The men, who were always landed with three days' rations, were moved away to camp or to the railway, the stores were taken charge of by the Army Service Corps and moved to the store houses or to the trucks, and the animals either accompanied their units or were taken to the remount establishment. So great was the volume of freight put ashore from the ships that it exceeded the powers of the land transport contractors and the Army Service Corps to deal with it. By the beginning of 1900 the docks were so seriously congested with baggage and stores that a deadlock might have resulted. At this point Colonel Templar, with his steam traction engines and trailers, came to the rescue, and the docks were cleared in less than a week. Henceforward the use of steam transport enabled the work of discharging cargo to go forward without difficulty. The work of both naval and military embarkation staffs entailed irregular periods of very heavy strain. One day several ships would come in, next day only one or none at all. At all times the berth accommodation was fully taken up, and often the harbours and roadsteads were dangerously crowded with a multitude of freight ships waiting to be unloaded or slowly getting rid of their cargo by means of



REAR-ADMIRAL SIR EDWARD CHICHESTER, BART., C.B., C.M.G.,  
CHIEF NAVAL TRANSPORT OFFICER, SOUTH AFRICA, 1899-1901.

*Photo by Heath, Plymouth.*





lighters. Both staffs were short-handed, and only the most cordial and business-like co-operation between them enabled their heavy task to be successfully dealt with. There was a complete absence of friction of any sort between the two services, and as they became familiar with the work, they were able to lighten each other's labours by a give-and-take system of mutual helpfulness.

Two causes specially contributed to increase their burden of work in the early months of the war. The break-up of the Army Corps brought confusion to all the arrangements at the base. Divisions and brigades were split up and their units sent in different directions as they arrived piecemeal at Cape Town. Troops disembarked at Cape Town were re-embarked in haste for Durban. Half the cargo of a ship was wanted here, the remainder there. Store ships had to be emptied, the stores for different destinations sorted out on the quay, and then reloaded and despatched. In these circumstances a complete breakdown at the ports of disembarkation might have been almost pardonable. As it was, the intensified labour was carried out with wonderful energy and swiftness, and the rearrangement of the whole campaign was effected with hardly any delay.

But the difficulty of the work was greatly increased by the haste or bad judgment with which much of the loading had been done in England. Overworked staffs, the great anxiety to get the troops and stores off in the shortest possible time, were no doubt accountable for many errors which caused delay and inconvenience at the ports of arrival. Rapid unloading depends mainly on the forethought and method displayed in loading. In the freight ships private cargo was sometimes found piled on top of Government stores, which had to wait for a day or two before they could be got at. In many cases artillery material—guns and wagons—had been taken to pieces and their parts stowed separately. When they were unloaded piecemeal the wharves would be encumbered by the heavy articles which could not be moved away until the wheels had been got out and attached to them. Stores intended for different ports were often shipped in an indiscriminate mass

Break-up of  
the Army  
Corps.

Delay caused  
by bad  
loading.

Obstructive  
attitude of  
harbour  
boards.

so that they all had to be taken out and sorted and part reshipped.

Difficulties of another nature were caused by the attitude of part of the civil element at some of the ports. At Cape Town, East London and Port Elizabeth the ports were under the control of harbour boards, the members of which were composed partly of elected merchants, partly of Government nominees. The occupation of so much harbour and quay accommodation by Government ships naturally caused inconvenience to the civil work of the ports, though the naval staff showed great consideration in freeing their special berths for civil purposes whenever it was temporarily possible. This exclusion from their accustomed accommodation caused much grumbling on the part of merchants and shippers. They often seemed to forget or to ignore the fact that the army was arriving for the defence of British South Africa, and in their eagerness to make the fullest use of their opportunities for making profit out of the work brought by the war, offered the most irritating obstruction to the task of landing and supplying the troops. In some cases, too, lack of sympathy with the British cause may have contributed to their obstructive attitude. It was not until October, 1901, that martial law was enforced at the Cape Colony ports, and until that time the Principal Transport Officer had to appeal for help to the High Commissioner to enable him to override the obstruction of the harbour boards. He had a short way with offenders on his own element which relieved him of difficulty with the merchant shipping itself. At all the ports, too, the unscrupulous and even dishonest dealing that so often accompanies civilian work during military operations was strongly in evidence. The country's need was the contractor's and merchant's opportunity, and considerations of patriotism seemed to have small restraining power in face of such temptations. The embarkation staff at Durban were more fortunate than those at the Cape ports. Martial law was in force from the beginning, the harbour was more directly under the control of the Natal Government, and a loyal spirit of co-operation met the transport staff in their work. There, too, they were splen-

didly served by the pilot staff of the port, whose courage, skill, and loyalty helped largely to overcome the natural deficiencies of Durban as a landing-place for troops and stores.

When the initial effort of landing the Army Corps was completed, the work of marine transport became a matter of steady though laborious routine. From the beginning of 1900 a stream of troops, remounts, and stores poured into all the South African ports from every corner of the Empire, but at no single period was there a repetition of the extreme effort of the first few weeks. The work was distributed and the machinery was in smooth running order.

When in November, 1899, Sir Redvers Buller first decided to divert a large part of the expeditionary force to Natal for temporary work there, it was arranged that sufficient transports should be held empty and in readiness at the various ports to transfer these troops back to Cape ports or to reinforce them largely from Cape Town. Enough ships to carry a complete Army Corps had accordingly to lie idle up and down the coast, in some cases adding to the existing congestion. Finally, those at Cape Town were moved to the naval harbour in Simon's Bay. The reservation of these transports was a very costly affair, and in the end they were never needed for the intended purpose, but the precaution was one that was perhaps worth paying dearly for when it is remembered how vitally important the factor of time was in the critical weeks of the campaign.

A constant handicap to the work of the embarkation staff and of the transports was the loss of men by desertion from the crews. The worst cause of this was the illegal recruiting of the irregular corps, which offered the temptations of high pay and the excitement of active service. Transports were often so short-handed from this cause that only the most strenuous efforts and the offer of extravagant rates of pay enabled them to get to sea at all. This evil was dealt with by martial law, though in one instance an officer of an irregular corps was deprived of his commission for recruiting among the crews of transports. The consequences of this depletion might have been so serious that there seems



to be a need for more stringent regulations to guard against it in future.

Boer  
prisoners in  
Simon's Bay.

After the surrender of Cronje the naval staff at Cape Town were called upon to provide accommodation for a large number of Boer prisoners while camps ashore were being built for them. A number of transports were allotted to them and anchored in Simon's Bay, with military guards on board. The health of the prisoners suffered from the confinement and from their own insanitary habits. A few managed to swim ashore and escape. After two or three months the camps ashore were ready and the prisoners were landed. The prison ships were an expensive, unsatisfactory, and troublesome experiment.

Captain  
Luscombe  
succeeds  
Sir E.  
Chichester.

In October, 1900, Sir E. Chichester, who had been at the head of the naval transport work in South Africa for over a year, was relieved from his duty and returned home. The war was thought to be practically at an end. He was succeeded by Captain F. St. L. Luscombe, R.N., who had up to that time held the position of Divisional Transport Officer at Port Elizabeth. At the termination of the war he was in turn succeeded by Captain H. G. King Hall, R.N., who had been Divisional Transport Officer at Durban and who superintended the winding-up of the campaign and the return of the Army for a period of nine months after the conclusion of peace.

Return of  
the Army,  
1902.

The desire of the authorities to return the troops to their homes with the utmost speed threw an immense strain on the transport staff. By this time the number of transports had been reduced to some thirty, and no others were engaged. Every available ship had to be taken into service; the mail and passenger steamers were called upon to carry troops. As all animals were to be left in South Africa the horse and mule ships were rapidly adapted by the alteration of their internal fittings. So energetically were these measures carried out that by the end of October, 1902, 148,000 officers and men had left South Africa and been safely landed in Great Britain, India, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These numbers were embarked in the proportion of one-half at Cape Town, one-quarter at Durban, and one-quarter divided between Port Elizabeth and East London.

A few figures will show more eloquently than anything else the magnitude of the task accomplished by the transport service during its three years of work. Between October, 1899, and June, 1902, 379,097 officers and men were embarked from all parts for South Africa, and of these all but 220 were landed fit for service on their arrival.\* 339,329 horses† and 103,000 mules were landed in South Africa, 13,000, or nearly 4 per cent. of the former and 2,000 of the latter, having died on the way. Food-stuffs and forage alone amounted to over a million tons. During the same period many thousand officers and men were brought back as invalids from South Africa, partly in the hospital ships,‡ partly in the ordinary transports. The work was carried through at the cost of two ships wrecked—the transport *Ismore*, and the freight ship *Denton Grange*. No lives were lost by the dangers of the sea.

The credit of this accomplishment is due, primarily, to the Transport Department of the Admiralty. The organizing and directing brains have the chief responsibility for success and failure alike, and by common consent the Department proved itself ready and capable for the task it had to face. The officers and men of the Royal Navy, who superintended all the work to the high-water mark limit, justified to the full the hope and the confidence that the nation entertains with

\* In the whole period from July, 1899, to the end of 1902, 423,373 officers and men were embarked for South Africa from all parts and 370,225 embarked in South Africa for England and other parts of the Empire. Of these 329,251 officers and men were taken out and 278,284 brought back by 117 transports of a total tonnage of 719,837 tons; 79,855 were sent out, and 83,991 sent back by freight ships; 8,300 of the Indian contingent were sent in 41 transports from India; while 5,967 of the Colonial contingents were sent out and 8,050 sent back by ships hired in the several colonies or at Cape Town. The full cargo store freight ships engaged by the Admiralty numbered 210, and the amount of cargo engaged amounted to 974,257 tons and 3,745 oxen. Besides these, 57 ships, making 117 voyages, were chartered by the Remount Department for the transport of horses and mules from foreign countries up to March, 1901, when this duty was taken over by the Admiralty. See Admiralty Paper 354, Aug. 13, 1903.

† See chap. vi. According to the figures of the Remount Department, 360,000 horses were provided, exclusive of South African remounts, by the department or by units. The discrepancy of 8,000 may be accounted for by casualties before embarkation, horses landed at Beira, etc.

‡ See chap. ix.

regard to their high professional skill, their unwearied devotion, and their cheerful common-sense, making light of difficulties and dangers, and helping the combined naval and military machine to run smoothly. The hard-worked military embarkation staffs deserve a full share of the credit. Engaged in uncongenial and in many cases in novel work at a time when every soldier longed to be up at the front, officers and men alike worked themselves almost to breaking-point and never failed to meet the heaviest and most unexpected demands. The country owes a great debt to the officers and men of the Mercantile Marine. It was their efficient and careful seamanship that carried across 6,000 miles of ocean the greatest army that ever engaged in such an operation.

Minor  
lessons.

Perhaps the most important of the minor lessons learnt in the course of the transport operations is that of the need of greater care and forethought in the allotment, loading, and despatch of troop and store ships. It is not of prime importance to start everything off the moment it can be got ready to sail. It is important to see that the despatch of men and stores is arranged after full consideration of the varying demands that will be made upon them on their arrival. For example, the average time taken by the voyage of the cavalry transports in November, 1899, was two days longer than the corresponding voyage of the infantry. Yet the cavalry were the most urgently needed and the condition of their horses on landing demanded at least several days of rest and exercise before they were sent to the front. The unloading of stores takes far longer than the disembarkation of troops. By filling up troop transports with stores and horse transports with forage in addition to regimental baggage and equipment, these vessels were often kept waiting at the base ports for weeks before they could get an opportunity of completing their unloading and returning home. Again, an extra hour devoted to the arrangement of cargo at home may save many hours at a more critical moment abroad. The Indian Marine taught the Imperial service a valuable lesson when they stored their field guns "all standing" in the holds, secured by wedging and close packing. Dis-mounting the guns and stowing wheels and parts separately



caused heavy and needless labour and delay in South Africa.

The return of the Army provided valuable evidence of the capacity of South Africa to provide from its own resources shipping for a large force. Suggestions have been made in favour of permanently stationing in South Africa a large proportion of the Imperial striking force. The evidence goes to show that the normal shipping rapidly available at South African ports is quite sufficient for the transport of a very large force. The return of close on 150,000 men in the course of five months was carried out by some thirty transports and ten ships that had been employed in bringing remounts and cattle from the Argentine. Apart from these vessels, no less than seventy trips were made with returning troops by freight ships taken up in South Africa which were then in the course of their normal work. In addition to the magnificent fleet of the Union-Castle Company, there were then available the Bucknall fleet, the White Star, "All one class" ships of 12,000 tons, the Blue Anchor, Aberdeen, Shaw Savile and Albion, and New Zealand shipping lines, besides several smaller lines running normally between South Africa, Australasia, and the mother-country. These facts indicate that the unaided shipping resources of South Africa could be safely counted on for the rapid transportation of a very much larger force than the garrison now stationed in that country.

The main lesson, however, from the experience of the South African War, as far as sea transport is concerned, is rather one for politicians than for soldiers. We possessed in the Transport Department of the Admiralty an organization prepared to bring into play for the purposes of national strategy the full capacity of the vast national maritime resources. Small as it was, the Department had its knowledge, its principles and its plans worked out and ready, and needed only money and authority to set them to work. The fact that these essentials were, at the eleventh hour, granted so grudgingly and timidly was only characteristic of the habitual methods and mental attitude of British Governments towards the problem of war. Unless the work of chartering, concentrating, refitting, and coaling transports is

South  
Africa's  
shipping  
resources.

The political  
lesson.

undertaken well in advance of the order for mobilization, it will probably always be true that our striking force will be ready to sail before the ships are ready to receive them; so that any steps to accelerate our mobilization methods will be of little effect unless they are accompanied by a determination to spend money freely on the provision of shipping before the final step is taken.

Limited  
character  
of the  
experience.

In conclusion, it is essential to remember that the experience furnished by the South African War was of a strictly limited character. It was a purely peace experience as far as the sea transport was concerned. Our adversary, to begin with, possessed no navy. The existence on the high seas of even a single fast hostile cruiser would have introduced all the problems of convoy or of the selection of routes free from the likelihood of danger. In another war those problems may well assume a most serious character, and the authorities may find themselves confronted with the grave dilemma of either having to delay the despatch of forces urgently required on the land frontiers of the Empire, or of weakening their naval strategy in order to furnish a sufficient convoy. From this point of view, too, there is much to be said for the stationing of a considerable part of the Empire's striking force in South Africa, and, for that matter, in Canada and Australia, whence their despatch to threatened points would be less liable to interruption from hostile cruisers, and consequently devolve less responsibility upon our fighting fleet. Again, throughout the South African War, there was no question of opposition to the landing of our forces. There was no instance of securing a landing by surprise or under cover of naval artillery, no troublesome disembarkation by boats and lighters on an inhospitable shore. The sea transport work in the South African War was in fact of the same character as troopship work in peace, but carried out on a gigantic scale. As such it was an undoubted success and afforded many useful technical lessons. But it would be a mistake to assume that it affords much guidance for the great problem of combined military and naval operations, the most vital problem which will have to be solved by the Empire in any life-and-death struggle.

## CHAPTER III.

## THE RAILWAY WORK IN THE WAR

IN October, 1899, 5,024 miles of railway were in operation in South Africa. As a rule, the railways in neighbouring states form separate and self-contained economic systems which only touch for mutual convenience at certain points on the boundary for the purposes of a relatively small international through traffic. In South Africa this was not so. Though the railways were owned by and passed through different states and colonies, they to a very large extent formed a single economic system which was only accidentally divided by frontiers. This system fell into two main divisions of which the economic centres were at Kimberley and Johannesburg respectively. It was the magnet of the diamond fields which first drew the iron road north from Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, and these two lines, known as the Western and Midland sections of the Cape Government Railway, met at De Aar Junction and continued along the western border of the Free State as the northern section of the same railway up to Kimberley. From this place the line ran north along the western border of the Transvaal into Rhodesia. It was not for some time after this line was completed to Kimberley that the imperious demand of the goldfields of the Witwatersrand for through rail connexion with the coast was successful in creating the lines which had Johannesburg for their economic objective. From Cape Colony this later, but far more important route was opened up by the prolongation of the Midland section of the C.G.R. from Naauwpoort, and of the Eastern or East London section

The main  
South African  
railway  
system



of the same line from Stormberg, across the Orange River, at Norval's Pont and Bethulie respectively, to the junction of Springfontein, 30 miles across the border, whence they continued as a single trunk line through the capital of the Free State to the Vaal River. Crossing the Vaal at Vereeniging, this line ran to Elandsfontein Junction outside Johannesburg and on to Pretoria. By means of the cross line running from De Aar on the west through Naauwpoort and Rosmead to Stormberg on the east, all three sections of the Cape system interlaced, and provided as it were a common base for the two main trunk routes to Kimberley-Bulawayo and Johannesburg-Pretoria. The other trunk routes of the Johannesburg-Pretoria system were that from Durban *viâ* Volksrust to Elandsfontein, and that from Lorenzo Marques *viâ* the frontier station of Komatipoort to Pretoria. Though these three main routes from Cape Colony, Natal, and Delagoa Bay were called into being by, and existed for, the service of Johannesburg, and though Elandsfontein Junction formed the railway key of the whole of South Africa, the nominal centre of the system had, for political reasons, been placed at Pretoria.

**Branch lines.**

The branch lines of the system were few and of minor importance. Radiating from the double centre at Johannesburg-Pretoria were the lines to Klerksdorp in the south-western Transvaal and to Pietersburg in the north. In Cape Colony a line from Port Elizabeth to Graaff-Reinet rejoined the Midland line at Rosmead. In Natal there was a short but important branch from Ladysmith over the Drakensberg to Harrismith in the Orange Free State, while another line ran along the coast from Durban to Zululand. The remaining branch lines were only short spurs connecting the main lines with adjacent towns or mines, or, like the Selati Railway, the incomplete beginnings of more ambitious projects. Altogether unconnected with the system at that time was the line from Beira in Portuguese East Africa to Salisbury in Rhodesia. Another short isolated line ran from Port Nolloth to the Ookiep copper mines in Namaqualand.

In Cape Colony the lines, with one very small exception,

were part of the Cape Government Railways (C.G.R.); in the Free State the line which had been constructed and worked by the C.G.R. was in 1898 handed over to the Free State Government; in Natal the only railway was the Natal Government Railway (N.G.R.). In the Transvaal, on the other hand, none of the lines were State owned. The main trunk lines of the Johannesburg system, already described, within the Transvaal were owned by a cosmopolitan concessionaire company,\* the *Nederland Zuid Afrikaansche Spoorweg Maatschappij* (N.Z.A.S.M.). But, although a company, the N.Z.A.S.M. was, as will be explained later, as far as military operations went, practically a State line. The northern line to Pietersburg and the incomplete Selati Railway were owned by separate companies.

Railway  
ownership.

Of the total length of line in operation, nearly three-quarters was in British territory. The following table shows the distribution of the total mileage:—

Mileage of the  
various lines.

*In British South Africa—*

	Miles.
Cape Colony.—Cape Government Railways . . . . .	1,987
Private Railways in Cape Colony . . . . .	126
Natal Government Railways . . . . .	567
Rhodesia.—Rhodesia Railways (worked by the Cape Government) . . . . .	587
Beira Railway, Salisbury—frontier . . . . .	176
Total . . . . .	— 3,443

*In the Orange Free State and Transvaal—*

Orange Free State Government Railways . . . . .	392
Netherlands South African Railway Company . . . . .	741
Pretoria-Pietersburg Railway Company . . . . .	177
Total . . . . .	— 1,310

*In Portuguese East Africa—*

Delagoa Bay Railway . . . . .	55
Beira Railway . . . . .	216
Total . . . . .	— 271

Total for South Africa 5,024

\* See vol. i., p. 114, for the nature of the concession to the N.Z.A.S.M., and vol. i., chs. iv., v., vi., and vol. vi., p. 9, for the history of this and other railway concessions in the Transvaal.

Distances  
from base  
ports.

The distance of the most important points in the whole system from the base ports was as follows:—

Stations.	From Cape Town.	From Port Elizabeth.	From East London.	From Durban.	From Delagoa Bay.
	Miles.	Miles.	Miles.	Miles.	Miles.
De Aar . . . . .	500	339	400		
Orange River . . . . .	570	409	470		
Modder River . . . . .	623	462	523		
Kimberley . . . . .	647	486	547		
Mafeking . . . . .	870	709	770		
Buluwayo . . . . .	1,360	1,199	1,260		
Naauppoort . . . . .	570	270	331		
Norval's Pont . . . . .	628	328	389		
Stormberg . . . . .	679	326	221		
Bethulie . . . . .	686	386	289		
Springfontein . . . . .	662	362	314		
Bloemfontein . . . . .	750	450	401	713	640
Kroonstad . . . . .	878	578	529	585	512
Vaal River . . . . .	962	662	613	500	427
Elandsfontein . . . . .	1,004	704	656	474	386
Johannesburg . . . . .	1,013	713	665	485	396
Klerksdorp . . . . .	1,131	831	782	601	512
Pretoria . . . . .	1,040	740	692	511	349
Pietersburg . . . . .	1,219	919	870	689	527
Belfast . . . . .	1,177	877	828	647	213
Komatipoort . . . . .	1,332	1,032	983	802	58
Standerton . . . . .	1,094	794	745	369	491
Volksrust . . . . .	1,155	855	806	308	552
Pietermaritzburg . . . . .	—	—	—	70½	
Estcourt . . . . .	—	—	—	146½	
Ladysmith . . . . .	—	—	—	189½	
Dundee . . . . .	—	—	—	237	
Newcastle . . . . .	—	—	—	268½	
Harrismith . . . . .	—	—	—	250	

Gauge;  
gradients;  
nationality  
of staffs.

The whole of the railways were narrow gauge, 3 feet 6 inches, and, with the exception of short stretches of a few miles, were all single line. The permanent way, though well constructed, was not up to the British standard, except,



perhaps, in parts of the Transvaal. All the lines were hampered, as far as carrying capacity was concerned, by the long climb from the coast ports up to the central table-land, which necessitated sharp curves as well as steep gradients. On the Cape lines the steepest ruling gradient was  $\frac{1}{40}$  and the maximum curve was 300 feet.\* On the Natal side the ruling gradient south of Ladysmith was  $\frac{1}{30}$  and the maximum curve the same as on the Cape Government Railway. On the Delagoa Bay line the climb was so sudden as to necessitate a rack railway between Waterval Onder and Waterval Boven. These various disabilities combined to make their capacity very much less than that of standard British lines.† In the Cape and Natal the staff were almost entirely of British origin. In the Free State the employees were also mostly Cape Colonials taken over from the Cape Government Railway with the line in 1898. In the Transvaal the railway staff consisted entirely of burghers and Hollanders.

By the declaration of war this vast, but loosely knit network of railway, forming normally a single economic system, was cut in two. On the one side was the Boer system with its railways radiating in every direction towards the frontiers from its centre at Elandsfontein. On the other side was the British system, consisting of a number of separate lines converging on the enemy's frontiers from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban, and Buluwayo. Strategically the Boers were in a very favourable position. They were acting on interior lines and could move troops by rail

Strategic comparison of British and Boer railway systems.

\* The original schedule times for troop-trains running to the front from the Cape ports were:—

Cape Town to De Aar	(500 miles)	about 33 hours.
Port Elizabeth to Naauwpoort	(270 " )	" 27 "
East London to Stormberg	(221 " )	" 25 "

† In one respect this railway system was far in advance of most of the railways in the world: the whole of the rolling-stock—both passenger and goods—was fitted with the automatic vacuum brake. This was due to the fact that the N.Z.A.S.M. had, two or three years before the war, given notice that after January 1, 1899, it would take over no C.G.R. goods stock (up till then fitted with the chain brake worked by hand) that was not fitted with the vacuum brake. As a result of this universal use of the vacuum brake the military traffic was enormously assisted as regards safety and despatch.

from one frontier to another with great rapidity. As an extreme instance of their advantage in this respect, it may be noted that they could move their commandos from opposite Tuli to Colesberg in fewer days than it would have taken the British weeks to make a corresponding move from Tuli to Naauwpoort. The chief defect of the Boer railway system was that only one of its lines connected with neutral territory and was available for the importation of supplies. The British system was also in many respects admirably contrived for the purpose it was called upon to fulfil. The numerous harbours facilitated the rapid disembarkation and regular provisioning of a large force, and the direction of the railways lent itself to the concerted enveloping advance which is supposed to be the normal strategy for the power which has great numerical superiority on its side. Its chief weakness was the lack of lateral communication between Cape Colony and Natal, and the dangerous proximity of the lateral communications in Cape Colony to the frontier. At the very outset the whole stretch of 400 miles from the Orange River to Gaborone was seized by the Boers, and the Rhodesian system was thus completely disconnected till after the relief of Mafeking. The East London line was separated from the rest of the system till March, 1900, owing to the abandonment of Stormberg Junction, and it was only Boer apathy that allowed the British reoccupation in November of the immensely important junction of Naauwpoort, without which Lord Roberts's great concentration would have been impossible.

**Rolling  
Stock.**

Owing to the exodus of the Uitlanders from the Transvaal on the eve of the war there had been far more outgoing than ingoing traffic, but the Boer railway management had contrived, whether by accident or design, to retain a favourable balance of rolling-stock. A certain amount of stock also was locked up in the besieged towns. This shortage, however, had no appreciable effect on the British railway operations at the commencement of the war, owing to the concurrent loss of railway mileage—some 700 miles on the Cape side and some 200 in Natal. Later on, as the length of line worked increased by hundreds of miles, the dearth of rolling-stock became acutely felt.

The problem of working and controlling in war a vast network of railways stretching across the theatre of operations had, prior to 1899, never been set before our army. In England itself we had never had any test of the ability of the railways to carry on military traffic under war conditions. In India, when concentrations of some thousands of men had taken place on the frontier, the mobilization schemes had been worked out beforehand, and the rail movements in connexion with them had lasted but a short time. In the Sudan the railway problem had been straightforward and comparatively simple, even though a new line had to be constructed. But though we lacked actual practice in military railway work, the principles on which that work must be based had been established in the General Staffs of the Continent for a generation. They had been tested and developed in huge struggles and worked out with infinite forethought and in immense detail. The first examples of the military use of the railway on a large scale were the wars of 1859 and 1866 in Europe, and the War of Secession in America. In France the teaching of these wars was neglected. In Germany the lessons were implicitly accepted and applied, and in 1870 the Germans possessed a very complete and perfected organization and system of control. The result was shown in the relative success of the concentrations of the armies of the two nations. The chaos in the railway arrangements during the French concentrations round Metz and Strassburg is now a matter of history.\* In 1899, not only France and Germany, but every Continental nation with any military pretensions, possessed the most elaborate organization and detailed regulations for railway work, based on the principles adopted by the Germans in 1870. In England there existed no such organization, and practically no instructions had been issued as to the necessity for any special arrangements in war. Owing to our geographical position and the nature of our past military experiences, owing also to the absence of a General Staff responsible for looking ahead, the necessity for such arrangements had not been realized. The result was that we entered upon the

The problem of railway control in time of war.

\* See M. Jacquemin, "Les chemins de fer pendant la Guerre de 1870-71."



struggle absolutely unprepared for the magnitude of the transport problem that awaited us. We bought our experience in South Africa, and the lessons we learnt in buying it must always be of the first importance to us.

The control  
and pro-  
tection of  
the civilian  
staff.

Of the principles established by Continental experience, and confirmed in South Africa, the most important is that the technical working of railways must be rigidly separated from their military employment and yet systematically co-ordinated, and that the organization whereby this is to be done must be carefully worked out beforehand. In peace the working of a great railway is a heavy and complicated task, but it is a matter of almost mechanical routine, of infinitely detailed prearrangement. In war its difficulty, from a technical point of view, is enormously increased. Smooth programmes of working are no longer possible; the vicissitudes of strategy and the hourly changes in the military situation call for continually varying efforts. One week a line is worked to its utmost capacity in carrying out a sudden concentration and in handling a mass of supplies, transport, guns, animals, and men. To cope with this, rolling-stock and staff are drawn together from other lines, which are consequently denuded of equipment and disorganized in their routine work. A week later, the concentration has been effected, the army has cut itself adrift from the line that served it, has flung itself across country to another, and the whole burden of the traffic work is suddenly transferred. Military demands cannot be completely foreseen or provided for, and the technical staff must therefore be continually facing fresh difficulties, performing fresh impossibilities. To enable such a task to be carried through, the working staff of a railway system must be freed from unnecessary interference. Confusing changes of programme, sudden demands and excessive strain have, as far as possible, to be avoided, and only imposed upon the railway after a full consideration of their necessity and their effect upon the railway system. Once their duties are allotted, the working staff must be left to carry out these duties in their own way, and must be guarded against the well-meaning, but often harmful interference of soldiers. The latter, quite naturally,

do not all understand a railway, and often do not appreciate that the system is not a simple organization worked in independent short sections, but is a very complicated and delicate mechanism which may be thrown out of gear for hundreds of miles by a single act of petty interference. This danger has been felt in every campaign where a great railway problem has existed, and measures for minimizing it have been taken. To provide the protection for the working staff and also to be the medium of co-ordination of military and technical action, it is absolutely necessary to set up, side by side with the technical staff, a military controlling staff, ranging from an officer in supreme control down to railway staff officers, at all important stations. The members of the controlling staff should really be intermediaries between the army and the technical branches of the railway; to ensure, on the one hand, that the working of the line is carried on as efficiently as possible from the military point of view; on the other, that the demands of the army on the railway are such as can be complied with, without disorganizing the system as a whole. Not only is it essential to maintain this separation and, so to speak, protection of the railway working staff from the military, but care is necessary on the military side to fix one central authority to decide what the real requirements are, among the many conflicting demands which are certain to be made.

The above applies to a case where an existing railway is being run by the civil authorities. Where a new line is constructed or an enemy's line has been captured, in which cases no ready-made operating staff exists, that has also to be improvised. In addition to the necessity for a working organization there is certain to be a demand for construction or repair work, often on a large scale. The capture of an enemy's line means broken bridges, tunnels blown up, track, stations, water-supply and workshops damaged, and rolling-stock wrecked or withdrawn. To cope with this there must be under the military railway administration a large number of skilled officers and men, as well as a supply of unskilled labour.

Use of a  
military  
technical  
staff.

In 1899 the whole of the British military railway

British military railway organization, 1899.

organization, existing in peace time, consisted of two railway companies R.E. (the 8th and 10th), amounting to some 300 of all ranks. These were composed partly of regular sappers specially trained in railway work, partly of specially enlisted reservists from the English railway companies. These latter had never been required to serve in the ranks, but were given reserve pay in return for their engagement to serve in time of war. In addition to the resources of these two specialist companies, the *personnel* of the Royal Engineers generally was to some extent qualified for the repair and construction branches of railway work. When war broke out the 8th and 10th Railway Companies, of whom the 8th had been sent out in August, were brought up to war strength, while the 31st and 42nd Fortress Companies were also handed over for railway work. These reached South Africa before the end of November, and were followed later by the 6th and 20th Fortress Companies, similarly transferred to railway work.

Want of a definite plan.

As for an organized railway staff, or a scheme of operations, they were simply non-existent. Our sole asset was the fact that the Army contained a number of officers, most of them young, capable, and energetic, who had had much practical experience of railway work in new countries. In Canada, in the Sudan, in India, they had faced problems and overcome difficulties akin to this one. In their character, enterprise, and adaptability, in the reserve of skilled railway workers existing in the ranks of the mobilized field force, in the loyalty and high professional skill of the staff of the Cape and Natal railways, lay our only hope of a successful issue. One of these junior officers, Captain and Brevet-Major E. P. C. Girouard,\* D.S.O., R.E., was appointed Director of Railways for the South African Field Force, with the local rank of Lieut.-Colonel, on October 7, four days before the outbreak of hostilities. Major Girouard, who was then only in his thirty-second year, was already a marked man. A graduate of the Royal Military College, Kingston, Canada, the experience he had gained in railway construction under difficulties in Canada and the United States gave him his

\* Now Lieut.-Colonel Sir E. P. C. Girouard, K.C.M.G.



first chance when Kitchener was looking for a man to build the desert railway in the Sudan, and he had subsequently become President of the Egyptian State Railways. He was now to have a wider field for the exercise of the originality, skill and character which he had already shown. Girouard quickly gathered round him a staff of fifteen Engineer officers who had had experience of railway work in many parts of the Empire. To these many others were added as the war went on. Before the newly appointed Director of Railways left England himself, a good deal of information about the South African railway system had been collected, and orders were placed for a large amount of material to meet probable requirements. To show the nature of the steps then taken, it is interesting to note that enough timber was ordered to rebuild temporarily all the railway bridges in the Free State, in the event of their being destroyed, as subsequently proved to be the case. Between forty and fifty girders for the more permanent repairs were also ordered, and a complete bridge under order for the Selati Railway was also taken over.

On October 23 Girouard landed at Cape Town with a portion of his staff. As far as immediate action was concerned, not much could be done. The Army Corps had not yet arrived, most of the troops in the country were stationed where they were required, and the steady accumulation of vast stores of supplies at the advanced depots was proceeding. Railway events were only enlivened by the early adventures of some of the armoured trains. Four of these had been constructed in Cape Town before the war commenced. One accompanied Methuen's advance, one did good service on the Stormberg line, while two were in Kimberley, whence they advanced towards Mafeking. Besides these there was the "Mosquito" at Mafeking itself, and the "Powerful" at Buluwayo, both of which proved of great value, and one train in Natal. But after the disasters at Kraaipan and Chieveley the armoured trains remained for a long time in disrepute, only to regain favour much later on when their proper functions and limitations were better understood. Before the arrival of the Army Corps the main task was to

Colonel  
Girouard's  
scheme.

complete the organization partially evolved on the voyage out. Girouard had from the outset decided to adopt the Continental system, under which the Director of Railways was to be in absolute control of the railways, subject only to the Commander-in-Chief, while the civil technical staff (on the Colonial railways) was to be paralleled and protected by a military controlling staff. Sir R. Buller fell in readily with the general principle of the scheme, though he did not endorse the complete application of it in certain respects. The authorities of the Cape Government Railways were also in entire agreement with the proposed distribution of duty between the controlling and technical staff. It only remained to appoint the controlling staff and get it to work. A counterpart to the General Traffic Manager of the C.G.R. was appointed as an Assistant-Director of Railways.\* He was on the staff of the Director, and also on that of the General Officer Commanding Line of Communications, Cape Colony. Four Deputy Assistant-Directors† were appointed to the four railway sections of the C.G.R. as counterparts to the Traffic Managers of those sections; they were also staff officers for railways to the generals commanding their portions of the line. Below the D.A.D.R.'s came the Railway Staff Officers at all important stations. It was with regard to the position of these officers that there was at first a divergence from the principles adopted by the Germans and Austrians and advocated by Girouard. They were the only part of the controlling staff contemplated and provided for in our existing regulations, and they were placed under the orders of station commandants or of the officers commanding on the lines of communication, and not under the Director of Railways. The drawbacks of this became so obvious after the capture of Bloemfontein that the Director's views were adopted, and a single chain of communication extending from top to bottom of the staff of the railway system was established.

\* Captain V. Murray, R.E.

† Eastern Section, Captain J. M. Burn, R.E.; Midland Section, Captain W. V. Scudamore, R.E.; Western and Northern Sections, Captain H. C. Narton, R.E.; Cape Town, Lieutenant E. H. M. Leggett, R.E.

The working of the amended system can be seen from the following *résumé* of the duties of the Railway Staff Officers as now fixed. They were the sole channel of communication between the Army and stationmasters, who took military orders from no one else, and thus protected the railway from interference by unauthorized officers. They arranged all details of entrainments, detrainments, and forwarding of stores with the stationmasters and the commandants. They met all troops arriving to entrain, and arranged for their entrainment. They saw that all trains were quickly loaded and not kept waiting; that railway officials were prompt in furnishing trucks at the right time and place; that only the authorized amount of baggage was loaded; and that no unauthorized persons proceeded to the front. They informed stationmasters of what trucks were most urgently needed, and gave the railway officials warrants for all troops and stores despatched. They telegraphed the composition and time of departure of all trains to the Railway Staff Officers at their destination, arranged for hot water to be ready for meals for troops arriving or passing through, directed to the rest camp all details who had to wait before proceeding, and saw that trucks were not kept under load a moment more than necessary.

Railway  
Staff Officers'  
duties.

Besides the control duties, the railway staff had to keep up records of the military work done, for the purpose of financial account between the Railway Department and the Army. This portion of the work gained much in secrecy, and was much simplified by the fact that a uniform rate per truck per mile was charged, no particulars of the contents of trucks being rendered. To keep the repairing parties fully supplied with material and for dealing with all questions of supplies and stores, a Railway Store Department was also started. The base store was at Cape Town, with an advanced depot first at Orange River, then at Naauwpoort. It was eventually found absolutely necessary to have an advance depot always within fifty miles of railhead. By an agreement with the Cape Government Railway, and with the assistance of the existing civil manufacturing departments, stores were obtained by the military administration in the cheapest

Financial ar-  
rangements.



market. In this respect, as in every other, the military throughout received the most loyal help and support from Mr. (afterwards Sir C. B.) Elliott, the General Manager, and Mr. (afterwards Sir T. R.) Price, the Traffic Manager of the C.G.R., and from all their subordinates.

Preparations  
for working  
captured  
lines.

After the organization of the "control" of the working of the Cape Government Railways, the next step was to prepare for the reconstruction and working of lines taken over from the enemy. It was decided to keep the temporary repair work in the hands of the Royal Engineers, rather than leave it to the civil engineering staff of the railway. The work would be carried out in the presence of the enemy, possibly under fire, and would be of a nature different to that usually undertaken by a civil staff. In peace, economy and durable work are the prime consideration, and the value of time is slight; from a military point of view time is all-important, the durability of the work matters less than its temporary effectiveness, and the question of economy does not enter into consideration. The discipline, the hardships, the irregular conditions that come in the day's work of the soldier would be new to the civil employee, and however indifferent to danger and zealous they might be, civilians could not be compelled to work under fire. It was for these reasons that this arrangement was made, and not in any disparagement of the great efforts made by the civil engineers, who carried out nearly all the permanent repairs behind the temporary work. For the repairs of the two lines of rail along which the advance was to be made, the Western and the Midland, two field sections R.E. were organized. The Western consisted of the 8th and 31st Companies R.E., with a number of refugee employees of the Free State Railway and some 300 natives; the Midland, of the 10th, 20th, and 42nd Companies R.E., with similar auxiliaries. The sections were each under an Assistant-Director for the Western\* and Midland† sides respectively. These officers were in close touch with the general commanding the advance, and their duty was to execute temporary repairs, and, as the forces moved forward,

\* Major W. R. Stewart, R.E.

† Captain J. H. Twiss, R.E.

to establish and control traffic between railhead and the "junction" station in rear, which was to be the dividing point between military and civil working. This arrangement proved to be unworkable, and after Bloemfontein was reached the field sections ceased to carry out the control of any of the traffic, which was done at once right up to the railhead by the ordinary traffic staff. The sections were reorganized into construction "parties" in construction trains under junior officers of the works department, and they were employed entirely in engineering work.

In December it became clear to the Director that the two field sections would not be able to carry out the immense amount of engineering work that would have to be done to repair the enemy's railway system, while the Royal Engineers could give him no more. The difficulty was solved by the raising of an irregular engineering corps for railway duties under the Director. There were at this time in Cape Town and the other ports many unemployed miners and artisans of every trade who had left the Transvaal, the larger portion of these being from the mines in the Rand. Mr. L. I. Seymour, an American, and Mr. G. A. Goodwin, both leading engineers of the Transvaal mining industry, had approached Lord Milner with an offer to organize a corps for railway work from these men, and with their assistance the Railway Pioneer Regiment, over 1,000 strong,\* was enrolled from skilled men of all trades. It was raised under the command of Major J. E. Capper, R.E., while Messrs. Seymour and Goodwin were appointed Wing Majors, and many other engineers and mine managers were appointed as officers. This regiment was soon destined to do splendid service both in the hasty and semi-permanent repairs of the railway bridges. It was composed almost entirely of civilians, but the great difference between employing this regiment and the civil staff

The Railway  
Pioneer  
Regiment.

\* After October, 1900, the Railway Pioneer Regiment ceased to exist as a railway corps, and was employed in military police and outpost duties on the Rand. At the end of the year three additional battalions were raised under the command of Colonel Capper. These units together were some 1,900 men strong and were employed till the end of the war on defence duties near Johannesburg and along the railway. These later units are omitted in the catalogue of South African corps at the end of vol. v.

of the railway was that the members of the former received a military training and became soldiers under military law.

Successful  
working of  
the system.

The preliminary organization has been treated in some detail, not only because of its intrinsic importance, but also because it had to be improvised in every particular after the outbreak of the war. The working of the system was soon tested by the transportation up country of the troops as they arrived. The civil authorities were not slow to appreciate the advantages of this organization, and when it became familiar to them it worked with surprisingly little friction and with great goodwill on both sides. It was from the Army itself that the initial difficulties came. The system, like the situation, was new to most of the superior and staff officers, and at first some of them were slow to understand the principle of the organization, and tried in various ways to override it. But as the controlling staff became familiar with their work and were strenuously supported by their chief, the difficulties gradually disappeared. On the whole, the result was a distinct success, and the long pause in the operations that came after the "Black Week" of December, 1899, during which there was little troop movement, gave further time to gain experience and collect supplies and repair material. When once the system was understood, the railing of troops proved a less troublesome task than the conveyance of supplies, a feature in keeping with Continental and Indian experience. During October, November, and December, the total military traffic from the three ports of Cape Colony had been 42,254 officers and men, 13,447 animals, 97 guns, 907 vehicles, 25,451 tons of stores and supplies. In Natal, for the same period, the corresponding figures were 43,296 officers and men, 11,479 animals, 96 guns, 377 vehicles, 19,499 tons of stores and supplies.

Lord  
Roberts's  
concentra-  
tion.

Half-way through January began the greatest effort of troop transport for strategical concentration that occurred during the course of the whole war. The railway was called upon to collect the men, horses, transport, guns, and stores and supplies required for the march on Bloemfontein from various points—Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Port Elizabeth, Cradock, Rosmead, Grahamstown, Rensburg, Naauwpoort,



Theebus, etc.—and to concentrate them on the short section of line between Orange River and Modder River stations. The troops had to be detrained at various stations, where no accommodation existed, on a single-line railway, while the concentration had to be done in a certain time, and be carried out with the greatest secrecy. Had the time been exceeded the whole operation might have fallen through for lack of supplies; had news of the projected move leaked out it might have been rendered futile, if not disastrous. With characteristic boldness Girouard undertook the whole responsibility for this task if he were given a free hand as to details, and if the utmost secrecy were observed. The arrangements for the move were controlled at De Aar by Major Murray, R.E., in conjunction with Mr. Clark, the Traffic Manager of the Western Section of the C.G.R.; rolling-stock was collected, some ten miles of sidings for detraining were hastily laid at Orange River, Graspan, Honeynest Kloof, and Modder River, and the concentration was secretly and successfully carried out. Between January 26 and February 10 a total of 152 trains, comprising 4,787 trucks, passed northwards through De Aar Junction, while approximately 30,000 troops, with horses, guns, etc., were detrained between Orange River and Modder River.

Before this concentration a good deal of reconstruction had already been done on the western line, where the railway repairs had kept pace with Methuen's advance, the most important single work being the replacement of the Modder River high-level railway bridge by a temporary one at low level. This was completed on December 7.\* After Cronje's retreat all haste was made to get the rail through to Kimberley, the Midland Field Section being temporarily withdrawn from its own area to assist. The repair party, starting from Modder River on February 16, met another party working south from Kimberley on the 19th, when the line was opened. From this time till the beginning of May no further progress to the north was possible, as the enemy were still in force in that direction.

The work of  
repair on  
the western  
line.

\* The semi-permanent repairs to the high-level bridge were started and traffic was running across by March 31, 1900.

Communica-  
tion opened  
up with  
Bloemfontein

The Army reached Bloemfontein on March 13, and for some time the all-important task before the railway was that of opening up communication with that place, the main obstacle in the way of this being the broken bridges over the Orange River. In Cape Colony the railway troops had kept pace with Clements's and Gatacre's advance up to the river, and had already completed a very large amount of heavy bridge repairs. As soon as these two forces entered the Free State it was possible to make a start with getting the rail over the river. At Norval's Pont, which was the crossing of the Midland section, three spans—each 136 feet long—of the bridge had been cut, whilst of Bethulie Bridge—the crossing of the Eastern section—five spans were down. It was decided to provide a temporary crossing at Bethulie and to concentrate the efforts at semi-permanent repair on Norval's Pont. At Bethulie the railway line was diverted by the R.E. to the road bridge saved by Gatacre's advance, and on March 27 communication with Bloemfontein and the Eastern section was thus opened. By May 10, when the low-level deviation, carrying whole trains, had been completed by the Railway Pioneers, 2,093 trucks had already been passed across the road bridge by hand. Meanwhile work had been pressed on at Norval's Pont. On March 25 an overhead aerial tram, steam-driven and carried on wire cables, had been completed by the Pioneers, whilst the low-level deviation, carrying whole trains was finished by the R.E. and Pioneers on March 27. Up till then through trains were running from the north bank of the river up to Bloemfontein; supplies had been carried across the river in a pontoon or by the aerial tram, at a speed quite inadequate to feed an army. Thus, fourteen days after his arrival in Bloemfontein, Lord Roberts was in direct through rail communication with all the Cape ports. On May 20, after working night and day, the Pioneers completed the restoration of the high-level bridge, and thus a perfect connexion, independent of floods, was once more established. The restoration of communication at Norval's Pont Bridge entailed heavy work of a nature new in war, and was a remarkable feat of engineering. The opening of

the rail to Bloemfontein, where the exhaustion of supplies had almost brought about a crisis, was of the utmost importance, and as the line between that town and the Orange River was untouched, the fate of the Army depended entirely upon the speed with which the huge gaps at the river were repaired.

As soon as the line was through, the most pressing railway task changed from one of construction to one of traffic. By April supplies had to be forwarded to Bloemfontein for some 65,000 men and 33,000 animals, and notwithstanding the opening of the line, there were many difficulties in the way of getting traffic up. Though the Cape lent engines to supplement those captured at Bloemfontein, the lack of engine power was a severe handicap, and to cope with the traffic the locomotives were worked night and day with double crews; the want of station accommodation at Bloemfontein itself was also greatly felt. But the main factor which for some time prevented the speedy and systematic supply of the Army was the great congestion of trucks south of the Orange River, caused by the lack of regulation of the military goods traffic, due to the absence of a central military control. Owing to the energy of the departments at the bases in forwarding supplies of all sorts, every station for miles to the south of the river was blocked with trucks under military load, so that not only was a large amount of rolling-stock locked up, but it was in many cases impossible to shunt or to send up what was first wanted. This weakness in the system was now so clearly demonstrated that a military controlling staff for the regulation of military requirements, and their notification to the Director of Railways, was organized. In spite of these difficulties, however, the traffic across the Orange from the time the rail was first through to the end of April amounted to 8,600 loaded trucks.

By the capture of Bloemfontein the British forces had suddenly acquired 149 miles of fresh line, and were shortly to be in possession of several hundred miles more. But the method, hitherto successfully followed, of leaving the working of the railways to an existing civilian staff, subject only to the general control of a military staff, was no longer possible.

Congestion  
of traffic.

Creation  
of the  
"Imperial  
Military  
Railways."



In the Free State, though many of the old railway employees of British extraction were individually willing to take service, the organization had disappeared, and the same state of affairs was likely to be found later on in the Transvaal. The taking over of the captured lines by the Cape Government Railways might have met the immediate problem in the Free State, but would hardly have applied to the Transvaal, and would in any case have involved political and administrative difficulties. It was decided to create an entirely new railway system, the "Imperial Military Railways," under which title all the railways in the conquered territories were to be taken over as they were acquired. The rapid formation of this new system in the midst of active operations, its subsequent effective working and enormous expansion—it finally included the whole of the 1,310 miles of Boer line—form quite one of the most successful achievements of the war. As had been done in the case of the Cape Government Railways, a military controlling and a technical working staff were established. The former was formed on the now accepted principles. The posts of fresh A.D.R.'s and D.A.D.R.'s were filled by Engineers, whilst the duties of R.S.O.'s were mostly performed by infantry officers. The technical staff was composed of R.E. officers, under whom were the works, locomotive, store, and telegraph departments, and of civilian officials, under whom were the traffic and accounts branches. The latter consisted of men lent by the Cape Railways and of approved ex-employees of the Free State. As far as possible the higher posts of the traffic management were filled by men who were used to the South African railway systems.

The organi-  
zation in  
Natal.

Before the work on the advance to Pretoria is considered, it will be as well to turn to what was done in Natal. In this Colony, as has been already stated, Girouard's proposed system of control was not at first accepted, the General Manager of the Natal Government Railways, Mr. (now Sir D.) Hunter, not approving of the principles which had been adopted in Cape Colony. Major G. S. McD. Elliot, R.E., was appointed A.D.R. Natal to act as a medium between the G.O.C. in C. and the General Manager of the railway, and R.S.O.'s were

posted at some of the main stations. The whole of the railway duties, including the temporary reconstruction as the army advanced north, were performed by the railway staff. In the latter work, however, the civil engineering department was largely assisted by the R.E. field companies and the infantry. There is, on the whole, much less to be said of the railway work on the Natal system than of the work on the others, because from the first it had no difficulty in performing the task imposed upon it. The problem, indeed, was a comparatively easy one. Before the relief of Ladysmith the distance from Durban to railhead was only 170 miles, while from the Tugela to the sea the line was practically undamaged. No lateral movements were possible, as there was only one line, and the transport of troops was practically confined to that of sending them up to the front in the first instance, while, in place of a shortage, there was, owing to the decreased length of line, a surplus of rolling-stock. The only period of traffic pressure occurred immediately after the relief of Ladysmith, when supplies for the starving garrison had to be sent up and the wounded and invalids brought down. North of Ladysmith the line was very thoroughly destroyed, but the rate of advance of the Army was slow, and the construction parties were easily able to keep pace. As a comparison, it is interesting to note that while railhead of the I.M.R. was advancing from Bloemfontein to Vereeniging, a distance of 212 miles, railhead in Natal had moved only 67 miles.

After the pause at Bloemfontein, which gave time for reorganization and the collection of material, the railway staff were called upon for a fresh effort—that of re-opening rail communication to Pretoria behind Lord Roberts's advance. From a period of traffic and organization work the task again changed to one mainly of rapid construction, for not only had the retreating Boers carried off their rolling-stock, but they had destroyed the railway with a thoroughness they had not shown before. Stations, telegraphs, water-supply, permanent way, bridges were wrecked wholesale; practically every bridge between Bloemfontein and the Vaal River, varying from mere culverts to spans of 120 feet, had

The advance  
to Pretoria.

been destroyed.\* The work of rapid repair was done by the construction train,† and in certain cases by Royal Engineer field units with the force. The Railway Pioneers followed, executing the semi-permanent repairs.‡ The hasty repairs generally consisted of deviation lines made from the level of the main line down almost to the bed of the river, where the rail was carried on a causeway or a low-level bridge. In many cases the piers of the old deviation lines—used when the bridges had been originally constructed—still existed and were of the greatest service. The semi-permanent work consisted in carrying the rails by means of trestle and other work across at their original level. As the Army advanced step by step from one big break to another, railhead followed never far behind, and eleven days after the Army reached Johannesburg, and sixteen days after it reached Pretoria, communication to these places from the south was opened. Luckily it was the dry season, and the absence of danger from floods made an immense difference to the speed with which temporary repairs could be carried out. Still, it is enough to recall the distance from Bloemfontein to Johannesburg, 263 miles, and the amount of damage done, in order to realize the true significance of what was accomplished.

The work  
of keeping  
the line  
clear.

Though on this advance the main efforts of the railway were directed to opening the line, yet the work of keeping it clear for traffic when once opened was of no small difficulty. Wherever railhead remained stationary for some time, as it did at the large breaks such as those on the Vet, Zand, and other rivers, a supply depot for the Army was formed, and quantities of supplies were at once sent up. As it was necessary at all costs to keep the line clear and the minimum of trucks under load, all supply trains were at once off-loaded on to the veld, and the empty trains sent back. The stuff was then loaded on to the Army transport and sent after the

\* The main large bridges destroyed were those across the Vet, Zand, Valsch, and Vaal Rivers.

† Under Lieutenant H. A. Micklem, D.S.O., R.E. These construction trains, as has been explained, now replaced the field sections.

‡ The permanent reconstruction was carried out by contract towards the end of 1900.



Army moving ahead. But the transport was limited and could seldom carry on all that had arrived by train. Very shortly the repairs were completed, and railhead was at once moved on to the next big break, perhaps ten or twenty miles further north. There was then naturally a desire to reload the supplies lying along the railway and send them on instead of bringing up more from Bloemfontein. From a railway point of view this was impossible, owing to the single line and the dearth of rolling-stock. It was, under the circumstances, far better to risk the loss of some hundreds of tons of stores than to risk blocking the line or locking up rolling-stock, for the line was already strained almost to breaking-point. It thus happened that the railway through the Free State was in some places lined with supplies of all sorts, from ammunition to champagne, which had been off-loaded and left behind at those spots which had once been railhead.\* Here again the zeal shown in forwarding supplies, irrespective of the facilities for handling them at their destination, had in many cases the reverse of a helpful effect. Other traffic difficulties, too, increased automatically with every mile advanced. No rolling-stock had been added since Bloemfontein was reached, so that the best method of employment for each single locomotive had now become a matter for careful calculation. Beyond Kroonstad the question of water-supply for the engines became acute, for, owing to the destruction of tanks and pumps there was a run of seventy miles without water. Till the Vaal River was reached every pound of coal had to be carried up from the coast or from the coalfields of Cape Colony, so that of the seven or eight trains which could be sent forward each day, one entire train was devoted to coal and material for the reconstruction of the line. The capture of the Vereeniging coal mines in working order, therefore, came as an immense relief to the locomotive department, as did the capture of 31 engines and 1,200 trucks

\* This explains how, amongst other things, 12,000 "coats, British warm," 1,500 mail-bags, and many lyddite shells happened to be lying at an unimportant wayside station like Roodewal and so fell into de Wet's hands when he captured and burnt this station on June 7, 1900.

at Elandsfontein, Johannesburg, and Pretoria, to the traffic branch. The crowning mercy of the whole railway situation, indeed, was the acquisition of Elandsfontein Junction—the key of the railway system of South Africa—in an undamaged condition.

Progress of reconstruction on other lines.

On the western line communication was restored by the construction train on that side,\* and was open across the Vaal River at Fourteen Streams by May 18. On June 9 the party working south from Mafeking were met, and the first train ran into Mafeking on that day. On the Natal line, the construction parties working north and south met at Vlakfontein on July 26, on which day traffic between Durban and Pretoria was opened, and a fresh trunk line of communication to Pretoria thus established. Amongst other repairs the Natal construction parties had repaired 150 yards of the Laing's Nek tunnel. The Johannesburg-Klerksdorp branch line was got in order during June, and the Pietersburg line as far as Pienaar's River was captured and restored in August. The main engineering work on this line was the temporary bridge and deviation over the Pienaar's River, where six 25-metre spans had been destroyed. It was repaired in five days. From Pienaar's River north to Pietersburg was repaired behind Plumer's advance in April, 1901, one of the chief features of the railway work being the number of mines found on the line.

The Netherlands Company's obstructive attitude.

The arrival of the Army at Johannesburg marked a critical period in the history of the I.M.R. Not only did the Netherlands Company, as such, refuse to continue working its lines for the British, but the refusal to serve also extended to the whole body of employees, who were mostly Hollanders. This was indeed a complication. But the possibility of its occurrence had been foreseen and measures taken to meet it. So far back as Bloemfontein a roll had been prepared of all those soldiers of the regular and irregular forces possessed of previous railway experience, and when, on the night of May 31, the N.Z.A.S.M. employees at Elandsfontein Junction refused to work the traffic, substitutes for local requirements

\* Under Captain F. G. Fuller, R.E. Over 1,200 infantry and 300 natives were employed to help the R.E. on the deviation across the Vaal.



BREVET-MAJOR (LOCAL LIEUT.-COLONEL)  
SIR E. P. C. GIROUARD, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E.,  
DIRECTOR OF RAILWAYS, S. AFRICA, 1899-1902.

*Photo by Mayall.*





were obtained on the spot from the two companies of the East Lancashires garrisoning the station. On June 1 Lord Kitchener was asked for the services of all the men in the force with railway knowledge. On the morning of the 2nd, when the traffic manager of the N.Z.A.S.M. finally and definitely conveyed to Colonel Girouard the decision of his company not to allow its employees to work for the British, the Director of Railways was in a stronger position than that gentleman thought. The appeal to the Chief of Staff had already borne fruit, and drawn up in a line in the station-yard were 200 soldiers from half the regiments of the Imperial forces, containing men who had worked on the London and North Western, Great Northern, Canadian Pacific, Great Indian Peninsula, Burma State, and many other railways of the Empire. To the amazement of the Hollander and Afrikander staff\* who stood looking on, these men were at once separated out into stationmasters, guards, drivers, stokers, signalmen, etc., and proceeded straightway to take up their duties. Next day the first British timetable was published in Johannesburg. By offering Royal Engineer rates of pay, nearly 1,000 soldiers from all branches of the services were almost at once obtained for railway duties, and this number was supplemented by employees of the Cape and Free State lines. The situation was saved and the organization for working the line proceeded at once. Headquarters of the Imperial Military Railways were moved from Bloemfontein to Johannesburg, and in an astonishingly short time the system was working efficiently.

Within three months of the entry into Pretoria the whole of the Delagoa Bay line had been seized. Through rail communication from Cape Town to the Portuguese border—a distance of 1,332 miles—was opened on September 27. The work on this advance was much the same in character as that already described, and included a large amount of heavy bridging. It was carried out entirely by the R.E., the Railway Pioneers having been diverted from railway work to the defence of the Rand. Though many bridges were

Capture of  
Delagoa Bay  
line.

\* Almost the whole of the Hollander staff were deported soon afterwards.

destroyed, the tunnel and the rack rail between Waterval Onder and Waterval Boven were luckily intact, though the special rack locomotives had been removed. By this time, owing to the mileage worked, the shortage of rolling-stock had become a most serious source of anxiety. Small quantities of engines and trucks were recovered at various stations along the eastern line. But so well did the Boer railway officials play their part, that it was not until the very end, when Komatipoort itself was reached, that the immense mass of their rolling-stock was recovered. Here nearly 13 miles of line and sidings were found packed with trucks and carriages. Komatipoort station was veritably the "last ditch." The Boers had made immense efforts to destroy everything; the station was a total wreck, stacks of coal and mountains of supplies were blazing, and on all sides stood out the iron skeletons of burnt trucks. But the work of destroying the accumulation of months had been put off till too late—Lord Roberts's advance had been too rapid. In all no less than 222 engines and 4,250 vehicles were recovered from the Delagoa Bay line, more than half of which, including the rack-rail locomotives, were found at Komatipoort itself. By November these had all been cleared off and distributed over the whole railway system.

Boer use of  
the railways.  
The exodus,  
Aug.-Sept.  
1899.

Having touched upon some of the chief aspects of the British railway work during the period in which it was so largely concerned with taking over and reorganizing a system that originally belonged to the enemy, it will not be out of place to give a brief account of the use which the enemy made of the railways so long as they were in possession of them. The actual military work on them was preceded by a great effort of transportation, of which the commencement dated back to about August, 1899, when the threat of war first forced the more timid of the Uitlander population to leave the Transvaal. The exodus continued steadily increasing as hostilities became more certain, and reached its highest point on the eve of war, when all British subjects who could not get special permits to remain were ordered to leave the country within a week. From September 1 to October 10 the N.Z.A.S.M. carried across the



frontiers over 130,000 people, mostly expelled British subjects and Kaffirs deported from the mines. As the normal outward traffic during peace was only 9,000 per month, some idea may be gathered of the pressure, especially after September 28, on which date the first military train of the Boer mobilization left Pretoria for the Natal frontier. The rolling-stock was of course quite insufficient to provide proper accommodation for all this traffic, and the unfortunate travellers suffered great hardships.

By the articles governing its concession, the N.Z.A.S.M. was, in case of war or threatened war, liable to be placed entirely at the disposal of the Government. By a decree of the Volksraad of September 13 this right was exercised, and the entire system, *matériel* and *personnel*, was "commandeered" and came under Government control. From that time, till they passed into British hands, the Transvaal railways were to all intents and purposes part of the State machinery. The staff took no merely perfunctory interest in the military work. They were enthusiasts for the war, and, as many of them were burghers, special steps had at first to be taken to limit the numbers who left their work to go on commando. When night running ceased—on October 15—and the great exodus and the mobilization were over, more employees were set free for purely military duty; at the end of 1899, for example, out of a total of over 3,000 more than one-sixth were on commando or on guard duty.

Possibly owing to their naturally suspicious nature, possibly owing to their ignorance of the fact that a railway must be worked according to accurately arranged time-tables, the Transvaal Government did not give sufficient information to the railway authorities, in spite of their repeated requests, to enable proper preparation to be made for the mobilization on the Natal frontier. Almost up to the last moment the staff were left in ignorance of the numbers to be carried, and the initial concentration on the Natal border was consequently marked by friction, confusion, and delay. From a traffic point of view, also, the spot chosen for concentration was not happy. Sandspruit station was only equipped with the usual sidings to allow of trains crossing, and though extensions were

Transvaal  
railways  
taken over  
by the  
Government.

The Boer  
mobilization.

hurriedly added, no place could have been much worse suited for the concentration of a large force. Detrainment was slow, shunting was next to impossible, and there was very soon a block which extended far back and prevented the line being worked at its proper capacity for days.\* In spite of this, from September 28 to October 10, 8,369 men, 7,288 animals, 308 wagons, 8 guns and ammunition wagons, and 1,618 tons of goods and ammunition were off-loaded at Sandpruit. The extent to which the railways generally were used for the mobilization is indicated by the military traffic returns of the N.Z.A.S.M. From the end of September to the end of October it carried 13,143 men, 16,474 animals, 53 guns and ammunition wagons, 1,077 wagons and 4,655 tons of ammunition and other stores.

Subsequent  
railway work.

After the main concentration was complete, however, the pressure was relaxed and work became comparatively light. The cessation of night running also made it possible for a proportion of the operating staff to be drafted to the Natal system as that was taken over, and to the Free State Railway in order to fill the gaps caused by the defection of the British employed on that line. The traffic work for some time consisted almost entirely of forwarding supplies and animals to the front and carrying back the number of burghers who obtained leave of absence from the fighting line. Not only was this number embarrassingly large for the commanders, but it brought more work on the railway than it might at first appear, for with Arcadian simplicity the burgher proceeding on leave not only insisted on taking his horses and all his smaller possessions with him, but occasionally even demanded transport for his ox wagon and team.

Strategic use  
of the rail-  
ways by the  
Boers.

On the whole, the railway proved a good servant to the Republican armies. During the earlier stages of the war, the Boer forces in Natal, at Colesberg, and at Stormberg were almost as completely dependent upon it as were our own. In fact, with the exception of the raid south of the Tugela in November, 1899, practically no attempt was made to move away from the line, while the other main forces, viz., those around Kimberley and Mafeking, which depended upon ox-

\* See vol. i., p. 371; vol. ii., p. 123.

wagon communication, not only suffered greater hardship, but were practically immobile. So great is the reputation which the Boers subsequently won by their feats of trekking that not only their dependence on the railway at the beginning of the war but also their really bold strategic use of it is sometimes forgotten. The most notable instance of this was Cronje's advance from Mafeking to reinforce De la Rey on the Modder. Entraining at Klerksdorp on November 21, a portion of his force arrived at Edenburg—south of Bloemfontein—on the 25th, and Cronje himself with some 1,200 men and a few guns reached Modder River late on the 27th in time for the battle next day. Commandos were railed from the Limpopo to Natal, from Natal to the Modder or to Colesberg, from Colesberg back to Bloemfontein. Some of these moves were carried out with great expedition. That of De la Rey's commando of some 1,000 men and horses from Norval's Pont to Bloemfontein on March 1, 1900, was completed in ten hours by stopping all other traffic. This move took ten trains for its accomplishment, a normal Boer troop-train carrying 125 men with horses and transport complete. On the whole, rolling-stock, if not ample, was sufficient, the shortage of the N.Z.A.S.M. and O.F.S. stock being compensated by British stock held back by the Boers at the outbreak of the war. Considerable skill was shown in moving rolling-stock to the rear at the various stages of the Boer retreat. That the British succeeded, in the end, in getting so large a proportion of the stock uninjured at Komatipoort was, possibly, not the fault of the railway authorities.

Very little construction or reconstruction work was attempted. The portion of the Natal line which fell into the Boer hands required some minor repairs before traffic could pass, owing to the damage done by the burghers themselves. A special station with platforms and sidings was erected at railhead at Modderspruit, six miles from Ladysmith. At most of the other halting-places to the north the stations erected by us were available. To facilitate communication between the Tugela position and the Boer lines round Ladysmith, the existing rail from Nelthorpe to Pieters

The work  
repair.



station was repaired and two light locomotives brought down from Johannesburg were transported to the line by road from Modderspruit. It was opened in the beginning of January, but little used. Elsewhere the reconstruction work consisted of trifling repairs, the only serious item being the repair, in June, 1900, of a bridge near Kaap Muiden, blown up by Steinaecker's Scouts, which it took a fortnight to carry out. What the powers of their railway engineers would have enabled them to accomplish in the way of speedy reconstruction, had we carried out any organized destruction of the line on a large scale, is not easy to estimate. Though the traffic work was excellent, their railway engineering, from the samples of it afforded, did not seem to be of the same standard. The extent to which the Boer advance might have been delayed, and the whole course of the war changed, had the British destroyed Laing's Nek Tunnel, the railway north of Ladysmith, and the bridges at Bethulie and Fourteen Streams, is an interesting subject for reflection.

The destruction work.

The destruction on all the lines as the Boer army retired was carried out under the supervision of European trained men of the railway staff. Though the spectacle of some of the larger broken bridges presented to our own railway engineers was sufficiently disheartening, there is no doubt that the Boers, had they possessed the knowledge, could have rendered the damage done more complete. This applies not only to the bridge demolitions, but also to the efforts made to damage the permanent way, in which they paid more attention to the open line, which could easily be repaired, than to the points and crossings, which could not. They profited by experience however in this matter, as in others, and their later efforts at track destruction were conducted with far greater knowledge than the first. At Wolvehoek—south of Vereeniging—for instance, their destruction of the line was confined almost entirely to the points and crossings. The telegraphic corps also included experts in demolition, and it was by these men chiefly that the lines were so often cut during the guerilla operations.

The work of the railway shops.

The resources of the railway-shops were also available for the manufacture of munitions of war, and the central

works at Pretoria successfully undertook the manufacture of gun ammunition and the repair of ordnance, and in one instance even manufactured a new Krupp howitzer from a damaged model.\* Amongst other things four complete ambulance-trains were constructed. In order to keep this military work going the shops were kept running night and day, and the time given to the maintenance of railway material had to be reduced as much as possible.

With the capture of the Delagoa Bay or eastern line, the entire system of Boer railways (with the exception of the northern portion of the Pietersburg line) passed into our hands. From the technical point of view the main difficulties confronting the railway staff of the Army had been overcome, and, subject to the occasional interruptions of large troop moves, and for many months, too, the continual interference of the enemy, the work now continued much the same up to the end of the war. The carrying power of the line varied a great deal at first according to the activity of the enemy and the possibility of night running. But after the establishment of blockhouses and the introduction of a regular service of armoured trains it was able to cope, not only with all military requirements, but also with a steadily growing volume of civil traffic. Many departments of the railway, such as the Works, Locomotive, Telegraph, Stores and Accounts departments, now received a complete organization, whilst others, such as the Medical Railway Staff, Employment and Police Branches, were first initiated during this period. Altogether, as the railway administration became consolidated and perfected, it gradually approximated more and more to that of an ordinary railway administration in peace, and in fact when peace came was taken over as it stood by the civil government of the new colonies.

From the point of view of railway strategy, on the other hand, this later period of the war is, in some respects, of exceptional interest. In the earlier stage there was nothing in the railway strategy on either side which markedly differentiated the South African War from other wars between neighbouring states. On both sides the railways served as

Character of the organization until the peace.

Interesting character of the guerilla period.

\* This howitzer was to replace that destroyed on the night of December 7, 1899, at Gun Hill sortie, Ladysmith. See vol. iii., p. 168.

lines of communication between the forces at the front and their respective forces in rear. There was nothing abnormal in their use, though undoubtedly the difficulty of moving large forces away from the railway in a sparsely populated and scantily cultivated country greatly accentuated their importance to the British. But in the later stage of the war the whole railway system was in the hands of one combatant, and was not so much a line of communication as a single continuous fortified base from which the British columns operated against an enemy whose base was the open veld. By their hold on the railway the British enjoyed a mobility and power of concentration over the whole area of the war which far more than compensated for the superior local mobility of the Boers. That the struggle was maintained as long as it was, was mainly due to the wideness of the meshes in the railway network.

Troop  
movements.

The transference of troops from one part of the theatre of war to another from time to time imposed a heavy strain on the railways, though no one single move was quite so difficult or on quite so large a scale as the original concentration for Lord Roberts's advance. In July, 1900, Methuen's mounted force was conveyed by rail from Kroonstad to Krugersdorp. This move was carried out in five days by means of thirty-one trains without interfering with the supply service of three trains per day to Pretoria. Again in August, 1900, when de Wet broke out of the Magaliesberg and tried to work round the north of Pretoria, portions of Ian Hamilton's and Baden-Powell's mounted force were railed up to Warmbaths and were thus enabled to head him off. Great use was made in December, 1900, of the lines in the south of the Free State and the north of Cape Colony to check de Wet, fifty-two troop trains leaving Bloemfontein during the month, while in February, 1901, when de Wet actually crossed the Orange River, 89 trains were despatched from the same place within nine days to carry south some 9,000 men, 14,500 horses, 48 guns and transport. For the concentration against the invasion of Natal in October, 1901, 24,418 men and 32,836 horses, with guns and wagons, were carried within thirty-six days. To appreciate fully



the nature of this work it must be remembered that it was carried out on a single line and that the ordinary traffic northwards went on at the same time. Apart from the great efforts at transport for the large concentrations a very large amount of rail carriage for smaller columns was done at various times, and valuable lessons were learnt as to the minimum distances for which it pays to send forces, especially mounted forces, by train. In order to exercise from Pretoria a complete control over all these various movements Lord Kitchener was kept informed daily of the exact state of traffic, both as regards troops and supplies, all over South Africa.

So far nothing has been said in the narrative on the subject of the interruptions to traffic caused by the enemy. These started with de Wet's raid on Lord Roberts's communications in June, 1900, when he stopped all traffic for over a fortnight.\* During this period one bridge—Leeuwspruit—already restored on June 1, was again twice destroyed and twice rebuilt. It is not easy to say for how long the communications might have been interrupted but for the severe check received by the Boers at Zand River on June 14. But the alarming effect upon the situation at Pretoria produced even by this isolated attempt of de Wet's against the railway suggests that a really determined and systematic effort of the Boers to cut the British communications and to keep them cut might have had the most serious consequences. But the Boers never seem to have thought of effectively concentrating their efforts upon the destruction of the British communications, though from now on they devoted a good deal of attention to the capturing of trains and wrecking of the permanent way. So frequent did the attacks on the line become that in July, 1900, night running ceased between Bloemfontein and the Vaal, and in October between Bloemfontein and the Orange, while in January, 1901, no night traffic was possible anywhere on the 1,310 miles of the I.M.R. system. It was not till the blockhouses and armoured trains were well established late on in 1901 that night running was resumed. The I.M.R. system alone was interrupted no less than 255 times between

Boer attacks  
on the line.

\* See vol. iv., p. 267.

June 7, 1900, and June 28, 1901, the worst period being during November, 1900. This destruction of the line and constant blowing up of trains were a most severe test on the running staff of the railway, many of whom were killed. The staff at this time consisted principally of civilians, and their devotion to duty during this trying period was beyond praise. The rapidity with which the large breaks in the line had been made good by the British railway engineers had been a conspicuous feature in the earlier operations. The even greater speed with which these subsequent smaller break, were continually patched up shows that the mere cutting of a railway line has little real military value when there are good technical troops available for repairs.

Armoured  
trains.

It was towards the end of 1900 that the once discredited armoured train was revived and found its proper function. The blowing up of culverts and rails had now become a nightly occurrence, and the repair of the damage done was the regular morning duty of the construction trains kept ready at intervals through the Free State. For this work some protection was necessary, and now that the Boer artillery was scarce, the best escort was an armoured train. Thus resuscitated, primarily as escorts to the construction trains, the armoured trains proved invaluable in many ways, and their number was soon increased to twenty. Their main object was to keep the railway lines free for an unobstructed flow of traffic; but they were used for patrolling, reconnaissance, reinforcement of points on the line, and finally for acting in conjunction with columns in the field. The moral effect alone of the existence of these swift-moving mobile forts upon the railways was considerable. By a gradual evolution, from the first improvised trains to the final type provided with quick-firing guns as well as with Maxims and searchlights, a very efficient weapon was created. But far more important than any technical improvement in the trains themselves was the improvement in the method of employing them. At first, indeed, their somewhat erratic movements seemed not unlikely to become more of an obstruction to traffic than the Boers themselves. To obviate this they were withdrawn from the authority of the officers

commanding sections of the line, and were put directly under the control of Captain H. C. Nanton, R.E., an officer of Girouard's staff. By working in conjunction with Army headquarters and the management of the railways, Nanton was able to harmonize the working of the armoured trains with the general traffic, and at the same time to get the best military results from their use. With the establishment of blockhouses along the lines and the free use of armoured trains the railways had acquired comparative immunity. The occupation of the wrecker had become more precarious, and had finally almost disappeared. But these protective measures, devised in the first instance purely for the conservation of traffic, helped also to convert the railways into formidable barriers. The railways, with their armoured trains, constituted the strongest portion of the whole blockhouse system, and thus played an essential part in Kitchener's policy of separating, enclosing, and hunting down the Boer commandos.



## CHAPTER IV

## THE ENGINEER WORK

Engineering  
and modern  
war.

IN spite of the obvious and increasing importance of the part played by the engineer in our daily lives, it is very doubtful if the preponderating influence he has on modern war is generally realized. We know from the sayings of Napoleon and of Wellington in what high estimation the Engineer arm was held in war by the great commanders of a century ago. It would be interesting if we could have their opinion on the subject in these days when the engineer, using the term in its broadest sense, practically rules the material life of the world in peace. We are so accustomed in our every-day peace life to have all the resources of engineering at our disposal as a matter of course, that we are apt to become oblivious of our dependence on them. There is even more danger of our forgetting how entirely dependent armies now are on their engineers, for, in the theatre of war, all these resources do not always exist ready to hand. There it is no longer a case of buying a railway ticket and taking a seat, of filling in a telegraph form, or of ringing up on the telephone, for the very railway, the telegraphs, and the telephones have often first to be built or organized. Strategy and tactics now have handmaids which are far more indispensable than those existing when life was simpler and war less complicated. The essence of the first large problem of the South African War was to convey our forces out to the front as quickly as possible and then to feed and reinforce them. The railway carried our armies to our ports, steamships transported them across the ocean, and the rail again conveyed them to the front. All this was engineering work, and, though not all carried out by the Army, was all an essential part of the

military operations. The problems of sea transport and of the railway work of the war have been dealt with in the last two chapters. The present chapter will deal with the many other forms of engineering work which fell to the lot of the Royal Engineers and their volunteer helpers. The South African War cannot, indeed, be called a "sapper's war," in the sense that the Crimean and the Russo-Japanese Wars were, for, in spite of the fact that sieges occurred, there were no regular siege operations. With this single exception, however, the long-continued struggle not only called, at some time or another, for the exercise of all the arts of the military engineer, but brought out some developments quite new in warfare. Some of the duties performed were conspicuous and obvious, but more were comparatively obscure, though none the less important because they lacked excitement or notice. An immense amount was done by the Engineers—Regular, Volunteer, and civil, and no duties during the campaign were better or more conscientiously carried out.

With the exception of the railway and the telegraphs, all the work carried out by the Engineers in South Africa was under the control and administration of the Chief Engineer, Major-General (now Sir Elliott) Wood, C.B., R.E. At the commencement of the war, after the reinforcements had been sent out, the proportion and allotment of the field units were according to the usual scale for a field army; but they changed considerably with the development of the campaign. So long as the troops were employed in the normal army organization, *i.e.*, before the guerilla war, the Engineer units may be for convenience classified as consisting of divisional units, of which there was one field company per division, and extra divisional\* units, such as field troops, bridging troops, telegraph divisions, survey, balloon and search-light sections, steam road transport companies, fortress and railway companies. When, however, the divisional organization of the Army ceased, this classification no longer held good. The fortress companies were lines of communication units, and

General  
organization  
of R.E. in  
South Africa.

\* These include "corps" units and others, such as fortress and railway companies, which are not corps units.

both fortress and field companies together were the units for general engineer work, as opposed to special duties. The former were employed on stationary work, while the latter, being "field" units, were mobile and worked with the Field Army. For the purpose of this chapter the work of the field and the fortress companies will be treated more or less together, that of the special units being separately considered.

Fortress  
companies  
and work on  
lines of com-  
munication.

The work in the different garrisons and on the lines of communication generally is first considered because, however much the demand for other branches of engineer work varied during the campaign, the necessity for this existed from the very first and steadily increased. The peace garrison of Royal Engineers in South Africa included one fortress company, the 29th, stationed at Cape Town. In December, 1899, four more fortress companies arrived upon the scene, the 6th, 20th, 31st, and 42nd, of which all but the first were employed at once on railways. Thus the units for general engineer work on the lines of communication were at first the 29th and 6th companies, though gradually other fortress companies, portions of field companies, and some of the special units were so employed. Operations commenced early in 1899 with the arrangement of all sorts of accommodation for possible troop concentrations near the base, and continued, when war became imminent, with similar work and with the work of making defences on the frontier. The duties then gradually extended to almost every post\* in the theatre of war which was held for any length of time, and their nature can only be very briefly summarized. They included the preparation of camps for the original concentrations, for permanent garrisons, and for prisoners of war; the erection of huts for cantonments, for prisoners of war, for hut hospitals, and for the accessory buildings of general hospitals (under canvas); the erection of storehouses and sheds for every purpose, of stables, remount establishments with all their accessories, such as kraals, sick lines, dipping troughs, etc., etc., and of quarters and offices. In this direction accessory buildings were put up for hospitals

\* In Mafeking there were during the siege no Engineers, and the garrison carried out all the engineering work.



for 20,000 and hut wards for 6,000 beds; hut barracks were erected for 7,500 men and for 8,500 prisoners of war; 210,000 square feet of floor space of covered storage was arranged, also sheds and stabling for 10,000 horses, kraals, watering and feeding arrangements for 53,000 horses and mules. All this construction work included water supply, drainage, sanitary services and maintenance. The lighting, largely electric, was carried out by the search-light sections and the Electrical Engineer Volunteers. Boring for water\* and the manufacture of ice were also among the various duties performed. When "blockhousing" commenced, factories were started at different centres for the manufacture of blockhouses completely ready for erection by the field parties. A blockhouse included a water tank, wire entanglement, alarm signals, flare lights, fixed rifle batteries, and in some cases land mines, some of which fittings were improvised by the erectors. Finally, the work all along included the placing of posts in a state of defence, and for this duty the Engineers were latterly held entirely responsible. The amount of work under the various headings here given was enormous, and of the first importance. But any detailed treatment of it would be impossible within the limits of the present chapter.

The defence work at Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking has been dealt with in the chapters describing those sieges. Considerable ingenuity was shown in some instances, but on the whole the defences were not very elaborate from the engineering point of view. The boldest and most original piece of military engineering, indeed, essayed in the war was the Boer attempt to flood out Ladysmith by damming up the Klip River.† In many instances, too, notably in the fighting on the Tugela and at Magersfontein, the Boers showed no inconsiderable native talent for field engineering. Their deep, narrow, and winding trenches offered admirable protection against shrapnel or lyddite, and afforded a most

The sieges  
and field  
engineering.

\* At Enslin and Graspan the water supply essential to permit of Lord Roberts's great concentration was secured by deep boring with a diamond drill. A great deal of boring was required later to supply the blockhouses on the Victoria West—Lambert's Bay line.

† Vol. iv., p. 525.

useful object-lesson of which the British were not slow to avail themselves.

Evolution of  
defences.

The progressive development of the scale and nature of the defences of posts up to the blockhouse era is interesting. At first the garrisons left behind at these places were strong, and the defences enclosed a large area. They consisted of earth-works and sangars, as low and inconspicuous as possible in order to escape artillery fire, and well dispersed for the same reason and also for fire effect: the defence depended chiefly on the frontal fire effect of a large number of rifles. As more and more troops were needed for the mobile columns, however, and the garrisons were reduced in strength, the perimeters of the defences originally constructed were found to be far too large, and had to be contracted. Owing to the reduced numbers it was now impossible to rely entirely on frontal fire: it was necessary to place, at commanding points, self-supporting small posts which could fire across the front. A better field of fire could now be obtained from such posts, for, owing to the decrease in the enemy's artillery, the concealment afforded by a low command was no longer essential. The ultimate and logical result of this tendency to get the best value from the modern rifle was the defence of a post by means of the fire from a few blockhouses round it, and not from a continuous enceinte of trenches.\*

Field  
companies.

Besides the 23rd Company, which had been in the country before the war, and was shut up in Ladysmith, the field companies of the Natal army were reinforced in November and December, 1899, by the 17th and 37th Companies, the divisional units of the Second and Fifth Divisions. Before the outbreak of hostilities there was one company, the 7th, in Cape Colony; in November it was joined by the 11th out from home. These two companies with two other units† accompanied Methuen's advance up to Magersfontein, being largely employed on railway repairing. In December the

\* This process did not begin generally till the end of 1900, but the principle had been applied before in certain instances. See the discussion on Ian Hamilton's defences at Ladysmith, vol. iii., pp. 178, 179. For a full account of the genesis of the blockhouses and the nature of their construction, see vol. v., pp. 256-261, 396-408.

† 8th Railway, 31st Fortress, and part of the 29th Fortress Companies.

12th Company joined the Third Division before Stormberg, and the 26th joined French at Colesberg, subsequently going to the Seventh Division. For Clements's force the 47th Fortress Company was converted into a field company, while the three divisional companies which took part in the march upon Bloemfontein were the 38th, the 9th, and the 7th. When the divisional organization ceased, the companies remained almost permanently split up. The country was then divided into areas under C.R.E.'s at the different headquarters. The headquarters and portions of the field companies were as a rule stationed at these places whilst various sections trekked across the country doing field duties.

The field work remained much the same in nature (except for the blockhouse construction) during the whole war, and consisted of ordinary duties, camp water supply, boring for water, arrangement of field defences, building of road bridges, assisting to repair railway bridges, making roads and drifts, assisting in telegraph and railway work, blocking drifts, laying land mines, etc., etc. As the forces moving about grew smaller and more mobile the sections of the field companies also became more mobile. It was found necessary to mount many of the sappers to enable them to do their very heavy work on the march, for it often happened that they had to remain behind the column, to complete a drift or bridge and see the transport over, and then overtake the column which had marched ahead, in order to arrange the water-supply at the halting place. One feature of the work was the great amount of drift making, and to assist in this, gangs of Kaffirs were employed as labourers, being in some cases mounted on donkeys collected on the march. There was less actual bridging than might have occurred elsewhere, and, except for the blowing up of farms, there was very little demolition by explosives, though one or two chances of cutting the line behind the enemy were seized with good results. When the blockhouse lines began to be erected all over the country the field sections had the work of selecting sites and erecting the blockhouses in addition to their other duties. The number of blockhouses of all sorts erected when peace was declared amounted to 8.000, most of which were erected

Work of the  
field units.



by sections of field companies. By the end of the war this work became greatly simplified and very expeditious. Upon deciding to blockhouse an area the houses were despatched from the reserve at all the blockhouse factories, and taken out by the different columns and parties ready for erection. Thus when it was settled to blockhouse the district Vryburg—Mafeking—Lichtenburg, blockhouses were concentrated and despatched from Middelburg, Standerton, Pretoria, Elandsfontein, Bloemfontein, and Cape Town, and it was possible to erect 400 in six weeks. Generally speaking, the longer the war went on the more fully was the usefulness of the field work of the Engineers realized. Divisional or column commanders who had never commanded Engineers, or at most only on manœuvres, at first hardly appreciated them or knew how to make use of them. This very soon changed when they had to deal with the actual difficulties of constructing defences—instead of laying tapes on the ground—of crossing rivers, or securing a water supply. At the end of the war there was a continual demand from column commanders for Engineers, especially for junior Engineer officers. The conclusions most obvious from the experiences of the war were the need for a larger proportion of field Engineers to other troops, and for having a larger number of the Engineers mounted.

The work  
with the  
cavalry and  
mounted  
troops.

In 1899 the authorized proportion of mounted Engineers was one field troop, consisting of headquarters and two sections, to each Cavalry Division, but only one troop—the 1st—was sent out from England. This troop at once joined the force under French at Arundel and remained with the cavalry during the whole of the war. The need for greater elasticity was very soon found necessary, and the troop was reorganized into headquarters and three sections. During the halt at Bloemfontein, when the number of mounted men in the country had greatly increased, the existing mounted Engineers could no longer cope with the technical duties of all the mounted forces, and a second—Number 2 Field Troop—of headquarters and two sections, was formed of sappers from other field units and of mounted infantry and Colonials. A small mounted detachment of some R.E., Australians and Canadians, was also formed in May. It existed until

October, 1900, and was known as the Australian Pioneers. On the Natal side, when Buller's army was preparing to advance from Ladysmith, a third troop—Number 3—was formed from the balloon section which had been in Ladysmith, supplemented by men picked from the artillery and infantry. The need for more mounted sappers to work with the still increasing number of mounted columns was again felt in August, 1900, and in that month yet another—the 4th Field Troop—was formed. Some detachments consisting of a few mounted men working under an R.E. captain or subaltern were temporarily improvised for work with columns. One such was formed early in 1900 for work with the Colonial Division; another was formed in January, 1900, from the Railway Pioneers in connexion with the project for cutting the Delagoa railway. As to the employment of these units, generally speaking, a field troop was not kept together as a whole, but was split up into its sections, each of which worked with a brigade of cavalry or of mounted infantry, and later with the independent mounted columns.

The normal work was to carry out for the mounted forces exactly the same duties as the field companies performed for the dismounted. The only portion of these duties, however, of which we need give any account here is that of raiding in order to cut communications. The American Civil War still affords the best example of the value of such operations carried out frequently and on a large scale, and South Africa shows little to compare with what was then done. The opportunities offered to the British were limited, and only lasted until they reached the Portuguese border. In January, 1900, the cavalry essayed to cut the line behind the Boers at Colesberg, and to blow up the Colesberg road bridge over the Orange River, but were frustrated by the enemy. When the cavalry got close to Bloemfontein in March, the railway line was successfully cut by a party of cavalry and Engineers who rode round to the north of Bloemfontein and blew up a culvert, thus capturing several locomotives and a considerable amount of rolling-stock, which proved of the utmost use.\* In May the line

Cutting communications.

\* Vol. iii., p. 589.

was successfully broken north of Kroonstad, but the result was unimportant. Later the railway and wires were cut in front of the main advance near Roodepoort on the Rand, and again near Elandsfontein. By this several engines and some rolling-stock were gained. An attempt to isolate Pretoria by breaking the Delagoa line immediately to the east was prevented by the enemy.\* Much more important than any of these minor raids would have been the successful blowing up of one of the main bridges on the Delagoa line. This project was often discussed and once or twice attempted, the most successful attempt being made by Steinaecker's Horse on June 17, 1900.† On the whole, though the opportunities for cutting the Boer railway communications were limited, it cannot be said that the most was made of them. There was plenty of initiative and zeal shown by individuals to attempt this work; but there was a reluctance at headquarters to face the probable sacrifice of small detachments as "forlorn hopes" in order to gain some possibly very great advantage.

**Defensive  
demolition.**

In this connexion it may be as well to refer to the kindred duty of defensive demolition of railways, bridges, etc., in face of an advancing enemy. On the British side this work was entirely neglected in the opening weeks of the war, when everything depended on it. The destruction of Laing's Nek tunnel, and of the railway to the south of it, and the demolition of the bridges at Norval's Pont, Aliwal North and Bethulie, would have completely altered the whole subsequent course of events. Here again the blame does not rest upon the technical services, but on the general incapacity to realize the seriousness of the war, and on a curious belief, apparently prevalent on the British side, that if they left the expensive bridges and tunnels undamaged the Boers would do so likewise. As a matter of fact, the Boers carried out the work of demolition systematically throughout their successive retreats, the only exception being the line Norval's Pont—Bloemfontein, which the rapidity of Lord Roberts's advance compelled them to leave intact. Of the prevention of demolition by the enemy, the most

\* Vol. iv., p. 155.

† Vol. iv., p. 386.



noteworthy instance occurred during Gatacre's advance in March, 1900, when the Boer charges, ready placed and connected up for blowing up Bethulie road bridge, were drawn under fire by Captain P. G. Grant, R.E., and Lieutenant Popham.\*

With the exception of the railway bridging there was <sup>Bridging.</sup> comparatively little heavy bridging carried out during the campaign. By far the greatest amount of heavy floating bridge work during the war was carried out on the Tugela by "A" Troop, Bridging Battalion,† assisted by the field companies on that side. From January 17 to February 29, 1900, numerous pontoon and trestle bridges were constructed, on two occasions under fire. On the other side, during Methuen's advance, a pontoon bridge was thrown across the Modder River the morning after the fight—November 29—by a field company. The largest floating bridge made during the war was constructed across the Orange River near Norval's Pont on March 15, when Clements's force moved into the Free State. This bridge, made by "C" Troop, assisted by other R.E. and infantry, was 266 yards long. The crossing of Clements's force and the subsequent repair of the broken Norval's Pont railway bridge, together afford a peculiarly interesting example of the successive stages in the crossing of a river in war. About March 10, while the Boers were still holding the north bank, an Engineer officer swam across to reconnoitre. On March 15 the covering infantry were ferried over in single pontoons, and on the same day the pontoon bridge was constructed and the force marched across. On the 19th a flying bridge, consisting of a large "pont" travelling along a wire cable, was rigged up near the broken railway bridge to take stores across from rail to rail, for, thanks to our raid north of Bloemfontein, trains were running from Norval's Pont to that place. On the 25th an overhead "aerial tram," supported on wire cables and hauled by steam, was conveying supplies from rail to rail at the rate of six tons per hour; and on the 27th this

\* See vol. iii., p. 593.

† Commanded by Major J. L. Irvine.

was supplanted by a low-level deviation bridge across which entire trains ran. By May 20 the high-level bridge was repaired and traffic passed over as before the war. No pontoons were taken by Lord Roberts on the march to Bloemfontein, and their absence was felt at Paardeberg when the Modder River was in flood. Excepting on one minor occasion, however, the pontoons were hardly needed on the subsequent advance to Pretoria, neither the Vet, the Zand, the Valsch, nor the Vaal Rivers necessitating floating bridges. In fact, after the Tugela and Orange Rivers had been crossed, no large floating bridges were necessary, and the bridging units—"A" and "C" Troops, Bridging Battalion, had, after March, 1900, very little of their own special work to do, and were mainly employed on ordinary engineer duties. Smaller bridges were built continually by the field companies for the movements of columns during the whole war; but owing to the nature of the country and the climate, bridging was usually replaced by the construction or repair of drifts. Though the floating bridge work in South Africa could not have been better done than it was, the existence of special units for its execution hardly seemed justified by the experience of the war, and the bridging companies have since then been abolished. Even in the best-watered countries this work should not be beyond the powers of field companies, provided they are sufficient in number and have the material at their disposal.\* At the time of the war every field company only carried enough pontoons and trestles for the immediate construction, without waiting for improvised material, of a floating and trestle bridge for all arms of fifteen yards length. The non-floating and foot bridges made all over the country were numerous and very different

\* This is the general view, but it is not shared by all R.E. officers. "The worst economy ever practised, and likely to bring about in any future campaign the difficulties experienced by the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula, and by the Americans in the Civil War," is the opinion of one distinguished officer on the abolition of the bridging companies. It is worth noting that the advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria took place in the dry season and that the river crossings were not seriously disputed. In a country with deep rivers and in face of a powerful enemy the pontoons would play a much larger part.

in design, varying from the suspension type carried by wire cables to girders knocked up out of roof rafters and corrugated iron, for of all the work that the military engineer has to do, perhaps bridging gives scopes for the greatest ingenuity in improvisation from the materials available.

Balloons were made use of for military purposes by the Ballooning. British Army as early as 1885, both in Bechuanaland and at Suakim. This time three ballooning units were sent out. No. 2 section, arriving in Natal in October, 1899, was at once sent up to Ladysmith. No. 1 section, arriving in November, was sent up to join Methuen's force on the Modder River, and No. 3, arriving in March, 1900, proceeded straight up to Warrenton on the western advance. Besides these, a fourth section was improvised for Buller's force outside Ladysmith. This was composed of more or less inexperienced *personnel* and equipped with surplus stores from the other sections. The actual work accomplished by the units with the different forces can be summarized as follows:—From the end of October till the beginning of December, *i.e.*, as long as gas could be obtained, frequent ascents were made from Ladysmith. The balloons were often fired at, but suffered little damage. As a practical result of their employment, some of the laagers were located and the enemy's movements were observed. A map was made of the country between Ladysmith and Colenso, and some heliograph messages from the relieving force were read. The unit improvised with Buller's force was boldly used, but the height of the hills was such as to conceal most of the Boer movements, and no attempts at ascents were made after the relief of Ladysmith. On the Kimberley side, No. 1 section joined at Modder River just before the battle of Magersfontein, during which ascents were made. During the subsequent halt at Modder River, a balloon was kept in the air continually in order to watch for any movement of the enemy from Magersfontein. The progress of French's march on Kimberley was watched, and on February 16 the reports as to the Boer position having been evacuated during the night were verified. The section then joined Lord Roberts's force at Paardeberg, where a balloon was again kept continually up for some days, the information



obtained being very useful. A sketch map of the Boer position, which was at this juncture of extreme value and greatly helped our attack, was also made by Lieutenant A. H. W. Grubb, R.E. At Poplar Grove the enemy's retirement was watched and reported. On the advance from Bloemfontein a balloon was kept filled and always ready, and ascents were made at the Vet and Zand River fights, and again outside Pretoria itself, but no very valuable results were obtainable. The 3rd section, on its arrival at Warrenton, proved of considerable service in locating the enemy's positions at Fourteen Streams, and in directing the fire of the howitzers and of the 6-inch gun. No more observation being required, the section then took over railway duties and ran the railway from Potchefstroom to Klerksdorp for seventeen days. Subsequently it was amalgamated with the 1st section into one unit, which proceeded a certain distance on the eastern advance, but, owing to lack of transport was sent back to Pretoria without being utilized. In July it ceased its existence as a balloon unit and was employed on various engineer duties.

Value of  
balloons.

Before the results of the employment of balloons in South Africa can be discussed, there are one or two points which will bear consideration. It is obvious that the value of captive balloons for observation is greatly diminished in mountainous regions. Not only are wind squalls, which interfere with ascents, frequent, but natural high points for observation already exist, so that the extra height obtained by a balloon does not confer much advantage. In many cases, too, the range of vision even of a balloon is extremely limited by the configuration of the hills round. It was to be expected, therefore, that not very much value would be obtained from the employment of balloons in Natal. Outside Natal, the balloons were used all along Roberts's advance, and it was only when the mountainous Eastern Transvaal was entered that their employment was abandoned. Afterwards there was practically no scope for the use of captive balloons. It needs a fight between fairly large masses, and one of some duration in one spot, to give time for an ascent to be made, for the observer to grasp the situation sufficiently to send

down useful information to the general, and for the general to act upon it. A running fight between comparatively small numbers scattered over a large area is too kaleidoscopic for this form of reconnaissance.\* During the earlier period of the war the balloons were of distinct service, and justified their employment. It is true that the collection of intelligence was intermittent and that fire observation for the guns often could not be carried out, but this only shows that balloon observation is no more infallible than other forms of reconnaissance. Apart from the direct advantages gained—of observation, etc.—there was another important result of their use, and that was their moral effect on the enemy. It is a well-known fact that a balloon in the air produces a curious impression upon those it is watching. As it can be seen by all within the range of vision, there is a natural tendency to suppose that the observer in it can see very much more of those below than is the case. It is thus endowed with entirely exaggerated powers specially disturbing to the ignorant, and there is no doubt that the *moral* of the Boers was to a considerable extent affected by the mere presence of our captive balloons whenever they were used. Thus, according to subsequent statements of burghers, the Boer retirement at Fourteen Streams was largely due to the moral effect produced by the balloon.†

The search-light and electric lighting work was of a specially technical character, and in few branches of the duties carried out by the Army in South Africa was more assistance given by the Volunteers than in this. The Regular units—the 1st and 2nd Search-light Sections, R.E., the first of which landed in March, 1900—were towards the end of the year amalgamated into one section. The Volunteer detachments were all from the Electrical Engineers, R.E. (Volunteers), the first detachment consisting of two sections which remained in the country from March to November, 1900. A fresh

\* It is interesting to speculate what would have been the effect upon the guerilla war if Kitchener had been able to dispose of a few dirigible balloons or aeroplanes to report on the whereabouts of commandos and laagers.

† Vol. iv., p. 217. See also vol. ii., p. 143, for the exaggerated powers ascribed by the Boers to the British war balloons at the outbreak of war.

detachment of two companies was sent out in the beginning of the following year; this was gradually increased to five companies and organized as a battalion of Electrical Engineers. During a great part of 1900 the Regular and Volunteer search-light units were kept on railway work, lighting up the repair operations at the large bridges in order to permit of day and night work, or on the railway telegraphs; but towards the end of the year all were employed in lighting hospitals, depots, etc. When, during 1901, the second detachment of Volunteers arrived, the broad division of work between the Regulars and Volunteers was that the R.E. search-light section carried on the more essentially field duties, such as that of the armoured train and mobile lights, whilst most of the fixed lights and the more permanent work were handed over to the Volunteers. The electric lighting carried out included that of all the large hospitals and of prisoners' camps, barracks, depots, stores, offices, etc. The Electrical Engineers in addition carried out much permanent telegraph erection and maintenance and telephone work. Their duties also incidentally included signalling, land-mines, a certain amount of steam transport and erection of buildings, and electricians' duties of every kind. At the close of the war they were split up into over sixty separate detachments all employed on technical work.

**Search-lights.** At the beginning of the war search-lights were made use of when available in the besieged towns. In Kimberley they were installed from those used by De Beers for guarding the diamond floors, and were run by the R.E. and by the civil employees of the mines. In Mafeking, where electric light projectors did not exist, acetylene search-lights were improvised and worked by the garrison, which included no sappers. In Ladysmith there were none. Outside Ladysmith two search-lights were employed. They were at first chiefly used for signalling into the besieged town from Estcourt. One plant was borrowed from the Durban Harbour Board and made up from apparatus taken off a tug in Durban harbour. This was run by civilians under the Engineers. The second, made up of plant obtained in the same way fitted with a naval projector, was mounted on a truck and manned by the



Navy. Later on both plants were used in the operations round Colenso. The Boers were quite alive to the value of search-lights, and though they had no special units allotted to the work, their Telegraph Corps put up two installations round Ladysmith and prepared an emplacement in their position at Colenso, the projectors being brought down from the Pretoria forts. This search-light plant fell into our hands after the relief. The next opportunity for the use of search-lights arose from the need of protecting the various occupied towns and posts against night attacks. For this purpose the Transvaal was not ill equipped, electricity being the common system of lighting of the larger towns, while most of the numerous mines had their own generating plant. Thus there were in many cases no difficulties in the way of obtaining power, dynamos, and wiring. Johannesburg and the Rand were especially well off in this respect, and it was for the protection of certain posts on the mines that some of the first defence lights were put up. More projectors were subsequently imported, and lights were gradually established at many of the permanent garrisons. As to their defensive value the evidence is certainly only negative, but they seem to have had a deterrent effect. From the siege of Kimberley onwards, it was noticeable that those places where lights were installed were rarely attacked. No doubt the value of search-lights, as of balloons and land-mines, is largely moral, especially against an unsophisticated enemy. If a party of burghers wandering across the veld were suddenly caught in a beam, even at such a range that it was quite impossible for those anywhere near the projector to see them, they at once imagined that, because they were plainly visible to each other, they must be equally visible to the enemy, and were consequently afraid to proceed. When towards the end of 1900 an organized armoured train service was created for the patrolling and protection of the railways, the provision of search-lights on the trains was found essential. Small projectors were improvised and all the trains were gradually equipped. These lights increased the value of the trains, for the presence of a light alone was often sufficient to keep the enemy away from the railway line. At a later stage the

search-lights on these same armoured trains were used with considerable effect in the drives. Their usefulness suggested the desirability of having a similar line of lights along the cross-country blockhouse lines, and a service of mobile lights drawn by motor transport or animals was improvised, and was becoming regularly organized when peace was declared.

Steam Road  
Transport.

It was decided as early as October, 1899, to send out a certain number of steam traction engines to South Africa, Colonel J. Templer, K.R.R. (Militia), being appointed Director of Steam Road Transport. Though this form of transport had for many years been one of the duties of the Engineers, no special unit for this work existed. In November, 1899, a new unit—the 45th Steam Road Transport Company, R.E.—was formed, and a certain number of civilian experts were engaged in England. The first lot of engines was unfortunately wrecked on the way out. This involved considerable delay and the engines subsequently secured were hardly as serviceable as those originally secured. However, work was started at Kimberley in a small way in March, 1900, with an equipment of comparatively few “trains,” by the conveyance of supplies to Boshof, Barkly West, and to various camps. From this beginning, in spite of many technical difficulties, and notwithstanding that the uses and limitations of traction engines were not at first properly understood by those for whom they worked, the value of the service became every day more evident, and the work carried out by it more extended. From the original numbers of 5 officers and 119 others, military and civil, the *personnel* had increased, when peace was declared, to 10 officers, 447 other ranks, military and civil, and 238 natives. The engines had increased in number, by importations and by commandeering, from the 11 first sent out to 46.

Method of  
employment.

The transport “stations” were formed at various places on the railways and served as bases or headquarters of a number of traction trains which ran the supplies out from them to posts off the line. At all these “stations” it was necessary to organize some means of carrying out small repairs and refitting, but for the heavier work large repair and building shops gradually grew up at Cape Town and

smaller shops at Kimberley. The chief drawbacks to the work were the lack of water, the existence of sandy belts, the absence of bridges, or continuous rain. For these reasons it was essential that a road should be thoroughly reconnoitred beforehand for use by traction engines, a fact not always appreciated at first. Being tied to suitable routes where water and coal could be obtained or their absence provided against, steam transport really took the place of light railways, and once this principle was generally understood, worked extremely well. A curious feature of its employment was that the enemy very rarely attacked a steam transport convoy.\*

As some criterion of the saving gained by the use of steam over ox transport, it can be assumed roughly that one engine and train could do the work of 10 to 12 ox wagons, each drawn by a span of 16 oxen. Not only was the number of animals thus greatly reduced by the employment of steam, but the wage bill was also cut down. Apart from this actual saving, the system also gave a possibility of carrying on when animals failed. In 1901, during the outbreak of rinderpest, not only were trek oxen short, but they were not allowed to move from one district to another; there was no quarantine on the traction engines. The total work done amounted to 1,705,203 ton miles carried at an estimated saving of some £50,000 net over the cost of ox transport for the same amount of haulage—this on the assumption that the oxen required had been available. Not being a very exciting nor, except to those concerned, a very interesting branch of military work, the Steam Road Transport Service did not attract quite the notice it deserved. It is certain that it greatly simplified the supply problem during the whole war, but more especially towards the end, when the whole country was dotted about with small detachments. Since the war a great deal more attention has been given to the organization of this branch of transport duties,

Advantages  
of steam  
transport.

\* The suspicious nature of the Boers was in itself a great protection to the engines. When a traction engine had to be abandoned on the veld it was only necessary, in order to prevent its being damaged, to fasten a couple of wires to the engine and bury them in the sand.



not only as regards steam, but also as regards motor traction—the latter a form of transport which in South Africa was only used for the mobile search-lights, but whose importance in future campaigns cannot be over-estimated.

Survey and  
mapping  
work.

The lack of suitable campaigning maps of the theatre of operations at the beginning of the war was freely commented on at the time. Accurate mapping is not a very expensive operation; at any rate, its cost bears a very small proportion to the total cost of preparing for or conducting a war. The whole of Cape Colony and Natal could have been mapped for £150,000, and even a fifth of that sum well spent in these colonies and in the Boer Republics might have proved of inestimable value. The real reason of the failure to provide the first and essential foundation of all military information was not expense, but the fact that the War Office did not, in practice at any rate, show anything approaching an adequate conception of the meaning of the word information. If it is asked why the colonies did not carry out this mapping for themselves, the answer is obvious; detailed topographical maps are by no means a necessity for a colony in the earlier stages of its development, though they are an essential adjunct for the conduct of war. The colonies did not feel under any obligation to provide for the military necessities of the Empire, nor indeed were they seriously pressed to undertake or to assist in this duty. As a matter of fact, a triangulation of the first order had been carried out in these two colonies in the years 1883–1892.\* But so far as military necessities were concerned, this geodetic triangulation was practically valueless, though it would have furnished an admirable basis for topographical work. The colonies, having spent so much money on the triangulation, may perhaps, with some reason, have considered that they had done enough for the time, so by a kind of paradox we must put the execution of this triangulation as a possible contributory cause towards the unsatisfactory state of affairs which existed at the outbreak of war.

\* By Major (now Colonel Sir W. G.) Morris, R.E. The execution of this triangulation was due to the initiative of Sir David Gill, H.M. Astronomer at the Cape.

There existed in the Cape Colony at the outbreak of the war "Divisional Maps" of the Colonial Survey Department. Maps in existence at outbreak of war. These maps, which were on a scale of 2 miles to 1 inch, were compiled by fitting together farm plans. They were essentially property diagrams. No hill features were shown; some streams were shown, some were not; the compilation, moreover, was by no means perfect; there were "gaps" and "overlaps." These maps were therefore of little use for military purposes. In Natal a military sketch map on a scale of 1 inch to 1 mile of the triangular portion of the Colony to the north of Ladysmith had been carried out in 1896, by Major S. C. N. Grant, R.E. The area mapped was about 4,000 square miles, but most unfortunately the work did not extend to the south of Ladysmith. In the Transvaal and Orange Free State no topographical survey had been undertaken. Large portions of the Transvaal, indeed, had been mapped in a series of farm surveys. But here again, as in the case of Cape Colony, the work had been done with a view to recording the ownership of land—to showing the boundaries of estates and not the topographical features which affect a campaign. Besides, there were a few large scale surveys of special small areas, such as townships, mining land, etc. Not only, therefore, were there no topographical maps existing in South Africa at the beginning of the war, but there was very little useful material for the Army surveyors or cartographers to work upon. If, in addition, we remember that a large portion of the area of future active operations was in possession of the enemy and not easily accessible, the full nature of the task of equipping the Army with suitable war maps becomes apparent. There were, it is true, a number of reconnaissances made by officers before the declaration of war, but these were of special points and made for specific purposes, and come more naturally under the head of Intelligence reconnaissance than of cartography.

To remedy this state of affairs was the duty of the survey and mapping sections. A survey section consisted of an officer and from six to eight specially-trained non-commissioned officers and men; a mapping section consisted of an officer and from five to ten non-commissioned officers Work done by survey and mapping sections.

and men, with civilian draughtsmen and surveyors attached in some cases. A survey section normally carries out the actual surveying—the field work—while a mapping section, from the work of the survey section or from any other available sources, compiles, edits, prints, and issues the finished maps. This division of duties, however, was by no means rigidly adhered to during the war, and it often happened that the survey sections did the work of the mapping sections, and *vice versa*. During the whole war two survey sections were employed continuously, and three mapping sections were organized. No 1 Survey Section, under Major H. M. Jackson, R.E., after mapping the Orange River station and Strydenburg regions, accompanied Army headquarters on Lord Roberts's advance,\* and was engaged, during the halt at Bloemfontein, in compiling from the Free State farm surveys maps of localities likely to be the scene of operations. This section, together with a mapping section, remained to the end of the war at Pretoria. No. 2 Survey Section was chiefly employed between Cape Town and Kimberley, having its headquarters at Cape Town, where a mapping section was also stationed. This was the centre of the work for Cape Colony. The third mapping section was stationed at Bloemfontein. From Cape Town, Bloemfontein, and Pretoria, the work of preparing and issuing maps to the Army went on continuously. The first series of maps issued to the troops was a patchwork of proper topographical surveys joined up by reconnaissances and filled in from existing farm surveys. As districts became pacified more areas were accurately surveyed and fresh editions issued. During 1900, the Imperial map of South Africa for the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony was compiled from the available sources by Messrs. Wood and Ortlepp, of Cape Town, under arrangement with the Field Intelligence Division on a scale of 3·94 miles to 1 inch. The corresponding map for Cape Colony was completed with the assistance of

\* During the actual advance there was naturally no opportunity for extended survey, and the work of the survey section was confined to making maps round those places where the halts allowed of this being done, and to making a traverse of the route of the advance.



the Surveyor-General and the Public Works Department in 1901. After the occupation of Pretoria a series of maps of the Transvaal was issued, covering nearly the whole country in sixty sheets, and it was on the correction and continual reissue of this series that the Pretoria sections were occupied till the middle of 1901. This map was on a scale of 2·347 miles to 1 inch. A topographical survey of some 3,000 square miles of the Transvaal was then carried out and incorporated in a fresh edition of the map. The mapping of the Orange River Colony was carried out in a similar way, and by the beginning of 1902 there were sheets available for the whole colony. In addition to the above main maps, numerous large scale maps of small areas, reconnaissance maps, and reports were printed and issued by the survey units, also telegraph maps, route maps, military organization maps, skeleton maps, besides various miscellaneous Intelligence publications, such as almanacs, directories, entraining facilities at railway stations, particulars of mountain passes, topographical reports, etc. The methods of reproduction in the field consisted of lithography, photo-lithography, photo-zincography, and the Vandyke process. By these means were printed some 340,000 maps at Bloemfontein and Pretoria; at Cape Town 106,000 copies of the Imperial map of Cape Colony were reproduced.

The chief deduction to be made in the matter is that no efforts during a war will compensate for the lack of a proper topographical survey made in peace time. Maps are a necessity to a modern army, and the expense of making them is very small compared with the cost of a campaign. The preparation of a military map of any part of the world in which British troops are even remotely likely to be called upon to fight is a matter of absolute obligation.

This was an entirely new departure in methods of military reconnaissance and therefore deserves mention, though not very much of it was done during the campaign. Encouraging results had been obtained in England in the taking of panoramic photographs of positions, etc., in order to amplify the usual reconnaissance reports and sketches, the actual views being taken by long-range cameras with tele-photographic

Need of maps  
for the  
future.

Photographic  
reconnais-  
sance.

lenses. Views were thus obtained which were in some ways more true and usually more quickly made than those drawn by hand. A small detachment consisting of one officer and a N.C.O. was fitted up and sent out with the necessary equipment to do this work from bicycles. The detachment joined French's headquarters at Colesberg, and was employed with the 1st Cavalry Division in its operations round Naauwpoort, where a large amount of this special panoramic work—combined with the ordinary rapid reconnaissance map work—was carried out, including a series of panoramas of the Boer positions and laagers, as seen from Coles Kop. After completing an extensive reconnaissance north of Bloemfontein, the detachment was no longer employed on its special work. It is hard to say what the value of the photo-reconnaissance work was. The method was quite an innovation in war, and the unit sent to carry out the work in South Africa was small and nobody's child. It seems doubtful whether its existence or possibilities were ever really appreciated, or whether it ever got a chance of showing what could be done by its means.\*

The Army telegraphs. A separate branch of Engineer work.

The Telegraph work in South Africa was, like the railways, a separate branch, and was under the control and administration of a Director of Army Telegraphs, Lieut.-Colonel R. L. Hippisley, R.E., who reached South Africa early in December. Meanwhile, before the arrival of the technical telegraph units of the Army on the Cape side, the Postmaster-General of Cape Colony had collected materials and made arrangements for the repair of the telegraphs damaged by the invading commandos, and had also opened new offices for the use of the Army. Indeed, during this period as well as later, the Army received the greatest assistance from the Telegraph Department of Cape Colony. Upon Colonel Hippisley's arrival, arrangements were made for a proper division of the control and working of the telegraphs between the civil and the military. On the

\* A large number of panoramic photographs (not tele-photographs) were taken by the editor for the present work, and proved very useful for the purpose of filling in topographical details in the battle-plans, more particularly in the case of the Natal battle-fields.

Natal side, the headquarters and one section of the Army Telegraphs arrived in October in time to be shut up in Ladysmith, the officer in command, Major W. F. Hawkins, R.E., becoming Director of Telegraphs on that side. For Buller's army outside Ladysmith, a section under Lieutenant R. J. Jelf was transferred in December from the 1st Telegraph Division \* on the Cape side, and the whole of the telegraphic work, until the relief, was carried out by this section, a remarkable achievement. On the Cape side the 1st Telegraph Division arrived at De Aar in November, and a "permanent line party" of two officers and fifty other ranks landed just before Christmas. Thus at the end of December, 1899, there were in South Africa five sections—one in Ladysmith, one with Buller, three on the Cape side, and also one permanent telegraph party. The amount of material in the country was 315 miles of air-line, 184 miles of cable, and 55 "offices."

From a telegraphic point of view the whole war can be divided into three periods. During the first, which extended, roughly, up to the junction of Roberts's and Buller's forces, the work consisted of establishing field communication between large forces and of repairing, maintaining, and working an increasing length of permanent telegraph line. The feature of this period was the rate at which the permanent work increased as soon as a start had been made from Bloemfontein and Ladysmith. During the second period, which extended up to the inauguration of the blockhouse system, the field work had to be carried out for smaller and more numerous mobile forces, whilst the permanent work expanded somewhat less rapidly. During the third period, which lasted till peace was declared, the field work decreased, whilst, owing to the blockhouse lines, telephones, etc., the permanent work grew again. During the first period the two field sections in Natal carried out the work inside and outside Ladysmith, and then marched with the northward advance, performing field duties and carrying out the repair of the

Organization  
at various  
periods.

First period.

\* At that time the proportion of army telegraph troops to an army corps was one telegraph division R.E. This consisted of headquarters and four sections. A section carried fifteen miles of air-line and seven miles of cable. This proportion has been very largely increased since the war.



permanent lines as they proceeded. The telegraphic junction between the two armies took place at Twyfelaar, north of Ermelo, where a cable line running south from Wonderfontein on the Belfast Railway was met. On the other side the three field sections were at first distributed at Modder River, Orange River, and Colesberg, and until the halt at Bloemfontein carried out all the field work of the advance. In April three fresh sections from home reached the front, two of which went up the Western line and one to Bloemfontein. There were now available on the western side two sections, while for the main advance there were four. The procedure from Bloemfontein all the way to Pretoria was that the field sections repaired the permanent line along the railway in the first instance, and also carried out field work for the detached forces and the parallel advances. The permanent party—which had already taken over the line between Bloemfontein and the Orange River—took over the permanent line to the north, completed repairs, and maintained and worked it as a trunk line. As the Army advanced, this work became more than the party allotted to it could manage, in spite of increases to their numbers from various sources, and when, during June, 1900, extra connexions had to be made to the many small garrisons placed along the railway in order to protect it from raids, the strain became extreme. A large proportion of the field sections had to be diverted from their proper work to carry on the permanent line duty. In fact, when Pretoria was reached only two field sections out of four remained available for field duties. It was essential to reorganize to meet the new conditions, and when the junction of the Natal Army set free two field sections, this was effected. Under this reorganization the Army Telegraphs comprised the following five branches, each under a separate head:—The Telegraph Division (of headquarters and four sections) for field duties; the Western District, Orange River Colony, and Transvaal Permanent Telegraphs; the Stores and Financial Department. This arrangement continued for some time during the guerilla war and the ensuing column moves; but when blockhouse operations commenced it was gradually changed.

Second  
period.

Third period. It was found better suited to the conditions of a great length

of permanent line, coupled with the incessant moves of small columns and the existence of numerous blockhouse lines, to divide the whole country into areas, each under one officer, who was responsible for the permanent telegraphs and also for the field work of the columns moving within his area. The latter work had greatly changed in character during the blockhouse period, for a close network of permanent wires grew up all over the country. No column could be very far from some wire, and many forces started *en l'air*. Four districts were accordingly now created—Transvaal, Orange River Colony, Natal, and Cape Colony, each of which was under its own Assistant Director for all telegraph matters.

It may be said that from the time that the telegraph units arrived at the front till the end of the war hardly any move or operation of any importance was made in which the troops were not almost continuously in telegraphic communication with some permanent line, and so with headquarters. As with most of the other Engineer duties, the work was carried out by small bodies of men, varying from a section under a subaltern to a few men and a sergeant, or even a couple of operators attached to a column. Throughout the first part of the war the number of field sections in the field was far too small for the work that had to be performed. In few instances, therefore, was the ideal of tactical telegraphic communication reached. There is one case, however—that of French's force round Colesberg in January, 1900—in which the proportion of telegraph troops to the whole force was more adequate, and this case furnished a good example of the thorough use of the wire and an illustration of the strength thereby conferred upon a force occupying a largely extended position. French's force extended over a concave arc overlapping the Boer positions, and from his headquarters at Coles Kop the General was connected by wire with his whole front, some thirty-three miles in length. It was, in General French's own opinion, mainly due to the field telegraphs that he was enabled to hold such a position, and, curiously enough, this was the only district in South Africa where, at this time, the British forces were doing more than hold their own. An example of fairly complete tactical

Work done  
by field  
telegraphs.

telegraphic connexion during an action was that at Poplar Grove, where the Commander-in-Chief was in touch with the base, with the attacking infantry, with the cavalry on the right flank, and with the balloon observing on the left. Spion Kop and Paardeberg, on the other hand, afford striking instances of our deficiencies in tactical intercommunication.\* As an example of a cable line quickly laid for a rapid advance, we have the cable line which followed up French's cavalry in their dash to Kimberley.† This line, about forty-five miles long, was unfortunately cut to pieces by Cronje's wagons retreating across it just at the moment when its services were most urgently required.‡ The advance to Bloemfontein is a good example of the use of both systems—cable and air line. The advanced cavalry was followed by a cable, which was taken up and replaced by an air line as the main body proceeded. It was impossible either to guard or to take up this field line to Bloemfontein, which was the longest laid during the war, viz., 125 miles, and it was abandoned. Fortunately, however, it was not destroyed by the enemy till some time after permanent communications had been restored *viâ* Norval's Pont and Bethulie. The field work remained the same in principle all through the war; but as mobile columns became more numerous, and the network of permanent lines grew closer, the lines became shorter and the detachments decreased in size. The work was specially difficult in the operations in the north-east of the Free State which culminated in Prinsloo's surrender. During the guerilla operations it varied in difficulty according to the activity of the enemy in destroying the wires and the number of the columns operating. At some periods it was impossible to keep lines repaired as quickly as they were destroyed for want of sufficient escorts for the repair parties. Nevertheless, the amount of laying and repair work done without escort was remarkable. At times, when the troops were only moving about in large columns of all arms,

\* See vol. iii., pp. 299, 451.

† Such a connexion with detached cavalry will no doubt be performed by wireless telegraphy in the future.

‡ See vol. iii., pp. 408, 410.



small parties of Engineers, under perhaps a subaltern or a sergeant, made long journeys across the veld, following up some telegraph line in order to find and repair a break. That more of these small detachments were not captured when carrying out these dangerous duties is surprising, while the pluck and zeal of those who carried them out deserve all praise. Among many instances of such dangerous work equally well accomplished one is worth noting. At the moment when Lord Roberts arrived in Bloemfontein there was a break in the field line laid behind his advance. The permanent wires to the south along the railway were cut, and the Army was, for the moment, isolated. There was another permanent line to Bloemfontein from Kimberley *via* Boshof, which place had just been occupied by the British, but there were Boers in between it and Bloemfontein and the line was cut. Lieutenant H. L. Mackworth, R.E., and a sergeant rode along this line to Boshof and successfully restored communication, not only managing to avoid observation by a party of Boers whom they came across, but taking advantage of night to "borrow" a remount from them.

Work of  
repair de-  
tachments.

The growth of the permanent line duties has been touched on. The simplest way of describing what work had to be done is to state that at the end of the war the Army was working 3,378 miles of permanent line with posts, which had been captured from the two Republics. This length of line carried 9,395 miles of wire, a large part of which had to be restored and all to be maintained. From the time that Johannesburg was reached the main line to the south was for some time subject to continuous interruption. During de Wet's raid in June, 1900, Army headquarters were cut off for some days, and only succeeded in getting through communication *via* Ventersdorp, Lichtenburg, and Mafeking (field line). On another occasion Pretoria and Kimberley could only be connected through Newcastle, Pietermaritzburg, King William's Town, and De Aar. At one period the line was being cut every night (within three months it was interrupted fifty times), and in executing the continual repairs the telegraph staff showed the greatest gallantry.

Permanent  
line work and  
its develop-  
ments.

Blockhouse  
lines.

The general bearing upon the field telegraphs of the evolution of the system of blockhouses has already been described. Even while the blockhouses were confined to the railway lines, the additional work entailed in the provision of telephonic communications was considerable. When, however, the system was elaborated, and the intervals between blockhouses decreased and a network of fresh blockhouse lines was made all over the country, the work of constructing and maintaining telephone lines became very heavy, though the actual working of the instruments was carried out by the garrisons of the blockhouses, and thus did not fall on the technical units. Every line of blockhouses was supplied with telephones, and in most cases with a proportion of telegraph offices. The magnitude of the labour of equipment and maintenance can be realized when it is recalled that the equipment of the blockhouse lines alone involved the erection of 9,361 miles of line and of 1,945 telephones, all but a very small proportion of which was done by the Army. Along the last blockhouse line, 374 miles long, between Victoria Road and Lambert's Bay, under construction when peace was declared, two wires were being run for its whole length.

Telephone  
exchanges.

In addition to the normal permanent line duties and the blockhouse telephones, which the Army Telegraphs had to perform, nearly all the principal towns and places in military occupation were provided with a system of telephones with exchanges. These exchanges were necessary for inter-communication between the commandants of defences and their outlying posts. Except those existing in Pretoria and Johannesburg, which were taken over and maintained, they were erected by the Army. Of the total amount of wiring connected with these exchanges (4,105 miles), 1,789 miles were erected by the Army Telegraphs. The headquarters and section within Ladysmith were constantly employed during the siege in the erection and working of a telegraph and telephone system for the defence. There was finally very complete communication between the various posts and headquarters, which enabled Sir George White to direct the defence by telephone, notably during the attack on January 6.

Work in  
Ladysmith.

The pressure of work in the offices was at all times great,\* *Personnel and statistics.* and extreme difficulty was found in replacing the clerks who fell ill from overwork; in the unhealthy districts they had to be relieved every two months. In spite of importations from England and reinforcements, there were at the end of the war only 691 clerks (including civilians) to work 504 instruments. Many of them had to work night and day, and a generous meed of praise is due to the telegraph operators, military and civilian; they carried on very trying and responsible work, often under unhealthy circumstances, sometimes in danger, always under strain. It is interesting to compare the numbers employed on the Army Telegraphs at the end of the war with the figures as they stood in December, 1899. When peace was declared the total establishment was 2,424 men, of whom 21 were officers and 918 natives. The total wire mileage laid (excluding telephones and the 9,395 miles of captured permanent telegraphs restored and worked) was 18,236 miles. The number of telegraph messages sent, transmitted and received during the war amounted to 13½ million. The power to cope with this vast amount of traffic was largely due to the Wheatstone automatic fast-speed instruments, which were used for the first time in war. The cost of the telegraphic work to the Army was £324,000, and the cost of the telegrams sent works out to one-third of a penny per word.

A wireless telegraphy detachment, consisting of some *Wireless telegraphy.* Royal Engineers and some civilian experts provided by the Marconi Company, was sent out in November, 1899. At Cape Town it succeeded in acquiring a large additional amount of wireless telegraphy gear consigned to President Kruger. In spite, however, of many trials and great efforts made to ensure success, the results achieved were inadequate, and the system was abandoned.

\* The excessive indulgence conceded to personal inquiries on behalf of relatives and friends, or to messages of a trivial character, added greatly to this work. After Cronje's surrender at Paardeberg, for instance, the tired operators were kept at work for hours by telegrams of congratulation from public bodies in England. There is no reason why some arrangement should not be made at the base for intercepting messages of secondary importance.



The Boer  
field tele-  
graphs.

Besides their system of permanent telegraphs the Boers possessed a military field telegraph department. It started with a heliograph corps which was formed in the Transvaal by General Joubert in 1890, as a result of the great use the British had made of the heliograph during the 1881 war. This detachment gradually undertook telegraphic duties, and was first used on active service in 1894 in the Malaboch campaign, when it performed valuable service. After the Jameson raid, when increases were made to the *Staats Artillerie*, the corps was increased to a strength of 31 and fully equipped as a telegraph and signalling unit, and took part in the Swaziland and Magato expeditions of 1897-1898. The Orange Free State also possessed a field telegraph corps somewhat smaller than that of the sister republic. Both corps were mobilized in September, 1899, the Transvaal corps under Lieutenant P. C. Paff, and joined the Natal army of invasion, while a detachment of Transvaalers was sent to De la Rey in the west for signalling and also for exploding mines round Mafeking, these duties being carried out by the same unit. Upon the advance into Natal the field telegraph corps was split up and allotted to the different commandos. Great difficulty was at first experienced in arranging communication along the railway line owing to the wholesale damage done to the wires and instruments by the Boers themselves. Telegraph lines were soon established round Ladysmith during the siege, but here, again, the technical troops were hampered by the ignorance of the other Boers, and had to lay underground cables because the burghers could not understand that the air lines were for the use of their own side. To what extent the Boers managed to retain their field telegraph units and equipment through the war is not certain. As they lost control of the permanent lines, and were unable to keep up the comparatively cumbrous apparatus of field telegraphs, they fell back more and more upon their heliographs, and with these and with instruments captured from the British, managed to keep up a fairly complete system of communication from their Governments and the Commandant-Generals to the commandos, till up to the very last. Heavy prices were paid to men who captured our heliographs. In fact,

during the guerilla war a heliograph was of far more value to the Boers than a gun. The Boers claim to have successfully tapped the British wires at one stage of the war, though gradually forced to give up doing so through lack of instruments. To what extent it really was done, will always remain doubtful; but in one respect their facilities for so doing were great, for all their operators knew both languages well, while some of them also had experience in the solution of cyphers. On the whole, for its size and training, and taking into consideration the ignorance of the majority of the burghers, the Boer telegraphic and signalling department was extremely efficient. Its most remarkable performance undoubtedly was the development of a system of signalling over the whole area of war by the use of the heliograph, an instrument peculiarly adapted to the bright sunshine and open spaces of South Africa.\*

Altogether 357 officers and 8,157 other ranks of the Royal Engineers were sent out during the war. The Regulars were largely assisted in their work during the campaign by the Militia and Volunteer detachments. In all, of the Militia Engineers 11 officers and 350 other ranks, and of the Volunteers 52 officers and 1,151 other ranks went out. In most cases these detachments were attached to various Regular units. There was also on the western side the Railway Pioneer regiment, whose services have already been referred to. In Natal, where there were only field units R.E., a corp of civilian pioneers recruited from the Public Works Department was organized under the C.R.E. to do the general engineering work, and also a native labour corps. Valuable as was the assistance derived from these various auxiliary sources the experience of the war in no way confirmed the idea that our army can in any degree dispense with a large and highly trained corps of Engineers, or with an abundant supply of officers equally skilled in the military and technical sides of their profession.

Regulars and  
auxiliaries.

\* The heliograph was, of course, very freely used by the British, but no special corps was assigned to the work, the various units providing their own signallers.

## CHAPTER V

## SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT

The British organization before the war.

THE comparatively rigid conditions of European warfare have enabled Continental nations so to perfect the machinery for provisioning their vast armies that it will work almost automatically from the day mobilization begins until disaster overtakes one or other of the opposing forces. The British Empire is in a far less favourable position, for no such detailed preparations can be made to meet all the various contingencies under which our troops may be called upon to take the field. After the Crimean War, one Quartermaster-General after another tried to solve the problem of providing a supply and transport service suitable to our peculiar requirements—an organization which would prove sufficiently elastic to meet the necessities of any campaign in which our forces might be engaged, and, at the same time, sufficiently adaptable to work under the most diverse conditions of climate and locality. No finality was reached until Sir Redvers Buller in 1888, forsaking the traditional notions which had hampered the efforts of his predecessors, reorganized the Army Service Corps on a purely military basis. The principles upon which his organization was founded were:— (i) That the duties of supplying an army and of carrying its food and munitions were so interdependent that it was impossible to separate them, or, to quote his own words, “to separate the responsibility for the wagon from the responsibility of the load it carries.” (ii) That the supply and transport of an army could only be efficiently carried out by a technical military corps, specifically enrolled and trained for the purpose, and under the administrative control of officers subject to military discipline, who had been thoroughly trained



in executive duties. (iii) That since very high qualifications were required in officers entrusted with carrying out these services, it was essential to make the inducements for candidates to the commissioned ranks of the Army Service Corps sufficient to attract the best type of young officer, by holding out the prospect of an immediate increase of pay, and the expectation of eventually attaining a position equal to that open to officers in any other branch of the service. These conclusions were, as he himself said, "the outcome of the experience of a century's campaigns, and of a series of expensive failures, each of which marked a milestone on the road to progress." The Army Service Corps then established was the pivot on which worked the whole system of provisioning the Army, as it existed at the outbreak of the South African War.

It has been customary to regard the functions of supply and transport as two distinct services. This is only true to a certain extent with regard to the subordinate and executive duties. The real problem is the supply of the troops; and the transport is, except in the case of what may be called the fighting, or first-line transport, the agency employed for delivering supplies to the troops whenever and wherever they are required.

In its widest sense, supply embraces all munitions required by an army in the field. These are provided by the two great departments—the Ordnance and the Army Service Corps. The dividing-line between the functions of these two services has not always been very clearly drawn; but for all practical purposes it may be accepted that the Army Service Corps is responsible for the provision of everything in the nature of food and sustenance for the troops, while clothing, equipment, and war material of all kinds is furnished by the Ordnance Department. The term "supplies" is nowadays usually confined to those commodities which are provided by the Army Service Corps, and is differentiated in the mind of the soldier from the "stores," which are drawn from the Ordnance—a distinction which will be preserved in the course of this chapter.

The bulk of the food for any large army operating beyond

Essential  
unity of  
supply and  
transport.

Distinction  
between  
supplies and  
ordnance.

Limitations  
to living off  
the country.

the seas must be provided from sources outside the theatre of war, as, under modern conditions of warfare, the local supply of provisions, even in the most civilized and productive regions, must be uncertain and unreliable. No country with limited climatic conditions is universally prolific; and though an army may find an abundant supply of one commodity at the seat of war, others are unobtainable, or only produced in sufficient quantities to meet the current needs of the population. Moreover, even under the civilized conditions of modern warfare, industry and agriculture are inevitably disorganized; provisions, however plentiful under happier conditions, become scarce; and food must be imported, not only for the army, but also, not infrequently, for the inhabitants of the territory in its occupation. These considerations apply still more to sparsely-peopled and only partially-developed regions like South Africa, where even in peace local supplies have hitherto been inadequate to the needs of the population, and where an army of any size represents an enormous addition to the total number of mouths to be fed.

Organization  
of the supply  
service at  
home.

The responsibility for providing and delivering at the base of operations all supplies required by the field army, other than those obtainable in the theatre of war, rests with the Quartermaster-General at the War Office.\* The system under which supplies are forwarded to troops on active service is very similar to that which prevails during peace. The general officer commanding the troops in the field notifies the War Office of his requirements. Instructions are then issued by the Quartermaster-General's Department to the officer in charge of the Supply Reserve Depot, Woolwich Dockyard, detailing the supplies which are to be shipped. The Supply Reserve Depot is the establishment through which all the executive work in connexion with the despatch of supplies is carried out. A small reserve of supplies is permanently maintained there to be in readiness for any sudden emergency. Before the South African War this reserve was based on the requirements of 40,000 men and 20,000 horses in the following proportions: preserved meat, 50 days' supply;

\* The general outlines of the system described here have been in force since Jan. 1, 1888.

biscuit, 15 days'; emergency rations, 2 days'; groceries, 30 days'; hospital comforts, 30 days'; hay and compressed forage, 25½ days'. The duties of the officer in charge of the Supply Reserve Depot in connexion with the war were to keep the Quartermaster-General, and through him the Director of Army Contracts, informed of all supplies required to be purchased; to inspect during and after manufacture the quality of all such supplies; and to ensure that they were properly packed for shipment. He was, further, responsible for making arrangements with the Naval Transport Department for the despatch of all provisions consigned from home ports and for the issue of forage required for horses on the voyage to South Africa. This involved the employment of a very large staff of inspectors, accountants, clerks, storekeepers, wharfingers, labourers, and mechanics of all kinds. It is impossible in the limited space of this chapter to give a due appreciation of the high standard of organization necessary to deal with the vast quantities of supplies passing through the depot at the time of the war; but there is no doubt that the success of the supply branch in South Africa was greatly due to the good work done by Colonel W. Dunne and the staff of the Supply Reserve Depot in Woolwich Dockyard. Not least among the difficulties with which they had to contend was the cramped space and inconvenient situation of their depot. Ocean steamers cannot berth alongside the wharves at Woolwich, and all supplies had to be conveyed down the river by lighter and transhipped, or else sent by rail to other ports, a fruitful source of confusion, delay and expense.

The organization of the supply services in the field was based on instructions which were issued in November, 1890, in an official publication, entitled 'Regulations for the Supply Services in the Field, and for the Organization of the Lines of Communication.' No instructions altering the principles of organization then laid down were issued before the South African War. Under these regulations, the general officer commanding lines of communication was responsible to the general officer commanding the field army for "keeping the army in the field and on the lines of communication, at all times and under all circumstances,

Organization  
of supply in  
the field.



supplied with food, munitions of war, remounts, transport animals, and every sort of store it may require." The supply duties of the army were placed under an officer on the staff of the general commanding on the lines of communication and were "divided into two great sections: those with the troops in the front, and those on the lines of communication, each under the direction of a staff officer." The officer for the lines of communication was responsible for the supply depots at the base and for the intermediate and advance depots on the lines of communication, and for the feeding of all troops within that area.

Supply at the base and on lines of communication.

The officer in charge of a base supply depot worked under the immediate direction of the Assistant Adjutant-General for "B" duties \* for the lines of communication. His functions were, to arrange with the Naval Transport Officer for the discharge of all supplies from freight vessels; to check the quantities and inspect the condition of all supplies received; to maintain the specified reserve of supplies; to comply with all requisitions received from the troops; and to make arrangements with the railway authorities, or transport officials, for the constant flow of supplies to the front. The purpose of the intermediate depots was to provide for the troops in the immediate vicinity, as well as for those passing through on their way to the front; and to serve as reservoirs for the accumulation of supplies to feed the advance depot. It was to be the constant aim of the general officer commanding lines of communication to ensure a sufficiency of supplies being maintained at the advance depot to meet all possible requirements of the field army. This depot was the connecting-link between the sphere under his control and that under the personal command of the general commanding operations. It was pushed forward as the army advanced; and the distance between it and the fighting-line was governed by the capacity of the transport at the front.

Supply and transport in the field.

In the field a single staff officer on the headquarter staff of the army attended to the supply and transport arrangements in front of the advance depot. He issued general instructions, on behalf of the commander of the forces, to the

\* Now termed the Assistant-Director of Supplies.



COLONEL SIR W. D. RICHARDSON, K.C.B.,  
DEPUTY ADJUTANT-GENERAL FOR SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORT, S. AFRICA, 1899-1900.  
DIRECTOR OF SUPPLIES, S. AFRICA, 1900.  
*Photo by Duffus Bros., Cape Town.*





general officer commanding lines of communication, and kept him informed on all supply and transport questions. The executive work of feeding the troops in the field was carried out by the brigade supply officers under the direction of an officer on the divisional staff, styled the Deputy Assistant Adjutant for "B" duties. The supply officer, together with the *personnel* under him, formed an integral part of the Army Service Corps company which was attached to each brigade and to divisional and corps troops for the purpose of furnishing the supply column and of superintending the whole of the transport. The executive work of the transport service was similarly carried out by the brigade and regimental transport officers. The essence of the system was that in the field supply and transport were not so much distinct services as integral parts of the various units. Each unit in the field—regiment, battalion, brigade or division—connoted not only so many fighting men, but a certain quantity of supplies and a certain number of wagons attached to it, each under the supervision of a certain number of expert officers.

This system, more particularly in its application to the transport service, has been variously described as the "War Office," the "Regimental," the "échelon," and, in an earlier volume of this history, as the "articulated" system. This latter term, perhaps, most aptly conveys one of its most essential characteristics as contrasted with other methods of organization. It owed its inception to Lord (then Sir Garnet) Wolseley who, in 1873, was employed as Assistant Adjutant-General in the War Office. A nucleus of regimental transport was then allotted to forty-eight battalions, and eventually a complete system of transport in the field was organized, divided scientifically according to the function each part was called upon to fulfil.

There was first of all the regimental transport, or transport allotted to units. This was subdivided into first and second-line transport. The former included all animals and vehicles required in or near the fighting-line for conveying ammunition, intrenching tools, signalling equipment, medical stores, water, etc., while the second-line wagons carried the baggage and equipment wanted in camp or

The British  
transport  
organization.

Regimental  
transport.

bivouac, and sufficient provisions to last while the supply column was away replenishing its stock.

The supply column.

Secondly, there was the Army Service Corps supply column. This consisted of a company of Army Service Corps under the immediate orders of the general commanding the division or brigade of which it formed part. It carried one day's emergency ration and one or more days' ordinary ration for every man, and one day's forage for each animal. This was the source from which the regimental provision-wagons of the second line were replenished, and formed the connecting-link between them and the supply park, or the advanced depot.

The supply park.

Thirdly, there was the supply park, a rolling magazine carrying three or more complete days' supply for the force. Its function was to fill the gap when the distance between the army and the advanced depot was too great to be covered by the supply columns.

Auxiliary and technical transport.

There was further auxiliary transport employed on lines of communication, either to supplement, or to take the place of the railway in bringing up supplies and stores from the base to the advance depot. This consisted of civilian transport organized into companies under Army Service Corps officers.

Lastly, there was the technical transport, including all animals and vehicles allotted to Artillery, Engineer, and Medical units for the carriage of ammunition, technical equipment and stores, such as pontoons or telegraph material, hospital tents, etc. Of these the ammunition transport was articulated, like the main transport, into ammunition park, ammunition column, and ammunition wagons with the batteries.

The stages of distribution.

The following short summary of the transport medium employed for each of the stages through which provisions passed on their journey between the base depot and their ultimate distribution to the troops in the fighting-line, will show the functions of the various classes of transport in the general system of supply: 1. From base depot to advance depot; conveyed by train to advance depot, or else to rail-head, and thence to the advance depot by convoy composed

of auxiliary transport companies. 2. From advance depot to the supply park; by sections of the supply park, working alternately. 3. From the supply park to the various brigades, divisional and army corps troops; by the supply columns of these units. 4. From the supply columns to the troops; by the regimental transport wagons.

This allotment was in nowise rigid, as the whole of the transport of the army, whether regimental or otherwise, was absolutely at the disposal of the general commanding, whenever the particular function for which it was detailed was in abeyance. Thus, the regimental transport of a unit temporarily withdrawn from the front could be utilized for general purposes under the orders of the commander of the forces, until such time as it was again required by the regiment or battalion.

The system sufficiently elastic.

Under the regulations of 1890, the whole of the transport of an expeditionary force was placed under an officer on the staff of the general commanding lines of communication, styled the Director of Transport. He was responsible for the best use and condition of the transport; but was to "interfere as little as possible" with regimental transport, technical transport, or with any employed with the force operating in front of the advance depot. The general organization of the transport service on the lines of communication was in other respects parallel to that of the supply service. The control of the whole of the supply and transport services of the army was thus centred in the general officer commanding lines of communication and administered by officers on his staff, and the organization for provisioning the army, from the base to the bivouac, was a coherent whole, under the supreme direction of a central authority, but with a definite sphere of responsibility allocated to each of the component parts.

Unity and coherence of the organization.

So much for the War Office organization. The next thing to consider are the local conditions with which that organization had to cope in South Africa. In the first place, in discussing the question of supplies it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that no reliance could be placed upon obtaining any regular supply from local sources. Adverse climatic and social conditions had impeded agricultural

Supplies locally available in South Africa.



enterprise. Most districts in South Africa are now denuded of the forest which, in the past, covered a great part of the country, with the result that the land is incapable of storing up the benefit of the summer's rain against the long winter drought. This makes cultivation on a productive scale almost impossible without resorting to irrigation, which the Boers, before the war, had, as a rule, neither the energy nor the means to undertake, or to advanced methods of "dry farming," with which they were unfamiliar. The small and scattered population, in which, it must always be remembered, the whites were only a minority, lived from hand to mouth, and produced no more than they required for their immediate needs. Cattle and sheep were known to be numerous, but no forecast could be made of the extent to which the enemy would attempt to clear the country before our advance.

The roads of  
South Africa.

The principal means of communication in South Africa were, of course, the railways. The part played by them in the war has been discussed in a previous chapter. The roads of South Africa, except in the immediate vicinity of the chief towns, were but broad, desultory tracks across the veld, broken and deeply rutted wherever the wagons closed in to cross a drift or climb a barrier of rocky kopjes.

The ox-  
wagon.

The picture of the long train of oxen, sixteen or more to the span, drawing, with ponderous strength, the huge half-tented wagons over the parched veld, or struggling across a precipitous drift, impresses the mind of the stranger perhaps more than any other feature of South African life. The ox-wagon, figuring as it does in the foreground of the most stirring scenes of Boer history, seems to embody the spirit of the race and to touch a strain of sentiment, buried deep in the heart of every Boer, making him endow the family wagon with a value far beyond the material wealth it represents. On the South African veld, where cattle are plentiful, farm produce scarce, and where metalled roads do not exist, the ox is, for ordinary purposes and, above all, for long journeys, by far the most efficient and economical animal for draught purposes. Its great superiority to all other transport animals lies in the fact that it can live and

work with no other food but what it can pick up on the veld. In other words, it is self-supporting and does not consume its own load. These are the reasons why the mule—a much later importation—has never become popular, except in the towns and more closely-settled districts.

But though the ox can cover as great a distance as the mule in the twenty-four hours, ox transport is, nevertheless, unsuitable for the second line transport of a field army. The principal drawback to employing it in this capacity is, that if the oxen are to be kept in serviceable condition, the transport must move at different hours to those at which the troops usually march; and, consequently, the wagons are not available when required. In any circumstances it is impossible to adapt the pace of ox transport to that of any force moving with it, as the ox soon succumbs if pressed beyond its normal pace of 2 to 2½ miles an hour. Moreover, the commander of a force provided with ox transport can only camp in localities where the grazing is good; and if moving against an aggressive and energetic enemy, must increase the numbers of the escort to his baggage, or retard the march of his column to cover it; while in camp, extra guards have to be provided to protect the oxen while grazing. These are serious objections to employing ox transport with the troops in the front, though they are no hindrance to its use for the supply park or on the lines of communication, where the conditions allow of its peculiarities being considered, and where regularity in working and economy of load are the principal factors.

Defects of ox transport.

The mule, on the other hand, is subject to none of these drawbacks, and is, therefore, under South African conditions, the most suitable form of transport for troops in the immediate front. The difficulty of providing mules with provender is the price that must be paid for the increased mobility they give to the fighting-line, but prohibits their use in rear of the army, where every effort is being made to push supplies up to the advanced depots.

Mule transport best at the front.

This view as to the relative advantages and respective functions of ox and mule transport in South Africa expresses the general consensus of opinion among Army Service Corps

Boer use of ox-wagons.

officers. A few officers, however, rate the value of the strong and self-supporting ox more highly, and believe that with skilful management ox transport can serve almost all the purposes required except for infantry first line and for cavalry. The Boers certainly managed to secure a high degree of mobility with a transport mainly composed of ox-wagons. This was partly due to their skill in handling oxen and their knowledge of the country, but still more to the fact that they were a wholly mounted force. This enabled them both to cover the movement of their transport at a distance, and to get back without difficulty at nightfall to whatever point the wagons had chosen for camping. One enterprising British column commander in the guerilla war also managed to do some remarkable marches with ox transport by dint of keeping two complete sets of teams and working them alternately.

Unsuitability  
of horses.

Horses have never been systematically employed for heavy draught in South Africa. As compared with mules, they do less work, require more food, and are less able to withstand the daily vicissitudes of war. Moreover, the wastage of horse-flesh at the front is generally so heavy that after a few months' campaigning the transport is depleted to provide remounts for the fighting-line. The horse has always been the most extravagant form of transport in war time; and there can be no doubt that in the future the conditions under which it has hitherto been employed will be more efficiently and more economically fulfilled by mechanical transport.

Mechanical  
traction.

The scarcity of fuel and water and the absence of suitable roads had prevented the introduction of traction-engines into South Africa before the war. Subsequently, when a certain number were sent out to the Army, the same causes limited their use to a few restricted areas, within which, however, they proved very useful.\*

Lack of pre-  
paration for  
transport  
necessities.

The reluctance of the British Government to recognize the inevitability of war, and its refusal to sanction any overt preparations or any serious expenditure till the very last moment, have been dealt with elsewhere in the present

\* See chap. iv., p. 348.



work.\* As far as supply and transport are concerned, the anxiety of the War Office for a long time did not get beyond the stage of correspondence. Letter after letter was sent to South Africa calling for reports on this matter or on that, asking for estimates of expenditure which were never sanctioned, for schemes that were never carried out, for draft contracts that were never concluded, for anything and everything short of active measures. The first actual move was made in February, 1898, when Sir A. Milner pointed out in a despatch to Mr. Chamberlain, that the most serious defect in our military arrangements was the want of transport and of any provision for collecting it. He suggested that the nucleus of a transport establishment should be formed in each battalion in South Africa, and that steps should be taken for the speedy collection of animals and vehicles, either by systematic registration or by standing contract. The War Office partially complied. By August, the regimental mule transport of the force in South Africa was completed. But the draft contract for the provision of all the rest of the transport required before the troops could mobilize was never ratified, and no such contract was made until the eve of the war. Nothing further was done until June, 1899, when instructions were sent to South Africa that all units† then in the country, and those about to arrive, should be completed with a sufficient number of mule-wagons to carry three days' supplies.

In May, 1899, Sir W. Butler, the general commanding in South Africa, cabled asking that his reserve of supplies might be made up to two months for the whole of the garrison, and that a supply of emergency rations might also be forwarded. These provisions were shipped by the middle of June; and over 1,000 tons of both oats and hay were sent out about the same time. It was decided on July 14 to maintain sixty days' reserve food in South Africa for all troops either in South Africa or likely be sent there in the future. One month's provisions for 50,000 men and 27,000 animals was shipped from England by October 30, and the remainder by

Creation of a  
reserve of  
supplies.

\* See vol. ii., chap. iii.; vol. vi., Part II., *passim*.

† 2 cavalry regiments, 6½ battalions, 7 companies M.I., and 4 batteries

November 18. Later on, the reserve for the whole of the force was raised to 120 days, and after the first two months there never appears to have been any serious anxiety about a possible deficiency of supplies.

July, 1899.  
Colonel  
Bridge sent  
out to  
organize.

On July 8, Colonel C. H. Bridge, an officer of great experience in the working of supply and transport in South Africa, was sent to Cape Town with four other Army Service Corps officers to assist in the work of organization. The *personnel* of two very scratch transport companies, on a peace establishment of two officers and fifty men each, and a few clerks, butchers and bakers were despatched in the same ship. On the voyage out, instructions were drawn up for the organization of the Army Service Corps duties at the base, on the lines of communication, and at the advanced depots. These proved most useful, and formed a foundation for building up the work of organization, the ground for which had already been prepared by the staff in Cape Town. In spite of adverse conditions, the small headquarters staff in South Africa had been working at high pressure for two years, doing all that could be done, in the peculiar circumstances, to prepare for contingencies. The whole garrison had been mobilized for manœuvres during the preceding summer; and loading tables, scales of transport, and other details had been worked out by actual experiment. Colonel Bridge, on his arrival, at once began to take measures for establishing remount and transport depots, for taking up dock accommodation, and for getting into touch with the sources from which transport animals and equipment could be best obtained. Lieut.-Colonel Stanley and Major Ludlow, Army Service Corps, went on to Natal, where they started work on the same lines.

Transport  
preparations  
in South  
Africa, July-  
Oct., 1899.

During July and August constant inquiries were cabled from the War Office about the quantity of mules, oxen, vehicles, and harness obtainable in South Africa, and the time it would take to collect them. The replies indicated that the supply was limited, and that sufficient to equip a force of 15,500 men with transport could not be obtained in less than two months. The actual resources of South Africa in transport were, as a matter of fact, infinitely greater than

was supposed. The total number of mules purchased by the Remount Department in South Africa during the war was over 45,000, irrespective of those commandeered and captured by the troops, while the number of oxen employed can be estimated from the fact that something like 50,000 were at work at the end of the war. The supply of local vehicles was reported to be inexhaustible, and large numbers were secured in various ways in the course of the war, though only about 1,000 mule-wagons and 760 ox-wagons were actually purchased directly from the small local factories, the output of which was very slow. The local harness, it may be noted here, proved most unsatisfactory, and was eventually replaced by that of English manufacture. On August 22 an order was received from the War Office to complete Colonel Baden-Powell's force with transport at once. This was followed a fortnight later by another cable saying that complete transport for 5,700 men of the Indian contingent and four more battalions must be provided forthwith. This latter order was carried out by the end of September. Sir F. Forestier-Walker, who had meanwhile succeeded Sir W. Butler, assuming that the time for hesitation had passed, included in this contract 1,000 more mules than were actually required for the purpose specified. But the authorities at home, in a last futile effort to check any excess of initiative in Cape Town, repudiated the unauthorized purchase. The contract was cancelled at a loss, and the same mules had eventually to be repurchased at a higher price. No more transport was bought until September 28, a fortnight before the hostilities began, when the Secretary of State cabled that 100 mule-wagons and 70 Scotch carts were to be purchased, and inquired at what price 700 ox-wagons could be hired. It was not till October 6 that authority was given to hire these wagons at £2 15s. each a day,\* delivery to be made by December 1. Preparations in Natal were not more advanced than those in Cape Colony. Information about local resources had been collected, and schemes for supply and transport prepared, but nothing definite had been done, with the exception of equipping the troops

Subsequently reduced to £2 5s.



from India, the mules for which were obtained in Cape Colony.

The Army  
Service Corps.  
Its numerical  
inadequacy.

By September 30, 51 Army Service Corps officers with the *personnel* of 6 transport companies and 230 supply men had arrived in South Africa. These numbers were not sufficient both to provide for the force already in the country and to furnish even a nucleus organization of establishments for war requirements. Fortunately, 84 more officers and 19 additional transport companies were embarked before the despatch of the combatant troops, and the foresight thus shown saved the situation, and prevented a serious breakdown in the administrative arrangements made for the reception of the Field Force. The total strength of the Army Service Corps at the outbreak of the war was 264 officers, 4,419 transport, 1,648 supply men and clerks, and 130 remount men, of whom 1,722 transport and 389 supply men were called up from the Reserve. With the exception of 31 officers and about 1,400 men required for duty at various stations at home and abroad, the whole Corps was sent to South Africa during the first year of the war; but with each reinforcement the proportion of warrant and non-commissioned officers decreased. The establishment of the Army Service Corps, originally fixed to meet the war requirements of three army corps for home defence or of two army corps for service abroad, proved quite inadequate to meet the strain now put on it. The result was that the supply and transport organization laid down in War Establishments, 1898, could not be carried into effect, and only two companies were allotted where three were authorized, and even then the *personnel* of each had to be greatly reduced. The scarcity of Army Service Corps officers was even more serious, and some 250 officers from other branches of the service had to be attached for supply and transport duties in the course of the war.

Distribution  
of duties  
at head-  
quarters.

Up to this point Colonel Bridge had been responsible for the whole of the transport, supply and remount services in South Africa. On October 3 Colonel (now Sir Wodehouse) Richardson reached Cape Town on his way to Natal, where he had been instructed to take charge of the supply and

transport services, and received orders to disembark and await Sir R. Buller's arrival. He had been originally informed by Sir R. Buller that he was to be officer commanding Army Service Corps on the headquarters staff, with Colonel Bridge under him as Director of Transport. But pending more precise instructions he decided not to take over any of Colonel Bridge's duties, but to take the opportunity of studying the supply situation and making such general recommendations to the War Office and to the local authorities in South Africa as the now rapidly developing situation might demand. After Sir R. Buller's arrival Colonel Richardson was appointed Director of Supplies and Colonel Bridge Director of Transport, each being, in accordance with the established organization, responsible to Sir F. Forestier-Walker, the general commanding on the line of communications. Sir R. Buller, however, ordered that, in cases of minor differences between the two departments which would have to work so closely together, the views of Colonel Richardson, as the senior officer, were to prevail. Under Colonel Richardson also was Lieutenant-Colonel F. T. Clayton, the officer commanding the Army Service Corps companies, who in this capacity was responsible for the distribution and records of all A.S.C. officers and men in South Africa, and also for the engagement and payment of all civilian *personnel*, both European and native—a difficult and troublesome duty, which he carried out up to the time of Lord Roberts's departure.

Immediately on his arrival Colonel Richardson accompanied Sir F. Forestier-Walker on a tour of inspection round the ports and lines of communication in Cape Colony. Supply depots had already been started at the important railway junctions at De Aar, Naauwpoort, and Stormberg, and he realized the necessity of filling these at once with as large a reserve of supplies as possible before the arrival of the troops. He calculated that it would take the railways three weeks to convey the Army Corps and the Cavalry Division from the coast to the front. During that period few trains would be available for the conveyance of supplies. Whatever risk might be involved in piling up large masses of supplies at the front with no adequate force to guard them,

Colonel Richardson hurries supplies to the front.

it was, in his opinion, worth running to avoid the confusion and delay which would otherwise have resulted. On their return to Cape Town Sir A. Milner was approached on the subject of proclaiming martial law or of imposing the Colonial Burgher Act. Either of these enactments would have greatly facilitated supply and transport arrangements by authorizing the commandeering of cattle, transport animals, and other necessities. It was, however, deemed inexpedient to enforce such stringent measures at this period.

Situation  
on Oct. 11,  
1899.

The situation when war was declared was as follows:— As regard supplies, the troops then in South Africa were being rationed by local contractors. Supplies were scarce, as the merchants had reduced their stocks to a minimum owing to the uncertainty of the political situation, and the Transvaal Government had for months past been making large purchases of food-stuffs in Cape Colony. There was sixty days' reserve of preserved rations for the troops in the country, while the War Office was making ample provision for future requirements. The advance depots at De Aar, Naauwpoort, and Stormberg already contained from one to three months' reserve supplies for their respective garrisons;\* nearly half a million rations had been collected in Mafeking; the De Beer's Company had large reserves of food in Kimberley. The organization of the base depots at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East London was in progress and would be in working order when the Army Corps arrived in November. On the Natal side every effort was being made to pour supplies into Ladysmith, where three months' reserve for the garrison was already accumulated. As regards transport, every unit in South Africa was equipped with regimental transport. 700 hired ox-wagons were on order for delivery by December 1, and the purchase of 300 mule-wagons and 130 Scotch carts had been approved. No contract for the supply of mules had been concluded, except for those already used in equipping the Indian Contingent. But Sir F. Forestier-Walker was at last

\* The supply depots at Naauwpoort and Stormberg were withdrawn early in November; the former was moved forward again on the re-occupation of Naauwpoort on the 18th, while Queenstown became the principal depot on the eastern line.



given a free hand as regards expenditure, and within a month of this time a sufficient number of animals was collected to equip each unit, as it arrived, with regimental transport, and to form supply and ammunition columns for the troops at the front. Large quantities of mules were meanwhile being bought by the War Office in other countries to complete the transport organization of the Field Force.\*

The provision of fresh meat for the troops when they arrived now became an urgent question. Colonel Richardson, after communication with every important firm of meat contractors in South Africa, obtained War Office sanction to accept the tender of the South African Cold Storage Company to supply two million pounds of either fresh or refrigerated meat to the Army at 11*d.* a pound. A larger contract for a twelve months' supply was subsequently arranged with the Cold Storage Company, the price of refrigerated meat being reduced to 9*d.* This was again extended, and remained in force until April, 1902. These arrangements were subjected to a great deal of adverse criticism. The local supply undoubtedly proved much greater than any one could have anticipated, and immense quantities of stock were captured in the course of the war. Previous knowledge of this might possibly have secured a lower contract price. But it is easy to be wise in the light of after events, and Colonel Richardson appears to have been justified in making these arrangements under the very uncertain conditions which prevailed at the time. Some of the criticism, too, was based on incomplete realization of the actual conditions. The arrangement, for instance, under which, at a later period of the war, cattle taken from the enemy were sold to the contractor at 9*d.* per pound and repurchased from him at 11*d.* was strongly denounced by critics who had entirely left out of account the expense and risk incurred by the contractor in driving, slaughtering, and delivering meat to the troops on the line of march. The South African War was the first occasion on which an army in the field was supplied with refrigerated meat. The experiment was most successful, both from the point of view

The meat contract.

Use of frozen meat.

\* See chap. vi. for purchases of mules in South Africa and elsewhere.

of the authorities, who were saved the inconvenience of looking after large herds of cattle and having to arrange for the slaughtering and the disposal of offal, and from that of the men, who much preferred good frozen beef to "trek ox." The refrigerated meat could, however, only be supplied to troops within a day's march of the railway.

The scale of rations.

The scale of rations to be issued to the troops in the field was fixed late in October. The following was the soldier's daily allowance: *Meat*.—1 lb. fresh or preserved meat, or  $1\frac{1}{4}$  lb. when the supply of cattle was abundant. A certain proportion of cheese or bacon might be substituted for all or part of the meat ration. *Bread-stuffs*.— $1\frac{1}{4}$  lb. bread, or 1 lb. biscuit, flour, or meal. *Groceries*.— $\frac{2}{3}$  oz. coffee or  $\frac{1}{3}$  oz. tea, or half the ration of both; 3 oz. sugar,  $\frac{1}{2}$  oz. salt, and  $\frac{1}{8}$  oz. pepper. The allowance of coffee and tea at a later stage in the war was raised to 1 oz. and  $\frac{1}{2}$  oz. respectively. *Vegetables*.— $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. potatoes or other fresh vegetables, or 1 oz. compressed vegetables. *Jam*.— $\frac{1}{4}$  lb. Lime juice was issued when ordered by a medical officer, and  $\frac{1}{2}$  gill spirits twice a week at the discretion of Divisional Generals. Each man was allowed a pound of tobacco monthly, for which he was charged a penny an ounce.\* The authorized forage ration was 12 lbs. of oats and 12 lbs. hay for horses over 15 hands, 10 lbs. of each for smaller horses, and 8 lbs. oats and 6 lbs. hay for mules. It was, however, found impossible to carry sufficient forage to allow of these quantities being issued on the march, and the scale of the ration was ruled by the exigency of the moment. Newspaper correspondents were charged 4s. a day for their own and 5s. for their horse's ration.

\* With this scale it is not uninteresting to compare the scales since adopted by the Germans in the Herrero campaign. Owing to the difficulties of the country in which they were operating, the Germans had a higher and a lower scale of rations. The higher, which consisted of 1 lb. of fresh or rather more of preserved meat, nearly  $1\frac{1}{2}$  lb. of bread or flour, just under  $\frac{1}{2}$  oz. of tea or 1 oz. of coffee,  $\frac{2}{3}$  oz. of sugar, and certain quantities of jam and preserved vegetables, was only issued to troops stationed on the lines of communication; while the lower scale, being about two-thirds of above quantities, was all that could be given to those in the field. Tobacco and a  $\frac{1}{2}$  litre of spirits were issued free every week; but the very generous allowance of the latter had to be discontinued, and two bottles of beer or soda-water were issued in its place.

Meanwhile, Kimberley, Ladysmith, and Mafeking, which had been cut off since the very first days of the war, had prepared for an obstinate defence. A detailed account of the resources which existed in these towns, and of the organization which was adopted for feeding the inhabitants during their isolation, has already been given in the history of the sieges.\* The administrative problems with which the commander of a besieged town with a large civilian population has to deal have never been adequately treated by any English military authority, a deficiency which it is hoped the General Staff will make good in the near future. There is no doubt that the first essential of efficient organization is the co-ordination of the work of all military and civil departments. The Engineers, the Army Service Corps, the Ordnance, the medical authorities, and the officials of the municipality, must work hand in hand, each keeping the other informed of their own requirements and proposed course of action. The sanitation of the town and the food-supply of the inhabitants are the first matters which have to be settled. A system must be devised by which the whole of the resources of a beleaguered town can be placed under the control of a central authority, so that they may be distributed for the common weal; but the means by which it is ensured that private hoards of food are not accumulated, that undue loss is not inflicted on any particular section of the community, that payment is made for provisions by those who can afford to pay, and that those who are without means do not starve, must be decided according to local conditions and exigencies of the moment.

Under the conditions which prevailed in South Africa, this problem of feeding the civilian population was not confined to the besieged towns, but extended to all the towns in British occupation. The plan first adopted in Bloemfontein, and subsequently followed in other towns, was to form a committee of the principal citizens, assisted by a sub-committee, usually of ladies, who dealt with all matters relating to the relief of the destitute. A scale of rations to be issued on repayment was drawn up, and the prices of all commodities were fixed, after investigating the invoices of

The supply problem in the besieged towns.

Supplying the civilian population.

\* Vol. iv., chaps. xv., xvi., xvii.



the leading merchants, so as to allow a fair margin of profit. Somewhat later in the war, employment bureaux were established, and every able-bodied man who applied for work was able to earn sufficient to pay for his rations. The concentration camps, whose history has been dealt with elsewhere,\* were only another development of the same responsibility—a responsibility which threw a very heavy additional burden on the Supply Department.

Organization  
of the  
transport.

Early in November concentration stations were formed at De Aar, Naauwpoort, and Queenstown, to which troops proceeded immediately they disembarked, to be fitted out with transport and equipment. Regiments brought their first-line transport vehicles, consisting of water carts and small-arm ammunition carts, with them from England; all the rest of their transport was provided in South Africa. This consisted of ten mule-wagons for a cavalry regiment, seven for an infantry battalion, and a proportionate number for units of other descriptions. It was calculated to carry one day's food and forage, and one emergency ration per man, as well as the authorized allowance of baggage and equipment. The supply columns, which varied in strength, also carried one day's food and forage for the force to which they belonged. The whole of the first and second-line transport, as well as the supply columns of the force operating from the base in Cape Colony, were drawn by mules, while the use of ox-wagons was restricted to the supply park and the communications in rear of it. In Natal, on the other hand, all, except the first line of fighting transport, for which mules were procured, consisted of ox-wagons. The mule or buck-wagon, with a load of 3,000 lbs., was usually drawn by ten mules, and the ox-wagon, which carried 6,000 lbs., by sixteen oxen. In spite of the difficulties caused by the delay in making timely provision for the war, the efforts of Colonel Bridge and his subordinates were so successful that on the arrival of the troops in November, every unit was able to be sent up direct to the front as it disembarked, with only a few hours' delay at one of the concentration stations. During the latter end of November 4,500 mules were issued from the De Aar depot to Lord

\* Vol. v., pp. 77, 252-254; vol. vi., p. 24.

Methuen's force alone, together with a sufficient number of vehicles to carry five days' supplies for his troops, while 230 ox-wagons were also at his disposal if he had wished to take them. This was ample to enable Lord Methuen to make a turning movement, and disposes of the allegation at one time made that the frontal attacks against the Boer position during the advance on the Modder were necessitated by an insufficiency of transport.

After the departure of Sir Redvers Buller to Natal on November 25 the work of massing supplies and transport went on steadily, while the scope of all the administrative preparations was greatly enlarged, in view of the prospective arrival of large reinforcements. By the time Lord Roberts arrived in January, there were seven million rations for men and animals in the Cape Colony depots, or two months' reserve for the force of 150,000 men and 80,000 horses and mules. A large quantity of these supplies had been pushed up to the advance depots. There were about 15,000 mules with the fighting troops, and every unit, including supply and ammunition columns, pontoon, bridging, and telegraph services, and also naval gun-detachments, was complete with the full scale of transport authorized. Besides these, there were 6,000 to 7,000 mules at the various remount depots. Thus there was no dearth of mule transport to meet all the requirements of the great concentration on the western line, though at this time it was distributed with the troops on the three main lines of railway along which Sir Redvers Buller had intended to advance. Lord Roberts, on being informed of this distribution, does not seem to have realized that the British system worked automatically, so that a concentration of troops at any given place, *ipso facto*, involved a similar concentration of transport, or that the authorized scale was sufficiently elastic to allow of any quantity of additional supplies or ammunition being carried by increasing the number of vehicles in the supply and ammunition columns. Such increase could have been expeditiously carried out in the ordinary course, under the existing regulations, by transferring transport from the stationary units to those taking part in the advance, if

Lord Roberts arrives. Decides to re-organize the transport.

the remount depots had not contained sufficient to meet this demand. No one familiar with the working of the accepted system can doubt that if Lord Roberts had stated his requirements, and left Colonel Bridge to decide on the method of satisfying them, the whole of the necessary transport would have been collected, and the organization, which every one understood, would have been preserved, to the great advantage of all concerned.\*

Reasons for  
Lord  
Roberts's  
decision.

Unfortunately neither Lord Roberts nor Lord Kitchener were at all familiar with the War Office system. Ignorant of the fact that its whole essence lay in the elimination of a separate transport organization at the front, they looked for the separate transport corps to which they were accustomed, and not finding it, concluded that no organization of the transport was in existence beyond a purely regimental one.† Moreover, their experience of war had been under conditions which were not particularly calculated to bring home to them the advantages of a flexible decentralized transport system. Lord Kitchener's entire experience in the working of transport had been gained in command of a small and compact army moving under conditions which permitted of the whole force bivouacking together, and of the whole transport being parked in one place. Lord Roberts's experience in Afghanistan was in many respects similar. At the same time the system to which he was accustomed, though "departmental" in the sense that transport was separate and under the department of the Military Member of Council, was still more or less articulated to correspond with the units of the force. Lord Roberts thought the transport required organizing. But Lord Kitchener, to whom the task of "organization" was entrusted, was chiefly concerned in centralizing it, convinced that he could thus get the maximum of work out of a given number of wagons, and apparently under the impression that it would be possible during the advance to keep the transport massed together,

\* See also vol. iii., chap. xii., for a full account of the transport reorganization in its relation to the strategical problem.

† Thus Lord Roberts in his despatch of Feb. 6 wrote: "There was no organized transport corps when I arrived in this country."



and to distribute supplies to the troops day by day as they required them, very much as he had done in the Sudan.

The whole of the mule transport which had been allotted and organized for definite purposes, with infinite pains and forethought, was now summarily withdrawn from units and pooled again.\* The unwieldy mass of transport, collected by this means, was divided into companies of 49 wagons and one Scotch cart each, to be drawn upon as the necessity of the moment demanded. The ox transport was already divided into companies of 100 wagons, subdivided into sections of 10 wagons, each carrying 20,000 soldiers' rations or 6,000 forage rations. The regimental transport officers remained with their regiments, and a separate transport service was organized out of the available A.S.C. officers with the supply columns, supplemented by miscellaneous officers drawn from all branches of the service. The rapidity and ease with which Colonel Bridge and his subordinates executed the, to them, distressing task affords evidence both of their powers of organization and of the elasticity of the old system. The change of system only altered the distribution without increasing the quantity of baggage or the number of days' rations which would have been carried under the old conditions. When the advance began on February 11 two days' provisions were carried on the man, two days' in the provision wagons of the new transport companies, and six days' in the supply park. Under the original organization, the same amount of supplies would have been taken; but the two days' rations carried by the transport companies would have been divided between the regimental wagons and the supply columns. The real factor which made the march to Bloemfontein possible was the provision of the 400 ox-wagons forming the supply park. On the very day of his arrival Lord Roberts had arranged to hire an additional 300 ox wagons beyond the 700 already provided, and he contracted for 200 more on the eve of the march to Bloemfontein, and for yet another 200 immediately after his

Reorganiza-  
tion of the  
mule  
transport.

\* Except from the Cavalry Division, which retained the old organization, in so far as the executive work was concerned.

entry into that town. The unfortunate misconceptions which led to the reorganization of the mule transport do not detract from the essential credit due to Lord Roberts for realizing that only an abundant transport could secure the strategical mobility required for victory.

Other departmental changes.

The same want of familiarity on the part of Lord Roberts and his Chief of the Staff with the War Office organization was presumably also responsible for certain changes now introduced in the central control of the work of supply and transport. There were two leading features about the established system. The first was that supply and transport were essentially functions of the general commanding the line of communications, that their administrative control centred in two senior officers on his staff, and that the staff officer for supply and transport with army headquarters at the front was a subordinate whose chief duty was to keep his administrative chiefs in touch with the needs of the chief command. The other was that supply and transport were two separate branches, under separate chiefs, on the lines of communication, but met in the field as a single service for carrying the supplies of units on the march. The abolition of regimental transport and the creation of a separate transport corps broke up the essential unity of the two services in the field. On the other hand, the central control of the two departments was now to be unified, and Colonel Richardson, who strongly favoured the reorganization of the transport, was made Director of Supplies and Transport. To complete the reversal of the established system, he was also ordered to accompany Lord Roberts in the field. By the time the army had been on the march a week Lord Roberts came to the conclusion that the experiment was not a success. Major-General Sir W. Nicholson,\* who had taken a specially active part in the reorganization of the transport system before the advance, was appointed Director of Transport, leaving Colonel Richardson free to devote himself exclusively to supplies. After the army reached Bloemfontein Colonel Richardson returned to the base, while

\* Now Lieut.-General Sir W. Nicholson, K.C.B., Chief of the General Staff.

Colonel (now Sir Edward) Ward took his place at army headquarters. What the relative positions of Colonel Richardson, Colonel Bridge, Colonel Ward, and Colonel Nicholson were from this time onward is a point which was never clearly defined. In practice, the centre of gravity of the two services remained at the front, while on the lines of communication Colonel Richardson and Colonel Bridge separately looked after their respective departments.

Meanwhile, no sooner had the march to Bloemfontein begun than the disadvantages of the "reorganization" began to make themselves felt. Many of the officers drafted into the transport from all branches of the regular and auxiliary forces were quite inexperienced, and in any case lacked the direct personal interest in the condition of their animals on the one hand, and in the comfort of the troops on the other, which animated the regimental officers. Moreover, the moment the force, as was inevitable, began to be scattered, the result of centralizing the transport was to cause great confusion and delay in the distribution of supplies, and in the delivery of the baggage-wagons on arrival at the bivouac. When the change was effected, it was intended that each transport company should remain intact and carry out the whole of the transport duties for a brigade, thus fulfilling in itself the functions both of the regimental transport and of the supply column. The responsibility for delivering supplies and baggage, which had hitherto rested with the units themselves, now devolved on the brigade transport officers. These very frequently lost touch with the units of their brigade, and the wagons failed to find their respective destinations. In a very short time after the advance began, regiments, discovering the discomfort caused by the withdrawal of their regimental transport, appropriated army wagons for their own use, and many of the transport companies gradually dissolved, and ceased to exist as separate units, except on paper. From the very beginning, in fact, there was a gradual tendency to revert to the old conditions. The experience gained was conclusive as to the relative

Disadvantages of the new system.

Gradual abandonment of the system.

\* The successive stages in the process can be seen in Army Orders for April 17 and 30, and for May 19, 1900.



advantages of the two systems of organization. Centralized transport, convenient and economical as it appears at first sight, has been definitely discarded by those who had most opportunity of observing its practical working, whatever their original views, and the superiority of the decentralized system has been officially acknowledged.\*

Cavalry and  
technical  
transport  
escapes re-  
organization.

The transport of the Cavalry Division managed, to a great extent, to escape the reorganization. Cavalry are always employed at such a distance from the supply park that a connecting-link between the regimental wagons and the centre of supply is essential. Moreover, the close personal supervision of the regimental transport officers is the only way of ensuring the mules being kept in sufficiently good condition to perform the arduous marches which are necessary to keep the wagons in touch with the units. This was very clearly exemplified during the relief of Kimberley,† which would, in fact, have been impossible if the departmental system had been strictly applied; and, subsequently, during the operations on the march to Pretoria.

Loss of  
Waterval  
convoy.  
Shortage of  
supplies at  
Paardeberg.

At the very outset of Lord Roberts's march the transport service received a staggering blow by the loss of 170 wagons, nearly half the supply park, at Waterval Drift.‡ But Colonel Richardson and his subordinates were equal to the occasion. Every available wagon on the line between the Modder and the Orange Rivers was brought up and loaded with supplies. The ambulance wagons, some of which had previously been withdrawn from the first line, in order to reduce the amount of the transport accompanying the advance, had the covers stripped off, the red cross obliterated, and were extemporized as provision wagons. Meanwhile a portion of the supply park was pushed on to Klip Drift, and was met on the 18th by the cavalry supply column, which refilled its wagons and pushed on to Paardeberg, where provisions were urgently required. The residue of the

\* The regimental or articulated system has once again been authorized in the latest edition of 'War Establishments and Field Service Pocket Book,' compiled while Lieut.-General Sir W. Nicholson himself was Quartermaster-General.

† Vol. iii., p. 456.

‡ Vol. iii., pp. 397-400.

supply park pushed forward from Jacobsdal by the south bank of the Modder and reached Paardeberg on February 23. There the army lived from hand to mouth, as the flow of supplies from Modder River and Kimberley was only maintained with the greatest difficulty. Heavy rains had made the roads almost impassable, the wagons took four days to cover a 30-hour journey, and the wounded who were sent back in them for lack of ambulances suffered most pitifully from the long exposure. The meat supply was also a matter of anxiety to Colonel Richardson at this time. Out of the 500 slaughter-cattle which had started with the army from the Modder, 300 had been lost at Waterval, and many of the remainder were taken to replace casualties among the trek-oxen. The capture of a large number of cattle and sheep at Osfontein, at the critical moment, saved the situation, and enabled an additional allowance of meat to be issued when the rest of the ration was reduced. Many horses and mules were sacrificed to the exigencies of the situation, as it was found impossible to issue more than 4 lbs. of grain daily to each horse, in place of the normal allowance of 12 lbs. grain and 12 lbs. hay. The cavalry had already lost one-third of their horses; and General French's failure to cut off the Boers as they retreated from Poplar Grove was largely due to the poor condition of the remainder. The men suffered more than was necessary, owing to their ignorance of cooking and to their neglect of the ordinary precautions of camp life. These defects of the English soldier became less conspicuous as he gained experience and profited by the example of his colonial comrades, who were probably the finest campaigners of any troops in the world.

The deficiencies in the transport had to some extent been replaced by General Nicholson during the halt at Paardeberg, so that when Lord Roberts marched from Osfontein on March 6, and severed his communications, the army of 35,000 men was accompanied by about 11,000 mules and 9,500 trek-oxen. Provision had to be made for all contingencies, since it was impossible to foretell when communication with the base would be regained or what quantity of supplies would be found in Bloemfontein.

The march to  
Bloemfontein.

Under these conditions, food for the men was the first necessity; only a very limited quantity of grain was carried, and the supply park was loaded almost entirely with biscuits and groceries. At the last moment 100 ox-wagons were requisitioned to take sick and wounded back to Kimberley. To make good the loss of carrying power the outside wooden cases protecting the tin canisters in which provisions are packed were stripped off, by which the gross weight of the packages was reduced 30 per cent. Even so, it was found necessary to leave behind some considerable quantity of the grain and biscuit which had been brought up to Paardeberg with so much difficulty. A portion of the grain was, however, saved by the officer commanding the cavalry supply column, Captain C. D. Christopher, A.S.C., who, when he heard that it had been abandoned, returned to Oosfontein with his empty wagons from Driefontein, where the cavalry were in bivouac. He succeeded in rescuing it, and rejoined the division, after a forced march of 24 miles, before it started the following morning. This was only one example among the many offered during the war of the manner in which the younger Army Service Corps officers accepted responsibility and took advantage of every opportunity of safeguarding the interests of the force to which they were attached. Three days later General French camped on the hills west of Bloemfontein, and found a welcome supply of forage in the various farms, which afforded the first full feed the horses had received for a month. During the advance the supply and ammunition parks, which attained a length of  $10\frac{1}{2}$  miles on the line of march, moved independently in rear of the army, under the charge of a small escort, usually composed of mounted infantry. The wagons started at 4 P.M. in the evening, reaching camp in time to refill the provision wagons before the army marched the following morning. The supply park arrived at Bloemfontein on March 14, carrying groceries for eight, and biscuits for five days, part of which was utilized at once to provision a force which was sent out to clear the line to the south. It was fortunate that the various stores in the town were found to contain a fair supply of food-stuffs for both



men and animals, as railway communication with Cape Colony was not opened until two weeks later.

There was abundance of supplies at the base and at the advance depots in Cape Colony. When Colonel Richardson returned to his duties on the lines of communication there were in South Africa four months' reserves of bread-stuffs, two of tinned meat, three of groceries and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  of forage for 210,000 men and 95,000 horses. Throughout the rest of the war, as a matter of fact, a reserve of approximately four months' supplies for all the troops in the country was kept up. The real difficulty lay in getting supplies through to Bloemfontein, and when Colonel Ward joined the head-quarter staff on March 20, there was only 10 days' supply of bread-stuffs available in the town, just sufficient to last until the Midland Railway to Norval's Pont was opened. The whole of April was spent in accumulating supplies at Bloemfontein, as the Commander-in-Chief did not feel justified in advancing on Pretoria until he had secured an adequate reserve from which the army could be provisioned in the event of communication with Cape Colony being seriously interrupted.\* By May 3, 30 days' reserve supplies for 60,000 men and 30,000 animals had been collected in the Bloemfontein depot, which the Commander-in-Chief considered sufficient to allow of the advance being resumed.

The halt at  
Bloemfontein.

After the experiences of the march to Bloemfontein, the disadvantages of an over-centralized transport were realized at headquarters. General Nicholson reintroduced regimental transport, and partially restored the old supply columns in the shape of transport companies definitely assigned to brigades; the rest of the transport companies were retained as army transport. During the march to Pretoria, the infantry carried 1 day's ordinary rations as well as an emergency ration in their haversacks, and 2 days' provisions in the wagons allotted to units. Supplies for the force were sent up by rail as far as possible, the supply park being employed to keep up the connexion between rail-head and the troops. It was divided into three parts, to supply

The march to  
Pretoria.

\* Vol. iv., pp. 11-14; vol. vi., p. 314.

respectively the right, left, and centre of the army. These were again subdivided into three sections carrying between them 7 days' provisions for men and animals. The three sections alternately relieved each other, and thus an endless chain of wagons, proceeding full and returning empty, enabled a constant stream of supplies to be maintained between rail-head and the provision wagons of units and brigades.

Difficulties  
on the way.

The most serious strain upon the transport was imposed by the destruction of the bridges over the Vet and Zand Rivers. The army reached Kroonstad on May 12 and left again on the 22nd. Meanwhile the railway only crossed the Vet on the 13th and rail-head did not reach Zand River, 40 miles from Kroonstad, till the 17th. Unable to move too far from rail-head, the supply park was delayed a week at Zand River, the mule-wagons of the army transport having to come back to it by forced marches. When the army moved off the supply park was still on its way. In order to cope with the situation, 100 empty wagons were left at Kroonstad ready to load immediately those from the south arrived. They then marched a ten-mile stage in the wake of the advance, where they were relieved by another 100 wagons which pushed on until they were met by those sent back from the front. Trains were never delayed at rail-head for more than an hour and a half, as it was essential to clear them without delay. A gang of natives boarded the train immediately it arrived, and threw the contents of the trucks down the embankment to the ox-wagons which were in waiting. Many of the cases and bags were broken by this primitive method of unloading, but the gain in time more than compensated for the wastage. After the supply park had arrived at Vereeniging, on the north bank of the Vaal, there was no further difficulty in bringing up provisions, as thence onwards the line was practically intact, and supply trains were able to run through. Up to this point, the work of the supply park had been very arduous; but there had been no deficiency of supplies during the advance, though about  $11\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the oxen had been sacrificed in maintaining the service.

The supply of the mounted troops during this period was very precarious, as they were making long and rapid marches many miles distant from the railway on either flank. On one or two occasions when the supply columns failed to regain touch for several days, the troops were placed on reduced rations, supplemented by such supplies as could be collected from the farms on the line of march. The distribution of the supplies taken with the force varied from time to time. General French started by carrying two days' food and forage on the horse, one days' in regimental wagons, and two days' in the supply columns; but the number of wagons in the supply columns was doubled during the halt at Kroonstad.

The supply of the mounted troops.

The supply park reached Pretoria on June 15, ten days after Lord Roberts had entered the town. A considerable quantity of provisions of all kinds was found there; depots were quickly established, and the distribution of supplies to the troops was conducted on normal lines. The provisioning of the force was still a matter of much anxiety, as it was entirely dependent on the long single line of railway to Bloemfontein, which was constantly being attacked and broken by the enemy. The strain was not relieved until July 29, when the Natal line was opened.

The army at Pretoria.

The provisioning of the army during the march to Komatipoort was a comparatively simple matter. The rate of progress was slow, and the wagons of the supply park, which were continually replenished by the railway in rear, were able to keep up with the movements of the troops. Supply depots were established at Middelburg, Belfast, and Machadodorp. To avoid the dangers of the unhealthy low veld, the ox-wagons were left at Machadodorp. But the staff of the supply park went on to superintend the issue of supplies, which were forwarded by railway. There was a serious stoppage at Kaap Muiden, where the enemy had destroyed the large iron bridge which spanned the Crocodile River. Supplies were conveyed by fatigue parties of the Yorkshire Regiment from the train to the bridge-head 150 yards away, whence they were rolled down to the river bed, carried across by natives, and loaded into wagons. In spite

The march to Komati-poort.



of the intense, steaming heat of the low veld, the fatigue parties laboured strenuously night and day at a task as trying as any which our men had to deal with during the war. When the Engineers had completed the deviation across the river on September 23, a supply depot was established at Kaap Muiden station, while the branch line from Kaap Muiden to Barberton was used for sending supplies to the Cavalry Division. The difficulties encountered by the transport of the Cavalry Division, both on their surprise march on Barberton, and subsequently on their useless and untoward march from Machadodorp to Heidelberg, have been described in other volumes.\* General French arrived at Heidelberg on October 26, having lost over 50 per cent. of his oxen and a large number of wagons. In reporting on this march, he writes: "In my opinion, even under the most favourable conditions, ox transport at this season of the year is quite unsuited for military purposes, as there is no grazing. . . . At the best of times, ox transport is unsuitable for a mobile force, as it moves too slowly and at inconvenient hours."

Kitchener  
reorganizes  
the services.

The termination of Lord Roberts's command opened a new era in the organization of the administrative services. General Nicholson, and Colonels Richardson, Bridge, Ward and Clayton left South Africa to take up various appointments, and Lord Kitchener appointed Colonel Wickham, of the Indian Army, Director of Transport, and Colonel Morgan, A.S.C., Director of Supplies. The headquarters of the whole supply service was now definitely transferred to Pretoria, Colonel Landon being appointed Assistant Director at Cape Town. The whole organization was systematized in accordance with the new situation. The whole of South Africa was divided into supply districts, of which there were six in the Transvaal, two in Natal, three in the Orange River Colony, and ten in Cape Colony. Depots were established at convenient stations in each of these districts, from which the smaller stations were provisioned. The ration strength† of the force in South Africa at this time

\* Vol. iv., p. 471; vol. v., pp. 48, 49.

† The ration strength included sick and wounded and civilian and native employees of all kinds.

was 230,000 men, with 120,000 horses and mules; but it rapidly increased during the next few months, until in September, 1901, it numbered 312,000 men and 265,000 horses and mules. There was, approximately a four months' reserve of supplies and forage for the army in various parts of the country. The Transport Department was re-organized on somewhat similar lines. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generals for transport were appointed in all the larger commands, to deal with the administration, distribution, and maintenance of the transport services, while staff officers for transport supervised the work with the columns and in the various districts. About twenty-five workshops and transport depots were formed in various parts of the country for the purpose of repairing vehicles or renovating equipment, and providing centres from which casualties among the *personnel* or animals could be replaced.

The organization of the force into a number of small independent columns, which was introduced to meet the guerilla tactics adopted by the enemy, necessitated a corresponding alteration in the distribution of the transport. The departmental companies were broken up, and each column was allotted a certain number of mule-wagons on a fixed scale, in which were carried the baggage and two days' complete rations of food and forage; in addition to these, it was provided with a sufficient number of ox-wagons to take six days' supplies. The transport with each force thus became a unit complete in itself. Under the conditions which prevailed, this was the only practicable system.\*

Transport adapted to the new tactics.

Nothing has so far been said about the local requisitioning

Requisitioning.

\* A similar system was used by ourselves in Burma, and more recently by the Germans in the Herrero campaign. The latter organized certain definite lines of supply, radiating in different directions from their base across the zone of operations. Depots were established at intervals along these lines, and were maintained by the ox-wagons, or *Kolonnen Abteilungen*, civilian wagons corresponding to those of our auxiliary transport companies. The military supply—or *Proviant*—columns drawn by mules were only used in the vicinity of the railways and at the bases. Each company of their battalion was provided with three ox-wagons, which carried from 15 to 20 days' supply for the men, and was thus enabled to act independently until its supplies were exhausted, when it could come in to refill at the nearest depot.

of supplies. At the beginning of the war, comparatively little use was made of the natural resources of the area of operations. The large supplies of food which, at a later stage, were found to exist, were very scattered; while the enemy was most successful in concealing his sources of supply from our troops, and in clearing the cattle away from the line of our advance. Moreover, before the South African War, our soldiers had no experience of living on the country, and there was no recognized organization for enabling them to do so.\* In any case, the collection of supplies on the line of march during a hurried advance is fraught with difficulty, and even in a fertile and thickly-populated country it is not until military control has been established over a wide area that the army can rely on materially supplementing its supply from local sources. In a few instances, notably that of the advance of the Eighth Division in the Eastern Free State, the troops managed to live largely off the country, and, throughout, captured stock helped largely to facilitate the supply problem. In the later stages of the war requisitioning played a large part in Cape Colony, partly as a means of securing supplies, transport, and remounts for the troops, but still more as a preventive measure.† The orders issued by the Headquarters Staff regarding the commandeering of supplies varied from time to time; but the general rules laid down for guidance at the beginning of the war, were: (1) All supplies or stores taken from an inhabitant who was not bearing arms were to be paid for on the spot at prices fixed by the Director of Supplies. (2) No payment was to be made, but receipts were to be given for goods commandeered from the dwelling or store of a man who was fighting against us. (3) Farms or houses where acts of treachery had been committed were to be burned, and the movable property confiscated. When goods were purchased, payment was generally made by a special form of Government cheque on the Standard Bank of South Africa, and all supply officers were provided with these cheque-books,

\* Since the South African War instructions on this subject have been issued: see 'Regulations for Requisitioning, 1904.'

† See chap. xi.



which showed in full the details of the transactions. Current payments were suspended in December, 1900, to avoid supplying the enemy with the sinews of war, and the greater number of receipts for commandeered supplies were presented to a special committee which was formed after the war, and worked for nearly two years investigating and settling these and other claims.\*

A form of living off the country which was quite peculiar to the South African War was embodied in the branch of the supply service known as the "Military Farms Department." These farms were started soon after the occupation of Pretoria, for the purpose of superintending the large quantities of live stock captured by the troops. They began in a small way with the occupation of Eloff's Farm near Pretoria, and gradually extended until every large up-country supply depot worked in connexion with a military farm. A Chief Inspector of Military Farms was appointed, and a very complete organization for their management was gradually instituted. Twelve farming districts were formed, each under a chief superintendent. Every district contained a certain number of "farming centres" made up of a few farms situated in the same neighbourhood. The farms were graded as "stock," "dairy," and "agricultural." The cultivation of the farms in each centre was undertaken in rotation, the labourers, animals, implements and wagons for the purpose being sent on from one to another. Only a sufficient *personnel* was permanently maintained on any particular farm to keep down the weeds and to do the necessary irrigation, while donkeys were provided for the routine work. Sufficient milk, vegetables, fruit and other produce was obtained to provide for the sick in hospitals, as well as to allow of frequent issues to the troops. The military farms may hardly have justified the jocular suggestion that Lord Kitchener would, but for the peace, have ended by making the war a dividend-paying concern. But they certainly represent the germ of a feature of modern warfare which contains great possibilities of development.

The military farms.

At one time large numbers of the stock captured on

The detective department.

\* See pp. 80-82.

the line of march were stolen, as the column commanders had no recognized means of taking charge of them, and would engage any casual person who presented himself as an authorized drover to drive in the cattle to the nearest depot. In many cases these men, knowing the country well, would secrete a part of the cattle somewhere until opportunity offered of driving them over the border into Rhodesia or Basutoland. Besides this organized robbery, the depots were constantly depleted by the native employees pilfering supplies and selling them to civilians. In order to check these depredations, Colonel Morgan established a detective department, which succeeded in recovering a good deal of Government property that had been made away with in this manner.

The Field  
Force Can-  
teen.

The Field Force Canteen was an innovation in war time which proved a great convenience and benefit to the whole Army. A canteen for the troops in the field had been sanctioned by the War Office at the beginning of the war, and one firm had actually taken the matter in hand when the sanction was cancelled. In Natal, however, a practice prevailed from the beginning of allowing the troops to buy small luxuries from the supply depots, where a stock of such commodities was kept for issue to the hospitals. It was found that this caused such confusion in the supply accounts, and added so greatly to the labour of the supply staff, that Colonel Morgan, then Assistant Adjutant-General for Supplies in Natal, decided to start a separate and self-supporting department to deal with the work. It was an anxious experiment, undertaken solely on his own responsibility; but its success was assured from the first, as there was no other source from which the men could provide themselves with the many small comforts that are so essential to the soldier. The trade grew by leaps and bounds, and the turnover was so rapid that the smallest possible margin of profit yielded a very large return. The very considerable surplus funds of the Field Force Canteen at the end of the war served subsequently to establish well-equipped garrison institutes at most of the military stations in South Africa.



COLONEL SIR E. W. D. WARD, K.C.B.,  
ASST. ADJUTANT-GENERAL NATAL FIELD FORCE, 1899-1900.  
DIRECTOR OF SUPPLIES, FIELD FORCE, S. AFRICA, 1900.  
*Photo by Dickinsons, London.*





It is generally acknowledged that the Army had never been so well fed in any previous campaign as it was in the South African War. The quality of the supplies as a whole was excellent; and the only complaints reported referred to the method of packing, and the form in which provisions were sent out, rather than to their condition and character. The field service ration has lately been altered in view of the experience gained in South Africa, the allowance of tea and coffee having been increased and the quarter of a pound of jam issued in South Africa being now included in the regular scale. The old normal ration was very deficient in sugar and fat, which are two of the most valuable articles of diet for men engaged in hard physical work under exposed conditions, as was proved by the craving which the troops showed for any food containing either of these constituents. The issue of jam meets the demand for sugar; but the proportion of fat is still insufficient unless bacon, which is now issued as an alternative, can be included in the normal ration. Quality of supplies.

Many suggestions have been submitted for providing the soldier with a more convenient, more nourishing, and more palatable form of ration than the ordinary preserved meat and biscuit. Some of these, no doubt, possess all the good qualities which their inventors claim. The whole difficulty in the way of introducing any patent or proprietary commodity into the routine ration on service is the vast quantity which it is necessary to provide, and which it is not in the power of any single firm to produce suddenly on the outbreak of war. The recent devices for "self-cooking" rations, by which the means of heating are contained in the same tin as the provisions, are extremely valuable under certain conditions, and were used to some extent by the Germans in South-West Africa. They are not, however, adapted for general use by an army in the field, not only because the supply is insufficient to meet requirements, but also because the larger and more cumbersome tins would add considerably to the burden of the transport. There were many complaints, indeed, more particularly among the mounted troops, of the inconvenience caused by the size of the six-pound tins of Suggested improvements.

preserved meat sent out to South Africa. The difficulty here was really the same as in the case of special foods. There is little commercial demand for tins of a smaller size; consequently they could not be obtained in sufficient quantities. The fact is, that in war on a large scale, armies must depend for their provisions on ordinary trade commodities purchased in the open market. How vast is the amount of food consumed by a great army may be estimated from the fact that over 2,000 tons of food and forage were required daily to feed the Army for the last five months of the war.

Officers'  
comforts.

No restrictions were placed in the way of officers obtaining for themselves such additional comforts and luxuries as opportunity allowed, as long as no burden was placed on the military services. There may have been occasional instances where officers were inclined to sacrifice mobility to personal comfort, but they were certainly rare. As a rule, whenever the troops were called upon to face exceptional hardship, their officers never hesitated to set an example of cheerful endurance by sharing every privation with them. But to make it a matter of principle that all ranks should always fare alike would be seriously detrimental to the efficiency of the Army. The strain of a long campaign can never be realized by any one who has not been on active service, and that strain increases in proportion to rank and responsibility. The British officer is a national asset, growing in value each day of the war, and very difficult to replace. Not only has he been accustomed from his boyhood to a different style of living from the private soldier, but in the daily routine of war, he must use his brain as well as his body; and often his real work only begins when he reaches the bivouac after a hard day's march. To deny him any reasonable comforts which can be secured by him without detriment to military efficiency would be a very mistaken policy.

Coloured  
personnel of  
the services.

The coloured and native *personnel* employed in the transport and other military services was very numerous. Over 20,000 natives were being rationed daily at one period of the war. Their organization was very similar in all branches of the service, the natives being divided up into gangs with a white superintendent or conductor in charge,



who was responsible for their discipline and supervision. The native transport *personnel* consisted of a driver and leader to each wagon, with a percentage of spare "boys" to help in camp or to replace casualties. There were 124 natives with 5 white civilian conductors in each mule company of 49 wagons, and 200 natives under 20 conductors in the ox company of 100 wagons. The rate of wages paid during the war varied from time to time. At the beginning, drivers were paid as much as £4 10s. a month, with rations. This high rate was given in order to collect the large number of natives required as quickly as possible ; but it undoubtedly had a bad effect, as the "boys," unused to such generous treatment, became dissatisfied, and soon amassed sufficient money to keep them in idleness, when they refused to work any longer. The rate of wages was ultimately reduced to £3 a month for drivers and £2 for leaders, while conductors were paid £15. The only punishments officially recognized were fining and dismissal ; but there were occasions when more drastic measures had to be taken to ensure strict discipline on the line of march.

Altogether 150,000 mules were purchased for the Army during the war. Of oxen some 50,000 were at work at the end of the war, and probably fully another 50,000 had been used up in its course. But the actual numbers, whether of mules or oxen or wagons employed, cannot be ascertained, as the transport was continually being replenished by captures from the enemy or requisitions from the country, which never appeared in any official returns. About one-half of the total number of mules provided was purchased in the United States ; one-third was obtained in South Africa ; and the remainder from Italy, Spain, and other countries.\* After the peace the great bulk of the animals and other effects of the transport department were sold, at good prices, to the civil authorities of the new colonies for the purposes of repatriation.†

Total purchases for transport

The following Table shows the quantities of some of the Total supplies.

\* See chap. vi.

† See p. 48.

commodities ordered by the authorities at home to be sent out to South Africa during the war, and the sources from which they were obtained. It does not include supplies purchased by the Supply Department in South Africa:—

Source whence obtained.	Preserved meat.	Jam.	Cheese.	Flour.	Hay.	Oats.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
Home . . . .	..	18,500	2,460	25,000	15,000	270,000*
Canada . . . .	670				187,000	14,500
Australia and New Zealand . . . .	12,500				193,000	120,000
United States . . . .	14,000	..	..	..	41,500	61,000
Argentina. . . .	..	..	..	..	138,000	2,500
Total . . . .	27,170	18,500	2,460	25,000	574,500	468,000

Accumulation of supplies at the peace.

Lord Kitchener insisted on the shipment of supplies from overseas being maintained to the very end of the war in order to discourage the Boers by impressing on them that he would continue until they were willing to accept his terms. In consequence of this policy, the quantity of provisions which remained on hand when peace was declared in May, 1902, was overwhelming. There were, at that time, about 150 depots in different parts of South Africa, in which were contained in all, at a low estimate, 18,000 tons of biscuits and other bread-stuffs, 10,000 tons of preserved and frozen meat, 100,000 tons of oats, and nearly double that quantity of hay, with equally ample reserves of groceries, wines, tobacco, and medical comforts. It was many months before the Army of 327,000 men (ration strength) and 265,000 horses and mules could be dispersed. In the meantime, vast quantities were still arriving, as all supplies on order had to be accepted. When the garrison had been reduced to normal proportions, there would still remain an enormous surplus of food and forage to be disposed of, which was rapidly deteriorating in value. The total amount which had eventually to be dealt with represented a value of nearly £11,000,000, and included such items as nearly half a million tons of forage, over 8,000 tons of preserved meat, nearly 5,000 tons

\* Purchased in the English market.

of jam, 800 tons of tobacco, 300,000 bottles of spirits, 600,000 of wine, 1,000,000 of ale and stout.

That a great part of the supplies would have to be sold was obvious. But there was a further and much more difficult question. Should the Supply Department retain enough supplies to provide for the wants of the gradually-diminishing force for as long as the various articles were likely to keep good, or should it sell everything it possibly could and secure what it wanted afterwards through local contractors? Lord Kitchener and Colonel Morgan decided for the latter alternative for a variety of reasons. In the first place they assumed that a very large proportion of the Army Service Corps would be ordered home, and that the numbers left in South Africa would have great difficulty in dealing with the enormous task involved in looking after and distributing so vast a quantity of supplies. The paucity of the commissioned ranks of the Army Service Corps did not permit of sending out a fresh staff of officers to deal with the work of "clearing up" and closing down the depots. Moreover, storage accommodation was lacking, and additional expenditure would be required to prevent a disastrous loss from deterioration. There were other considerations of a more speculative character which are dwelt with elsewhere.\* It was accordingly decided that, as far as possible, the whole of the supplies should be sold, and that the provisioning of the forces left in South Africa should be let out to contract. In the applying of the latter part of this decision a system was introduced of selling Government supplies direct to the contractor, who at the same time contracted to supply them back to the troops, as they were wanted, at a difference in price, which was supposed to allow a fair margin of profit after paying for sorting, removing, storing, issuing, and loss by deterioration, the cost of which would otherwise have fallen on the Army.

The method chosen for disposing of the surplus.

The circumstances in which the supply authorities were placed at the time might have warranted some arrangement of the kind, provided that the utmost care and supervision

Unfortunate results of contract system.

\* See chap. xii., where a fuller account of these transactions is given from the financial point of view.



had been exercised while it was in force. Unfortunately, however, Colonel Morgan, who was responsible for the inauguration of the system, did not remain in South Africa, and his successors appear never to have grasped his intentions. The system of financial control which Lord Kitchener had established was not continued, and the most amazing blunders were perpetrated. Many of the officers who had to carry out the contract scheme seem hardly to have realized that the selling to the contractor and the buying from him were part of the same arrangement and concerned the same articles, or to have made any attempt to discover whether the contractor was really rendering any service for the difference between the two prices. In some cases the transfer to the contractor was purely nominal. The supplies remained where they were and were served out by the Army Service Corps subordinates as if nothing had ever happened, the only difference being that the contractor pocketed a heavy profit on the transaction. The evidence given before the Royal Commission on South African War Stores disclosed the existence of an organized system of collusion between the contractors and several non-commissioned officers who, in many cases, had great quantities of supplies under their charge, and were thus enabled to accumulate surpluses unknown to their officers. These surplus supplies they secretly sold to the contractor at a less rate than he could purchase them elsewhere.

Position of  
the A.S.C.  
officers.

As regards the officers responsible for the proper supervision of the supply work, the Royal Commission, though commenting severely on the "inept management of the Supply and Pay Departments," which were responsible for the heavy losses incurred, concluded that there was "no evidence that any of the officers in charge of these departments or any officers holding His Majesty's Commission, with the exception of those mentioned,† have received any

\* The officers mentioned were one Lieut.-Colonel A.S.C. and a Quartermaster of a cavalry regiment, who admitted taking money from a contractor. The cases of two junior officers were referred to the War Office for investigation, and two officers were mentioned as having borrowed from a contractor money which had been repaid.

bribe or inducement, pecuniary or otherwise, from any contractor or contractor's agent." The best excuse that can be made for the incompetence and negligence censured by the Commission is that so many experienced Army Service Corps officers had returned home soon after the end of the war, leaving junior men, already wearied out by three long years' campaigning, in responsible positions, where they were called upon to negotiate intricate commercial transactions with astute and, in certain instances, unscrupulous business men. It may be that in some cases the very qualifications which won them success as supply officers in the field were antagonistic to the cautious and precise methods necessary for the work which was entrusted to them after the war. On active service, economy is not the supreme test; the supply officer must feed the troops in the face of every difficulty, irrespective of cost, and he is encouraged to accept any responsibility in achieving this object by the knowledge that his superiors will support him in any steps he may have undertaken.

At the same time much of the waste and fraud involved was due, not to any inherent difference of the qualities most desirable in war and those most desirable in business, but to sheer remediable ignorance of business methods and business conditions. This has been recognized, and an effort is now being made to train the future administrative officers of the Army in the broad principles of commerce, and to give them not only an insight into the point of view of the business man, but also some knowledge of the economic laws governing the development of modern industry. It is intended by this means to build up a staff of trained administrators, who will be qualified to deal with the many complex questions that arise under the ever-varying conditions of British warfare. At the same time the position and prospects of the administrative services have been improved, and their responsibility in peace has been increased, by the reforms introduced by Lord Esher's Committee.

Among the points brought home by the experiences of the war, the first, perhaps, is the actual numerical deficiency of the Army Service Corps *personnel* for the requirements of

Need of  
business  
methods.

Need for the  
expansion of  
the A.S.C.

a large campaign. This was not only the prime cause of the failure in the conduct of the supply service after the war, but was also the root of many of the difficulties experienced in the course of the campaign. Almost at the very start, large numbers of officers, the majority of whom were entirely ignorant of Army Service Corps work, were brought in to command and administer the transport over the heads of the trained officers of the corps who happened to be junior in Army rank, while at a later stage commissions in the supply and transport service were given with great latitude. For reasons of economy the problem cannot be completely solved by the simple expedient of increasing the peace establishment of the Army Service Corps, though that establishment should always be sufficient, not only to provide for the first requirements of an expeditionary force, but also to furnish a substantial nucleus of trained men for subsequent expansion. The lay reformer has from time to time suggested that the entire supply and transport services of the Army should be handed over to civilians. This is obviously impossible; any one who has been on active service, or even on peace manœuvres where the experiment has been tried on a limited scale, knows that men untrained as soldiers are not amenable to discipline unless organized as a military body under the immediate direction and control of military officers. Something may perhaps be done by inducing a certain number of regimental officers to qualify for Army Service Corps work. But the best hope of expansion undoubtedly lies in the development of the new territorial system. It is intended that each territorial division shall possess a complete Army Service Corps organization trained and supervised by Regular officers. Although the members of this force do not engage to serve overseas, it is probable that, in an emergency, a sufficient number of volunteers will be forthcoming from it to supplement the deficiencies of the Army Service Corps during a foreign campaign. Nor if some greater measure of certitude were required ought it to be impossible to induce a considerable number definitely to undertake an obligation to serve abroad in time of war, and to fit themselves for this duty by special courses.



Another point which has been already discussed is the grave disadvantage resulting from the existence of entirely different systems of organization in different parts of the Empire. The experience of the war has, as far as the British War Office is concerned, definitely vindicated the supply and transport organization established before the war. Meanwhile the supply and transport service of the forces in India, which has recently been reconstituted, and is now under the Commander-in-Chief, instead of being, as it was formerly, a separate department under the Military Member of the Council, still retains the departmental organization of the transport. The conditions prevailing in India may have justified this decision; but it is nevertheless a serious anomaly that a large proportion of British regiments should be trained to a system of transport foreign to the rest. The confusion which resulted from mutual want of comprehension in South Africa affords only an indication of the complications which might arise in a case when the British and Indian forces had to act together on a large scale. If there really are insuperable obstacles to organizing the military transport and supply services on a uniform basis throughout the Empire, then the only conclusion is that all officers likely to be concerned with any one of these services should at least be compelled to make themselves fully acquainted with the details of all the existing systems.

Need for uniformity of system throughout the Empire.

The absence of any organization for dealing with the requisitioning services in the field was a defect in our administrative system which led to much confusion and unnecessary expenditure, both during the war and long after its conclusion. This has been remedied by the recent issue of instructions on the subject, under which, in future campaigns, the whole system will be brought under control, and arrangements will be made for establishing a central office to record and settle all claims as they are presented, instead of postponing investigation until peace has been declared.

Need of provision for requisitioning.

The system of accounting in the field need not be discussed at length in this chapter, although it is closely connected with the supply and transport services of the Army. The practical impossibility of accurately recording the quantity

Accounting in the field.

of provisions or stores issued daily to troops who are marching and often fighting from early morning until late at night was proved again and again. Under the regulation in force during the war, all supply officers were required to keep a daily account; but, as a general rule, no attempt was made to make up their books until a favourable opportunity offered, when the account for the whole period would be neatly compiled and such entries made as might be necessary to strike a balance approximating to the quantity of provisions which remained on hand. An account made up in this manner could be of no practical use, and was an obvious waste of time and ingenuity. Field service accounting has, however, lately been completely revised, and placed on a common-sense basis. All accounting is in future to be relegated to the base and to the depots on the lines of communication, where records can be kept of the bulk issued to the troops, supply officers in the field merely keeping a diary of their total issues and receipts. The responsibility of the supply officer will be limited to issuing the provisions which he receives, in accordance with the authorized scale, and to economizing the supplies in his charge to the best of his ability.

**Conclusion.**

Taking things as a whole, such defects in our supply and transport system as were disclosed under the immense strain of the war in no way reflected on the general soundness of the principles of the organization established by Sir Redvers Buller in 1888. The supply of a large army is at once the most complicated and the most urgent of all considerations involved in the administration of a campaign; and in spite of all mistakes and mischances, it remains undisputed that in the South African War a great advance was made in the methods of maintaining an army in the field under modern conditions.

## CHAPTER VI

## THE REMOUNT SERVICE

No war of modern times has been dependent upon its re-mount service to a degree at all approaching that of the South African War. In the first place it was predominantly a war of mounted troops. The forces of one of the combatants were entirely mounted; those of the other, apart from stationary defences, comprised an ever-increasing proportion of horsemen. In the second place, it was a war which depended enormously upon animal transport, in the shape of mules or oxen, the provision of which, as far as mules were concerned, fell upon the Remount Department. The work of that department in its relation to the war falls under two main heads: the supply of animals to the Army in South Africa from England and elsewhere, and the work of the remount organization in South Africa itself.

Importance  
of remount  
service.

*The Provision of Remounts.*

A brief but comprehensive summary of the position of the Remount Department of the War Office before the war, and of the special measures taken by it to provide remounts, both before and after the outbreak of hostilities, is contained in the report of the court of inquiry into the administration of the Army Remount Department, held in 1902, and is worth quoting in full:

Its organi-  
zation and  
administra-  
tion before  
the war.

*I. Conditions existing in the First Part of 1899.*

1. On January 1, 1899, the staff of the Remount Department, consisted of an Inspector-General (on the Headquarters Staff of the Army), a Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, three Assistant



Inspectors, and two staff captains, whose duties were distributed as follows :—

At headquarters in London were the Inspector-General, the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, whose duties were principally office work, and one Assistant Inspector, who dealt with the registration of reserve horses, and who assisted the Inspector-General in the purchase of cavalry horses in England.

At Woolwich was one Assistant Inspector, who purchased horses for artillery, Engineers, and Army Service Corps. Under him was a staff captain, who superintended the depot at Woolwich.

In Ireland was one Assistant Inspector, who purchased in Ireland for cavalry and mounted infantry. Under him was a staff captain, who superintended the two remount depots in Ireland. The Inspector-General was Major-General Truman, who was appointed to that office on January 1, 1899, having previously been an Assistant Inspector for nearly seven years. The Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General was Major Peters, who left the office in December, 1899, to join his regiment in South Africa. He was succeeded by Colonel R. C. B. Lawrence.

2. The duties with which the department was charged under the Quartermaster-General were practically confined to the purchase of horses for mounted corps serving at home. The troops serving in India are provided for entirely by the Government of India. The only other mounted troops serving out of the United Kingdom were one regiment of cavalry and one field battery in Egypt, and one regiment of cavalry and three field batteries in South Africa.

3. Horses required for Egypt were purchased by the general officer commanding in that country, and were usually obtained from Syria. A few horses were purchased as an experiment in Hungary in 1896 by an officer of the Remount Department and sent to Egypt. Horses required for the mounted corps in South Africa were purchased in that country, with the exception that in 1897-98 horses for service in South Africa were purchased in Argentina by Major-General Truman, who was then an Assistant Inspector of Remounts; the number of animals thus purchased was as follows :—In 1897, 1,362 horses; in 1898, 690 horses and 701 mules.

4. The normal operations of the Remount Department were, therefore, confined to the home market, for although in 1886 some 300 horses had been bought in Canada as an experiment,

with a view of getting into touch with that source of supply, the experiment was not repeated, and orders were issued by the Secretary of State that future purchases were to be made only in the home market.

5. In 1899 the number of remounts required to meet the normal peace demands in the United Kingdom was estimated at 2,500. The approved method of providing these horses was by purchase from dealers who had been accustomed to procure horses for army purposes and knew the class of horse that was required.

6. Horses for the cavalry of the line were purchased almost entirely in Ireland, mainly from five or six so-called Government dealers, *i.e.*, dealers who entered into an arrangement with the War Department to provide horses at a fixed price, and were bound to take back within six months any horse that proved to be unsatisfactory. A certain number of horses were also bought, at an average price, from private dealers and at fairs, but in these cases the purchase was final. Purchases of artillery, Engineers, and Army Service Corps horses were made in England and Ireland when required, usually from recognised dealers. In making these purchases, the purchasing officer had to determine the suitability of the horse for the branch concerned, while the veterinary officer who accompanied him was responsible for the soundness and the age.

7. In 1887 a system of registration of horses had been established with a view to form a reserve to meet a national emergency. By this system owners of horses could register a proportion of their horses, under an arrangement to produce that number of suitable horses at a fixed price in the event of their being required. An officer of the Remount Department inspected the horses annually, and on the owner signing the agreement he was paid 10s. a head \* for the number of horses registered for the current year. When the emergency arose, the War Department could take all or any of the registered horses on payment of the fixed price; and if the required number of suitable horses was not forthcoming the owner was liable to a fine of £50 for each horse deficient. On April 1, 1899, 14,105 horses were thus registered in the horse reserve.

8. The question of the number of horses that would be required in case of war had been reported upon in 1884 by a committee, of which Lieut.-General Sir F. Fitz-Wygram was president. In this report it was stated that in order to place the

\* Reduced to 5s. in 1905.

1st Army Corps in the field 6,600 additional horses would have to be provided, and for the 2nd Army Corps 9,300 additional horses. The 1st Army Corps, it was stated, must be complete in one month; the 2nd Army Corps in three months; and reinforcements to replace casualties (9,600 horses) within six months, raising the total required to be purchased within a few months of the outbreak of war to 25,500. The experience gained in previous wars led to the belief that this number could not be purchased in the home market. The committee also considered that the number required for the 1st Army Corps could not be obtained even in foreign markets within the required time, so that, in order to mobilize the 1st Army Corps, it would be apparently necessary to maintain about 2,000 additional horses in time of peace.

9. By the establishment of the horse reserve in 1887, as above described, it was calculated that the necessary number of horses would be obtained for the mobilization of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps, and for the wastage of the first six months. The estimate of General Fitz-Wygram's committee was confirmed by a memorandum written in 1891 by Mr. Stanhope, who was then Secretary of State for War, in which it was laid down that the force to be provided to send abroad, in case of necessity, would be two complete Army Corps, with a Cavalry Division and line of communication troops, and that this force would require an additional provision of 25,000 horses.

10. It is to be observed that the above number of horses was to complete the ordinary combatant units, viz., cavalry, artillery, and ammunition columns, and did not touch the question of the provision of animals for the supply trains or for the lines of communication. The practice in previous wars had been that these were supplied by the purchase of transport animals, either at the seat of war or in foreign countries where such sources of supply were open to the British Government.

11. The foregoing statement represents generally the state of affairs until the middle of 1899, up to which time no expansion of the Remount Department had taken place. Estimates were then made of the number of horses and mules likely to be required in the event of military operations becoming necessary in South Africa. The numbers contemplated were comparatively few, and, with the exception of a certain number in South Africa, no purchases were made until after the declaration of war.

12. With a view, however, to possible contingencies, about the middle of July, 1899, commissions of officers, to make



preliminary inquiries as to the supply of mules, were sent to the United States of America, to Spain, and to Italy. A veterinary surgeon accompanied each commission, but no purchases were to be made until the officers received further orders. A commission for the purchase of horses was also sent to Australia, arriving in that country on September 30, 1899.

## II. *Action taken on the Outbreak of War.*

13. When the war broke out in October, 1899, the mobilization of the 1st Army Corps was ordered. Measures taken on outbreak of war.

14. In order to meet the greater pressure on the department, the purchasing staff at home was increased, but the staff at the headquarter office was not strengthened until May, 1900, when one officer was added. Two more officers were added towards the end of that year.

15. For the purposes of mobilization, 3,682 horses were purchased from the registered reserve, the remainder required being bought in the open market. In this way sufficient horses were found in the United Kingdom for the combatant units which left England at the outbreak of war.

16. The first purchases abroad were made in South Africa, and were carried out under the orders of the general officer commanding in that country. On July 25, 1899, the General Officer Commanding, South Africa, had been ordered to buy 900 mounted infantry cobs for Colonel Baden-Powell's force at Bulawayo and Mafeking, and thereafter similar purchases were made in that country, both of mules and horses, as they were procurable. On October 27 it was decided that cobs should be provided in Natal for two regiments of mounted infantry of 500 each. It is to be observed that in the early part of the war the Basutos were unwilling to sell their ponies, and that source of supply was not fully open to our Army until a much later date, when some 12,000 to 13,000 animals were obtained from them.

17. On September 18, 1899, approval was given for the purchase of 260 horses in Australia to replace anticipated casualties.

18. On September 23 the following orders were sent for the purchase of mules, viz. :—

Naples, 3,000 ; New Orleans, 3,000 ; Spain, 1,000 ; and on October 2 an additional 1,000 mules were ordered from New Orleans.

19. On October 4 the following purchases of cobs were ordered :—

Ireland, 300 for officers' riding.  
 Australia, 300 „ „ „  
 Argentina, 200 „ „ „  
 South Africa, 700 for mounted infantry.  
 Argentina, 1,600 „ „ „

20. For the purchases in Argentina a commission was despatched on October 13, 1899.

21. On November 8, 1899, 3,000 additional mules were ordered, viz., 1,000 in Italy and 2,000 in the United States, to complete the mule transport of the Fifth Infantry Division. At the end of November, 1899, orders were given for the mobilization of the Sixth Division, and steps were taken to purchase the animals required for it. On December 11 the mobilization of the Seventh Division and of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade was ordered.

22. Thenceforward the demands became larger, and it became evident that further sources of supply must be tapped. Whilst, therefore, the purchases in Argentina and Australia were continued, orders were sent to purchase horses in the United States and Canada, beginning respectively in March and May, 1900.

23. About the middle of December, 1899, the employment of the Imperial Yeomanry was approved, and the Imperial Yeomanry Committee were allowed by the Secretary of State to make their own arrangements for the purchase of horses.

These arrangements do not come within the purview of this inquiry, and it is sufficient to state that the committee resorted to Austria-Hungary as the field for their purchases, and continued to purchase for themselves until March 27, 1900, when the duty of supplying horses for the Imperial Yeomanry was transferred to the Remount Department, who then decided to begin purchasing remounts in Austria-Hungary.

24. Horses and mules were therefore being purchased in the following countries :—

Australia ..	..	..	Horses.
Argentina ..	..	..	„
Canada ..	..	..	„
Hungary ..	..	..	„
Italy ..	..	..	Mules.
Spain ..	..	..	„
United States ..	..	..	Horses and mules.

From this time the purchasing was practically continuous.

25. The extent of the demands made upon the Remount Department, and the way in which they were met, may be judged from the following table :—

Quarter Ending.	Demanded.		Supplied.	
	Horses.	Mules.	Horses.	Mules.
December 31, 1899 . . .	4,272	12,900	5,901	18,095
March 31, 1900 . . .	13,980	18,000	14,155	15,092
June 30, 1900 . . .	19,830	20,600	34,104	18,749
September 30, 1900 . . .	18,530	6,000	19,751	9,988
December 31, 1900 . . .	10,072	5,000	10,090	6,055
March 31, 1901 . . .	35,394	6,000	25,118	4,467
June 30, 1901 . . .	30,716	7,000	23,468	5,971
September 30, 1901 . . .	31,716	6,000	30,855	7,500
December 31, 1901 . . .	30,816	6,000	40,365	5,113
and for				
January 31, 1902 . . .	9,972	2,000	13,056	3,000
	205,248	89,500	216,863	94,030

26. These enormous and unprecedented demands show the **Wastage.** extraordinary wastage which took place, as to which it is sufficient to refer to the evidence given by the Quartermaster-General on March 1, that there were then on the ration list in South Africa 243,000 horses and mules ; that of these 20,000 were on the sick list ; and that of these, no less than 1,000 a week were being destroyed as incurable, irrespective of the numbers which were lost in action or died of disease.

27. In addition to the demands from South Africa, horses had to be provided at home for four reserve regiments of cavalry and for 66 new batteries of artillery.

\* \* \* \* \*

Altogether the Remount Department, at home and in South Africa, provided for the purposes of the war some 520,000 horses and 150,000 mules, at a total cost of over £15,000,000. Of these some 350,000 horses and 50,000 mules perished in the campaign.\* These are enormous and, **Total supplies and wastage.**

\* The corresponding figures on the Boer side cannot be ascertained. The Boers took the field with 50,000 to 60,000 horses, which were renewed several times in the course of the campaign. Their net wastage of horses very probably exceeded 100,000.



at the same time, remarkably significant figures. For details the reader can refer to the statistical table prepared by the Quartermaster-General in 1903 which appears on the page opposite.

South Africa  
and other  
colonies.

The largest single source of supply, as was perhaps only natural, was South Africa, which provided some 160,000 horses and 45,000 mules and donkeys, not to speak of an unknown number of oxen, possibly 100,000 or more,\* to the British forces and was, of course, the only source of supply for the two republics. The resources of South Africa might, indeed, have been drawn upon even more fully than they were, and certainly at an earlier date. Much that might have been done in the way of purchase before the war was left undone, in South Africa as elsewhere, partly for fear of offending Boer susceptibilities and thus prejudicing the diplomatic negotiations, but in part also, it can hardly be denied, from short-sighted motives of economy, and from the failure to realize the greatness of the danger ahead. After the war broke out similar unmilitary considerations interfered with the impressment of horses in Cape Colony, which was not carried out till the beginning of 1901. Other British colonies or possessions supplied some 75,000 horses between them.

Foreign  
supply  
sources.

By far the largest source of supply for mules, and, after South Africa, for remounts, were the United States, which furnished 80,000 mules and 110,000 horses. Another 90,000 remounts came from Hungary and Argentina, while Spain and Italy supplied 23,000 mules. Altogether foreign countries supplied nearly two-fifths of the horses, and over two-thirds of the mules required for the campaign, a state of things as unsatisfactory as it should be unnecessary. Moreover, the permission to make these purchases constituted a relaxation of the rules of neutrality in our favour which may not be extended to us on another occasion.

Home  
supplies.

Barely 80,000 horses were furnished by the United Kingdom. It must not, indeed, be inferred that this number represents the actual limit of the home supply. Of the 14,000 horses registered before the war less than one-half

\* See p. 403.

Statistics of  
supplies, and  
their dis-  
posal.

SOURCE.	Numbers provided.			Total.	Cost.
	Horses.		Mules and Donkeys.		
	With units.	Re- mounts.			
Home . . . . .	20,251	56,984	167	77,402	£
South America . . . .	..	26,544	..	26,544	14,495,394*
Canada . . . . .	..	14,621	..	14,621	
U.S. of America . . . .	..	106,658	80,524	187,182	
Australasia . . . . .	..	23,028	..	23,028	
Austria (i.e., Hungary).	..	60,352	..	60,352	
Spain . . . . .	..	..	15,229	15,229	
Italy . . . . .	..	..	7,004	7,004	
Cyprus . . . . .	..	..	128	128	
South Africa . . . . .	..	158,816	45,290	204,106	
Uganda (i.e., E. Africa).	..	..	306	306	15,329,306
Purchased for British South Africa Company in U.S. of America . . .	..	3,220	1,000	4,220	
Total provided by Re- mount Department . . .	20,251	450,223	149,648	620,122	14,495,394
Home, provided by Im- perial Yeomanry . . . .	2,500	4,500	..	7,000	290,000
From India . . . . .	5,549	3,062	1,114	9,725	233,900
Colonial Contingents . .	27,473	1,431	19	28,923	199,287
Austria, provided by Imperial Yeomanry . . .	..	3,805	..	3,805	110,725
Total . . . . .	55,773	463,021	150,781	669,575	15,329,306
	518,794				
Numbers in hand in S.A. on May 31, or landed after that date . . . .	151,118		94,626†	245,744	
Number in hand at Home, purchased for South Africa . . . . .	3,500		..	3,500	
Lost on voyage . . . . .	13,144		2,816	15,960	
Sold in Canada . . . . .	1,224		..	1,224	
Disposed of in New Zealand . . . . .	350		..	350	
Brought to England from Canada . . . . .	2,451		..	2,451	
Balance expended dur- ing campaign . . . . .	347,007		53,339	400,346†	

Total net expenditure, including amounts paid for not completing contracts in Austria (£16,862), and New Zealand (£1,052), less sale of American horses in Canada (£8,078) = £15,339,142.

\* Exclusive of cost of animals with units before the outbreak of hostilities.

† Including 7,893 donkeys.

‡ This includes casualties prior to shipment. The real wastage was even greater, as the total of 669,575 given above does not include captures of ponies or mules on the veld, a very considerable item.

were selected, and these principally from the London omnibus horses. Many more horses could have been got at a higher price, and still more if recourse had been taken to section 115 of the Army Act, which sanctions the impressment of all available horses in case of urgent necessity. At the same time the inadequacy of the home supply to meet the demands of a serious war is one of the many grave military problems with which the British nation is confronted but which it refuses to face.

The ideal  
animal re-  
quired.

Turning from the subject of numbers to the quality of the animals, and more especially the horses supplied, it may not be amiss to preface our consideration of what was actually purchased by a description of the ideal type which experience showed was the one to aim at. The following quotation from a competent writer \* expresses the general consensus of opinion :

“The almost universal report from South Africa by men who understood horses was that a good, strong, well-made, hardy polo pony was the type of animal that was wanted—an Irish hunter in miniature, but an animal which need not be quite fast enough to play an international polo game. I have very little doubt that those who expressed these opinions were quite right ; that was the animal that was wanted, but could not be obtained. After having seen nearly a hundred thousand horses on four different continents, I believe that such a pony is an article which is only to be obtained in strictly limited numbers, and then at a greater price than the British public would wish to pay for Army work.”

Quality of  
animals  
supplied.

Of the horses actually supplied, the South African pony and the English horse, when acclimatized, proved the best campaigners. The best South African ponies approximated to the ideal set forth above. Moreover, they enjoyed the enormous advantage of being native to the country, and were generally chosen by men who understood them. The latter circumstance also applied in the case of the English horses, which were, as a rule, more carefully selected than those bought abroad. The London omnibus horses did admirably for artillery work, largely, no doubt, because they were in

\* H. Sessions : ‘Two Years with Remount Commissions.’



perfect working condition when taken over. As to the others, the circumstances were such that it would be rash to condemn offhand the horses of any particular country, such as, for instance, Argentina. The buying commissions were often very imperfectly acquainted with the conditions of the countries they bought in and of the individuals with whom they had to transact business. To buy a horse in one's own country is quite difficult enough, and requires no little tact, patience, knowledge, and confidence. But it is infinitely more difficult to buy many thousands in a hurry in a strange country. In many instances, notably in the purchases from Argentina, the tendency seems to have been to buy for size and appearance, regardless both of the fact that the small and wiry animal generally thrives best under campaigning conditions, and of the importance of securing animals in hard working condition. The result of the want of provision before the war and of the continuous pressure of the urgent needs of the campaign itself were inevitable. Animals of all sizes, shapes, and ages, from various climates, accustomed to grasses and cereals often very different from anything they were to receive on service, and requiring some months of work to get them into hard campaigning condition, were hurried over the sea to South Africa, hurried up to the front without a proper rest after the journey, and hurried unfit into the field where, in most cases, they succumbed to their exertions in the first few days.

The work of the Remount Department, both at head-quarters and in South Africa, met with the severest criticism in Parliament and in the Press. The want of adequate preparation, the delay in making purchases till the war had actually begun, the mistakes made by the buying commissions, the bad quality of many of the animals, the terrible waste of horseflesh and muleflesh at the front, were all severely animadverted upon. The criticisms were justified in the main; not so the blame which, as a rule, accompanied them. To blame the officers of an undermanned department, financially starved in every direction, and accustomed to deal with the purchase of 2,500 horses a year, because they made mistakes when suddenly called on to deal with the problem of

Work of  
Remount  
Department  
criticized.

purchasing horses and mules at the rate of 250,000 a year, hardly shows a proper sense of proportion. The mistakes were the natural outcome of a military system under which no one, whether in the Government or in the War Office, ever contemplated the possibility of a war calling for a larger force than one of two Army Corps and one Cavalry Division—an arbitrary limit based on no conceivable strategical grounds—or ever drew the obvious conclusion that this war, in particular, would have to be fought out, in the main, by mounted men. The thing that really matters is not the apportioning of the blame but the providing that the mistakes then made shall not be made again.

Improve-  
ments since  
the war.

Some of the experience gained by the war has undoubtedly been turned to account. The Remount Department at the War Office has been reorganized and has gained greatly in efficiency. Systematic efforts have been made to ensure a better utilization of the resources of the United Kingdom. In every one of the large commands (except Aldershot) there is a remount officer attached to the Administrative Staff. The duty of this officer is, during peace time, to make himself acquainted, not only with the horse population in the command, but with the leading residents, farmers, dealers, and breeders, and to select from among them such as are willing to give their services to purchase and collect in an emergency. He has to know the peace and war establishments of all units in his command, to draw up plans, keep lists of all requirements, and settle where animals are to come from and are to be sent to. The framework of an organization has thus been created, which, it is to be hoped, will be made really effective by co-operation with the county associations, so that it may be possible for the military authorities in the future not only to secure to the best advantage the horses required in peace or for minor wars, but also, in case of need, to enforce, with the greatest efficiency and the least inconvenience to the sufferers, the measures of impressment sanctioned by Section 115 of the Army Act. Moreover, the experiences of the war have provided the department with a list of many hundreds of officers and private individuals qualified to undertake buying commissions abroad,

a list which only requires constant revision and augmentation. The information as to the world's horse and mule market gained during the war is kept up to date by the General Staff, assisted by the military attachés and by British consuls. An officer of the Remount Department has lately resided in Canada to keep in touch with breeders and dealers in the country, and paid occasional visits to the United States. He has since been withdrawn, it is to be hoped only for a time. A Remount Manual has been issued, based on our South African experiences, which, in a small compass, provides all the instructions an officer requires for duty in the Remount Service at home or abroad. Mobilization equipment for one base and two advanced remount depots is stored at Hilsea, and more can be easily obtained now the requirements of these depots are known. Something also, though not nearly enough, has been done to provide the men to work the remount depots in time of war. Four companies of the Army Service Corps have been assigned to remount work. Of these, two are only cadres, but it is hoped that the Special Service Section of the new Territorial Army will be able to provide the men to bring all four companies up to war establishment.

All this is to the good, as far as it goes, but it scarcely touches the fringe of the all-important question of the supply of horses. The total horse population of the United Kingdom may be estimated at about 2,000,000, of which only about half are over five years old, while a very much smaller fraction, possibly not more than 150,000, would be suitable for military work overseas. Moreover, all the statistics indicate that the horse population, and especially that portion of it with which the Remount Department is most concerned, is steadily diminishing. According to the latest mobilization figures, the expeditionary force would require, to complete on mobilization, some 54,000 horses; of these 13,000 would be riding horses, while 41,000 would be required for draught and pack purposes. Another 84,000 would be required for the mobilization of the Territorial Army. The expeditionary force alone, judging by past experiences, would probably require 200,000 horses before the end of a year's

Inadequacy  
of home  
supplies.



campaigning. In other words, our supplies are hopelessly inadequate.

Failure of  
existing  
measures.

Many proposals for increasing the supply in the United Kingdom of horses fit for military purposes have been made from time to time. But they have hitherto all failed in face of the disinclination of the authorities to sanction any expenditure on the working of any sort of trial or experiment. The existing measures, it must be remembered, do not constitute any very substantial encouragement. The registration fee of 5s. hardly constitutes a remuneration. It is more like the recruiting shilling, the ratification of a contract to sell at a certain price if required. Its value to the Remount Department is not to increase the total supply of suitable horses, but to steady the market in case of a sudden demand. Nor do the prizes given by the Secretary of State, or the Remount classes at shows, do much to increase the supply. The classes rarely fill because the breeder will not allow his horse to be classified at the remount price. In fact, generally speaking, the farmer or breeder prefers to sell to the dealer, who buys anything and everything at its price, rather than to the Remount Department, which has a fixed price and insists on one particular type.

Proposals for  
increasing  
supply.

The latest proposals of the Government,\* if properly carried out, will undoubtedly constitute a distinct advance. Some 500 stallions and 25,000 mares are to be officially registered as sound. The owner of a registered stallion is to receive an extra fee for service to a registered mare, while the owner of the mare is to receive a fee on the mare being in foal at the end of the covering season. The hope is that in time some 15,000 suitable foals will be bred yearly, and a supply of some 70,000 horses eventually built up. Further, there is to be a general inspection of young breeding-stock with the view to the purchase of a certain number of three-year-olds, to be left with the sellers on a monthly payment for keep, till fit for military work. The success of these proposals will depend entirely on the actual inducements held out. If the money is not forthcoming to make these inducements adequate, the proposals will remain pious aspirations.

\* Lord Carrington in House of Lords, July 6, 1908.

The purchase of three-year-olds has been repeatedly urged by the Royal Commission on horse-breeding, and is carried out by foreign armies, many of whom actually buy in this country, thus lessening the supply of available four-year-olds for our forces. Foreign armies, indeed, realizing the vital importance of a good supply of horses, are ready to go to vastly greater expense than we are. The French Government, for instance, pays from £70 to £80 for a five or six-year-old horse as contrasted with £45 paid in this country. Another proposal that is well worth a trial is the supplying of good brood mares from the Army to such approved farmers, breeders, or associations as are likely to make proper use of them, the State either giving these mares gratis, or putting a low fixed price on them. A selection of Army mares which have reached the age of ten years, having given four of their best years to the public service, might be distributed throughout the country as suggested above. After two years, any that are barren could be sold, and the amount credited to the State. The due service of these mares by registered stallions should be recorded, and inspection could be made periodically. The State should have a lien on the stock, though it would be impolitic to impose such conditions as would discourage the breeder. Even if the State did not give the mares away gratis it would, quite apart from indirect results, pay to sell them at a low figure. In fact, there is much to be said for casting and selling all cavalry horses after four or five years. A well-trained and fairly sound horse at ten years will command from £25 to £35 as against the £40 to £45 it has cost originally, whereas his cavalry value depreciates rapidly after that time.

A serious defect in this connexion, which should be remedied, is the insufficiency of the peace establishment of the ordinary cavalry regiment. That establishment is reduced on mobilization by the weeding out of horses unfitted for service by youth, age, or sickness, while additional horses have to be found to bring up the total strength to the war establishment. When the 1st Cavalry Brigade went out to South Africa it required 23 per cent. of its strength in horses to complete it. Further, the insufficient establish-

Measures  
advocated.

Insufficiency  
of peace  
establish-  
ments.

ment leads to the taking of young horses to manœuvres, a practice strictly forbidden in other armies. An addition of 70 or 80 horses to each regiment would add enormously to the efficiency of the cavalry generally.

Need for  
remount  
depots.

In every other European country the breeding of horses and the maintenance of stud farms are among the chief duties of the agricultural department, while the military authorities maintain remount depots on a large scale for the maturing and training of young animals, and for the recovery of the unfit. They regard these depots as an essential feature of their provision for war. In this country the establishment of a remount depot in every county to maintain a reserve of horses, both for the Regular Army and for the Territorial force, and to stimulate horse-breeding in the district, is a desirable and, indeed, a necessary step. But so far there is no indication of any readiness on the part of the authorities to take the matter in hand. At present there are only four depots in existence, viz., at Woolwich, Lusk near Dublin, Melton Mowbray, and Arborfield Cross near Reading. Woolwich, which is reserved for artillery horses, is in some respects conveniently situated. But its chief value lay in the use of Plumstead marshes, which have had to be abandoned of late years, and for many reasons an artillery depot somewhere between Aldershot and Salisbury and with easy access to Southampton would be preferable. Lusk is the only depot in Ireland. The Government has recently purchased a large and suitable tract of land at Moore Park near Fernoy, and a large depot could be started there with advantage. Melton Mowbray and Arborfield Cross were both taken up by the War Office originally to deal with officers' chargers, in consequence of the decision come to at the end of 1902 to provide all mounted officers with public chargers.\* It was impossible to carry out this decision effectively without having depots where horses could be taken in and tried by officers, and where rest and treatment could be given to those that had met with strains or

\* A feature of the scheme is that officers can use their chargers for general purposes or for hunting on payment of £10 a year. The income derived by the Government from the scheme is about £10,000 a year.



accidents. Melton Mowbray was bought by the Government, and though at present reserved for officers' chargers, might easily be developed into a large collecting depot for the Midlands. It is to be hoped that the same will eventually be done with Arborfield Cross, which is at present only on lease. It is conveniently situated for Aldershot, and, through Basingstoke, for Southampton, and is capable of great development as a centre for the whole surrounding country. In the event of mobilization it will probably have to receive all the rejections from Aldershot, as well as keep up a constant supply for shipment from Southampton.

The question of embarkation depots is another important, and hitherto neglected, point. Experience showed that Southampton was the best port for embarking horses, as it gave more time for them to settle down before taking the open sea. A depot at Southampton is urgently required. Arborfield Cross may serve for lack of a better, but what is really needed is a depot within two or three miles of the docks. The site, at least, of such a depot should be secured, and a certain amount of preparation made and equipment stored, if the creation of a large working depot in peace is thought too expensive. For the Thames the existing Woolwich depot would serve, while if Dover should in future become a port of embarkation the cavalry barracks at Canterbury might be utilized in default of a nearer depot. Temporary accommodation can also be provided at Liverpool, which, however, did not prove a very satisfactory port of embarkation. In Ireland, Lusk for Dublin, and Moore Park for Queenstown, would serve the purpose sufficiently well.

But when all the measures recommended have been taken, we shall probably still be faced by the fact that the supply of horses in the United Kingdom, even when considerably improved, will be quite inadequate to the demands of a really serious and protracted campaign. Moreover, such a campaign might, like the last, also involve a great demand for mules, which are practically non-existent in this country. The remedy lies, not in trusting to the uncertain chance of being able to buy in foreign countries, but in developing the resources of the British Empire. Those resources can

Embarkation  
depots.

Remount  
depots in the  
colonies  
advocated.

more than meet the need of any war if only trouble and expense enough are devoted to encouraging their development in right directions. The registration of horses and mules, the establishment of remount depots in the colonies by the British War Office, are steps that would naturally be welcomed by the Colonial Governments, and would probably meet with active assistance in the shape of a grant of land or other concessions. South Africa might easily be developed as a great breeding-centre both for horses and mules, and is, from the strategical point of view, well situated both for India and for any scene of operations nearer home.\* Canada has almost unlimited land for breeding the best of horses for the least possible outlay. But here, as everywhere else, unless measures are taken to encourage the breeding of a horse really suitable for cavalry work, we may, when the emergency comes, find that the uncontrolled demands of agriculture or industry have developed a thoroughly un-serviceable type. Australia and New Zealand also have great possibilities, especially for the supply of India in case of war. In fact, in this respect as in every other, the United Kingdom can no longer stand by itself, but must look for co-operation and support to the younger states of the Empire.

### *Transport by Sea and Rail*

Transport by  
sea.

The transport of horses and mules by sea is no unimportant matter, as horses are far from good sailors, and even with every provision in the way of special fittings suffer heavily. Over 13,000 horses, as against 2,000 odd mules, died at sea, and many times that number perished because they were put into the field before they had properly recovered from the effects of the voyage. Here, too, the reluctance of the Government to face the prospect of war exercised its

\* A great opportunity for establishing a really first-rate military remount depot on a large scale in South Africa was lost at the end of the war. There was at first some idea of doing so, and at Bezuidenhout Farm, near Johannesburg, Colonel Gunning collected over 1,000 brood mares, picked from ten times that number, before the scheme was countermanded. Government stud farms, naturally on a smaller scale, were afterwards started by the agricultural departments of the new colonies.

prejudicial effect, and a trifling expenditure on horse fittings, which were required to make possible the easy despatch of the mounted troops, was not sanctioned till the very last moment. As regards the actual measures taken, it was decided that all ships carrying horses from home, and mules from any ports, should be provided by the Admiralty, while the Remount Department should find all other vessels required from foreign and colonial ports. The transports carrying horses from home were engaged by time charters, and carried, in addition, both troops and stores; the mule ships were in a few cases on time charter; while on the other hand, the ships engaged by the Remount Department carried the horses as freight. The cost of transport varied from £14 odd per head from Buenos Aires, to £23 odd from Montreal. In the case of ships taken up by the Remount Department, it was usual for the owner to find all forage, fittings, water, and attendants, making a small additional charge for the passage of the conducting officer (if any) and the veterinary surgeon. The first ship (other than those with units), the *Johannesburg*, left home on September 22, 1899, with 100 artillery horses and arrived in South Africa on October 16. The last ship, the *Michigan*, left Fiume with 615 cobs on July 3, 1902, and arrived on August 4. Altogether 520 outward voyages were made; one ship, the *Carinthia*, was wrecked. Over 200 officers were employed to take charge of horses and about half this number made more than one voyage. The proportion of men to horses was at first 1 to 20, but later was increased to 1 to 15. Since the war, both the Admiralty and the Remount Department have modified their horse-fittings in accordance with the experiences gained. Slings are now only provided for 5 per cent. of the horses. The hay is hung in nets near the horse's head to avoid waste. The space that used to be left for cleaning up behind the stalls has been given up in order to allow more space in front where horses can be exercised on matting when weather permits.

Hardly less important in its effect upon the condition of horses arriving at the front is a railway journey, especially when, as often happened in South Africa, it may be a journey <sup>Transport by rail.</sup>



of several days. Not only have arrangements for watering and feeding to be carefully planned out, but precautions have to be taken to prevent horses injuring themselves or each other on the way. This latter difficulty was increased, especially in the case of the large English horses, by the narrowness of the South African trucks. The best way of carrying horses is to have them standing parallel to the rails, and in two lots, facing each other, with a space between them to allow of feeding and watering. This is the most comfortable and secure for the horses, and saves a great deal of time, as all detraining and entraining on the journey are avoided. But it requires certain fittings to keep the middle of the truck clear, and in the South African trucks only six horses could be taken in each truck as against eight or nine if the horses were stood side by side across the trucks.\* The convenience of the railways in this instance prevailed over the views of the remount officers, and the fact no doubt contributed to the waste of horseflesh when animals were taken straight out of the train after a long journey and sent on a hard march. Horses going up from Beira to the Rhodesian Field Force travelled in trucks specially secured by wire gauze against the possible entrance of the deadly tsetse-fly.

#### *The Remount Work at the Seat of War*

Beginnings of  
organization  
in S. Africa.

The Remount Department in South Africa began its work in October, 1899, under Colonel Bridge, Director of Transport, with Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) Birkbeck as Staff-Officer for Remounts, and one clerk. The instructions upon which the department began work were to purchase as many animals as possible for the Army Corps about to arrive under General Sir R. Buller. The contract system was adopted. Animals were passed at three centres, viz., Stellenbosch, De Aar, and Queenstown; they were there branded, the numbers passed to the remount office at Cape Town, and the accounts

\* For this and many other points see the excellent little handbook, 'Animal Management,' prepared in the Veterinary Department for the General Staff, 1908.

paid by the Chief Paymaster. This system proved unsatisfactory, and was discontinued. Purchasing officers were then given imprest accounts from which they paid direct, with better results. On the arrival of Sir Redvers Buller, the three centres mentioned above contained a few horses, some 1,300 cobs, and 2,000 mules. Sir Redvers Buller then requested that a percentage of horses per month of the total establishment of the force be shipped from England to replace casualties.

A number of Army Service Corps companies had now arrived for duty, and were posted on the lines of communication as remount companies, two being sent to Stellenbosch, and one each to De Aar, Queenstown, and Port Elizabeth. A disembarking depot was formed at Woodstock, but eventually moved to Green Point, from whence the horses were taken by road to Stellenbosch. A similar depot was formed at Kragga-Kama for the mules landed at Port Elizabeth. The Army Service Corps companies worked well, as they had a staff accustomed to keep accounts, but the deficiency of qualified officers of cavalry and artillery for the actual remount work was much felt. No definite instructions had been received, but the general scheme was to collect mules on the Western line for one division and the Corps troops, and for one division on each of the other two lines of communication. By the middle of November the first overseas shipments of mules had begun to arrive. The first heavy call was for Lord Methuen's division, and it kept the De Aar depot busy during November and December. A small depot was formed at Modder River for the reception of sick and captured animals. Concurrently with this call, General Gatacre's division was being equipped from Queenstown. A depot was also opened at Naauwpoort to replace casualties in General French's Cavalry Division.

Formation of  
depots, Nov.-  
Dec. 1899.

By the time Lord Roberts arrived some 90 horses, 6,800 cobs, and 8,700 mules had been purchased in the colony, and about 1,000 horses, 2,600 cobs, and 13,600 mules had been received by sea. Of these there were remaining in depots 370 horses, 1,570 cobs, and 5,400 mules—the remainder had been issued. The Army Service Corps *personnel* was now withdrawn from remount work and replaced by a

Situation in  
Jan. 1900

heterogeneous civilian establishment, including refugees from the Rand as well as a number of Indian sowars and syces, pending the arrival of seven remount depot companies from England. At the same time the Remount Department was completely separated from the Transport and placed in charge of Colonel Birkbeck. Under Lord Roberts's instructions the mounting of the South African corps was left in their own hands, so the Remount Department was relieved of the first mounting of these corps. On February 4 a depot was opened at Orange River, and the De Aar depot temporarily closed. It was from the Orange River depot that the large force of mounted infantry under Colonel Hannay was chiefly supplied. At this time the depots were distributed as follows: Western line—Green Point, Stellenbosch, Orange River and Modder River; Midland line—Port Elizabeth and Naauwpoort; Eastern line—East London and Queenstown.

Work of the  
Dept., Feb.  
1900.

After Lord Roberts moved from Modder River, the demands to replace casualties became such as clearly to indicate that they would exceed all anticipation. Urgent cablegrams were despatched to the War Office for an increased supply. Meanwhile all available cavalry and artillery horses were pushed up to the Modder River depot, to which place also the Orange River section was moved, and were forwarded in batches to Paardeberg. When the march to Bloemfontein was resumed, all available horses and cobs were sent to Naauwpoort to await the opening of the line into the Free State. A small depot was at the same time established at Kimberley for Lord Methuen's force in order to pick up the derelicts of the Cavalry Division, and to buy as many animals as possible, while a temporary depot was opened at De Aar for Lord Kitchener's Prieska expedition. The whole of this period was one of great strain on the remount officers engaged at the same moment in organizing and training their unskilled staffs and in coping with the urgent demands of the Army.

March-April.

On March 14 the seven remount depot companies from England began to arrive; these were posted to Naauwpoort, Port Elizabeth, Queenstown, Stellenbosch, Bloemfontein, and two to Natal. The head remount office now





LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR W. G. NICHOLSON, K.C.B.

MILITARY SECRETARY TO LORD ROBERTS, 1899-1900.

DIRECTOR OF TRANSPORT, S. AFRICA, 1900.

*Photo by R. Maruki, Tokio.*



moved temporarily to Naauwpoort. The Western line was practically abandoned except for feeding Kimberley and subsequently Mafeking. The Midland line became the main line for the supply of horses, and the Eastern line for supply of mules and Argentine cobs.\* All available trains were used to concentrate horses and cobs at Naauwpoort. Small receiving depots were established at Norval's Pont and Bethulie. A continuous flow now passed by rail and road towards Bloemfontein, and the troubles of watering, feeding, marching in mobs, and sore backs began. From this date to the end of April may be considered as one of the most trying times for the Remount Department. At the beginning of May Naauwpoort was abandoned and No. 1 depot was moved up to Springfontein.

By now the question of the disposal of debilitated animals and derelicts had become serious. A farm had already been occupied at Piquetberg Road, not very far from Cape Town, where debilitated horses were left in colonial hands. But the experiment was not a success. The remount depot at Bloemfontein now had three farms attached, Fischer's, Tempe, and Lynch's. The numbers on these farms amounted to 6,000, and the feeding of so large a number at such a distance from the coast was impracticable. They were divided into three classes: those that would be fit in one month, those that would be fit in two months, and others. The third lot were to be sold or destroyed, if they could not survive a journey to the colony, those in the second class were sent to farms in the Colesberg district, while those in the first class remained at Bloemfontein; most of the latter were subsequently issued at Pretoria. It was at Fischer's Farm that Captain Eassie of the Army Veterinary Department began the system of exercising large numbers of horses at one time, and of herding them, *i.e.*, turning them loose into shelters, which has been in use in Germany for some years. The result was admirable, and the system was taken

Treatment of  
debilitated  
horses.

\* It is worth noting that the distance of Cape Town from Bloemfontein and the cold winter rains of the Cape peninsula caused that port to compare unfavourably with Port Elizabeth and East London for landing horses, notwithstanding the superior dock accommodation.



up by other depots as the war went on. The plan was reported on by the Senior Veterinary Officer as:

"economical and effective—all kraals open into the track, which is kept littered and well watered in dry weather, and the horses are just turned loose into the track; at first they exercise themselves sufficiently, but subsequently, as they get fitter, they require driving to increase the pace. By this system a few men can exercise thousands of horses during the day. There is no weight on their backs, but on the other hand, their backs are not hardened under saddle, and this is the only drawback. The next for issue can, however, be ridden for a week before being sent out. Extraordinarily few injuries result from this form of exercise.\*

Other work  
in April and  
May.

During all this time a steady flow of mules and cobs was coming up the Eastern line to Bloemfontein, while ponies were beginning to come in from Basutoland, now the natives saw clearly which side was going to win. The Kimberley depot was busy equipping Lord Methuen's force, General Hunter's division, Sir Charles Warren's force, and Colonel Mahon's column for the relief of Mafeking. One thousand cobs were also collected there for the subsequent use of Mafeking and the Rhodesian forces. On May 27 No. 5 Remount Depot moved up to Kroonstad.

Advance to  
Pretoria.

Meanwhile, early in May, the head remount office had returned to Cape Town by order of the general officer commanding lines of communication, who found it impossible to keep properly in touch with a subordinate some 500 miles away. The want of a remount officer with the headquarters of the Army was much felt at this time. It was difficult for the head of the Remount Department at the base to keep touch with Army headquarters, when every day the distance became greater, and travelling more difficult. During the advance on Pretoria, a small mobile depot accompanied Army headquarters, by means of which about 1,000 animals were requisitioned and distributed. Had there been several of these mobile depots it would have helped

\* Of 158,000 animals which passed through the central Transvaal depot at Bezuidenhout Farm only two were seriously injured.

matters considerably. As soon as the Army reached Pretoria and railway communication was open a depot was established at Skinner's Court, outside the town. In July the pursuit of de Wet caused a great wastage in horses. Under orders from Army headquarters train-loads were despatched from Kroonstad to various points on the line to meet columns which had often moved before the horses arrived; parties were left behind to bring them on by double marches, and the consequence was the animals reached the columns in an exhausted condition. At this period General Rundle's division mounted itself by requisition along the Basuto border, and from Basutoland, where the remount officer, Major Lowry, was bartering captured cattle for ponies. Remounts now also began to come up by the Natal line.

In Natal the Remount Department, which was in charge of Colonel Stevenson, had worked practically independently of the organization on the Cape Colony side. At the beginning of the campaign a small landing depot was established at Durban, a depot with grazing-farm in connexion at Maritzburg, and an advanced depot, with sick horse depots attached, at Ladysmith. When Ladysmith was invested, Maritzburg was enlarged, but was abandoned for a few days when the Boers were supposed to be approaching. The Durban depot was then enlarged and provision made for the reception of 5,000 animals. Towards the end of November, 1899, the Maritzburg depot was re-established, and in December a large farm of some 5,000 acres, subsequently increased to 8,000 acres, was established at Mooi River. After the relief of Ladysmith depots were established at Newcastle, Volksrust, Paardekop, and Standerton. There was a large farm at Richmond in connexion with Maritzburg, one at Mooi River, and at Brockhoek, near Ingogo, in connexion with Newcastle. In November, 1900, Colonel Stevenson returned to England, and the whole of the remount organization came directly under Colonel Birkbeck.

The general belief, in Lord Roberts's headquarters no less than in England, that the march to Komatipoort had practically finished the war, was not without its effect on the supply

Organization  
in Natal.

Supplies  
reduced by  
War Office.

of remounts. In the first burst of confidence the supply was stopped altogether in the belief that there were enough animals in the country or on the way to carry on till the end of November. A little later the War Office began to realize that operations might possibly go on beyond that date, and a reduced monthly supply was ordered. From 34,000 horses supplied in the second quarter of 1900, and nearly 20,000 in the third quarter, the supply for the last quarter fell to 10,000. As a matter of fact the task of the Remount Department was, in some respects, only beginning. It was yet to be called upon to find more than twice as many horses as it had provided already.

Nov.-Dec.  
1900.

For the moment, however, the troops seemed to be able to carry on with the existing supply. In the beginning of October a large force under General French was equipped at Machadodorp from horses handed over by the Imperial Light Horse and other Colonial corps which were to be disbanded. When, after marching through Ermelo to Heidelberg, General French's force returned to Pretoria, they received 1,500 fresh cavalry remounts, probably the best that had been issued during the war. The supply of cobs for the mounted infantry, which were arriving during October at Pretoria, about kept pace with the supply of men and saddles. A large force under General Alderson was in this way equipped to replace the Colonial corps. The establishment of sick horse farms was by now proving a great success and enabling some 3,000 horses monthly to be returned to duty. In November, Pretoria was abandoned as a depot and a new one was formed at Bezuidenhout Farm on the Rand. This depot was organized by Lieut.-Colonel C. Gunning, and consisted of twelve kraals surrounding an exercising track 25 yards broad and 1,000 yards round. It remained the central issuing depot for the Transvaal.

Supplies  
seriously  
needed, Dec.  
1900.

By December, when Lord Kitchener took over the command, it was quite evident that the war was anything but over. More than that, events were already showing that the enormous numerical superiority enjoyed by Lord Roberts over the Boers, while the latter contested the possession of the railway lines, had disappeared now the Boers were



initiating a new campaign on the open veld; and that for the purposes of this campaign the British were actually inferior in mounted troops\*—the only troops that could decide the issue. Lord Kitchener at once raised his demand to 3,000 cobs a month, then to 5,300. Very soon he was asking for horses at the rate of 35,000 a quarter. But the seriousness of the situation was never fully realized at home, nor could the Remount Department, which had recalled its buying commissions, respond at once to the increased demand. Only 25,000 were supplied in the first quarter of 1901, and it was not till the second half of the year that the supply began to catch up with the demand. Meanwhile horses had to be issued as fast as they arrived, regardless of their condition, a state of things largely responsible for the terrible wastage of this period. It is a criticism, not so much of the Remount Department as of the general policy of the nation, to state that if, instead of the reduction of the supply in October, 1900, 20,000 or 30,000 extra remounts had been sent out, the direct saving in horseflesh, quite apart from a speedier conclusion of the war, would have represented many millions. Possibly Lord Kitchener, too, on his part might have been better advised if he had not attempted to mount so many, often imperfectly trained, men, and had confined himself to keeping his best mounted troops well supplied and letting the others wait while a reserve accumulated at the depots. Numbers were immensely important—they always are in war; but it is to be feared that there was throughout this period a tendency to sacrifice quality to mere quantity.

The year 1901 began with only 31,000 odd horses in the field, and 34,000 odd mules. In the depots there were some 20,000 horses and 3,300 mules. In January the newly-raised Colonial corps, the Johannesburg Mounted Rifles, 2nd Imperial Light Horse, the Body Guard, Scottish Horse, and Kitchener's Fighting Scouts, were all equipped in addition to disbanded corps which were now resuscitated. General French's force was re-horsed at Johannesburg; General Paget's Bushmen and New Zealanders at Pretoria; while

Supplies  
available,  
Jan. 1901.

\* See vol. v., pp. 5 and 69-74.

General Bruce Hamilton was given 30 per cent. of spare horses for a special effort against de Wet in the Kroonstad district. General Charles Knox was re-equipped at Kroonstad and Winburg with over 1,000 horses. The bulk of the new Yeomanry were mounted at Springfontein, Bloemfontein, and Kroonstad; Lord Methuen mounted 2,000 at Kimberley and Mafeking, and General Rundle mounted two battalions from the Harrismith district. French's movement to the Swazi border in February resulted in great wastage, and two large convoys of horses from Volkrust and Dundee sent out to meet him,\* having met with unfortunate delays by heavy rains and swollen rivers, arrived in miserable condition.

Purchases in  
Cape Colony.

Meanwhile, for the first time, the resources of Cape Colony in remounts and mules were being properly utilized. Martial Law was proclaimed in the Colony in December, 1900, and every effort was made to clear animals from the districts threatened by the spread of rebellion. Officers, hurriedly appointed, were sent into the country to purchase and requisition everything they could find. The Cape Government aided by instructing the resident magistrates to assist. Old depots were re-opened and new ones formed. With all this haste, and with badly-equipped depots, some 70,000 remounts were obtained by the end of May, 1901.

Feb.-July,  
1901.

The second invasion of Cape Colony by de Wet in February, 1901, was probably the most trying time of the whole war for the Remount Department. The columns moved rapidly from one place to another, arriving suddenly at some station where large demands for fresh horses were made, and mobs of exhausted horses left behind. After de Wet's repulse the derelicts were gradually collected and disposed of on farms, and the columns were again properly mounted in the Orange River Colony. The columns left in Cape Colony were now ordered to mount themselves locally, and Colonel Haig established remount depots of his own for this purpose. This system lasted until July, when the

\* It was found practically impossible with only a small party of men to march large numbers of animals in mobs to meet the columns, so it was established as a principle that a sufficient number of dismounted men were to be sent in to the depôts to bring the horses out to the columns.

supply in Cape Colony became exhausted. General French, who now took over the command, arranged to draw 2,500 imported horses a month for all his columns in Cape Colony.

The invasion of Natal by Louis Botha in September, 1901, led to enormous wastage. Natal had been comparatively peaceful for some time and all horses had been moved up to the Transvaal depots. This necessitated the columns being horsed by freshly-imported horses that had only been from ten days to three weeks in the country. Every effort, however, was now being made to check the wastage. Colonel Long was appointed Inspector of Remount Depots and Veterinary Hospitals, and by constantly visiting the columns and ordering weak horses into hospital, and by increasing the accommodation, a great improvement was effected. One undoubted source of the terrible destruction of horseflesh, however, was beyond remedying by such measures. The policy of centralization by which Lord Kitchener directed the movements of almost every column from Pretoria, whatever its advantages in other directions, was fatal in its effects upon the condition of the horses. A column would start with soft horses straight from the depot, or come in with its animals entirely exhausted, and find orders to be at some spot forty miles away, at dawn. The commander might know that to obey would kill half his horses and make his column impotent for weeks; but to fail might wreck the whole combination and certainly wreck his own prospects, and so the horses were sacrificed.

In January, 1902, the system of drives began, and these measures, together with the steady slow work and the increased facilities for remounting when fast work was required, reduced the wastage by one-third. The remount centres were as follows: General Bruce Hamilton drew from Standerton; Byng's, Elliott's, and Rimington's columns drew from Heilbron, Kroonstad, and Harrismith, as convenient; General Charles Knox drew from Basutoland, Winburg, and Bloemfontein; Lord Methuen drew from Kimberley, Mafeking, and Klerksdorp. Bezuidenhout's Farm remained the chief depot for the Transvaal, and supplied Pretoria for the Pietersburg line, Middelburg for the Eastern, and Klerksdorp for the Western

Great wastage, Sept.-Oct. 1901.

The drives. Depots, Jan. 1902.



line. Most of the horses for the Transvaal came from the Natal depots, while Cape Colony ports supplied Bloemfontein.

Supplies  
available,  
May 31, 1902.

The general easing off during the peace negotiations gave the Remount Department in South Africa the first real chance of getting level with requirements. Fresh supplies were pouring in and were given time to get into condition; the horses with the troops found an opportunity to recoup. When the Boers surrendered Lord Kitchener was in command of a far more effective mounted force than at any previous period of the war. On May 31, 1902, the number of horses and mules in the field were respectively 65,275 and 77,532. There were left in the remount depots and veterinary hospitals 66,453 horses, 7,791 mules, and 1,950 unclassified.

Retrospect.

Such is the brief account of the operations of the Remount Department in South Africa. In the course of them the department grew from a staff of one officer and one clerk in October, 1899, to a total of 105 remount officers, 30 veterinary officers, 3 riding-masters, 1,275 Europeans, 1,998 Indians, and 10,227 natives scattered about in 32 depots at the close of the war. The readers of this history must be familiar with the marching and counter-marching, the long treks, the fruitless expeditions, and the wearying detours of the two and a half years of the war. The long journeys by rail, the difficulty of watering and feeding, the hurrying to the front before animals were in condition, the collecting and protecting the derelicts, the nursing of sore-backed and emaciated animals, have been referred to from time to time. It can easily be conceived what a demand was made on the quality and endurance of the horses and mules that bore the brunt of the fatigue. There were many factors in the South African War that are not common to all wars. It was essentially a country unsuited to foot-soldiers; at the same time the scarcity of forage made it by no means an easy country for mounted troops, and owing to the vast area covered by the operations, threw an enormous additional burden on the transport service. The experience gained under such difficult conditions has been quite unique and should be of immense value for the future.

Of the lessons brought home to the Remount Department by the war none is more important than the provision of adequate remount depots within the area of operations. When the war began our officers had little or no experience of remount depots. The two depots then existing at home could certainly not have been taken as examples of what depots ought to be. The general conclusion from the experience gained in South Africa is that a good depot for active service must be divided into four sets of stables or lines: (1) the infirmary stables; (2) the receiving stables on first arrival; (3) the intermediary stables; (4) the issuing stables; while, in addition, some farm or land in the neighbourhood should be secured for recuperating emaciated and injured animals. Every depot should have an exercising ring as described on a previous page. A good depot staff is an absolute necessity, for there is much clerical work that must be done. As for the rest of the *personnel*, experience has proved that a few well-qualified grooms are far better than a collection of lazy and useless individuals known as "details." The "details" in South Africa were conspicuous at all stations for the small amount of work they considered should be exacted from them. The communication between the base and advanced depots is naturally most important. If it is a railway, the size of the trucks and the arrangements for watering and feeding have to be carefully studied; the length of journey without a halt must be kept within certain limits. To make the service perfect, a certain number of trains should be told off entirely for animals. They should bring back the debilitated and sick horses on their return journeys so as to keep advanced depots for fit horses only. Mobile remount sections supplied from the advanced depots should accompany the field troops. These sections should have a remount officer with them who would issue fit horses to the troops and take over their sick and exhausted ones, and captured animals.

A brief account of the day's work at a depot in the field will be of interest to those who have not had personal experience of such work. A batch of animals is received by ship or train, or from the field troops, and drawn up in line.

The remount depots.

Routine of a field depot.

The veterinary surgeon examines them carefully, using a reflecting mirror for inspection of their nostrils in search of any trace of disease, also looking for wounds, or signs of farcy. After this examination is over the horses are classified by the depot officers, and told off to their various stables or kraals, as officers' chargers, artillery or cavalry horses, mounted infantry cobs, or mules, with sub-classification as fit (shod or unshod), half-fit, debilitated, for grazing, for sick lines, etc. The conductor in charge of each kraal receives a slip showing the number of horses sent to his charge, and the classifying officer hands into the office the result of the classification. The same process is gone through in the case of animals brought for sale. A depot state is made up every night. The sorting of horses after classification is continuous. The debilitated and grazing herds are gone through weekly, and transfers take place. When animals have to be issued, the requisite number are taken from the fit; they are then trotted out one by one, passed as fit, examined by the veterinary officer, and, if free from any symptom of infectious disease, are ready for issue. The selection of officers' chargers takes a considerable time, which can, however, be kept down if depot officers know all about the animals and have several ready to choose from. The exercising of animals, according to the amount of work required in the different classes, goes on most of the day. An important part of the day's work, and one which takes time, is the preparation and distribution of foods from the central forage store for each class of animals, or issues in bulk to the conductors in charge. Slight injuries, cases of catarrh, etc., have also to be treated—the serious cases are sent to the veterinary hospital.

#### **The shoeing.**

Then there is the branding and shoeing—the latter a very large item in the work. A sufficient supply of farriers is a matter of the very first importance. During the war, with the issues of animals going up to 20,000 in the month, the staff required for shoeing alone became alarming in numbers and expenditure. At the end of the war the department had 11 military farriers, 49 military shoeing-smiths, 175 civilian farriers and shoeing-smiths, and 104 Indian farriers and shoeing-smiths, giving



an output of about 35,000 horses per month from the forges. The number of horses a fair workman can shoe in a month is 120, taking wild and tame horses together. Some of the horses were very wild, and stocks had to be built at all depots to enable the smiths to handle them. All horses were sent out from the depots properly shod, for it was almost impossible for them to be shod with their units.

Last, but not least, comes the office work. A large depot is a business concern, and to carry it on needs a man with great business capacity and power of organization in addition to knowledge of horses. One of the greatest difficulties at the head office is the accounting. One would naturally say, war first and accounting afterwards, but unfortunately experience teaches us that the day of reckoning will come sooner or later—the terror and glamour of war will wear off, but the “account” is sure to cause trouble long after the war. In the early days of the campaign the postal difficulties, and the necessity of issues in bulk to columns at stations where there was no remount depot, were almost insurmountable obstacles to complete accounts. Staff officers to columns signed vouchers, but often kept no records of the distribution to units. The remount office at the base, in addition to the Animal Account Branch dealing with the animals sent out to South Africa, was obliged to keep four other sections, viz.: (1) financial accounts (chiefly records of purchases); (2) requisitioning accounts; (3) charger accounts\*—(records of chargers issued and sums due for their hire); (4) general registration of correspondence, telegrams, returns, etc., etc. It is hardly a matter of surprise therefore that the office grew from one to thirty military clerks and four civilians, at the end of the war. It is a curious commentary upon the elaborate system of checking and supervising the expenditure of even the smallest sums in peace, that in war the sole charge of a huge spending department, such as

The  
accounting.

\* In our next war there will be no charge made for hire of officers' chargers, so Section No. 3 will not be required. With a universal form of requisitioning in the field the work of Section No. 2 will be very greatly reduced. The same reduction of labour may be expected, in view of our new organization based on past experience, as regards the Animal Accounts Branch.

the Remount Department in South Africa became, should have been entrusted to a regimental major of no departmental or financial experience, and without a single departmental regulation to guide him, and that this officer should have become personally responsible for the expenditure of £5,000,000 in horse purchasing alone, and for the sale of 120,000 horses after the war, without the smallest check upon his operations save those of his own devising.

Work of  
Remount  
farms.

An interesting development of the duties of the Remount Department was the protecting of locally-owned stock by receiving them into remount farms. It is satisfactory to know that, owing to the care and trouble that was taken over this onerous duty, upwards of 24,000 animals were given back to their lawful owners at the end of the war. Many of the animals had grown out of all recognition, and were only identified by the careful records kept by the officers in charge of the "protection" farms.

Lessons of  
the War.

The terrible wastage of the South African War should have taught us many useful lessons in detail, in addition to the general lesson of the costliness of insufficient preparations in time of peace. One cause of the rapid breakdown of the horses was the enormous weight they were expected to carry. The weight has since been reduced from nearly nineteen stone to under eighteen stone, but is still too heavy for fast and continuous work. Failure to look properly after the horses' feet on landing, insufficient recovery from the sea voyage, delays on the railway journey, all combined to cause animals to arrive out of condition. Very important are the quantity and quality of forage. In the case of imported animals there is the further difficulty that a ration otherwise ample and of good quality may not at first suit an animal accustomed to different food, a point which was not sufficiently studied in the early stages of the war. Unsuitable saddles may rapidly put horses out of action with sore backs, while a shortage of shoes and nails may leave them unable to walk. Most important of all are horse-mastership and discipline. Only discipline can make a weary soldier look properly after his horse at the end of a day's march. Only horse-mastership will enable the soldier to get the utmost out of his horse by

continuous care, and by the husbanding of its strength in every possible way.

All these considerations are enhanced by the fact that the modern battle-field occupies a far greater area than those of the past. There are wider turning movements for cavalry; the scouting is further in front and on a much wider front; greater distances have to be traversed by orderlies, staff officers, etc. All of these duties call for exceptional condition and endurance, and they must necessarily eliminate the weak, underfed, or unsound horse. These changed conditions must be accepted, and must be met by the utmost care in looking after the horses, but also by such organization as will allow of fresh supplies being constantly near at hand and fit for issue. It is fervently to be hoped that never again will the life of a remount be as short as it was at times during the South African War. But it is impossible to forecast what it will be, and we should be prepared for all contingencies.

Motor-cars, motor-cycles, aeroplanes, and dirigible balloons may, no doubt, largely lighten the duties of mounted troops, and take the place of horses in highly-civilized countries. But there are still vast regions where, for a long time to come, the horse will still be the most economical and most effective instrument of locomotion, while the importance of the mobility in action itself, which the horse can still best provide, even in countries where roads are plentiful, has been enormously increased by modern tactical developments. Again, important as may be the military developments of mechanical traction in civilized regions, where good roads can be found, there are, and will long be, other regions where the ox, the mule, the pack-pony, the ass, or the camel must be relied on for transport. And it is precisely in these uncivilized or only partially-developed regions of the world that the British Army is most likely to be called upon to fight. The maintenance of an efficient Remount Department is therefore destined for a long time yet to remain one of the chief needs of our military system.

Conditions of  
modern  
warfare.

Future  
modes of  
transport.



## CHAPTER VII

## THE WORK OF THE ARMY ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

Misleading  
character of  
the word  
"Ordnance."

BEFORE proceeding to place on record the part played by the Army Ordnance Department in the campaign, it will be as well if a brief reference is made to its particular duties, about which a good deal of ignorance exists both in and out of the service. This ignorance may be in no small part attributable to the name, which is calculated to convey, to the lay mind at any rate, an erroneous impression that the duties of the department are limited to matters connected with "ordnance," or, in the common acceptance of the term, guns. Moreover, in dealing with the work of the department during the war, there is the possibility of further confusion owing to the considerable changes, affecting its position and duties, subsequently introduced into the constitution of the War Office.

Duties of the  
department.

At the time of the war the Army Ordnance Department was under the Director-General of Ordnance, who was responsible for the "provision, inspection, and supply of all warlike stores, clothing, and necessaries." These few words covered an immense sphere of action. With the exception of food, forage, fuel—which all came under the heading of "Supplies"—medical, veterinary, and certain technical stores, building materials, horses and other transport animals, the department undertook the provision and supply of everything else which the Army might require. This included arms and ammunition of all natures, accoutrements, camp equipment, tools, transport vehicles, harness, saddlery, guns of all natures, together with their carriages, limbers, and appurtenances, bedding, barrack and hospital stores, clothing,

etc., etc.—anything, in fact, from a 12-inch gun to a packet of screws or a pair of socks. A list of the various articles comprised in the expression “warlike stores and clothing,” would produce a total of something like 20,000 different headings. The responsibilities of the department did not end with the provision and supply of stores; it was further charged with the task of regulating the quantities to be issued, of seeing that full value was got out of them by the troops before their “life” came to an end, of repairing them when it was worth while doing so, and disposing of them when it was not. It was also entrusted with the inspection and maintenance in working order of the armaments and ammunition in works of defence, and with the storage and care of a large portion of the reserves of stores and clothing held ready for mobilization—in truth, a formidable array of duties. Most of the officers of the department were qualified expert inspectors of guns and explosives, and the periodical inspection of all carriages, of the bores and mechanisms of all guns, and the testing and examination of all cartridges, shells, etc., both in ordnance store and in the hands of the troops, was a highly important duty.\* The *personnel* of the Army Ordnance Corps, under the officers of the department, was composed of clerks, storemen, and artificers of various trades; also—in separate sections—of armourers and machinery artificers, who, besides being posted to ordnance depots for general district work, were attached to cavalry regiments, infantry battalions, and brigades of horse and field artillery. When the Army Council was constituted in 1904 the Army Ordnance Department was placed under the orders of the Quartermaster-General, and its functions were limited. It still remained responsible for the provision and inspection of all general stores, such as clothing, saddlery, barrack and camp equipment, and for the storage, periodical inspection, and issue of warlike stores, *i.e.*, guns, ammunition, and the technical stores of the Artillery and Engineers. The initial provision and inspection of warlike stores was, however, transferred to a new official, the Master-General of the Ordnance.

\* During the war Major H. S. le M. Guille was mortally wounded while carrying out the inspection of a battery in the field.

The  
Ordnance  
depots.

The necessary machinery for the distribution to the troops of the above-mentioned stores includes the establishment at each important military station at home and abroad of an ordnance depot from which the troops in that particular area or district are supplied. Each depot is in charge of an "Ordnance Officer," who is assisted by a certain number of other officers of the Army Ordnance Department and by a subordinate establishment of warrant and non-commissioned officers and men of the Army Ordnance Corps, together with, in most cases, a permanent staff of civilians. A "Chief Ordnance Officer" was formerly attached to the headquarters of each district to carry out the general administrative duties of the department within the area; under the recent organization of the country into commands, his place has been taken by an "Assistant Director of Ordnance Services" attached to the headquarters of each command, certain administrative areas in which are placed under Chief Ordnance Officers. The stocks of various stores held at the distributing depots are replenished from time to time by means of bulk supplies received from the two main establishments at Woolwich Arsenal and Weedon. The former deals with all descriptions of stores except arms, which are supplied from Weedon. These supplies are supplemented when considered necessary by the local purchase of stores at the various centres. Clothing and necessaries are distributed from the Royal Army Clothing Depot, Pimlico. These three main establishments obtain their requirements partly from the Government manufacturing branches and partly from the trade.

The  
Ordnance  
factories.

To go into the work of the Government factories in detail is beyond the scope of the present chapter. The ordnance factories were under a Chief Superintendent, at that time Colonel (now Sir E.) Bainbridge. They consisted of the Royal Gun and Carriage Factories at Woolwich, the Royal Laboratory at Woolwich for the manufacture of all kinds of ammunition, the small-arms factories at Enfield Lock and at Birmingham (the latter since abandoned), and the gunpowder factory at Waltham Abbey. Besides these there was the clothing factory at Pimlico. On all these the war



imposed very heavy demands, with which they proved themselves able to cope with very considerable success. The superior staff of the ordnance factories was not enlarged, but the working staff was largely increased, the average of employees rising from 18,948 in the year 1899 to 25,361 in 1901. The value of their output rose from £3,159,000 in 1898-1899 to £4,853,000 in 1900-1901. Some 142,000,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition were turned out between 1899 and 1901, and the strain on the Royal Laboratory was at one time very severe. The ordnance factories are now under the Master-General of the Ordnance, while the clothing factory is in charge of an officer of the Army Ordnance Department under the Quartermaster-General.

Before the war, the department consisted of 167 officers and—exclusive of the armourers and machinery artificers—911 of all other ranks. The reserve of the corps only totalled 210 men, all of whom duly reported themselves upon mobilization. There were eleven complete companies, nine of which were stationed at home and two in South Africa, while smaller detachments of the corps were distributed at the various colonial stations throughout the Empire. In Cape Colony there was a Chief Ordnance Officer who had under his command 2 other officers and 20 other ranks of the corps, while in Natal the department was represented by a chief, one other officer, and 40 other ranks. Small ordnance depots adapted to normal peace requirements were located at Cape Town and Pietermaritzburg. These were strengthened in August, 1899, by the addition of 4 officers and 54 other ranks divided between Cape Colony and Natal. At the outbreak of the war there were 446 of all ranks either in or on their way to South Africa. In April, 1900, the establishment of the corps was increased to 19 companies, having a total strength of 1,440, and by April, 1902, this had been raised to 2,155. In April, 1900, there were 51 officers in the field; in July, 1901, 75; while 63 were serving there at the close of the war. During the war a Royal Reserve Company consisting of 98 men was formed at home. In all 1,204 men of the corps took part in the campaign, the average strength in the country being 950, and of these numbers 83,

Numbers of  
the A.O.D.

together with 2 officers, lost their lives. In addition, 2,060 civilian subordinates were employed in the department in South Africa during the war.

Provision for  
the war.  
Absence of  
a reserve  
of stores.

Turning now to the measures taken with regard to the supply of *matériel*, we find that, in the summer of 1899, the department had in store the complete mobilization equipment laid down for two army corps, a cavalry division, and lines of communication troops, together with reserves of clothing and necessaries for 25,000 men. Except for this last item there was absolutely no reserve to provide for the upkeep of the equipment of the army in the field. On September 11, £15,000 was allowed to provide one khaki drill suit, instead of serge, for troops then in South Africa and ordered out. No other material addition to equipment or reserves was sanctioned till September 22, when a sum of £74,000 was allotted for ordnance stores and clothing, and speedily expended. On October 4 a further £150,000 was granted for supply of clothing, and on November 6 £37,000 was given to complete provision of a second suit for 70,000 men. The want of an adequate reserve of stores soon made itself seriously felt. Sir Henry Brackenbury, the Director-General of Ordnance, determined to make use of the occasion to secure that reserve, not only for the immediate emergency, but for the future. In a forcible and comprehensive statement of the situation, he urged that "we are attempting to maintain the largest empire the world has ever seen with armaments and reserves which would be insufficient for a third-class military power." His representations carried weight with Lord Lansdowne, and in April, 1900, the sum of £10,500,000 was voted to be spent in three years on creating a reserve,\* which was to be kept permanently full by the automatic replacement of stores withdrawn from it. To take in hand the creation of this reserve in the midst of the strain of the war, and concurrently with the all-important task of meeting the ever-growing demands of the army in the field, was no small matter. One result of the enormous

\* Usually known as the "Mowatt Reserve," Sir F. Mowatt, of the Treasury, having acted as chairman of the inter-departmental committee which considered and reported on Sir H. Brackenbury's suggestions.

magnitude of the double demand for stores thus set up was that the department was compelled to go hurriedly into every available market and purchase—almost at sight—whatever could be obtained.

Even more serious, at any rate for a time, was the position as regards ammunition. There was an authorized stock of 151,000,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition. But some 66,000,000 rounds of this consisted of Mark IV., which had not only been condemned as an expanding bullet by the recent Hague Convention, but had been found useless for military purposes because it stripped in the rifle. The rest of the reserve was practically exhausted in the first few weeks by large consignments to South Africa. On November 20, 1899, the Secretary of State had to cable to South Africa that "there is only eight weeks' supply of Mark II. .303-inch ball ammunition in the country, and all gun ammunition will be exhausted before eight weeks." \* To such straits were we driven a little later that "we had actually got reduced in this country to two or three boxes of Mark II. ammunition, so that if we had had to go to war with a European Power we should have had to fight with expanding bullets," which, as already stated, had been condemned and were useless in any case. The difficulty of keeping up the demands of gun ammunition for South Africa was also felt. At home there was only a reserve of 200 rounds per gun for horse, field, and mountain batteries, in addition to the 300 rounds per gun with the batteries, and, in the words of Sir H. Brackenbury, "the whole of this reserve was absorbed long before December 15. Naval orders for ammunition had to be held in abeyance from the beginning of October. We borrowed ammunition from the Navy, and we borrowed ammunition from the Government of India, and yet I was unable to meet Sir Redvers Buller's demands for 5-inch howitzer and 7-pdr. ammunition until a fortnight after they should have been complied with. I had to deplete the quantities of ammunition for the siege train in order to supply the 6-inch howitzers in South Africa, and to take guns from the

Serious  
shortage of  
ammunition.

\* See "Report of the Elgin Commission," p. 87, § 160, for this and the following quotations.



armament at Plymouth to meet Sir Redvers Buller's demand for long-range guns." For a time home defence was most inadequately provided for. The demands for ammunition in the autumn of 1899 were only met by the ordnance factories working day and night and on Sundays, by the manufacturing resources of the trade being taxed to the uttermost, and by the dangerous expedient of putting aside naval orders. The crisis was thus surmounted and a supply of gun and rifle ammunition more than equal to the needs of the war and of home defence was provided.

Quantities  
sent out.

Meanwhile at Woolwich Arsenal the Principal Ordnance Officer \* (Colonel J. Steevens, C.B., A.O.D.), and at the Royal Army Clothing Factory, the Chief Ordnance Officer † (Colonel F. E. Mulcahy, A.O.D.), were working at the highest state of pressure in order to enable the Ordnance in South Africa to cope with the requirements of the army in the field. Between June 1, 1899, and the end of the war immense quantities of stores and clothing were sent to South Africa. Among the thousands of items despatched, the following are of interest: 354,000 water-bottles, 1,246,600 blankets, 93,500 tents, 595,000 waterproof sheets, 175 tons of wagon grease, 119,000 sets of mule harness, 76,100 sets of saddlery, 3,772,000 pairs of horse and mule shoes, 351,300 rounds 15-pdr. breech-loading ammunition, 105,100 12-pdr. breech-loading, 529,000 37-mm. (pom-pom), 137,000,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, exclusive of that taken out by the troops, of which 66,000,000 were expended. With the exception of the ammunition, which was chiefly made in the ordnance factories, the majority of these items were supplied by contract from the trade. The following are a few items of clothing despatched up to May 31, 1902: boots, 1,997,000 pairs; riding-breeches, 510,000; drawers, 748,000; field-dressings, 497,000; helmets, 1,152,000; jerseys, 545,000; putties, 971,000; shirts, 1,714,400; socks, 2,743,800 pairs. All

\* Now Major-Genl. Sir J. Steevens, K.C.B.

† Now Major-Genl. F. E. Mulcahy, C.B., Director of Equipment and Ordnance Services.

these figures are in addition to the complete war equipment taken out by each unit.

The foregoing very brief particulars may give some idea of the work of the department at home. Large quantities of clothing, boots, tentage, and other articles for use in the field were also obtained from the military factories in India, and in order to keep pace with the requirements of the large number of additional mounted troops which came to be raised, saddlery had to be obtained from all parts of the world. Consignments of stores were despatched for the most part in the shape of "units of supply," *i.e.*, the estimated requirements for the upkeep, during a known period, of the stores in possession of any particular unit, such as a brigade or division, and instructions were sent out to the representatives of the department in South Africa to replenish their stocks by calling for a "repeat" of the whole or any proportion of any one of these "units." Although open to criticism, as tending to diminish the direct responsibility of the authorities on the spot, the system proved very convenient, as long as the Army remained organized in its original formations, and stores continued to be demanded in this way up to November, 1900.

In South Africa the officers of the department were unable, in the general uncertainty of the months preceding the outbreak of war, and in the absence of a clear lead from home, due largely to the unwillingness of the British Government to prejudice negotiations by overt preparations, to make the best use of their opportunities for securing stores locally and for other organizing work. It was not till early in October that mule wagons and harness to the extent of £23,000 were ordered in Cape Town. On the 10th, the day before the outbreak of hostilities, an advanced ordnance depot was opened at De Aar by Major H. D. E. Parsons and ten other ranks of the A.O. Corps—a most inadequate establishment for such an important centre, but apparently all that could be spared at the time. In Natal a depot was formed at Ladysmith under Major W. Clare Savile, and a small staff posted to Durban to supervise the work of unloading and forwarding stores up country. The troops who came from India to

Method of  
despatch.

Preparations  
in South  
Africa.

Natal were accompanied by a field park of the Indian Ordnance Department, which served side by side with the A.O.D. depot throughout the siege of Ladysmith. The stores of the park were eventually taken over by the A.O.D., and the *personnel* returned to India.

Organization  
in November,  
1899.

Early in November the distribution of the senior officers was as follows:—Col. R. F. N. Clarke, Principal Ordnance Officer of the Army, and the following chief ordnance officers:—Lines of Communication, Cape Colony, Lieut.-Col. G. R. Hobbs; Western line and De Aar, Major H. D. E. Parsons; Midland line, Major E. A. Moulton-Barrett; Eastern line, Major G. J. Butcher. Lieut.-Col. E. B. Appelbe was Chief Ordnance Officer of the Natal Field Force and of the lines of communication on that side of the country. Base depots were formed at Port Elizabeth and East London, while that at Cape Town was considerably enlarged by the hiring of additional buildings; in addition to this, at each of these three ports accommodation was reserved in the docks for the temporary warehousing of all stores landed from the incoming vessels. Stores so landed were subsequently handed over to the base depots or made up into consignments for direct despatch by rail to up-country depots. Similar action was taken on the Natal side. As far as field depots were concerned, De Aar was already in existence, and to this were added Naauwpoort on the Midland and Queenstown on the Eastern line, while Natal established a depot at Mooi River. At this time the bulk of the troops were concentrated on the Western line preparing for the relief of Kimberley and for any subsequent advance. De Aar was the advanced base for these troops, and the pressure on the staff of the depot was so tremendous that it was gradually increased, until in February, 1900, it reached a total of 5 officers and 120 men. As the troops advanced from De Aar a supplementary depot, mainly devoted to repair and transit work, was opened at Orange River. During the latter part of the siege of Kimberley a few truck loads of such stores as were most likely to be first required by a force which had endured a lengthy siege, were held in readiness at Orange River, and as soon as



the railway had been reopened these were run into the town and their contents distributed. An important depot was subsequently formed at Kimberley to provide for the forces under Hunter and Mahon.

On quitting the Western line the army had left all their camps standing at Modder River, Enslin, and elsewhere. In March, 1900, the ordnance officer at De Aar received a telegram from the Chief of the Staff to send by rail to Bloemfontein tentage and camp equipment for 30,000 men. As soon as the state of the traffic permitted it, these stores, which had been collected again at De Aar, were sent round as directed. Directly Bloemfontein had been occupied the sphere of ordnance activity was transferred to the Midland line and *personnel* and stores were concentrated at Naauwpoort. In due course these were transferred to Bloemfontein, where a large ordnance depot was formed by Major G. J. Butcher, stores being sent up both by the Midland and by the Eastern lines. The march of the troops from the Modder River had left them in a state of virtual destitution, as far as ordnance stores and clothing were concerned, and it was to their immediate refitting that the Bloemfontein ordnance depot had to devote itself. By dint of the most strenuous exertions the Army was within a very few weeks put upon its feet again, while concurrently with all this the department succeeded in providing for the requirements of what almost amounted to a second army, namely, the sick and wounded. Even the serious losses, including guns and carriages sufficient to equip 1½ field batteries, brought about by the disastrous affair at Sannah's Post, were replaced in four or five days, a remarkably prompt response to the call made upon the department.

During the advance through the Free State a small depot was opened at Kroonstad, while very soon after the occupation of Pretoria had been effected a large depot was established there by Major E. A. Moulton-Barrett, with a branch at Johannesburg. On the Natal side Lieut.-Colonel E. B. Appelbe worked practically independently of the Cape. Depots were opened first at Estcourt and Frere, and subsequently, as the Natal army advanced, at Colenso, Newcastle, Volksrust, and

The situation  
in March-  
April, 1900.

Steady  
increase in  
number of  
depots.

Standerton. As the campaign progressed, and more and more country became occupied by our troops, it became necessary to increase the number of ordnance depots. In the course of the campaign the following main depots were opened:—Cape Town, De Aar, Kimberley, Mafeking, Buluwayo, Marandellas, Port Elizabeth, Graaff-Reinet, Naauwpoort, Springfontein, East London, Queenstown, Sterkstroom, Aliwal North, Bloemfontein, Kroonstad, Winburg, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Mooi River, Estcourt, Frere, Colenso, Ladysmith, Harrismith, Newcastle, Volksrust, Standerton, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Klerksdorp, and Middelburg (Transvaal). In addition to these, repair and transit depots were formed at Orange River, Modder River, Victoria (Rhodesia), Tuli, Piquetberg Road, Victoria Road (Cape Colony), Colenso, and Dundee, besides a few others opened for short intervals and to meet special circumstances.

Reorganiza-  
tion in 1901.

In April, 1901, Colonel Clarke was invalided home, and was succeeded by Colonel Appelbe. The headquarters of the department were transferred to Pretoria in May, and its administration reorganized. The whole theatre of operations was divided up into five areas, each under a Chief Ordnance Officer. These areas were as follows:—(1) Cape Colony, excluding the Western line north of De Aar; (2) Western line, from De Aar to Buluwayo; (3) Orange River Colony (excluding Harrismith); (4) Transvaal (excluding Standerton district); (5) Natal (including Zululand and Standerton and Harrismith districts). In connexion with this reorganization Major R. W. M. Jackson was ordered to Cape Town as Chief Ordnance Officer at the Base Ports. Subject to the general supervision of the Principal Ordnance Officer of the Army, this officer was charged with the responsibility, hitherto vested in the authorities at home, of keeping the whole of the supply of stores in South Africa up to requirements. The "unit" system was abandoned altogether, and the stocks held at the three base ports were rearranged until each one held only certain classes of stores. Thus all clothing was held at Port Elizabeth, and all harness and saddlery at Cape Town. The C.O.O. Base Ports was informed from time to time of the general state of the stocks at up-country depots,

and exercised his discretion in ordering up stores to replenish them from one or more of the base ports. Natal was not included in this scheme.

One of the great drawbacks from which the department suffered in the field was the lack of first-hand knowledge as to the quantity and condition of the equipment in possession of the units constituting the field army. An ordnance officer would receive a bald statement of requirements from some unit possibly 50 miles away from his depot. He could not possibly find out whether what was asked for was really wanted, or whether the unit was simply trying to make itself comfortable by getting what it could out of the department. Nor had he any means of checking a system which at one time was largely practised by inconsiderate units, namely, that of demanding the same stores at the same time from two or more depots. From the point of view of the interested units the system was an admirable one, as if one depot failed another would meet their requirements. But the practice was, to say the least of it, reprehensible, seeing that in nine cases out of ten the offending unit could neither use nor carry all the stores that reached it, with the result that large quantities of stores were wasted and other units had to suffer in consequence. The presence of an ordnance officer with the troops in the field would have constituted a wholesome check on waste of this kind. He could also have kept a watchful eye on the equipment of his force, and could have given timely notice to the ordnance depots as to when it was likely to require refitting, which depot it was likely to apply to, and what quantities and description of stores it would probably require. Again, as the troops moved through the country, they frequently took over from the inhabitants on a "promise to pay" certain useful articles of clothing or equipment, vehicles or harness. Sometimes the troops brought bills away with them which in due course were forwarded to the department for settlement; in other cases claims filtered in from the creditors after a long lapse of time. In either case the absence of any first-hand knowledge as to the disposal of the articles or the authenticity of the accounts rendered, continually landed the

Want of  
ordnance  
officers in the  
field.



department in endless correspondence. The disposal of damaged or worn-out stores in the possession of the troops, the collection after an action of the arms and accoutrements of the killed and wounded, and their despatch to the ordnance depots for subsequent reissue, are further examples of cases in which the presence on the spot of an officer of the department would have obviated the difficulties which nearly always arose. Unfortunately the regulations as they then existed did not provide for "mobile" ordnance officers, and although the disability under which they were labouring was soon realized by the officers of the department, an insufficiency of staff made the desired reform impossible. In one case only—that of the Eighth Division—was the principle of a Divisional Ordnance Officer established, and with very satisfactory results. The Tenth Division for a short time had attached to it an ordnance officer with a small travelling workshop. It is satisfactory to note that the latest edition of 'War Establishments' provides for the attachment of an ordnance officer to the headquarters of each cavalry and infantry division.

**Local  
purchases.**

The supply of stores from home was very largely augmented by means of local purchases made by the department of certain stores peculiar to the country. These consisted for the most part of ox and mule wagons and carts, trek gear for the oxen, and mule harness, the latter item being eventually obtained from home at cheaper rates and of superior quality. Merchants' stocks were also drawn upon for clothing, saddlery, horseshoes, and such-like articles. Up to the end of May, 1900, the expenditure in Cape Colony alone in connexion with these services reached a total of £242,000, and up to the end of that year averaged upwards of £40,000 per month, not always judiciously spent.\* From this point onwards, and until the end of the war, local purchase in Cape Colony fluctuated from month to month, the highest figure reached being £208,000 in March, 1901, and the lowest £25,000 in January, 1902. The total expenditure in Cape Colony during the campaign amounted to upwards of £2,500,000.

\* See Appendix to evidence before the War Stores Commission.

Smaller sums were correspondingly expended locally in Natal, the Free State, and the Transvaal.

Though the main bulk of the stores provided by the A.O.D. department was either obtained from home or by means of workshops, local purchases, a certain proportion was derived from the departmental workshops, which were established at nearly all the more important depots. These workshops varied in their extent and capacity from a small field establishment consisting of a few men working with hand tools in a tent to a workshop such as that created at Cape Town, which at one time employed as many as 120 artificers of various trades. The primary function of all these workshops, whatever their size, was the repair of damaged *matériel*, though they were not infrequently called upon to undertake new manufacture. Thus at one time the stock of riding-breeches in the Cape Town depot became very low, and although any number of them were then on the sea, they could not be landed in time to meet the urgent demands outstanding. At one day's notice the number of tailors employed was increased from eight to sixty, and 500 pairs turned out weekly. The *personnel* of the workshops consisted, as far as the up-country depots were concerned, almost entirely of military artificers. At the base depots the majority of the staff were civilians, most of whom were highly-skilled artisans from the Rand. These men remained with the department up to the end of 1901, when, as some of the mines came to be reopened, they began returning to Johannesburg.

Two instances may be cited here as illustrating the resources of the department in the matter of their work-shops and their technical staff. A small workshop train was extemporized at Bloemfontein from available rolling-stock, three covered cattle vans and one open truck being pressed into service. One of the vans was fitted up as a blacksmiths' and fitters' shop, one was devoted to carpenters' and wheelers' requirements, while the other carried stores and materials, and at the same time served as accommodation for the staff. The open truck carried a hydraulic wheel-tyring machine, by means of which loose tyres—always a trouble in South Africa—could be tightened up with ease

and rapidity. This workshop train eventually moved up to Pretoria, where it was normally stationed when not on tour. The programme of each of its tours was notified beforehand, and on its arrival at each station it was shunted into a siding and then carried out the necessary repairs to the stores which had been collected in anticipation of its arrival.

Mounting of  
big guns.

The other point to which passing reference should be made was the mounting of a 9·2-inch gun on a travelling railway-carriage. This feat was accomplished by one of the department's mechanical engineers, Captain D. Paul, Inspector of Ordnance Machinery, the actual details of construction being carried out under his supervision at the Cape Government Railway locomotive shops at Salt River. Though this gun was never actually fired in action its firing trials were carried out with complete success. Captain Paul had previously got out designs for the mounting in a somewhat similar manner of two 6-inch guns, which were moved up to Kimberley immediately after the relief of that place, and subsequently took an active part in more than one affair. The same officer was also responsible for the design of the extemporized field carriages which enabled 5-inch breech-loading guns (known colloquially as "cow guns") to accompany the troops in the field. In this respect the Army Ordnance Department was anticipated by the Navy, Captain Percy Scott, of H.M.S. *Terrible*, having designed and constructed field carriages for 4·7-inch guns at the very beginning of the war and having mounted a 6-inch gun on a railway truck.\*

Equipping of  
Yeomanry,  
etc.

The Imperial Yeomanry and the Rhodesian Field Force were originally equipped independently of the War Office, by the Imperial Yeomanry Committee and the British South Africa Company, and, during the early part of the war, obtained their replacements from special depots established at various important centres. Eventually, however, the whole of these depots, together with the stores contained in them, were taken over by the department and absorbed into the general system.

As the movements of the troops themselves, and of the

\* See vol. ii., p. 302.



supplies wherewith to feed them, naturally had the first claim on the railways, etc., it was only with the greatest difficulty that ordnance stores could be got forward quickly enough from the coast with the rolling-stock and train accommodation placed at their disposal. As long as the main bulk of the stores was concentrated at Cape Town the difficulty was accentuated, but the extension of the base depots, and the distribution to each of certain specified classes of stores went a long way towards improving the situation. Three lines became available for the greater portion of the journey in place of only one, and from May, 1901, onwards from 250 to 500 trucks per month were sent up country from the base ports on the Cape side alone.

An immense amount of additional work was thrown upon the department in connexion with the establishment of burgher, repatriation, and prisoners of war camps. Tentage and other stores had to be specially provided and obtained for these services, frequently at very short notice, among the items being included thousands of suits of plain clothes for issue to the prisoners of war. Many instances could be given of the troops having to be placed on short commons in order to allow of "our friends the enemy" being made comparatively comfortable.

In accordance with the regulations in force at the commencement of the campaign, all units taking part in it were supposed to keep an accurate account of the whole of the equipment and stores issued to them. The Commanding Officer was, in theory, held responsible for all such stores, and it rested with him to show that he had legitimately disposed of all those which could not at any particular moment be accounted for as being in his official possession. In other words, the procedure which normally obtains in peace time was extended, as it stood, to active service conditions, and the Army Ordnance Department was supposed to take the necessary steps, as in peace time, to ensure that these accounts were properly kept. What actually happened was that the somewhat cumbrous, but theoretically correct, peace system broke down completely under the strain of the demands made by actual service in the field, and that the

Difficulty in  
getting  
rolling-stock.

Repatriation,  
burgher  
camps,  
prisoners of  
war.

Accounting  
for stores.

accounting by the units gradually resolved itself into utter chaos. Some of the Regular units with experience of the subject, made praiseworthy efforts to keep their accounts in the prescribed manner, but corps such as the Imperial Yeomanry and the Colonial troops contented themselves with occasionally producing a collection of loose pieces of paper which they considered fully met all that could reasonably be demanded in the matter of accounting. Even the Army Ordnance Department itself failed to produce results of any great accuracy, although its regular *personnel* is well versed in the general principles and intricacies of detail which are involved in Army store accountship. This was in no sense due to want of effort, but to a variety of circumstances of which a typical one may be quoted. The station "ledgers" at De Aar, in which the whole of the depot transactions were booked, were kept in a makeshift "office" constructed of timber and galvanized iron. One morning while work on these books was in full swing (all entries being, according to rule, made in indelible pencil) a sudden squall demolished the building and deluged the ledgers with rain. When the books were recovered it was found that whole series of pages had become firmly glued together, and when eventually and with great care they had been separated, the result was a totally indecipherable smudge. Nothing then remained to be done but to consign the heavy labour of many weeks to the nearest rubbish heap. It will readily be imagined that the attempts made at the conclusion of the campaign to audit the accounts of the field army produced results which can only be described as ludicrous from the auditor's point of view. The fact is that the conditions imposed for the keeping of accounts in peace time proved themselves to be hopelessly inapplicable to active service. This has been fully appreciated at headquarters, and the next campaign in which the department may be called upon to take part will witness radically simplified methods in the keeping of store accounts.\*

Demobiliza-  
tion.

The cessation of hostilities was, generally speaking, the signal for the cessation of labour on the part of the fighting

\* See chap. v., p. 410, and chap. xii.

troops. This, however, was not the case as far as the Ordnance Department was concerned; on the contrary, it is hardly too much to say that some of the hardest work imposed upon it by the campaign took place after the announcement that peace had been concluded. At the time of the declaration of peace there were located at various points in the country many thousands of oversea Colonial troops, nearly all of whom had considerable quantities of ordnance stores in their possession. It was considered desirable for many reasons that all these troops should be sent back to their homes at the earliest possible moment, and in order to enable them to start for the coast as soon as the necessary sea transport was ready for them, they were concentrated at the chief centres, and instructed to return the whole of their Imperial Government stores to the ordnance depots located there. In the majority of cases the time available for this duty was limited, with the result that every depot affected became hopelessly overloaded with mountains of stores, with the disposal of which the department could only hope to deal at some future time. This was not the only difficulty. The department was supposed to see that everything which should be returned to it was actually handed in, and endeavours to bring this about constituted no light labour. For instance, the average Colonial soldier regarded the rifle which had been served out to him as his own personal property, going so far in a great many cases as to carve his name or initials in the woodwork, and it took much argument, and no small amount of money stoppages, to convince him that he was labouring under a delusion. Again, bayonets, prized as mementoes of the war, were not forthcoming, having, as was learned later, been smuggled on board ship in all sorts of curious places, such as under the trousers, or inside the socks of the transgressors. Hard on the heels of the oversea Colonials came the South African irregular corps, and when these had been finished with, there were thousands of Militia and Yeomen to be dealt with, to say nothing of those Regular units which were under orders to leave the country. As the great fighting army gradually melted away, it bequeathed



to the department a legacy which, taken in conjunction with its other work, kept it busily employed for the next two or three years. This other work consisted of shipping home, or otherwise disposing of, the masses of reserves of all natures of stores, which required to be maintained right up to the last day of the war, and which rapidly became superfluous as the number of the troops remaining in the country decreased.

Conclusion.

One word, in conclusion, for the officers and men of the Army Ordnance Department and corps. Located at the different depots on the lines of communication, with none of the excitement of actual fighting, they worked from dawn till midnight, month in and month out, with monotonous regularity. "Clear the line" telegrams for stores had to be dealt with at all hours during the day and night; anything from a demand from the Chief of the Staff for "camp equipment for 30,000 men at once" to "1,000 rounds of gun ammunition" from a staff officer who quite forgot to mention the nature of the gun. To quote words used by H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, when unveiling the Army Ordnance Corps war memorial at Woolwich: "No doubt other branches of the Army had more chance of dying on the battlefield, but the Army Ordnance Corps have known how, by devotion to duty, and by nobly carrying out most responsible and arduous duties, to walk in the same way as all their comrades of other branches of the Service."

## CHAPTER VIII

## THE ARMAMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARTILLERY

IN 1899 a British Army Corps, organized in a similar manner to that in force on the Continent, consisted of three divisions and corps troops. Each division included one brigade division \* of field artillery (three batteries under a lieutenant-colonel), while with the corps troops there were one brigade division of horse artillery (two batteries), two brigade divisions of field artillery, and usually a brigade division of field howitzers. Thus, including these latter, there were normally 2 horse artillery, 15 field artillery (gun) and 3 field artillery (howitzer) batteries, or 120 guns and howitzers, with the Army Corps. Each brigade of cavalry included one horse artillery battery. One brigade division of field artillery preceded the Army Corps. The remainder went out with it, and when additional troops were subsequently sent out more horse and field artillery were despatched. These had nearly all landed in Cape Colony by February, 1900. Each brigade division, except those of the corps troops, included an ammunition column which carried the first reserve of gun and small arm ammunition of the division to which it belonged. One ammunition column provided for the corps troops, and an ammunition park formed a second mobile reserve for the whole army. The park in South Africa was soon broken up and the columns drew from the advanced depots.

British  
Artillery  
organization,  
1899.

Establish-  
ments.

The following table shows the war establishments of the

\* The term "Brigade Division" has been dropped since the war, and has been replaced by "Brigade."

different batteries and of an infantry divisional ammunition column at the opening of the campaign.

—	No. of Guns.	No. of Ammun. Wagons.	No. of other Vehicles.	Officers.	N.C.O.'s and men.	Horses.	
						Riding.	Draught.
Horse Artillery Battery }	6	6	5	5	181	87	114
Field Artillery (Gun) Battery }	6	6	5	5	170	29	108
Field Artillery (Howitzer) Battery }	6	9	5	5	194	31	131
Infantry Division : Ammunition Column }	—	9	34	5	205*	31*	213

#### Armament.

All the horse artillery batteries sent from home were armed with the 12 pdr. breech-loading (B.L.) gun of 6 cwt., and all the field batteries were armed with the 15-pdr. B.L. gun of 7 cwt., except those field batteries (six in number) which had the 5-inch B.L. field howitzer. The horse artillery, besides being armed with a lighter gun, differed from the field batteries in carrying the gun detachments mounted, whilst the field gunners were carried on the limbers and wagons.

#### Ammunition supply.

The number of rounds of ammunition carried per gun was as follows :—

—	With the Battery.	With the Ammunition Column.	With the Ammunition Park.	Total.
Horse Artillery 12-pdrs. }	140	99	62	301
Field Artillery 15-pdrs. }	148	78	77	303

#### Colonial and other field artillery.

During the course of the war the regular Horse and Field Artillery were supplemented by various other batteries. A

\* Mules were provided in South Africa in place of a proportion of these horses, and the number of drivers was reduced. During the progress of the war local vehicles in many cases took the place of service vehicles.



four-gun battery of 12½-pdr. Q.F. guns accompanied the City of London Imperial Volunteers. Canada contributed three field batteries\* and New South Wales one. The British South Africa Company sent out four 15-pdr. batteries for the defence of Rhodesia, and two 15-pdr. batteries belonging to Cape Colony, originally intended for the defence of the Cape Peninsula, were also sent to the front. A single 13-pdr. Hotchkiss gun was presented to Brabant's Horse and a few 6-pdr. and 3-pdr. Q.F. guns from ships and coast defences were utilized. There were also a number of 9-pdr., 7-pdr., and 2·5-inch muzzle-loading guns belonging to the Imperial and Colonial authorities; their effective range was short, and they used black powder. A number of 12-pdr. 12-cwt. Q.F. guns, mounted on extemporized travelling carriages, and a few 12-pdr. 8-cwt. Q.F. guns were furnished by the Navy, and a battery, sent from Elswick (the gift of Lady Meux), had for its armament six 12-pdr. 12-cwt. Q.F. guns on steel travelling carriages. These guns had a high velocity and a long range, but they were too heavy for field artillery and not powerful enough for heavy artillery.

The use of heavy artillery with field armies was not contemplated in 1899, except in connexion with operations of a siege nature, and for such operations, mortars or howitzers of comparatively short range, but throwing heavy shells, were provided. Such were the siege train† 6-inch howitzers sent out in December, 1899, and the four 9·45-inch howitzers sent out in April, 1900. There was practically no occasion for their use when they arrived, and they fired but few rounds;‡ meanwhile the appearance of heavy artillery, in the shape of four 6-inch "Long Toms," with the Boers at the very commencement of the war created a demand on our side for similar weapons.

\* The guns in this instance were R.H.A. 12-pdrs., but the batteries were organized, horsed, etc., as field batteries.

† At this time it was considered that a siege train should normally consist of howitzers only, a few guns being added if special circumstances required. Four 4·7-inch guns were sent with the siege train to South Africa.

‡ It is very probable, however, that in Europe these howitzers would prove at least as valuable as the long-range, flat trajectoried guns which were so much used in South Africa. Germany, Austria, and France provide similar howitzers to accompany their field armies.

This was first met by the ingenuity of Captain Percy Scott, R.N., of H.M.S. *Terrible*, who mounted the long 12-pdr. 12-cwt. Q.F. guns and 4·7-inch Q.F. guns and one 6-inch Q.F. gun on extemporized wheeled carriages. The two 4·7-inch guns which reached Ladysmith in time to share in the siege, were, however, only on platform mountings. Eight 4·7-inch Q.F. guns and sixteen 5-inch B.L. guns on travelling carriages manned by Garrison Artillery companies were sent out from home in February, 1900, to supplement the Naval guns, and the naval detachments, after rendering admirable service in the field,\* were gradually withdrawn as the Garrison Artillery arrived. Besides the above, two old 6·3-inch R.M.L. howitzers, belonging to Cape Colony, were sent into Ladysmith just before it was cut off, and did useful work there, while two 6-inch Q.F. guns were placed on wheeled mountings at Cape Town and two more on railway trucks; one of these latter was in action for some time, in April and May, 1900, at Fourteen Streams, and one was in action near Pretoria. The heaviest gun sent up was a 9·2-inch B.L. gun, dismounted from the Cape Town defences, and placed upon a railway truck; this truck got as far as Belfast, Transvaal, but was too late for the action at Bergendal. The great variety of guns employed complicated the work of the ammunition columns and parks. But the fact that mistakes in supplying the right natures of ammunition to different columns were almost, if not entirely, unknown suggests that the stress laid on uniformity of calibre may sometimes be exaggerated, at least as regards the possibility of confusion in the field. The advantage, from the point of view of convenience and security of supply, of uniformity of calibre between similar types of artillery is too obvious to require elaborating here.

The following tables show the artilleries employed on both sides during the war, and give the details of the principal guns. A table of the principal field guns at that

\* For a more detailed account of the special work of the naval detachments than is given in the narrative of the previous volumes, see Surgeon J. T. Jeans, 'The Naval Brigades in the South African War,' and Lieut. C. R. N. Burne, 'With the Naval Brigade in Natal.'

# ARMAMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY 469

time in use by Continental Powers is appended for comparison.

## BRITISH GUNS USED IN THE FIELD IN SOUTH AFRICA.\*

	Horse Artillery.	Field Artillery.		Naval and Garrison Artillery.				Miscellaneous.
	12-pdr. B.L. 6 cwt.	15-pdr. B.L.	5-inch B.L. howitzers.	12-pdr. Q.F. 12 cwt.	4·7-inch Q.F.	5-inch B.L.	6-inch B.L. howitzers.	
In S. Africa before October 11, 1899.)	..	36						1 9·2-inch B.L. gun.
Army Corps and Cavalry Division.)	24	90	18					4 9·45-inch B.L. howitzers.
Landed from H.M. ships . . . . .)	..	..	..	42†	18			2 6·8-inch R.M.L. howitzers.
5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions . . . . .)	..	54						5 6-inch Q.F. guns.
Supplementary Artillery from home and India landed in S. Africa Jan.-March, 1900 . . . . .)	36‡	54	18					1 13-pdr. B.L. gun.
Siege train and heavy batteries from home landed in S. Africa Dec.-Feb., 1900 . . . . .)	..	..	..	..	12	16	8	30 to 40 R.M.L. guns (9-pdrs., 7-pdrs., 2·5 inch).
C.I.V. and Elswick Batts. . . . .)	..	4§	..	6				
Movable armament (Cape Town), Canadian, N.S. Wales, Cape Colony, and British S.A. Coy. Batts. . . . .)	..	60¶						
Total . . . . .	60	298	36	48	30	16	8	

\* These numbers do not include guns sent out in reserve to replace losses, worn guns, etc.

† Including 7 12-pdr. Q.F. 8 cwt.

‡ Including 2 batts. with 15-pdrs. from India; one of these was re-armed in S. Africa with 12-pdr. 6-cwt. guns.

§ 12½-pdr. Q.F. guns.

¶ The 18 Canadian guns were 12-pdrs.



## BRITISH GUNS.

	12-pdr. 6-cwt. Horse Artillery B.L. gun on* Mark I. Carriage.	15-pdr. B.L. Field Artillery gun on Mark I. Carriage.†	5-in. B.L. Field Howitzer on Mark II. Carriage.	12½-pdr. Q. F. C.I.V. Batt.	12-pdr. Q.F. 12-cwt. Elswick Batt.
Calibre . . . . .	3 in.	3 in.	5 in.	2.95 in.	3 in.
Weight of gun . . .	cwt. qr. lb. 6 0 0	cwt. qr. lb. 7 0 0	cwt. qr. lb. 9 0 0	cwt. qr. lb. 6 0 0	cwt. qr. lb. 12 0 0
Weight of gun carriage packed . . . . .	17 3 20	20 2 27	..	20 2 20	30 0 3
Weight of limber packed . . . . .	15 0 0	16 3 18	..	17 3 0	18 3 25
Weight behind gun team without men . . . . .	32 3 20	37 2 17	48 1 8	38 1 20	44 0 0
Weight behind wagon team without men . . . . .	33 1 0	38 2 25	48 1 26	37 2 20	..
Diameter of wheels . . . . .	5 ft.	5 ft.	5 ft.	4 ft. 8½ in.	5 ft.
No. of rounds on gun carriage . . . . .	4	4	..	..	..
No. of rounds in limber . . . . .	44	40	16	36	24
No. of rounds in wagon with limber . . . . .	92	104	48	80	..
Muzzle velocity f.s. . . . .	1,553	1,574	782 670 556 402	1,575	2,210† 1,660
Weight of shell . . . . .	lb. oz. 12 8	lb. oz. 14 1	lb. oz. 50 0	lb. oz. 12 8	lb. oz. 12 8† 14 1
No. of bullets in shrapnel . . . . .	156	200	..	164	192
Weight of shrapnel bullets . . . . .	35 to lb.	35 to lb.	..	..	..
Bursting charge of common shell . . . . .	..	..	lb. oz. 9 15 lyddite	..	lb. oz. 1 8
Maximum range of time fuse . . . . . yards	3,700†	4,100†	..	5,200	4,200
Maximum range of gun on horizontal platform . . . . . yards	5,400	5,600	4,900	6,000	8,000† 6,500

\* All the 12-pdr. 6-cwt. guns were on Mark I. carriages; of the 15-pdrs. 4 batteries had Mark II. carriages and 12 had Mark III. carriages; with Mark III. carriages the weight in draught was 38 cwt. 1 qr. 1 lb.

BOER GUNS.

4·7-in. Q.F. on 6-in. Howitzer Carriages.	5-in. B.L. on 40-pdr. R.M.L. Carriages.	6-in. B.L. Howitzers.	75 mm. Cren- zot Gun Z.A.R.	75 mm. Krupp Q.F. Gun Z.A.R.	120 mm. Krupp How- itzer Z.A.R.	6-in. Creuzot Gun Z.A.R.
4·7 in.	5 in.	6 in.	2·95 in.	2·95 in.	4·7 in.	6 in.
cwt. qr. lb.	cwt. qr. lb.	cwt. qr. lb.	cwt. qr. lb.	cwt. qr. lb.	cwt. qr. lb.	cwt.
42 0 0	40 0 0	30 0 0	7 0 0	4 2 0	8 8 0	49
86 0 0	74 0 0	69 3 8	20 1 1	abt. 10½ cwt.	19 1 15	..
12 0 0	15 0 0	15 0 22	15 1 11	..	16 1 23	..
98 0 0	89 0 0	85 0 2	35 2 12	..	35 3 10	108
..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 ft.	5 ft.	5 ft.	4 ft. 11 in.	4 ft. 4 in.	4 ft.	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..
..	..	..	36	..	16	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2,150	1,750	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 777 \\ 635 \\ 598 \\ 559 \\ 510 \end{array} \right\}$	1,951†	..	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1,009 \\ 476 \end{array} \right\}$	1,542
lb. oz.	lb. oz.	lb. oz.	lb. oz.	lb. oz.	lb. oz.	lb.
45 0	50 0	120 0	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 11 \ 8\frac{1}{2} \\ 14 \ 0 \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 18 \ 8\frac{1}{2} \\ 11 \ 0 \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 8 \ 8 \\ 35 \ 0 \end{array} \right\}$	94
225	236	..	234	103	617	..
..	..	..	45 to lb.	44 to lb.	41 to lb.	..
$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{lb. oz.} \\ 7 \ 5 \\ \text{lyddite} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{lb. oz.} \\ 7 \ 4 \\ \text{lyddite} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{lb. oz.} \\ 18 \ 14 \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{lb. oz.} \\ 0 \ 4 \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{lb. oz.} \\ 0 \ 4\frac{1}{2} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{lb. oz.} \\ 1 \ 1 \end{array} \right\}$	..
6,000	5,400	..	6,800	..	..	..
10,000	10,500	5,200	6,800	4,400	6,800	11,000

† A fuse, known as the "blue fuse" from the colour it was painted, was issued during the war, filled with a slower burning composition available up to 5,800 yards in the 12-pdr. and 5,900 yards in the 15-pdr.

‡ For the common shell.

## FOREIGN FIELD ARTILLERY.

	HORSE ARTILLERY.				FIELD ARTILLERY.			
	German mod. 1896.	French.*	Russian.	Italian mod. 1901.	German mod. 1896.	French mod. 1897.	Russian mod. 1900.	Austrian mod. 75-98.
Calibre . . . . .	3·08 in.	3·15 in.	3·42 in.	2·95 in.	3·08 in.	2·95 in.	3 in.	3·42 in.
Weight behind team . .	cwt. qr. lb. 32 3 13	cwt. qr. lb. 31 3 8	cwt. qr. lb. 31 3 20	cwt. qr. lb. 34 1 14	cwt. qr. lb. 33 1 23	cwt. qr. lb. 38 0 0	cwt. qr. lb. 34 3 17	cwt. qr. lb. 38 3 0
Muzzle velocity . . . .	1,525 f.s.	1,545 f.s.	1,600 f.s.	1,574 f.s.	1,525 f.s.	1,640 f.s.	1,950 f.s.	1,470 f.s.
Weight of shell . . . .	15 lb.	14½ lb.	15 lb.	14·7 lb.	15 lb.	15 lb.	13·6 lb.	14·2 lb.
Maximum range of time fuse . . . . .	5,550 yds.	6,000 yds.	4,480 yds.	6,000 yds.	5,550 yds.	6,000 yds.	6,000 yds.	4,100 yds.
								4,400 yds.

\* This is not a Q.F. gun, but the 90 mm. gun introduced about 1877 and still used for the Horse Artillery batteries with the Cavalry Brigades.

## FIELD HOWITZERS.

	German.	French.	Russian.
Calibre . . . . .	4·14 in.	4·7 in.	6 in.
Weight behind team . .	38 cwt. 1 qr. 15 lb.	46 cwt. 2 qr. 6 lb.	41 cwt. 1 qr. 9 lb.
Muzzle velocity . . . .	984 f.s.	935 f.s.	760 f.s.
Weight of shell . . . .	35·2 lb. 30·8 lb.*	45 lb.	59 lb. 63 lb.*
Maximum range . . . .	6,452 yds. 7,655 yds.*	6,200 yds.	3,600 yds.

\* Shrapnel shell.



The Boer artillery organization has been previously described (Vol. II., page 80). The armament was of a miscellaneous description, including guns of many different dates and calibres, as the following list shows.

Transvaal.	Orange Free State.
4 155 mm. (6-inch) Creuzot B.L. guns.	14 75 mm. (2·95-inch) Krupp B.L. guns.
4 120 mm. (4·7-inch) Krupp B.L. howitzers.	9 other guns of four different natures, principally smooth bores, muzzle-loaders, etc.
8 75 mm. (2·95-inch) Krupp Q.F. guns.	—
2 75 mm. (2·95-inch) Maxim-Nordenfolt Q.F. guns.	23 guns.
6 75 mm. (2·95-inch) Creuzot Q.F. guns.	<i>Guns captured by Boers during the course of the war.</i>
22 37 mm. (1-pdr.) automatic gun, "Pom-pom."	1 4·7-inch Q.F. gun.
28 other guns of fifteen different natures and of small importance, principally smooth bores, muzzle-loaders, etc.	26 15-pdr. B.L. guns.
—	11 12-pdr. B.L. guns.
74 guns.	7 2·5-inch R.M.L. guns.
	3 7-pdr. R.M.L. guns.
	7 1-pdr. automatic guns (pom-pom).
	—
	55 guns.

The British 12-pdr. and 15-pdr. guns were of the same class and power as the corresponding guns in the German and Russian armies, and as the guns which were, in 1899, being superseded in the French Army by the new 72 mm. Q.F. gun. This latter gun was distinctly ahead of any gun in possession of any other Power. The Austrian and Italian guns were of older pattern and of inferior power to any of the above. The German gun had an advantage over the British gun in having a longer burning time fuse. The British B.L. guns and howitzers, in the above table, all had interrupted screw breech mechanism of the De Bange type. They were fired by friction tubes; brass cartridge cases were not used. The 12-pdrs. and 15-pdrs. had telescope sights, and had spades attached to the axles to check recoil. Except a few case shot, shrapnel was their only projectile, and was used with a metal time and percussion fuse. The howitzers used lyddite shell only. They had several charges, so that a steep angle of descent could be given at all ranges, and they

Detailed features of the British guns.

were allowed a short recoil on the carriage by means of two buffers. The Q.F. guns had interrupted screw breech mechanisms which were opened or closed by the single motion of a lever; they used brass cartridge cases. None of the guns had shields. All the limbers were fitted for pole draught. Collar harness was used, and each horse was harnessed alike, but this was found unsatisfactory as too much harness was carried by every horse; the collars gave trouble as they ceased to fit when the horses lost condition. Some of the bores of the guns were worn out during the war, but otherwise the equipments stood the wear and tear of the service extremely well. Of the other guns used, but not detailed in the table, the 9·2-inch 22-ton gun fired a 380-lb. shell, with a muzzle velocity of 2,065 f.s. The 6-inch Q.F. of 7 tons fired a 100-lb. shell with a muzzle velocity of 2,154 f.s. and weighed about 11½ tons on its wheeled carriage. The 9·45-inch howitzer of Austrian (Skoda) pattern, fired a 280-lb. shell; for travelling, it and its mounting formed two loads, each weighing about 4½ tons without the limber. Except the muzzle-loaders, all the British guns used smokeless powder, and with a few exceptions this was cordite, a propellant composed of 58 parts of nitro-glycerine, 37 of gun-cotton, and 5 of mineral jelly.

**Features of  
the Boer  
guns.**

Of the Boer guns, the 75 mm. Creuzot was the most modern pattern; this gun recoiled in a cradle which had two short buffers, and the trail was fitted with a spade to check recoil. It had an unusually high velocity for a field gun,\* and could probably fire somewhat faster than any other field gun used during the war. Its buffers, however, gave trouble and were often in need of repair; its ammunition proved unsatisfactory, partly, perhaps, because the Boers never learnt to use time shrapnel. The shrapnel and common shell being of different weight was a bad feature, as they would range differently; the common shell was a light one for the

\* High velocity strains the carriage, and is not usually considered to offer sufficient compensating advantages in a field gun to justify this drawback, but on occasions a gun whose projectile reaches the enemy before its own sound or the sound of discharge has a considerable moral effect. With a low velocity gun men can get under cover after hearing its discharge.

calibre of the gun. A nitro-cellulose smokeless powder was used. The Krupp 75 mm. Q.F. gun (date 1895) also used projectiles of different weights; the shrapnel was of cast iron and therefore held few bullets, but the Krupp ammunition is said to have proved more trustworthy than the Creuzot. The Krupp fuses were good; ballistite was the smokeless powder employed; the carriages were rigid, with no buffers. The Free State Krupp 75 mm. B.L. guns fired 8½-lb. shells (shrapnel, containing 136 bullets, and ring or segment shell) with a black powder charge. The 120 mm. B.L. Krupp howitzer was a very good weapon; it fired light shells (shrapnel and common) for its calibre, but got good accuracy up to 6,000 yards. Its carriage was a plain rigid one with no buffer. The 6-inch 94-pdrs., better known as "Long Toms," were intended as siege pieces to be used on wooden platforms; they had buffers to connect their carriages to a pivot plate fixed to the platform; they fired shrapnel and common shell with black powder charges and ranged over 11,000 yards. Their employment in field operations showed the resource of the Boers and their wonderful ability for getting heavy guns into, and out of, difficult positions. They played their principal part in the siege of Ladysmith; one, however, was used against Mafeking in the early part of the siege and one against Kimberley for a few days before its relief. In the early part of the war the Boers never succeeded in using the shrapnel shell of this gun properly; later on they modified the fuses and at times got good results at about 10,000 yards range. One of the 6-inch guns, and two of the 120 mm. Krupp howitzers were damaged by sorties from Ladysmith; the 6-inch and one 120 mm. were, however, repaired in the Transvaal workshops and used again with slight loss of efficiency.\*

\* During the war a considerable amount of ammunition was made for the Boers, principally in the Begbie factory at Johannesburg; about 12,000 rounds were supplied for the Krupp 75 mm. Q.F. guns, about 4,500 for the Free State Krupp 75 mm. B.L. guns, and about 6,000 for the Pom-poms. About 300 rounds were made for the 75 mm. Creuzot Q.F. guns, and about 4,800 rounds for the captured 12 and 15-pdrs. No ammunition was made for the 6-inch. Creuzot or 120 mm. Krupps. Manufacture was seriously interrupted and a large amount of ammunition destroyed by an explosion in the Begbie factory on April 24, 1900.



The "Pom-pom."

The effect produced in the hands of the Boers by the 1-pdr. Automatic Vickers-Maxim guns (better known as "Pom-poms," from the peculiar noise of their discharge) was such that orders were given for them for the British troops, and 57 were eventually sent out, the first three arriving just in time to take part in the final fighting at Paardeberg. These guns worked automatically on exactly the same principle as the rifle calibre Maxim machine guns. They fired a 1 lb. shell with a muzzle velocity of 1,800 f.s. The shells were cast iron, filled with powder and fitted with a nose percussion fuse; they were fixed in brass cartridge cases and 25 of these were placed in a belt. The limber carried twelve of these belts, and the weight of the gun and limber in draught was 27 cwt.

### *Experiences and Lessons of the War.*

Field artillery training in 1899.

The system of fire discipline and fire tactics in force in England and on the Continent in 1899 was mainly based on the experiences of 1866 and 1870. In 1866 the Prussian artillery utterly disappointed themselves and their comrades by their failure to produce any decisive results. In 1870, on the contrary, the German guns achieved many most marked successes. The experiences of 1866 had convinced them of the uselessness of opening fire at extreme ranges, and they now invariably endeavoured to push in to effective range.\* They had learnt to lay accurately and to find their ranges carefully; they used their guns in masses, and were not afraid to sacrifice themselves if necessary for the other arms. The new methods were applied with conspicuous success in 1870, though the marked inferiority of the French artillery no doubt contributed to the result. The war only confirmed the vital importance of effective and intimate co-operation between the different arms. Though the German artillery in 1870 did excellent work and repulsed many attacks

\* Before Gravelotte, orders were issued (though it was not found possible to carry them out strictly) that the German artillery was not to open fire till within 1,800 paces.

unaided,\* they also learnt that they could not act independently in the attack and, by their own fire alone, drive good infantry from their positions. The Russians at Plevna in 1877 ignored these lessons. They used their guns at long ranges, and bombarded the Turkish lines for days. When the shelling ceased they launched their infantry without any attempt at real co-operation. The long-range independent bombardments did no harm to the Turks, and the isolated assaults were disastrously repulsed. The training of the British artillery had for many years before 1899 been carried out in the light of the above experiences, and had been brought to a high state of perfection, whilst the battery organization was probably the best school of instruction in the army for junior officers. For twelve or fifteen years before the war the artillery had been most carefully developing its training. Absolute accuracy and uniformity in the work had been insisted upon. Officers and men were thoroughly drilled in all essentials. Active service conditions were constantly kept in view. The replacement of casualties in action was, for instance, regularly practised. The war disclosed the importance of some factors which had not been sufficiently appreciated. But on the whole the artillery came through the ordeal with conspicuous success, though it is always necessary to remember that it never had to encounter serious artillery opposition.

The capabilities and use of field artillery were, however, not generally understood throughout the Army. In peace time there is a tendency for officers of other arms to regard artillery as a technical branch, which they cannot be expected to understand. That tendency was particularly marked in the British Army, where no general staff existed to correct it. The result in 1899 was that many senior officers did not at first appreciate the best manner of availing themselves of its powers or realize the limitations of those powers. Thus the uselessness of independent preliminary bombardments and the necessity for co-operation of the two arms in the attack,

Uselessness of  
isolated bom-  
bardments.  
Long-range  
firing.

\* Notably at Vionville, where they held up the French army, marching to the west, till the arrival of their own main body, with results of a most far-reaching character.

taught in 1870 and confirmed at Plevna, had to be re-taught at Magersfontein and on the Tugela. So, too, the British guns were again and again ordered to open at long ranges where their fire was ineffective. For this latter demand there was, indeed, often considerable excuse. In all wars a tendency may be observed to use weapons up to their extreme ranges, and certain special conditions in South Africa gave peculiar emphasis to this tendency. These were the large and generally open features of the country, the absence of trees and hedges and the wonderfully clear atmosphere. Moreover, the keen trained eyesight of the Boers enabled them to take full advantage of these conditions, and 5,000 to 6,000 yards was quite a common range for them to open fire with their field guns, while much longer ranges were attempted with some of their high-velocity and heavy guns. This fire as a rule caused no casualties, but its moral effect was often considerable, especially on irresolute commanders. Whole brigades hesitated, and were repeatedly ordered to halt when a few 12-lb. shells, fired at an enormous range, buried themselves harmlessly in the ground near them. The demand for longer range fire on the British side, regardless of its really useful effect, and for guns capable of outranging the Boers, at once became instant, if for no other purpose at least for that of removing the bad moral impression produced when the enemy's artillery fire is not replied to, however ineffective it may be. In many cases, too, the moral effect upon the enemy of otherwise ineffective fire justified its use. The 15-pdrs. on Caesar's Camp drove off Boers from the dam on Klip River at ranges approaching 6,000 yards. At Colesberg these guns were used to shell Boer positions at 7,500 yards range. In any case, quite apart from special local conditions which encouraged firing at extreme distances, other factors of universal application necessitated an increase of the recognized minimum artillery ranges. Smokeless powder and the long-range fire of small bore rifles, appreciable at 2,000 yards or more, have not affected the principles which govern the employment of artillery, but have undoubtedly created a demand for a more powerful artillery fire at longer ranges.



That a battery should not as a rule be broken up, was one of the features of artillery training in 1899. A battery is not a mere collection of six guns working independently, but an elaborately organized machine on the harmonious co-operation of whose different parts success depends. The war, however, showed that, under exceptional circumstances, it may be advisable to break up a battery. Guns may be fairly easily hid singly or in pairs, when it is not equally simple to hide six guns in action together. Smokeless powder has made invisibility of the greatest importance, and the British gunners at the beginning of the war hardly realized the importance of concealment or the necessity of subordinating regularity of alignment and intervals between the guns in a battery to the formation of the ground. Moreover, as the Boers proved more than once, there are occasions when even a single gun may be most effective, especially if posted in a concealed position from which an important line of approach can be enfiladed. The moral effect, too, of a single gun is sometimes not to be despised. A single gun coming into action on Spion Kop at any time on January 24, 1900, might have had as striking an effect as the first German gun on the Rothberg at Spichenen in 1870. The greater power of the modern quick-firing gun may increase the number of occasions on which the effective use of single guns is possible. But, even with the most powerful weapons, fighting guns in complete batteries must be the general rule in order to ensure the necessary concentration of fire, though, no doubt, improvement in means of communication on the field may enable the same concentration and a more converging fire to be secured by batteries or guns working at greater intervals than have hitherto been considered practicable. The Boers habitually fought their guns singly. They had neither the discipline nor the training for fighting whole batteries, even if they had possessed sufficient guns for the purpose. With their numerical inferiority in artillery concealment was essential. Occasionally, as at Spion Kop, their scattered guns concentrated an effective converging fire. But, as a rule, they fought their guns upon no principle and with very little decisive effect.

The battery  
unit.

Teaching of  
drill-books  
alone is  
inadequate.


The neglect to consider the uses of long-range fire and the objection to recognize the advantages to be sometimes gained by breaking up batteries are instances of the tendency of ideas to crystallize when based on theory and not frequently submitted to the test of practice. In times of peace there is always an inclination to accept rigid rules without question; possible departures from these rules, developments, and fresh interpretations of them, makeshifts, expedients, ruses, are not sufficiently taken into consideration. A touch of Boer "slimness" would improve the usual interpretation which is given to the soundest of the dicta of the drill book. In no two wars are exactly the same conditions found, and the relative strength and efficiency of the rival artilleries must always affect the choice of the best course to pursue. Extensive practical experience in the field is the best corrective for narrow views. Such experience does not fall to the lot of every officer. In default of it a careful study of other wars, joined to a close acquaintance with modern artillery material and with the latest theories on the tactics of the arm, are indispensable to preserve the alertness and adaptability acquired in time of war.

Necessity of  
combination.

The war only served to confirm in the very strongest fashion the vital importance of close combination between the artillery fire and the infantry attack. It was the failure to realize this in many instances that was responsible for a certain sense of disappointment on the part of officers who had based exaggerated hopes on the unaided effects of modern shrapnel. The Boers took care never to give shrapnel a good target. Their firing lines were very thin, they had no supports or reserves, and their men were usually well intrenched and always carefully concealed. As long as a man sits at the bottom of a deep shelter trench, or behind a large boulder, he is quite safe from the shrapnel of flat trajectory guns. It is useless to fire at trenches and to plaster hillsides with shrapnel when there is nothing to compel the enemy to expose himself. The infantry advance alone will make him do this. The artillery must certainly come into action before the infantry begin their attack, because it must establish itself in position, reconnoitre the terrain in



COLONEL (LOCAL MAJOR-GENERAL)  
 SIR ELLIOTT WOOD, K.C.B., R.E.,  
 COMMANDING ROYAL ENGINEER, S. AFRICA, 1899-1902.  
*Photo by Nissen, Pretoria.*



COLONEL (LOCAL MAJOR-GENERAL)  
 SIR G. H. MARSHALL, K.C.B., R.A.,  
 COMMANDING ROYAL ARTILLERY, S. AFRICA, 1899-1900.  
*Photo by Stenning & Hickling, London.*





its field of fire, ascertain the ranges, feel out the enemy's position by a preliminary fire and control his artillery, but it is the combined action of infantry and guns which can alone be counted upon to gain important successes. That combination must be kept up to the very last moment, even at the risk of an occasional shell inflicting losses on its own infantry. This close support necessitates the most careful watching of the infantry advance in all its stages, and the closest possible intercommunication between the guns and the firing line. By an unfortunate failure to realize active service conditions the artillery had been deprived of their signallers shortly before the war, but the mistake has since been rectified. The war also showed the absolute necessity of artillery officers being supplied with good telescopes.

In many cases this combination between artillery and infantry fire was most effectively secured. In the earlier fights in Natal, and in the Modder River advance, positions were carried with moderate loss, in spite of the comparatively dense formations and hurriedly pushed attacks then in vogue, and that the loss was not heavier was largely due to the degree of control of the Boer fire established by the British artillery. At Driefontein, between forty and fifty dead Boers were found on a position shelled by "Q" and "T" batteries, Royal Horse Artillery, and both at this fight and at Elandslaagte, the defenders had more killed than the attackers, an unusual result which can probably be attributed largely to the effective use of shrapnel shell. Monte Cristo, Pieter's Hill, Alleman's Nek and Bergendal are also instances of effective artillery support protecting the infantry attack. Artillery support was no less effectively given on occasion to enable infantry to hold their ground or to cover a retreat. At Magersfontein, by the heaviest expenditure of ammunition per battery in any fight in the whole war, "G" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, and Colonel Hall's Brigade Division rendered invaluable help to the shattered Highland Brigade in keeping the Boer rifles in check. The shrapnel of Abdy's battery on January 6, 1900, was no less useful in enabling the defenders of Cæsar's Camp to hold their own. Abdy's and Dawkins's batteries saved the retreating infantry at Ladysmith on

Instances of  
successful  
co-operation.

October 30, 1899. McLeod's and Perceval's batteries enabled the remnants of Gatacre's force to get away from Stormberg. Among instances of useless preliminary shelling Magersfontein, Colenso, and the days before Spion Kop are perhaps the most conspicuous. Spion Kop itself was the most striking example of infantry left exposed to infantry and artillery attack without adequate artillery support, because no proper artillery positions could be secured. With guns as with rifles the best results were achieved when the fire was of a converging nature. This was the case at Elandslaagte, Monte Cristo, and, on the Boer side, at Spion Kop. A German officer, serving with the Boers, described how, in fighting near Dewetsdorp, four or five Boer guns were able to hold their own against the frontal fire of a superior force of British artillery, but when other guns farther to a flank brought a converging fire to bear on them, the Boer guns only got off with difficulty.

British  
versus Boer  
artillery.

The preliminary artillery duel, which plays so important a part in most combats where the opponents are at all equally matched in artillery, was only a minor feature in South Africa. Our guns never came under the accurate shrapnel fire of a well-trained artillery, and were never forced to learn the lessons which such an experience alone can enforce. The chief difficulty with the scattered Boer guns was to locate them. Once located, they were generally quickly silenced, at any rate for the time, though they generally reopened fire later on to enforce the lesson that "silenced" artillery always needs watching, and can only be regarded as disposed of if the gunners have been wiped out or the guns actually taken.

British guns  
versus Boer  
rifles.

The really serious adversary the British gunners had to deal with were the Boer riflemen. In a direct struggle, the former were able to maintain themselves at such ranges as 1,200-1,500 yards. Thus, at Modder River, the 75th field battery (Lindsay's) was left unsupported 1,100 yards from the Boers and held its own as long as its ammunition lasted. The strength of the Boer rifle fire which it had kept under became obvious when the battery had to limber up and withdraw. Till their ammunition failed, even Long's batteries at Colenso held their own by a magnificent effort,



though with heavy losses, and beat down the fire of 1,000 rifles. The experiences of these batteries, and many episodes in South Africa, and since then in Manchuria, show that, however difficult and even critical may become the position of batteries thrust up to close rifle range, such demand may often be made upon artillery, and must be satisfied regardless of losses. A fixed determination to close to decisive ranges at all costs is indispensable for success in the attack, and if the failure of generalship, or the absence of support by other arms, causes the loss of men and guns, the responsibility rests on those who leave the artillery in the lurch, and not on gunners who do their duty.

The British field artillery in South Africa practically confined themselves to the use of shrapnel. There can be no comparison between the effectiveness of the modern shrapnel shell, with its accurate time fuse, and the common shell. Apart from their weakness in numbers, the chief cause of the ineffectiveness of the Boer artillery was their use of common shell. The Boer guns fired some 20,000 shell into Ladysmith from commanding positions, during the four months' siege, and the total casualties caused by their gun fire were under 300, while of the 30 or 40 men killed in this way, 14 were certainly accounted for by 3 shrapnel shell.\* On January 22, 1900, opposite Magersfontein, the 65th field battery was in the open under an accurate fire of percussion shell from Krupp 75 mm. guns, at about 3,800 yards range, for about one and half hours, the three Krupps firing about three shell a minute; no men or horses were hit and only one wagon was slightly damaged. At Driefontein some forty Boer percussion segment shell fell in "Q" battery, Royal Horse Artillery, but not a man was touched. On some occasions, on the other hand, when the Boers used time shrapnel, they got good effect. At Klip Drift, on February 15, 1900, 3 Krupp 75 mm. Q.F. guns kept up a rapid fire for about

Common and  
shrapnel  
shell.

\* One camp in the open at Ladysmith, containing 600 men and 600 horses, was shelled daily, mainly with percussion common shell, through the four months' siege, and had only one man and one horse wounded and one horse killed. It is not surprising that the officer in command of that camp remarked that "the only shell worth the trouble of loading a gun with for employment in the field is a time shrapnel."

20 minutes, at 3,200 yards, against 18 R.H.A. 12-pdrs. which had come into action at a spot whose range had been already taken by the Boers. The batteries lost 2 officers and 24 men, and would have lost more if the shrapnel bullets had not lacked penetration, being probably burst too short, many of them sticking in the men's putties, haversacks and clothes. Spion Kop was another instance in which the Boers not only secured an effective concentration of artillery fire, but managed to burst their shrapnel to some purpose. A notable case of the effect of long-range shrapnel fire occurred on September 3, 1900, near Lydenburg, when a shrapnel from the Boer 6-inch 94-pdr. caused 21 casualties in the Volunteer company of Gordon Highlanders at over 10,000 yards range. It has sometimes been suggested that common shell should be supplied so as to destroy the enemy's guns. But even in the Franco-German war, where these projectiles were exclusively used by the Germans, and largely used by the French, the amount of harm done in this way was infinitesimal, and lengthy trials confirmed the British authorities in the belief that expenditure of ammunition with a view to destroying the enemy's guns was useless and should not be incurred. This belief has been confirmed by South African and Manchurian experience, though it is possible that when our artillery has thoroughly mastered its new Q.F. gun, direct hits against shielded guns may occasionally be secured.\* Against trenches, especially those of low command, the damage done by the small common shell of a field gun is infinitesimal, and that due to a whole day's shelling can be easily repaired with the spade in a short time. Peace experiments have proved this over and over again. On a grand scale, Plevna showed the uselessness of hammering earth parapets with common shell, while the same lesson was taught by all the field battles in Manchuria. In

\* The effect of a shell hitting a limber or ammunition wagon is now much less likely to cause serious damage than in the days before smokeless powder, as this latter does not explode so readily as black powder. Cases occurred at Pieter's Hill, Mafeking, and elsewhere, of Boer shells bursting in limbers or wagon bodies and only scattering their contents. On the other hand Boer black powder magazines or limbers were sometimes exploded by our shells.

South Africa the Boer attacks on the Colonial troops at Wepener included a liberal shelling of the parapets hastily thrown up there, and one of them received 111 shells in one day without any damage resulting. The shelling of Boer intrenchments at Magersfontein, both before and after the battle, and during the operations on the Tugela, even with the high explosive shells fired by 4.7-inch guns and by 5-inch howitzers and guns, did no damage to the earthworks.

The very limited usefulness of common shell was illustrated by the experience of the field howitzers. Except at Omdurman in 1898, no rifled breech-loading howitzers had been seen on service before the war in South Africa. They had been introduced in the British, as in Continental armies, to obtain searching effect, to breach overhead cover, to destroy buildings, etc. A heavy shell with powerful bursting charge was therefore considered desirable, and in our 5-inch howitzer, range and shrapnel effect had been sacrificed to this. No shrapnel was provided, and a 50-lb. lyddite shell, with a maximum range of 4,900 yards, was the only projectile. South African conditions were by no means ideal for this type of howitzer. The narrow and deep intrenchments of the Boers did not expose their defenders to the back effect which the 50-lb. shell might have had against infantry lining an ordinary parapet. There was no overhead cover to breach, and there were no buildings to destroy. The lyddite shell did best against stony kopjes, on account of the splinters of stone caused by its explosion. If it fell into a trench, as happened occasionally during the operations on the Tugela, it cleared out the defenders; but a 30 or 40 lb. shell would probably have done this equally well and would have ranged farther. In any case lyddite shell suffered from the inherent drawbacks of all common shell; it had to fall exactly in the right place, and even then, if the ground was soft, it might be smothered; it had none of the depth of effect or searching and sweeping power of shrapnel. The absence of shrapnel, combined with the short range and weight in draught of the 5-inch howitzers, militated against their usefulness. Moreover, being comparatively new weapons, their value was not always well understood by



those in authority, and they were often given unsuitable tasks to perform. Major Hamilton Gordon's 61st battery in the Ladysmith relief and subsequent operations with Buller's army was, however, well used and rendered conspicuous service. Always using the smallest charges, and therefore the most curved fire possible, it searched out Boer trenches with astonishing accuracy of aim and destroyed or drove out their occupants. During the battle of Pieter's Hill it kept up its fire till the infantry were within 100 yards of the trenches, the curved trajectory of its shell enabling it to continue firing longer than the field guns. Again, at Bergendal the 5-inch howitzer lyddite shell caused many casualties by dropping in among the high boulders which otherwise afforded the Boers good cover against the flat trajectory of the 5-inch, 4·7-inch, and 15-pdr. projectiles. It is this dropping fire effect which must render the howitzer a valuable weapon in future. Its power of searching out most hasty intrenchments and of rendering dangerous or untenable the reverse slopes of hills must often tell, especially if the field of fire has been carefully reconnoitred before the fight. But our South African experiences showed that the future howitzer must be lighter in draught than the 5-inch, and must have a longer range. A lighter shell will suffice, but, in any case, a considerable proportion of shrapnel must be provided. A howitzer throwing a 35-lb. shell 7,000 yards is the ideal to aim at, and our newest howitzer answers these requirements.

Heavy  
artillery in  
the field.

Though the fact had been lost sight of before the war, heavy artillery had, in previous campaigns, frequently accompanied field armies. In 1813-14, 18-pdrs. (about equivalent in mobility to the modern 4·7 inch) were used in the south of France. In the first Sikh war, as in South Africa, our army took the field with only field guns, but the Sikh 22-pdrs. at Ferozeshah showed the value of heavier metal in the field, and, in the second Sikh war, Gough's army included a strong force of heavy artillery, which was used with decisive effect at Gujerat. Indian experience has, in fact, led to a few heavy batteries being always maintained with the Indian army. The Germans won their great battles

of 1866 and 1870 without heavy artillery, and this caused the value of these weapons to be ignored. The Boers showed considerable initiative and energy in bringing their 6-inch 94-pdrs. into the field. These guns were fitted with recoil buffers intended to be fastened to a holdfast let into the ground, and were provided with wooden platforms. The Boers, however, used them frequently without these adjuncts and moved them about over most difficult ground. The South African trek ox is probably quite unequalled for this sort of task, and every Boer is an expert at heavy transport work. The various extemporized 4·7-inch and 5-inch guns used by the British, weighing up to five tons, were also able to keep up with troops in most cases, and the infantry were always ready to assist if difficult places had to be got over. Opposite Laing's Nek, two 5-inch guns were got on to a hill about 700 feet high; one was hauled up by 64 oxen, one by 400 infantry. On the march these guns were usually hauled by twenty to twenty-four oxen. During Buller's operations round Lydenburg, two 5-inch guns were, however, hauled by twelve horses, or twenty in bad places. Similarly, in the S.E. Transvaal, two 4·7-inch guns were horsed. The open ground and clear atmosphere of South Africa enabled these guns to open fire at very long ranges, 11,000 yards or so, though about 8,000 was the limit of really effective work. As far as the Boer "Long Toms" were concerned, their effect, owing largely to bad ammunition, was usually not great. But they showed that the mere power of annoying an enemy at over 10,000 yards is a valuable one, and that such fire must be replied to. However, beyond merely annoying, the long-range fire of heavy guns may have considerable effect in enfilading the enemy's lines from distant positions and in reaching from more advanced positions the enemy's reserves and trains. Thus Callwell's 5-inch guns co-operated at 8,000 yards with the infantry at Monte Cristo, and materially assisted by their enfilade and reverse fire in clearing the hill with very little loss. In the early part of the war, 4·7-inch and 5-inch guns were principally equipped with lyddite shell; but, as with the howitzers, experience showed that shrapnel was the

projectile of greatest utility; the want of a suitable time fuse, however, limited their shrapnel range to about 6,500 yards.

**The Horse  
Artillery.**

The function of the Horse Artillery in South Africa had necessarily to conform to the general character of the work of the cavalry. The chances of assisting cavalry in shock action against hostile cavalry, as contemplated in the drill book, never arose. Judging from the Manchurian campaign, it is, at any rate, not likely to arise frequently, and it may be doubted whether, for that particular purpose, galloping machine guns would not be equally well suited. In South Africa the Horse Artillery simply played the part of more mobile field batteries, keeping up with the cavalry on the march, and supporting their dismounted action, or, for that matter, that of any other troops. In this way it rendered admirable service, though sometimes handicapped by the shortness of its effective range. In the closing months of the war the Field Artillery with columns practically became assimilated to the Horse Artillery, the detachments being mostly mounted on cobs.

**Mountain  
guns.**

Mountain artillery played only a very small part in the war, although in many parts of the theatre of operations the nature of the ground would have made portable guns a valuable adjunct had any of a modern type been available. There was a mountain battery in Natal when hostilities commenced, but it was involved in the disaster of Nicholson's Nek, the mules stampeding during the night march and four of the guns being lost; the remaining two proved of little use in Ladysmith. The only battery of this kind on the home establishment was sent out late in 1899 and took part in the later operations on the Tugela, but owing to the limited range of the guns and to their firing black powder they proved to be of very little use; they were on their way to the top of Spion Kop when the mountain was evacuated. In portions of Natal, in the Lydenburg mountains, and in many parts of Cape Colony, mountain artillery armed with guns ranging up to 5,000 yards and firing cordite would have proved very useful.

The place of mountain guns and, to some extent perhaps,



of real quick-firing horse artillery guns was largely taken in South Africa by a weapon originally intended only for naval purposes, the Vickers-Maxim 1-pdr. automatic gun, universally known as the "Pom-pom." The Boers had bought a number of these, and their employment in the field at first came somewhat as a surprise to the British troops, and produced a considerable moral effect. Though its material effect was never great, the peculiarly aggravating bark of the pom-pom and the knowledge that, when one shell had come, a string of others was on the way and likely to burst in the neighbourhood, were trying to the nerves. It was a weapon that fitted in well with the Boers' idea of fighting. It was comparatively light, easily concealed, and did not throw up clouds of dust on being fired. It was suited for acting by surprise and for use singly. It certainly found its uses in the war on both sides, but it was in the reconnoitring and skirmishing work, especially of mounted troops, that the British found it most valuable. For clearing up the situation in reconnaissance work, for driving off snipers from columns or convoys on the march, and for preventing small parties from checking mounted troops, it often proved of the greatest service when used boldly. No body of troops liked to move without some gun or guns, and the pom-pom frequently answered the purpose. It filled up the gap between the rifle calibre machine gun and the horse artillery 12-pdr., and saved the latter much work. But a gun which has marvellously little killing power, and the effective range of which is but little over 3,000 yards, with a weight almost equal to that of a 12-pdr., cannot be regarded as very satisfactory. It is possible, however, that its killing power might prove considerably greater in enclosed country, where it would have more opportunities of getting within range of troops in close formation, or of hostile artillery, and there are some foreign artillerists who recommend it for the purpose of obtaining direct hits upon shielded guns.\*

\* On occasion the pom-pom, owing to the ease with which the burst of its shell could be seen, proved a very useful practical range-finder for the infantry. The service range-finder used in South Africa, known as the Mekometer, proved fairly satisfactory for reconnaissance and preparatory work. But it was difficult to use in the attack and at medium ranges

A few of the pom-poms, it may be added, were the only guns used in South Africa which were provided with shields.

Machine  
guns.

The service pattern machine gun at the time of the war was the .303-inch Maxim gun. One of these guns formed part of the equipment of every regiment of cavalry, company of mounted infantry, or battalion of infantry. The gun fired the same ammunition as the service rifle, the ammunition being fed up automatically in canvas belts containing 250 rounds each. The barrel was kept cool by means of a water jacket, which had to be filled up as the water evaporated with rapid firing. The weight of the gun was about 60 lb., its behaviour depended mainly on the quality of the ammunition and the skill and experience of the men who worked it. Some men were always in difficulties with their Maxim guns, whilst other men—and these were the majority—never had anything amiss. The mounted troops had a variety of two- or four-wheeled carriages for their Maxim gun, each carrying a number of rounds of ammunition and drawn by two horses. The infantry had a two-wheeled carriage, with 4,000 rounds, intended to be drawn by one mule. This carriage was found to be very unsuitable; it was too heavy to traverse anything but easy country, and so large as to be impossible to conceal; the gun could therefore frequently not be got up to places where it might have been invaluable. To meet the demand for mobility and invisibility, tripods were sent out, but the troops did not receive them until after the relief of Ladysmith. A very useful pattern of tripod was used with some Hotchkiss machine guns, a few of which were sent out, which enabled the gun to be brought on to the ground level while the gunners could lie behind it. A number of Colt guns on tripod mountings were also used by several of the irregular corps, and these and the Hotchkiss guns on many occasions rendered useful service. Neither of these guns required a water jacket.

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owing to the exposure of the men; also it suffered from the objections inherent in instruments depending on the exact co-operation of two observers. In South Africa it was frequently difficult to obtain any distinct object to range upon.

*Expenditure of Ammunition.*

A few details as to the expenditure of ammunition during the war may not be out of place. Of the Horse Artillery batteries, the largest number of rounds during the war were fired by "O" battery, 7,939 rounds, and "J," 7,544 rounds; whilst of the field batteries, the 4th, 64th and 77th fired 8,416, 8,486 and 8,551 respectively. In the first period of the war, up to August 31, 1900, "O" and "R," Royal Horse Artillery, fired 4,559 and 4,062 rounds, whilst during the same period, the 4th, 63rd, 64th, and 78th field batteries fired 4,854, 4,955, 5,607, and 5,092 respectively. Of the 5-inch howitzer batteries, the 61st fired 4,131 rounds up to August 31, 1900, and 4,426 in the whole war. Of the 5-inch gun batteries, 4 guns, No. 16 company, Southern Division, Garrison Artillery, fired 2,353 rounds up to August 31, and 3,314 altogether. Five 4·7-inch guns employed in the relief of Ladysmith with the Naval Brigade fired about 4,000 rounds. The greatest expenditure of ammunition per battery in any one action was at Magersfontein, where "G," Royal Horse Artillery, fired 1,250 rounds, and where the 18th, 62nd, and 75th batteries fired 1,012, 1,003, and 924 rounds.\* At the Modder River battle, the 18th and 75th batteries fired 1,029 and 1,008 rounds. None of the batteries of the Natal army expended so much ammunition in one day. In the battle of Lombard's Kop the 6 field batteries expended altogether 2,285 rounds, of which the 42nd battery fired 692. At the battle of Colenso, the 64th and 73rd batteries fired 777 rounds between them; in the Spion Kop operations, January 20-26, 1900, 5 batteries fired 6,766 rounds, of which 2,294 were expended on January 27, the 7th battery firing 764 of these; no other battery fired more than 640 rounds in one day in the Ladysmith relief operations.

Details of  
ammunition  
expenditure.

\* It may be interesting to note the following amounts of ammunition expended by individual German batteries in some of the great battles of 1870:—at Mars la Tour, 1,041, 1,048, 1,148, 1,164; at Gravelotte, 920, 960, 965. At Mars la Tour 37 batteries fired 19,638 rounds (average 531 each), and at Gravelotte 115 batteries fired 34,483 rounds (average 299 rounds each).



NUMBER OF ROUNDS OF GUN AMMUNITION EXTENDED BY R.A. UNITS, OCTOBER 11, 1899, TO MAY 31, 1902

Period.	12-pdr. B.L.	15-pdr. B.L.	5-in. B.L. How- itzer.	6-in. B.L. How- itzer.	4-7-in. Q.F. Gun.	5-in. B.L. Gun.	6-in. Q.F. Gun.	2 5-in. R.M.L. Gun.	6-8-in. R.M.L. Howitzer.	12-pdr. Q.F.	12-pdr. Vickers- Maxim.	9-pdr. R.M.L.	Pom-poms.
From commence- ment of Cam- paign to August 31, 1900 . . .	19,947 (9)	90,203 (40)	6,572 (3)	19 (1)	1,838 (5)	3,099 (3)	98 (1)	2,897 (2)	765 (1)	2,091 (4)	1,495 (1)	..	..
From September 1 to December 31, 1900 . . .	4,102 (10)	19,802 (36)	1,270 (6)	36 (1)	705 (4)	1,067 (5)	195 (1)	347 (2)	..	{ 1,344 (5) }	..	{ 65 (1) }	111,420
From January 1 to June 30, 1901 . . .	7,593 (9)	31,116 (38)	1,402 (6)	..	{ 330 (6) }	987 (5)	15 (1)	86 (2)	..	{ 1,758 (5) }	..	{ 72 (1) }	..
From July 1 to December 31, 1901 . . .	4,905 (8)	18,973 (36)	531 (5)	..	{ 113 (4) }	180 (4)	9 (1)	545 (2)	..	{ 555 (6) }	..	..	55,288
From January 1 to May 31, 1902 . . .	214 (2)	6,454 (25)	15 (1)	..	{ 49 (1) }	147 (3)	..	..	..	{ 308 (6) }	..	..	27,129
Grand Total for whole War . .	36,161	166,548	9,790	55	3,035	5,480	317	3,875	765	6,056	1,495	137	193,837

The figures in brackets underneath the number of rounds show the number of batteries of Horse or Field Artillery and the number of companies of Garrison Artillery which were in action during the period referred to.

The 61st howitzer battery in Natal fired 294 and 239 rounds on January 22 and 24, 1900, and 261, 374, 264, and 145 on February 22, 23, 24, and 27. The 65th howitzer battery fired 402 rounds at Magersfontein. Of the heavy Royal Garrison Artillery batteries, No. 16, Southern Division, saw the most fighting, taking part in the Ladysmith relief operations from Vaal Krantz, inclusive, where 2 guns fired 181 rounds on February 5. Their greatest expenditure was 286 rounds on February 23, whilst in 13 days of the fighting they fired 1,928 rounds; at Botha's Pass 2 guns fired 103 rounds, and at Bergendal 86. No. 36, Southern Division, Royal Garrison Artillery, marched from Bloemfontein to Pretoria, and 2 guns fired 150 rounds in one day, and at Diamond Hill they fired 68.

The table on the preceding page gives the total expenditure of gun ammunition at different periods of the war.

#### *Progress of Armaments since the War.*

After a period of peace there is always a strong tendency towards increasing the mobility of horse and field artillery, but in and immediately after war time the demand is for power; Germany, Austria, Russia, and, above all, France, all introduced heavier and more powerful field guns immediately after their wars in the sixties and seventies, sacrificing mobility in some cases to a great extent. But, for some years before 1899, the swing of the pendulum had been in the opposite direction, and the field gun adopted by Germany in 1896 was lighter than the horse artillery gun adopted in 1873. Since 1896 France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and other Powers have re-armed their field artillery, and in every case the calibre and weight of shell of the new gun are less than those of the old gun, while the mobility of the new gun exceeds that of the old, as the following figures show:—

Mobility and  
power of field  
artillery.

	France.			Germany.			Italy.			Russia.		
	Calibre.	Weight of Shell.	Weight behind Team.	Calibre.	Weight of Shell.	Weight behind Team.	Calibre.	Weight of Shell.	Weight behind Team.	Calibre.	Weight of Shell.	Weight behind Team.
1873-1896.	in.	lb.	cwt.	in.	lb.	cwt.	in.	lb.	cwt.	in.	lb.	cwt.
1896.	3·54	19	41½	3·46	16½	39½	3·4	15·3	41½	3·42	15½	38
1896 and since	2·95	15	38	3·08	15	33½	2·95	14·74	34	3	13½	35

The South African War produced a strong demand for more power, more effect, and a longer useful range; but the great extent of ground covered, the wide turning movements, the exceptional mobility of the enemy, and the large number of mounted troops employed, also created a quite unprecedented demand for mobility. These opposite requirements can only be met by different natures of guns. The Horse Artillery must be kept particularly mobile, whilst power must come before mobility for the Field Artillery, which must also be supplemented by a few heavy guns.

#### Quick-firing guns.

Though some of the guns used in the war have been described as quick-firers, none of them were really so; some of those taken from ships and coast defences were quick-firers on their proper mountings, but not when placed on field mountings. A carriage which will remain immobile, or practically so, when the gun is fired, is the first essential for a quick-firer; such carriages had been brought forward before the war, but the French alone possessed a carriage which fulfilled this condition, and they had kept everything to do with their new 75 mm. Q.F. field gun very secret. Rumours as to its capabilities got about, but they were not given the credence they deserved till Messrs. Ehrhardt, a gun-making firm of Düsseldorf, produced in 1900 a gun whose carriage remained motionless on firing. This stability was obtained by allowing the gun a very long recoil (40 inches or so) on



its carriage. Previous to the introduction of the long recoil system, numerous improvements in detail had been proposed for the older breech-loading guns, such as quicker acting breech mechanisms, brass cases for the charges, recoil checking apparatus, improved sights and fuses, and other similar arrangements, all tending to increase the possible rate of fire ; but these were all mere improvements in detail and tended principally to increase the rate of loading, but not of laying, and as long as that was the case no really considerable progress resulted.

The British Government was more fortunate than some others, notably the German, in having escaped the cost of a premature re-armament on the very eve of the birth of the quick-firing, long recoil gun. In the emergency of 1900 eighteen batteries of Ehrhardt guns were ordered, and supplied towards the end of the year. On the conclusion of the war steps were at once taken to decide upon a new armament, not only for Horse and Field Artillery, but also for field howitzer batteries and for heavy batteries. Committees were assembled, and after exhaustive experiments a 13-pdr. for Horse Artillery, an 18-pdr. for Field Artillery, and a 60-pdr. for heavy artillery were decided upon in 1904 and were introduced into the service. The howitzer proved to be by far the most difficult to design, and re-armament with the new weapon only commenced in 1909. The new field and horse artillery are similar in design and both remain motionless on discharge, thanks to a long recoil on the carriage. In addition to the great rapidity of fire which they admit of, to their greater power and their increased range, improvements in fuses and in the arrangements for laying combine to place them far in front of the weapons which were taken into the field in South Africa. In the case of the 60-pdr., the recoil is not completely absorbed in the buffers, in spite of their length, but fire can be as rapid as is likely to be necessary with a weapon of this class. All three guns are extremely accurate almost up to their extreme range, and the *personnel* concerned with them are thoroughly satisfied with the pieces in their charge. The new field howitzer is also remarkably accurate, and it appears to fulfil all the conditions required

Re-armament  
since the war.

of a weapon of its class. The table below gives some of the more important details in connexion with the artillery now in the hands of our field army:—

DETAILS OF GUNS.

—	13-pdr.	18-pdr.	60-pdr.	4·5" Howitzer.
Muzzle velocity . . .	1675	1,590	2,080	
Calibre . . . . .	3"	3·3"	5"	4·5"
Weight of projectile . .	12½ lbs.	18½ lbs.	60 lbs.	35 lbs.
No. of rounds in gun limber	24	24	100*	
„ „ wagon .	38	38		
„ „ wagon limber	38	38		
Maximum range for shrapnel . . . . .	6,200 yds.	6,200 yds.	9,500 yds.†	7,000 yds.
Weight behind gun-team	cwt. qr. lbs. 31 2 22	cwt. qr. lbs. 38 2 26	cwt. qr. lbs. 107 3 2	cwt. 40*
No. of rounds carried in the field per gun . . .	1,000	1,000	500	

\* Approximately.

† The maximum effective range for common shell is considerably more.

The new quick-firing guns have, undoubtedly, added enormously to the power and effectiveness of artillery. The tremendous advantage of a high rate of fire at certain moments, as in the case of a fleeting opportunity against mounted corps in the open, for the surprise of troops in close formation, for the support of the critical stage of an infantry assault, and for the protection of the guns themselves against rifle fire at close ranges, is obvious enough. But, apart from these occasions, a quick-firing gun offers many hardly less important secondary advantages. It is always ready to fire; the duties of laying may be divided among two men and can thus be performed more rapidly and efficiently; laying can go on uninterruptedly; better appliances for laying can be provided, facilitating especially indirect laying from behind cover, which has become an essential feature of the modern artillery combat; telescopic sights which need not be removed for firing can be used; finally, the men can remain stationary

and close to the gun all the time. This last point is of great consequence, as nothing renders men or guns more visible than movement, and so long as men have to step outside the wheels to avoid recoil, and have to man-handle a gun up after every round, they will soon disclose its position, unless they are under very excellent cover. The great effect of modern rifles and shrapnel necessitates protection to the gunners, and the value of a shield is greatly enhanced if the men can remain in their places and keep all the time under its cover. The new British guns are provided with shields, as are the guns of all other Powers which have recently re-armed. The men supplying the ammunition must also be protected as much as the others, and this is now usually effected by shielding the ammunition wagon also, and by bringing it into action beside the gun.

The introduction of quick-firing field guns makes the already serious question of ammunition supply still more formidable. A high rate of fire will not, indeed, always be necessary. Against such ill-defined, scattered, and well covered targets as the Boers usually offered, a very moderate rate of fire will probably be adequate in normal conditions. At the same time the power of greatly increasing the rate of fire at need, and the tendency of great battles to last for days and even weeks, entails the provision of increased reserves of ammunition. With 150 guns in an army corps the number of wagons required to keep up this supply becomes enormous, and for operations in civilized countries provided with good communications there must be an increasing tendency to employ mechanical transport for the second line trains of an army. The French solution to the ammunition question has been to reduce the number of guns per battery from six to four, and to provide in the battery three ammunition wagons per gun; in this way 312 rounds per gun are carried in the battery and 189 per gun are carried in the ammunition column. This entails no less than five ammunition wagons to one gun. As a question of artillery organization there may be much to be said for the change, provided always it does not involve a reduction in

Ammunition  
supply for  
Q.F. guns.



the proportion of guns to rifles. The need for covering and supporting the infantry in their advance is more than ever imperative; and the increased frontage of the infantry and the longer ranges will enable a larger force of artillery to find room to come into action than formerly. To reduce the proportion of artillery to general fighting strength would be a most dangerous policy.

## CHAPTER IX

## THE MEDICAL SERVICES DURING THE WAR

SCARCELY more than a year before the outbreak of hostilities the Army Medical Service had emerged successfully from a long struggle to obtain a position that gave it an organization and military status analogous to that of other branches of the military service and enabled it to undertake with greater confidence and self-reliance the many responsibilities which had been thrown upon it since the final abolition, in 1878,\* of what was known as the "regimental system." The difficulties experienced by it in coping with the emergencies of war had been a chronic subject of Parliamentary inquiry ever since the ill-fated expedition to Walcheren in 1807, and the South African War was to carry on the tale, although with far more satisfactory results. Not only was the outcome of official investigation into the actual work done more to the credit of the service, but it has resulted in the introduction of comprehensive and far-reaching reforms, whose beneficial effects cannot fail to become evident in future wars.

The Army  
Medical  
Service before  
the war.

In peace time the requirements of the Army Medical Service for war were apt to be forgotten; its interests were thrust aside in favour of other interests, and efforts to improve it, under the influence of the public attention that was attracted to it for the moment, lost spirit and determination when the lessons of the war were forgotten. Even the

Its neglect  
by the  
authorities.

\* The regimental system was, strictly speaking, abolished in 1873 by Royal Warrant, but medical officers were retained in their regiments until 1878, when, except in the case of the Guards, the regimental medical officer ceased to exist.

improvements effected by these efforts were sometimes whittled away under the pressure of economic and other causes. There was a widespread belief in military and Government circles that the civil profession would supply the demand for additional medical establishment, and that numerous voluntary aid organizations would spring up on the occurrence of a serious national war, and, somehow or other, fit into the military arrangements. No anxiety was therefore felt as regards professional aid to the sick and wounded. This belief was strongly ingrained in the minds of those who saw only one side of a military medical service, who conceived its duties to consist solely in the professional treatment of injuries and disease, and who felt that any undue suffering from sickness and wounds could be equally well alleviated, perhaps better alleviated, by the sympathy and devotion of voluntary helpers. Even as recently as 1898 the military opinion expressed in connexion with the maintenance of an adequate medical establishment trained for war was to the effect that "wars are intended to be provided for by depleting home hospitals, and the remedy for that is extra women nurses and active recruiting." \*

The effort to  
secure  
military  
status and  
organization.

This attitude entirely ignored the fact that to insure the really efficient working of the medical service in war, to secure adequate preparations, and to provide a framework for expansion in times of emergency, it was essential that it should form an integral portion of the military organization. The arguments which had made the engineer work, and, at a more recent date, the supply and transport work, an essential component part of an army, and not a mere external adjunct, applied with no less force to the medical and sanitary work. The constant demand of the medical officers for full military status and for the complete military organization of their service was not due to mere vanity and love of military titles, but to a realization on the part of all the keenest and most thoughtful among them of the difficulties that were

\* See Minutes of Evidence, Royal Commission on South African Hospitals, Q. 13, where the Director-General of the Army Medical Service quotes this as the opinion of the then Adjutant-General (Sir Evelyn Wood).



bound to beset a medical service that had no recognized status in the military organization. The history not only of our own campaigns, but also of those of other countries, had exposed the danger over and over again, but full recognition of the military value of an adequately manned, trained and organized medical service was slow to arrive. For many years there existed in the Army a corps of men, recruited from soldiers already enlisted in the combatant ranks and subsequently trained for hospital duties, called the Medical Staff Corps, but it was not under the command of the medical officers. In 1861 its name was changed to the Army Hospital Corps, and part of its administration then came under the Director-General of the Army Medical Department, though its pay and discipline came directly under the department of the Purveyor-in-Chief. There was no real military position for medical officers, and, in fact, it was not until 1869, on the recommendation of a committee presided over by Lord Northbrook, that the Director-General was even attached to the Military Department at the War Office. In 1878 the Army Hospital Corps became recruited by direct enlistment, but no steps were as yet taken to bring its ranks into closer union with the medical officers with whom they had to work. The first step in this direction was taken by the Earl of Morley's Committee, which was appointed in 1883, after the Egyptian War, to consider the condition of army hospital organization and the transport of the sick. This Committee recommended that the Army Hospital Corps should be merged in the medical department as the "Royal Medical Corps," and that the medical officers should have undivided control in military hospitals. The time, however, was not ripe for such sweeping reforms, and a compromise was made by converting the medical officers into officers of the Medical Staff, and the Army Hospital Corps into the Medical Staff Corps—its old name—and by giving the officers of the Medical Staff complete command over the Medical Staff Corps, their uniform being at the same time changed from scarlet to blue in order to resemble more the uniform of the men.

The creation  
of the  
Royal Army  
Medical  
Corps.

Subsequently considerable agitation was carried on, mainly by the British Medical Association, with a view to the abolition of all distinctions that seemed to place the military medical officer in a position inferior to that of his combatant brother. The medical schools boycotted the service. Some concessions, such as the granting of compound titles, were made, but the end of the controversy was not reached until May 4, 1898, when Lord Lansdowne, speaking at the first banquet ever given by a Lord Mayor of London to the medical profession, announced, not only the fact that the Medical Staff and the Medical Staff Corps were in future to be consolidated in one Army Medical Corps, but also that her Majesty had been pleased to signify her intention of bestowing the title of "Royal" upon the new corps. The feeling in the medical profession at the time was expressed by Lord Lister, who, in a speech that followed, stated that Lord Lansdowne had removed a terrible cloud from the medical profession and a terrible evil from the nation.\* The medical service thus entered a new life almost on the eve of the South African War. The Royal Warrant regulating the altered conditions was signed on June 23, 1898. A complete military hierarchy from private to colonel, the higher administrative ranks only retaining the old title of Surgeon-General, afforded at any rate the framework necessary for unity of action and purpose and for the discipline and training of the corps in the future. At this time, Surgeon-General J. Jameson was the Director-General of the Army Medical Service at the War Office. His staff at headquarters consisted of a Deputy Director-General, Surgeon-General (now Sir J.) Taylor, and three officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps—Lieut.-Colonel W. Gubbins,† Major W. G. Bedford, and Major W. G. Macpherson.

Unsatis-  
factory  
conditions.

The development of the Army Medical Service into a Royal Army Medical Corps, analogous in interior economy,

\* *British Medical Journal*, May 7, 1898, p. 1215.

† Lieut.-Colonel Gubbins eventually went to South Africa as Principal Medical Officer of the Sixth Division, and his place was taken by Lieut.-Colonel W. Johnston, from the retired list. Major Bedford also went to South Africa as Secretary to the Principal Medical Officer of the Forces. His place was taken by Major E. M. Wilson.

command and external status to that of other professional or scientific corps, was an indispensable step in the creation of a medical service adequate to the needs of the Army. But it was only a step, and much yet remained to be done before the rise in military status could achieve the desired results in the way of increased strength and efficiency. The training and the career offered to the medical officer still left much to be desired. The limited opportunities and inadequate pay of the service continued to act as a deterrent to young men of ability and ambition. There was little regular instruction after joining; opportunities for gaining useful experience were very limited; few facilities for study were provided, and ambitious officers had usually to find them at their own expense and in their periods of leave. Promotion was almost wholly by seniority, independent of scientific merit. All the conditions in fact which stimulate efficiency on the part of the rising civil practitioner were absent. Considering the circumstances, what is surprising is, not that the *personnel* of the service was in many cases weak, but that it did include so many officers of scientific distinction and practical capacity.

The causes of these unsatisfactory conditions may have lain in part with the service itself. But in the main they were the result of the refusal of the military and political authorities to take the service sufficiently seriously. The recent changes had been regarded in many quarters more as a concession to the personal feelings of the service than as a measure intended to strengthen its power, and the real proof of interest, the readiness to provide money, was not forthcoming. Not only were the inducements offered to the individual insufficient, but it was impossible to induce the authorities to maintain the total strength of the corps at anything like an adequate figure. Before the war the authorized establishments of the corps in officers and men had fallen considerably below the minimum requirements of the two Army Corps and Cavalry Division, which was the standard adopted for purposes of mobilization for service overseas. The peace establishment of the Royal Army Medical Corps, when war was declared, was 3,045 non-commissioned officers

A starved  
service.



and men in all parts of the Empire. Of this number 2,106 were serving at home; and when the original force for South Africa was mobilized along with its field medical units and its hospitals for the base and lines of communication, as many as 1,728 were swept away, leaving only a small balance for the work of the home hospitals, for replenishing wastage, and for the requirements of a second army corps, or any other troops that might be required in South Africa. This situation had long caused anxiety and misgiving to the Director-General and his staff, but although he had constantly struggled to obtain an adequate establishment of subordinate ranks, his demands had been met by half measures only. Even when 400 of all ranks were pressed for in the estimates of 1899-1900, in consequence of the increased establishment of the Army as a whole and of the fact that South Africa was gravely undermanned, only 150 were granted.\* It was not until the war had begun that the balance was sanctioned. The capacities of expansion within the corps itself were extremely limited. The Reserves of the Royal Army Medical Corps of the first three classes numbered 760 only. They were called up on October 9, 1899. Fifty Volunteers of Class D came forward, and subsequently 180 were ordered out; this exhausted the whole of the Regular Reserves of trained men of the Corps. There was also a reserve of 127 officers retired from the Army, including 7 quartermasters, who were liable to be recalled to service. On the outbreak of war most of these took over charge of military hospitals at home, while some went to South Africa and were placed in charge of units, such as hospital ships, hospital trains, and some of the hospitals which were sent out by private individuals and committees.

Insufficiency  
of nursing  
sisters.

The Army Nursing Service, which had existed as a regular establishment of the Army since the Crimean War, had one lady superintendent, 18 superintendents, and 56 nursing sisters, distributed amongst the principal military hospitals at home and abroad in 1899; and there existed an Army

\* Minutes of Evidence, Royal Commission on South African Hospitals. Q. 13, p. 3, evidence of the Director-General of the Army Medical Service.

Nursing Reserve\* of nursing sisters, having the same nursing qualification as those of the Army Nursing Service. Their number was only 101 at the commencement of the war, though this number increased rapidly immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. This extraordinary inadequacy of the female nursing staff was due to a variety of causes. In the first place the medical authorities, anxious to make the best use of their narrow means, were naturally more concerned to secure the trained orderlies required in the field, whom it would be difficult to improvise, rather than nurses whose duties would lie mainly at the base and on the lines of communications, and who would require no special training. But there was also in the minds of most of the medical officers a marked disinclination to make use of the services of nurses. So much of the recent fighting of the British Army had been done in savage countries under conditions which practically excluded female nursing, so large a proportion of the peace work of the medical service had been concerned with particular forms of disease where such nursing was unsuitable, that, in spite of the lessons of the Crimea, the value of nurses in any war fought on a large scale and under civilized conditions was insufficiently realized. It was only for general hospitals that their use was contemplated; and the authorized scale of one matron and eight nurses to a hospital of 520 beds, as compared with the 145 male orderlies attached, is an indication of the position assigned to them. Fortunately, when the experience of the war brought with it a better recognition of their value, there was never any lack of devoted women helpers, the majority of them thoroughly trained for the work they undertook.

The Militia and Volunteer Medical Services were only partially organized and trained to supplement the Regular Army Medical Service. The former consisted partly of an old regimental system, which was being allowed to die out, and partly of a Militia Medical Staff Corps. The formation of the latter had been begun in 1892, and it was composed

Militia and  
Volunteer  
Medical  
Services.

\* This Reserve was founded by H.R.H. Princess Christian of Schleswig-Holstein, and was officially recognized by the Secretary of State for War in 1897.

in 1899 of five companies, organized to replace the Royal Army Medical Corps in military hospitals at home on the outbreak of war. They were at once embodied, and supplied 240 men for duty in the hospitals at Netley, Aldershot, and Woolwich. At the same time a special service section of the corps was authorized, and 120 men were thus obtained for service in South Africa. In the Volunteer forces and in the Yeomanry the regimental system existed in an exceptionally flourishing form. There was no restriction on the number of medical officers who joined and wore the uniform of Volunteer battalions, many of which had six on their establishment. This was no doubt excellent enough in its way, but it was not based on any rational principle of organization for war. But in addition there was a Volunteer Medical Staff Corps, which had been established, independently of the regimental system, in 1885. In 1899 it was composed of fourteen companies, organized originally for the purpose of affording general assistance to the Regular Army Medical Service, as required, but subsequently for providing field medical units for the Volunteer forces in the event of their mobilization for home defence. These companies were not utilized, therefore, as separate units during the war, but their number increased to twenty-six before it was concluded, and authority was obtained to accept a limited number of men belonging to them for service in South Africa, as was done with combatant Volunteers. Many of the medical officers, both of the Militia and Volunteers, were enrolled in what was then known as the Army Medical Reserve of officers, but, as the names on this reserve were also names on the establishment of Militia and Volunteer regiments, and other Militia and Volunteer units, it was not, strictly speaking, a reserve at all, and proved of no special value during the war. Besides these, civil medical men volunteered in large numbers and were engaged for duty in the stationary and general hospitals, and subsequently with field units, as contract surgeons.

The St. John  
Ambulance  
Brigade.

None of the auxiliary military organizations proved sufficient to meet the demand for the subordinate ranks, when medical units had to be got together in numbers beyond all previous anticipation, and arrangements were then made to take



advantage of a scheme that had been proposed in February, 1899, for the employment of men of the St. John Ambulance Brigade as auxiliaries to the Army Medical Service. The brigade is organized on a military basis, and its members had not only been thoroughly trained in the principles of first aid to sick and wounded, but many of them were also regularly employed in connexion with accidents in civil life. Their organization was so complete that little difficulty was found in mobilizing as many as chose to volunteer. They proved an invaluable addition to the Medical Services during the war, and served with every kind of medical unit. As many as 1,900 were handed over fully clothed and equipped to the Army medical authorities. Besides these, pharmacists and men with special nursing qualifications were specially engaged during the war. There was a great demand for the former, and as many as 200 out of a large number who came forward were accepted.

Special  
enlistments.

Finally, there was that unknown quantity, voluntary aid. An unknown quantity, that is to say, in Great Britain, but in other great states a carefully exploited and organized auxiliary of the Medical Services in war. Shortly before the South African War an effort had been made by the War Office to bring the resources of aid of this kind into touch with the Army Medical Service, on the lines upon which the great Continental Red Cross organizations are controlled. An official report by Major Macpherson on the Sixth International Conference of Red Cross Societies, which was held in Vienna in 1897, led Lord Lansdowne to suggest the formation of a committee for this purpose, and in January, 1899, he officially recognized the committee as a Central British Red Cross Committee for organizing and dealing with all offers of voluntary aid in war. Lord Wantage was chairman, and it was formed of representatives of the Army Nursing Reserve, St. John Ambulance Association, the National Aid Society, and the War Office, with Major Macpherson as its honorary secretary.\* In August, 1899, the Princess of Wales

Voluntary  
aid and the  
Central  
British Red  
Cross  
Committee.

\* The members of this committee at the commencement of the war were H.R.H. Princess Christian and Miss Wedgwood (Army Nursing Reserve), Viscount Knutsford and Mr. Furley (St. John Ambulance

accepted the appointment of honorary president. When the war broke out the Central Committee was able to regulate to some extent the numerous and varied offers of assistance that poured in, and to prevent overlapping and wastage. To it fell the duty of determining the best manner of expending the various funds that were subscribed for the sick and wounded, organizing special Red Cross units, such as hospital trains and hospital ships, distributing clothing, luxuries, and other comforts among the hospitals in South Africa by means of Red Cross commissioners and agents, and considering the various schemes of private hospitals, convalescent homes, and similar offers of assistance. The committee met weekly, sometimes oftener, during the greater part of the war, and proved of great service. But it had not been in existence long enough before the war to have created anything in the nature of a regular organization for the development and co-ordination of voluntary aid. Its function at first, indeed, was largely that of an intermediary between the Medical Department and the patriotic public, and the donors of hospitals and other voluntary helpers were sometimes inclined to regard it as too prone to act as the mouthpiece of official views on such subjects as female nursing or the exact size of hospital establishments.

Expansion  
hardly con-  
templated.

The fact was that in the Medical Service, as in every other, the contingency of expansion on a really large scale had never been contemplated by the political rulers of the country, and had consequently not entered, to any extent, into the calculations of the various departments of the War Office. The Medical Service was not behind the other services in this respect, nor did the response which it made to the unforeseen strain compare unfavourably with that made by other services. That it was able to do what it did was largely due to the reforms of the last few months before the war, which provided at any rate a central framework to which the heterogeneous voluntary assistance given could

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Association), Lord Wantage, Lord Rothschild and Sir Wm. MacCormac (National Aid Society), Surgeon-General H. S. Muir, Colonel P. Lake and Lieut.-Colonel Gubbins (War Office).

attach itself, and some recognized channel for the co-ordination of patriotic effort.

In order that a proper estimate may be formed of the general condition of affairs on the outbreak of hostilities and the manner in which the difficulties of the situation, caused by an inadequate establishment, were met, a brief review of the field medical organization of the Army at that time and its requirements will be useful. Although, with the exception of the Foot Guards and Household Cavalry, no medical officers were attached or belonged to regiments in time of peace, each battalion of infantry, regiment of cavalry, brigade of artillery and similar unit had to have one medical officer given to it when it went on field service. He had no men of the Royal Army Medical Corps with him, but in each company two men were trained as stretcher-bearers, and a non-commissioned officer and private of the battalion were assigned to him to assist and to take charge of the medical and surgical equipment which accompanied him. His duties were to maintain general sanitary supervision over the battalion, to determine what men were unfit for duty and required to be sent away from it for treatment, to treat himself the more trivial cases, and to accompany the battalion into action and attend to the wounded when they fell. Each officer and man carried with him a first field dressing, and had thus on his own person material for the application of a temporary dressing, should he be hit. In touch with this regimental service there were bearer companies, and in touch with the bearer companies field hospitals, there being one bearer company to each brigade, and one field hospital also to each brigade, and to the headquarters of each division and each army corps. These were mobile units with a definite scale of transport for the conveyance of tents, medical and surgical supplies, and other equipment. Ten ambulance wagons for conveyance of sick and wounded to the field hospitals formed part of the transport equipment of each bearer company, but the field hospitals had no special transport of this nature. Each bearer company required an establishment of 3 officers and 58 of other ranks, and each field hospital 5 officers, including a quartermaster, and 34

Scheme of  
Field Medical  
Organization  
in 1899.  
Regimental  
Medical  
Service.

Bearer com-  
panies and  
field  
hospitals.



of other ranks. The bearer company *personnel* formed 8 stretcher squads of 4 men each, and supplied a wagon orderly to each ambulance wagon and a dressing-station party. The field hospital formed a unit, nominally called a hospital, for 100 beds, but in reality not intended for hospital treatment at all. Instead of beds it had blankets and waterproof sheets for the temporary reception of sick and wounded. In addition to the *personnel* of the Royal Army Medical Corps, transport drivers of the Army Service Corps were nominally attached to these mobile units, but special arrangements were made, at the commencement of the war, to use buck-wagons, Scotch carts, and ox-carts\* with mules, oxen and native drivers, in place of the regulation general service wagon and the Army Service Corps *personnel*, the scale allowed being 1 water cart, 2 buck wagons, and 1 ox-cart, together with the 10 ambulance wagons, for a bearer company, and 2 water carts, 4 buck wagons, 1 Scotch cart, and 1 ox-wagon for a field hospital. One conductor and 35 natives in charge of 139 mules and 6 oxen formed the transport *personnel* of the former, and 20 natives with 64 mules and 6 oxen the *personnel* of the latter.†

Stationary  
and general  
hospitals.

All the other units of the Medical Service were organized for the lines of communication and the base. They were not mobile units and had no fixed scale of transport. There were two kinds of hospitals—the stationary hospital, organized for 100 beds, and the general hospital for 520 beds.‡ The former was a comparatively light unit, capable of being readily conveyed by rail or other means of transport to advanced positions on the lines of communication. It was provided with stretchers instead of with hospital beds. The general hospital was much more elaborately equipped, and allowed of the treatment of sickness and wounds under very reasonably favourable conditions. Its normal position was intended to be at the base, but general hospitals were frequently

\* The ox-cart is a light cart carrying a load of 1,500 lbs.

† Official Report on the Medical Arrangements in the South African War, p. 80.

‡ In nearly every instance the accommodation in these hospitals was greatly increased during the war, the number of beds being doubled, or even trebled, in many of them.

moved up the line during the war. The *personnel* required for a stationary hospital was 4 medical officers, 1 quartermaster, and 40 men, and for a general hospital 20 medical officers, one quartermaster, 145 men of the R.A.M.C., and eight (afterwards 20) nursing sisters of the Army Nursing Service. Other units, for which provision had to be made, were base and advanced medical supply stores. Each required one officer and a small *personnel*. *Personnel* for hospital trains and hospital ships was also estimated in the requirements of the Medical Service, and at home the general hospitals at Netley, with 1,100 beds, and at Woolwich, with 660 beds, for the reception of invalids sent home had to be considered.\* Finally, an administrative staff had to be included, each Army Corps requiring a principal medical officer and two assistants, with a principal medical officer and an assistant for each division, for the line of communication, and for the base. It is typical of the way in which the Medical Service was starved, that though the scale of stationary and general hospitals provided for on mobilization was four of each to an Army Corps, it was not considered desirable to keep more than two of the former and one of the latter in the ordnance stores ready for mobilization.† This shortage had continued for years in spite of the repeated protests of the Director-General, and it was not till October 4, a week before the outbreak of war, that sanction was given for the preparation of the remaining hospitals needed for the expeditionary force. As it happened, the delay had no serious consequences; but it is not pleasant to speculate what would have happened if the force had been required to go rapidly into action and had sustained heavy losses in the first weeks of the war.

Other  
medical  
units.

Field ad-  
ministrative  
medical staff.

To meet all the requirements, even of the original force, and still more in order to provide for further expansion as the war progressed, the Director-General was faced with difficulties from the very first, and he soon had to turn to

Success of  
the efforts  
made in  
England to  
meet the  
medical  
requirements  
of the  
situation.

\* Not only the Netley and Woolwich Military Hospitals, but also those at Aldershot, Shorncliffe, Devonport and Colchester had subsequently to be expanded for this purpose by the erection of huts, etc.

† Report of the Royal Commission on South African Hospitals, p. 8.

every possible source of supply outside the Royal Army Medical Corps, as the war began to assume dimensions in excess of anything that had been provided for. His efforts and those of his staff to cope with the situation met with considerable success. All the organized troops sent out to South Africa had their full complement of field medical units, though the later units were necessarily of a very improvised character. Sir Redvers Buller's force left England complete in every respect, with his medical units composed of the trained *personnel* of the Royal Army Medical Corps.\* The mistakes made during the first Egyptian campaign had been carefully avoided, and all the equipment and transport material of the medical units, with only one or two exceptions, embarked with them on the same ships. The two hospital ships assigned to an Army Corps had also been got ready, and reached South Africa between the 9th and 19th October, 1899, before the Army Corps had sailed from England. These were the *Spartan* and *Trojan*, ships belonging to the Union Castle Line. They were fitted out at Southampton in September.

Preliminary  
medical  
arrangements  
in South  
Africa.

Before this time, both in Cape Colony and Natal, such action as was possible was being taken to make the Medical Service ready in the event of a sudden outbreak of hostilities. Colonel J. F. Supple was Principal Medical Officer of the military command, and was at its headquarters in Cape Town. Lieut.-Colonel W. Johnston was the Senior Medical Officer in Natal. There were permanent military hospitals at Cape Town and Wynberg, in Cape Colony, and at Ladysmith and Maritzburg, in Natal. The *personnel* of the Royal Army Medical Corps was just sufficient for the duties at these posts. There was a medical supply store at Cape Town with a small reserve of field equipment. The Cape Colonial Forces possessed a Medical Staff Corps of six officers and 140 other ranks, and both they and the Natal Volunteer Corps had also a regimental medical service. Equipment for three field hospitals and three bearer companies was

\* From the very first, however, a number of civil surgeons were taken on for the general hospitals at the base, and over 50 of these had been appointed by October 14.



added in June to the medical store in Cape Town, and two hospital trains, as well as several ambulance vehicles, were subsequently prepared there. Another hospital train was got ready in Natal, an advanced medical store depot was moved up to Ladysmith, medical supplies and equipment were sent to De Aar, Kimberley, and Mafeking, and medical reconnaissances were made of the principal strategical posts along the lines of railway from East London and Port Elizabeth. Registers of civil doctors and nursing sisters who were willing to serve were kept both in Cape Town and Maritzburg, and arrangements were made to despatch invalids to England by the mail steamers weekly. All these preparations, quietly made in anticipation of hostilities, showed much initiative and resource, and give the impression that the administration of the Medical Service in South Africa before the war was in the hands of officers who were fully alive to the necessities of the situation. Under the circumstances which obtained at the time, it would have been difficult to have done more.

When the Indian contingent arrived in Natal early in October, it brought with it one half and three complete field hospitals for British troops, and one field hospital for natives of India accompanying it as transport drivers and in other capacities. These medical units were organized in a totally different manner from the corresponding units in the British service. They combined the functions of both field hospitals and bearer companies,\* and had a large number of native dhoolie bearers with Lushai dandies, field-stretchers, and a proportion, but not all, of their regulation equipment of tongas.† With the exception of the officers of the British field hospitals who belonged to the R.A.M.C., the establishment was entirely Indian, and consisted, in addition to the officers of the Indian Medical Service with the native field hospital, of assistant-surgeons of the Indian Medical Service, native

Medical units  
with the  
Indian  
contingent.

\* This fusion of the field hospitals and bearer companies has, since the war, been introduced into the British Army as well.

† The Lushai dandy is a light litter, slung from a bamboo pole and carried on the shoulders of bearers, which has replaced the heavy dhoolie of former times. The tonga is a light but strongly constructed cart used on hill roads in India.

ward orderlies, water-carriers, cooks, sweepers, and others. Each battalion and regiment from India had also with it an officer of the R.A.M.C., and an assistant-surgeon of the Indian Medical Service.\* No line of communication medical units, however, accompanied the contingent, and for continued treatment of its sick and wounded it had to depend on the resources of the colony, or on such hospitals as arrived from England.

The heterogeneous character of the resources out of which the medical requirements were met.

Throughout all these preparations, indeed, one feature is already clearly indicated, and that is the heterogeneous nature of everything that had subsequently to be got together in connexion with the Medical Services. Trained and untrained *personnel*, British, Indian, and Colonial systems of organization, military and civil elements, improvised resources at home and in South Africa, voluntary offers of every description—all had to be utilized and welded into some organized whole during the progress of the war. It was a state of affairs that gave great opportunities for developing latent qualities for administration, initiative, and resource, but that was no less bound to break down wherever there was a lack of tact, elasticity, and imagination. This heterogeneous character of the Medical Services became more marked as the war progressed, and the difficulties of dealing with its elements, partly inevitable, partly the lack of previous organization, were constantly in evidence.

The medical administrative staff with the forces in South Africa.

The task of coping with this difficult problem fell to the lot of Surgeon-General (now Sir W. D.) Wilson, who went out to South Africa with Sir Redvers Buller, as Principal Medical Officer. He had Major Bedford as his Secretary and Captain M. L. Hughes as the only other assistant on his staff.† When he arrived in South Africa Colonel

\* The assistant-surgeons may belong to the class of Eurasians or they may be natives. But many are pure Europeans, often sons of retired non-commissioned officers who have settled in India. The officers of the I.M.S. are of the same class as the officers, R.A.M.C., but natives of India with British qualifications to practise medicine and surgery may become officers in the I.M.S.

† Captain Hughes accompanied Sir Redvers Buller to Natal and was killed at Colenso. He was not replaced on Surgeon-General Wilson's staff till August, 1900, when Major R. J. Simpson, and subsequently Captain A. F. Tyrrell, was appointed orderly officer to the P.M.O. of the Forces.



Supple became Principal Medical Officer of the base and lines of communication at Cape Town. Lieut.-Colonel Exham had already been sent to Natal as Principal Medical Officer with Sir George White. When Sir Redvers Buller's Army Corps was split up and he himself proceeded with the main portion of it to Natal, Surgeon-General Wilson remained behind at Cape Town to organize the Medical Services generally in South Africa, and Colonel (now Sir T.) Gallwey, with Major W. Babbie as his staff officer, then accompanied Sir R. Buller as Principal Medical Officer. Colonel E. Townsend became Principal Medical Officer with Lord Methuen in the north, and Colonel J. Dallas Edge with General Gatacre in the east of Cape Colony. In the narrative of the events connected with the Medical Service in the course of the war, only the special features of the various arrangements that had to be made will be noted. Incidents of professional or other interest must be sought elsewhere, in the numerous reports and books published by civil and other medical officers. Nor is any mention made here of the individual work of the officers, men, and nursing sisters of the Medical Services. They gained for themselves in all quarters a fully deserved reputation for courage and devotion to duty. Four officers of the R.A.M.C. (Major Babbie and Lieutenants W. H. Nickerson, E. T. Inkson, and H. E. Douglas) were awarded the Victoria Cross for conspicuous acts of bravery during the war.

In Ladysmith the field medical units were complete until the retreat of General Yule from Dundee, when two of the field hospitals had to be left behind with the wounded. An advanced depot of medical stores was already in the town, and all the sick and wounded had been removed to Maritzburg by hospital train before the place was invested. There was thus a fair provision of medical *personnel* and equipment for the siege and for the actions immediately preceding it. But the general arrangement of hospitals within the town was upset by the long-range guns of the Boers, and this led to the establishment, with General Joubert's consent, of a large hospital camp at Intombi Spruit, which was opened on November 5, 1899. All the available medical *personnel*, equipment, and supplies were

Medical  
arrangements  
during the  
sieges of  
Ladysmith,  
Kimberley,  
and  
Mafeking.



used for the formation of this hospital, only a proportion of the field hospitals and bearer companies remaining within the area exposed to the fire of the Boers. The sick and wounded were transferred to Intombi by rail daily. The difficulties with which the officers who administered the hospital at Intombi had to contend have been related elsewhere.\* The most acutely-felt want was suitable nourishment for the patients, who suffered chiefly from dysentery and enteric fever. In spite, however, of far from satisfactory conditions the mortality was not excessive. But with the numbers in the hospital increasing eventually to 2,500, the strain on the officers became very great. Five out of the 48 officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps and the Indian Medical Service were killed or died from disease, and practically half suffered from prolonged attacks of enteric fever and dysentery. In Kimberley and Mafeking the medical arrangements presented no special features. In both the defence was mainly by local Volunteer corps and town guards, and the local civil hospitals under local civil practitioners afforded means of treating the sick and wounded. The Royal Army Medical Corps officers, of whom there was one in each of the besieged towns (Lieutenant O'Gorman in Kimberley and Major Anderson in Mafeking), acted as Military Administrative Medical Officers and supervised the general sanitary condition of the troops.

The medical arrangements with Sir Redvers Buller's force in Natal. Their satisfactory features.

Of all medical arrangements during the war, those during Sir Redvers Buller's operations in Natal presented the most satisfactory features. This was due to a combination of causes. In the first place must be reckoned the capacity and initiative of Colonel Gallwey, the P.M.O. in Natal. Further, the most highly-trained and complete field units, those for which provision had long ago been made in the peace establishments and training of the Royal Army Medical Corps, and those whose mobilization was of a normal character, accompanied Sir Redvers Buller to Natal. There were no exhausting marches, no short rations, nothing in fact to try the health of the men. The fighting was done under conditions which made the collecting and bringing in

\* See vol. iv., pp. 517-519.

of the wounded a comparatively easy and speedy matter. The line of communication with the base was also short and was amply supplied with hospital trains. In addition to the one that had been formed before the outbreak of hostilities, a second and similar train was prepared in November, and eventually the hospital train "Princess Christian," constructed in England by the Central British Red Cross Committee, arrived in Natal in time to be available when Ladysmith was relieved. An important base depot of medical stores had been established in Durban early in November, and it was possible to organize from it an advanced depot, which accompanied the field army. The chief difficulty was the formation of general and stationary hospitals on the lines of communication, mainly on account of the lack of suitable *personnel*. It was only in connexion with these that the shortage of regularly-trained *personnel* began to be felt in Natal. There was ample equipment for them; that of one stationary and one general hospital was in the colony, and two additional general and one stationary hospital had arrived in Natal from England by the time Ladysmith was relieved.

Colonel Gallwey and his staff made the best use of these advantages, and introduced some new features into the medical arrangements that proved of immense advantage. These were the formation of corps of stretcher-bearers and the conversion of large transports into hospital ships. It was anticipated that the fighting to relieve Ladysmith might be at some distance from the railway line, and that it would be impossible to depend upon the bearer companies to carry out the process of transporting the sick and wounded from the field hospitals to the hospital trains. This is a service, in fact, which has its own special organization in other armies, and Colonel Gallwey early recognised the necessity of filling in this gap in the chain of evacuation. There was a large number of refugees from the Transvaal in Natal, and a paid corps, called the Natal Volunteer Ambulance Corps, was rapidly raised and equipped with stretchers, just before the passage of the Tugela was attempted. Originally its strength was 1,200, but it was eventually increased to about

Colonel Gallwey's special measures.

The Natal Volunteer Ambulance Corps.

1,800. Four companies were formed, one for each brigade, with two officers, detached from regiments, in military command. The companies were further divided into sections of twenty-five under a leader elected by the men of the section. The work of the corps was invaluable in connexion with the actions at Colenso, Spion Kop, and Pieter's Hill. With their assistance the field at Colenso was cleared of 800 wounded before dark. In subsequent actions they also assisted the regular bearer companies and helped to clear the dressing-stations and field hospitals. When a stationary hospital was moved to Spearman's in connexion with the casualties at Spion Kop and Vaal Krantz, they carried the more serious cases on stretchers the whole way back to Frere on the line of railway. Another ambulance corps was raised at the same time. This was the "Indian Ambulance Corps," organized from among Indian indentured coolies by the Natal Public Works Department, and under the control of two of its officials.\* It numbered some 800 men, who worked from rail-head to a point where they met the wounded brought in by the Natal Volunteer Ambulance Corps. The Natal Volunteer Ambulance Corps was disbanded after the relief of Ladysmith and the Indian Ambulance Corps in February. The former was replaced by the formation of a corps called the Imperial Bearer Corps, 100 men of which were attached to each regular bearer company.

The Indian  
Ambulance  
Corps.

Conversion of  
transports  
into hospital  
ships at  
Durban.  
Their subse-  
quent value.

The conversion of transports into hospital ships was begun at Durban by fitting up the *Lismore Castle* as an auxiliary ward of the Maritzburg hospital, in order to increase the hospital accommodation at the base. The *Spartan* was already there, but the accommodation on board was small and insufficient. The success that attended the conversion of the *Lismore Castle* led to the subsequent conversion of the *Nubia*, *Orcana*, and *Avoca*, and, after the relief of Ladysmith, of the *Dunera* and *Simla*, a fleet of six

\* The idea of raising a corps of natives of India originated amongst themselves as a demonstration of loyalty. Their intention was to give their services free, or, at least, that the expenses of the corps should be borne by the wealthier members of the Indian community. See vol. iii., p. 100.



fine hospital ships being thus formed and a fortnightly service to England initiated. Colonel Gallwey, in this manner, established a complete chain of evacuation between his field medical units and England which was of the greatest value subsequently, when the hospitals in Natal became the chief base for invaliding sick and wounded to England.

In Cape Colony the chief centre of activity at first was Cape Town, where three large general hospitals were opened on their arrival from England at the end of October and in the course of November, 1899. Hospital No. 1, which was opened on October 30, occupied the whole of the Wynberg barrack huts, No. 2 a large camp area in Wynberg Camp, and No. 3 a fine situation at Rondebosch. Use was also made of the not very satisfactory old garrison hospital at Woodstock. A large convalescent camp was formed at Green Point later on. Small hospitals that had been established at De Aar and Orange River before the outbreak of hostilities were expanded and more completely equipped by stationary hospital units from England. The two hospital trains that had been prepared by Colonel Supple in September were manned by a complete *personnel* from England, and were kept in constant touch with Lord Methuen's advance. In most cases they were run up almost into the firing line, and during the actions at Belmont, Graspan, Modder River, and Magersfontein, they relieved the force of its sick and wounded in an incredibly short time, conveying some to De Aar and Orange River, and others to the general hospitals at Cape Town.

The chief difficulty in connexion with Lord Methuen's force was the provision of field medical units, owing to the splitting up of the Army Corps and the formation of new brigades out of battalions in South Africa not previously brigaded. The bearer company from the 3rd Brigade, which was being left at the base, had to be transferred to another brigade, a divisional field hospital had to be converted into a brigade field hospital, while the Army Corps field hospital was sent as a divisional field hospital to Natal. There was, in fact, in the Medical Service, as in every other, a general shuffling of the cards involved in the break-up of the Army Corps, and when eventually the 3rd Brigade was sent to

The medical  
arrangements  
in Cape  
Colony.

Difficulties in  
supplying  
field medical  
units to forces  
in Cape  
Colony.

join Lord Methuen's force on the Modder River it was without medical units. A company of the Cape Medical Staff Corps, under Surgeon Lieut.-Colonel Hartley, V.C., was then converted into a bearer company and joined it, while a field hospital was obtained from a divisional field hospital left in Cape Colony by one of Sir Redvers Buller's divisions. General Gatacre's force in the east of Cape Colony had also to be supplied with field medical units in a similar manner. His medical bases were East London and Port Elizabeth, where there were small hospitals, together with the hospital ship *Trojan*, which had been sent to the former port to act as a stationary hospital at the base. His field units were a divisional field hospital, a bearer company, also formed of one of the companies of the Cape Medical Staff Corps, and half a field hospital of the permanent Cape establishment. The small force under General French operating from Naaupoort and Arundel had some of the Cavalry Division field medical units with it.

Success of the  
medical  
arrangements  
in the first  
three months.

The operations of the various fragments of the disintegrated Army Corps in November and December, 1899, and the operations in Natal up to the relief of Ladysmith, imposed no exceptionally severe strain on the Medical Service. The losses in action were in no case really heavy. The nature of the wounds made them easy to deal with; the Mauser bullet was a merciful instrument, and wounds from shell fire were rare. The fighting was almost all on the railway, so that rapid evacuation of the field hospitals was possible. The general health of the troops was remarkably good; enteric had hardly begun to make its appearance, and the men flourished on abundant rations in an invigorating climate. The undoubted success with which the Medical Service dealt with its task, added to the splendid gallantry shown by its officers and men on the battlefield, impressed not only the ordinary correspondent, but men of the highest professional attainments. The reports which reached England of the work of the R.A.M.C. sounded a note of praise and triumph, all the more gratifying by its contrast to our military reverses. That note was sustained by such eminent authorities as Sir W. MacCormac and Mr. Treves. At a dinner

given at the Reform Club on April 28, 1900, these two gentlemen, who had just returned from South Africa, where they had acted as consulting surgeons, declared that "it would not be possible to have anything more complete or better arranged than the medical service in this war."

At the same time, in South Africa, a certain undercurrent of criticism began to make itself felt. Away from the actual work of the battlefield those who came in contact with the management of the hospitals were impressed in many instances by the excessive influence of routine, the fear of unauthorized action, the reluctance to assume responsibility, which was the natural result of the cramped conditions under which the Medical Service had so long lived. The civil surgeons, fresh from the working of the great English hospitals, were struck not only by certain defects in equipment but by a certain want of elasticity on the part of the medical officers, a tendency, it almost seemed to them in some cases, to consider diet sheets more important than diet, and returns than cures. An undoubted instance of this want of elasticity was shown in the attitude of some of the hospital authorities to the question of female nursing. Trained orderlies were badly needed at the front; at Cape Town hundreds of qualified nurses, local or from England, could easily have taken their place; but it was only as the result of considerable pressure applied at the War Office from various quarters, and on Lord Roberts after his arrival, that the employment of nurses became at all general. Rumours that all was not perfect reached England, and in January, 1900, *The Times* sent Mr. W. Burdett-Coutts, M.P.—who, as a special commissioner during the Russo-Turkish War, had had some experience of medical arrangements in war—as a special correspondent to study the medical situation in South Africa. In a series of articles Mr. Burdett-Coutts described the hospital system at the base, dwelling on some of the weak points, suggesting various reforms, but also giving due emphasis to the difficulties which the Medical Service had to contend with, and to the successful aspects of the work done.

Signs of weakness.  
*The Times* sends out Mr. Burdett-Coutts.

Meanwhile enteric fever, the common scourge of all armies



Enteric fever  
in South  
Africa.

in the field, had begun to make its appearance amongst the troops in South Africa shortly before Lord Roberts's arrival. It had for long been endemic among the civil population of South Africa, and the possible outbreak of the disease had been anticipated—in fact, it was expected even earlier than it actually did appear—and measures had been taken to avert it, if possible.\* When it came it attacked the troops in all spheres of military operations practically about the same time. Whatever may have been its origin, Lord Roberts's troops, during the advance on Bloemfontein, carried the germs of the disease with them from Modder River, while the exceptional conditions around Paardeberg and the existence of enteric fever in the Boer laager there assured the extension of the epidemic. The troops were worn out with hardship and short rations by the time Bloemfontein was occupied. Through a mistaken consideration for the comfort of the inhabitants, which no other army would have dreamt of showing, they were not quartered in the town, but had to bivouac, at first without tents and in rainy weather, on the veld outside. Measures were at once taken to establish hospitals in the town out of local resources. Ten field hospitals and ten bearer companies entered Bloemfontein on March 13, bringing 200 sick and wounded with them. In three days the number under treatment increased to 327, and then mounted up till it reached a maximum of over 4,000 at the end of May, when it gradually declined. Within the first week, various buildings in the town were converted into hospitals accommodating 500. An additional 233 beds were prepared in other buildings during the second week, and some 100 more later on, by which time all the available buildings suitable for hospital purposes, for which a *personnel* could be supplied, had been utilized. The *personnel* of the bearer companies had to be used to provide a staff for these buildings. A stationary hospital arrived in Bloemfontein on March 29 and opened in the Raadzaal the following day. It had been kept in readiness at De Aar to proceed to Bloem-

Conditions at  
Bloemfontein  
after its  
occupation.

\* Large numbers of the soldiers, 20,000 or more, were inoculated against enteric on the voyage out. But the results were doubtful and the practice was discontinued.

fontein as soon as the line was opened. The 45 tons of stores had to be carried by fatigue parties over  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles at Norval's Pont to entrain. An advanced depot of medical stores arrived on the same day. By the end of March, 56 nursing-sisters had been obtained, and during April 67 more had been added. A civil hospital, the Langman, arrived on April 2, and three general hospitals between the 7th and 11th of the month. Other civil hospitals, the Irish and the Portland, arrived on the 12th and 14th. The two hospital trains which had been working along the lines of communication in Cape Colony reached the town on April 2 and April 8 respectively, and evacuation of the hospitals was continued regularly after these dates, partly by the hospital trains, but to a larger extent by ordinary and locally prepared trains. General hospitals were opened at Naauwpoort, Deelfontein and Springfontein, and thus lessened the distance over which many of the cases had to be conveyed.

In spite of these measures it must, however, be admitted that for a considerable time the condition of a large part of the patients at Bloemfontein was by no means satisfactory. The accommodation in the general and civil hospitals was inadequate to deal with the rapidly increasing number of the sick, and many had perforce to be accommodated somehow in the field hospitals. These were, of course, never intended for such work. They possessed neither beds nor the necessary ward utensils for a fever hospital, and their equipment, scanty as it necessarily was, had been cut down heavily in order to economize transport on the march. The condition of things in some of these field hospitals, especially when contrasted with the extravagant eulogy of the speeches made at the Reform Club, stung Mr. Burdett-Coutts, after some weeks spent at Bloemfontein, to write an article (Number IX of the series) in which, deserting the judicial temper of his earlier articles, he launched into an impassioned invective against the state of affairs he had witnessed. A few sentences will suffice to indicate the character of the article:

Their unsatisfactory aspect. Mr. Burdett-Coutts's Article IX.

“On that night (Saturday, the 28th of April) hundreds of men to my knowledge were lying in the worst stages of typhoid,



with only a blanket and a thin waterproof sheet (not even the latter for many of them) between their aching bodies and the hard ground, with no milk and hardly any medicines, without beds, stretchers, or mattresses, without pillows, without linen of any kind, without a single nurse amongst them, with only a few ordinary private soldiers to act as 'orderlies,' rough and utterly untrained to nursing, and with only three doctors to attend on 350 patients. . . The tents were bell tents such as were mentioned in a former letter as affording sleeping accommodation for from six to eight orderlies when working and in sound health. In many of these tents there were ten typhoid cases lying closely packed together, the dying against the convalescent, the man in his 'crisis' pressed against the man hastening to it. There was not room to step between them. Think of this, you who know the sort of nursing a typhoid patient requires. With no beds or mattresses, and only forty-two stretchers in the whole hospital, it followed that 274 patients had to be on the earth. . . The ground is hard as stone, and at night the temperature falls to freezing point. Besides other deficiencies which cannot be described, there were no sheets or pillow-cases or pretence of bed linen of any kind; only the coarse rug grated against the sensitive skin burning with fever. The heat of these tents in the midday sun was overpowering, their odours sickening. Men lay with their faces covered with flies in black clusters, too weak to raise a hand to brush them off, trying in vain to dislodge them by painful twitching of the features. There was no one to do it for them."

The hardships possibly exaggerated, but not wholly unavoidable.

The language of the article was undoubtedly sensational. In any impartial survey of the situation it is essential to keep in mind the difficulties with which the medical authorities had to contend in getting up stores over a railway crowded to its utmost capacity with other traffic essential for Lord Roberts's purposes, and the fact that only a portion of the patients had to undergo the discomforts so luridly depicted. Moreover, taken as a whole, the epidemic of enteric fever, compared with the epidemics of previous campaigns, was not one of exceptional severity, when looked at in proportion to the strength of Lord Roberts's force. The number of sick and wounded in Bloemfontein was only 3.6 per cent. of the marching in strength by the end of March, and, when the epidemic was at its height in May the proportion of enteric



fever cases to strength did not exceed 5 per cent. of the total strength north of the Orange River.\* Bloemfontein was then the great centre to which the sick and wounded were conveyed during the operations that followed to the north and east. Yet, making every allowance for the difficulties of the time, and avoiding all exaggeration as to the extent of the hardships undergone, it is hard to believe that they were wholly unavoidable. Even supposing that it had been absolutely impossible to get up any more medical stores, yet there was no insuperable obstacle to bringing up more nurses, or to enlisting more voluntary aid in Bloemfontein itself. Beds, or at least sheets, must have been procurable, if necessary, by commandeering. There is no reason to question the devotion to duty of the medical officers concerned, or their eagerness to do the utmost which circumstances permitted. What was lacking was not good-will, but the initiative, and possibly also the authority, to have forced stronger measures upon the Headquarters Staff. What was wanted was some one to insist that the troops should be billeted on the inhabitants, and not allowed to bivouac on the veld, some one prepared to fight tooth and nail for a few more trainloads of stores, some one not afraid to seize beds, sheets or any other private property required for hospital purposes, and to secure sanction afterwards.

The publication, at the end of June, of Mr. Burdett-Coutts's article created an immense sensation in England. Reinforced by other criticisms on the Medical Services made both outside and inside the House of Commons, it led to the appointment in July of a Royal Commission to consider and report upon the care and treatment of the sick and wounded during the war. Lord Justice Romer was President of this Commission, and the members were Sir David Richmond, Lord Provost of Glasgow; Dr. Church, President of the Royal College of Physicians, London; Professor D. J. Cunningham, Professor of Anatomy in Dublin University; and Mr. F.

The Royal  
Commission  
on South  
African  
Hospitals.  
Its report.

\* The actual percentage of admissions for enteric fever in Bloemfontein during the months of April and May was only 3·5 of the strength, the number of deaths being 0·65 of the strength (*British Medical Journal*, Feb. 2, 1901; i., p. 306).

Harrison, General Manager of the London and North Western Railway Company. The Commissioners took evidence in London and throughout South Africa, holding their first meeting in London on July 23, 1900, and proceeding to South Africa on August 4. They embarked for England again on October 10, and some other evidence was taken on their return to London. Their report was presented in January, 1901. While admitting the existence of hardship and suffering caused in some instances by oversight or mistakes, or due to unavoidable circumstances, the report was generally of a thoroughly reassuring character. In conclusion the Commissioners stated that, "in reviewing the campaign as a whole, it has not been one where it can properly be said that the medical and hospital arrangements have broken down. There has been nothing in the nature of a scandal with regard to the sick and wounded; no general or widespread neglect of patients, or indifference to their suffering, and all witnesses of experience in other wars are practically unanimous in the view that, taking it all in all, in no campaign have the sick and wounded been so well looked after as they have been in this." The report was freely criticized as being unduly favourable in its tendency, more particularly by Mr. Burdett-Coutts, who urged that the evidence taken was mainly that of officials, and that the absence of compulsory powers and other conditions of the inquiry made it impossible to get really satisfactory evidence from soldier patients, and that his own witnesses in particular were not heard. It is possible to admit the force of these criticisms, and yet to accept the substantial correctness and equity of the Commissioners' general conclusion. Taking the war as a whole, it undoubtedly marked a great improvement on previous wars. And, in spite of certain unsatisfactory features, it is only fair to Surgeon-General Wilson and to the staff of the R.A.M.C. to record that, in the main, their efforts to cope with the difficulties of an unprecedented task met with a very considerable measure of success. As for the author of the whole hospital controversy, it may readily be conceded that Mr. Burdett-Coutts's language was not always judicious; the fact remains,

that the attention focussed by his writings and speeches on the Medical Services resulted not only in immediate improvements, but also, after the war, in a series of reforms of the first importance.

To return to the narrative of the campaign. Until such time as Lord Roberts had firmly established himself in Pretoria, Kroonstad formed an intermediate post at which No. 3 General Hospital from Rondebosch, and a civil hospital, the Scottish National Red Cross Hospital, opened about a fortnight after Lord Roberts's arrival there. The scene was shifted to Pretoria in June, 1900, and for two years after its occupation the capital of the Transvaal became the most important centre of the Medical Service. On the date of its occupation, June 5, several Boer hospitals, each with a comparatively small number of beds, were found there. Their accommodation was rapidly expanded to 1,000 beds, until such time as general hospitals could be brought up. No. 2 General Hospital at Wynberg had been held in readiness to proceed to the Transvaal from May 21 onwards, but it was considerably delayed both at Bloemfontein and Kroonstad on its way up, and did not open in Pretoria till July 17. The advanced medical depot at De Aar was also kept ready to move up, experienced similar delay, and did not reach Pretoria till July. But before this time the Irish Hospital had come up, and on June 21 the Palace of Justice, in the centre of the town, was handed over to its *personnel* to be converted into a hospital. It was able to accommodate 450 beds, but its *personnel* was unable, of itself, to take charge of so many patients, and men from some of the military hospitals were lent to it. Soon afterwards other private hospitals came up to Pretoria; the Langman from Bloemfontein on July 21, and the Welsh Hospital from Springfontein on August 4. They were placed near No. 2 General Hospital. Later on various other additions and changes were made. A general hospital (No. 19) took over hospitals that had been established in three of the Pretoria schools, a branch hospital of the Imperial Yeomanry was established, and No. 7 General Hospital was brought up from Natal. When the hospital arrangements in

Pretoria becomes the centre of the medical arrangements in June, 1900.



Johannesburg and Elandsfontein become large hospital centres.

Pretoria were completed, there were 2,700 beds available in all. Half of the general hospital at Naauwpoort and No. 2 Stationary Hospital from East London and Kroonstad were brought up to Johannesburg. Convalescent camps were opened at both Pretoria and Johannesburg. Elandsfontein, eight miles east of Johannesburg, also became a hospital centre, and a general hospital (No. 16), and No. 2 Stationary Hospital from Johannesburg were opened there. Two more general hospitals were brought up in the following year, No. 20 in March, and No. 13 in May, 1901, and were established between Elandsfontein and Johannesburg. During the advance in the Eastern Transvaal, a hospital ship, the *Orcana*, was sent to Delagoa Bay, and sick and wounded were sent to it across Portuguese territory.

Medical arrangements during the period of guerilla warfare.

When the prolonged guerilla warfare set in, special medical services, both as regards *personnel* and material, were improvised to suit the occasion. The sick and wounded from the various columns were first brought to small or stationary hospitals, opened in such places as Belfast, Middelburg, Barberton, Komatipoort, Machadodorp, Waterval Onder and Lydenburg in the Transvaal, and Winburg, Heilbron, Harrismith and several minor posts, such as Thaba 'Nchu, Senekal, Ficksburg, Reitz, Bethlehem, Vrede and Brindisi, in the Orange River Colony. Small rest stations were also established along the lines of evacuation leading to these places, and to the general and stationary hospitals which were established at Standerton, Heidelberg, Krugersdorp, Kimberley and elsewhere on the line of railway, as well as at the larger centres already mentioned. Maritzburg and Cape Town became then merely large bases for invaliding men to England. The multiplication of medical posts and of small columns necessitated a complete breaking up and reorganization of the field medical units. Bearer companies and field hospitals ceased to exist as independent units, and a modified unit to carry on the functions of both, consisting of 2 officers and 25 non-commissioned officers and men, with 4 to 6 ambulance wagons or tongas, became the recognized mobile medical unit for a column. As the columns never operated far away, or for a long time, from their base, their sick and wounded



LIEUT.-COLONEL R. L. HIPPISELEY, C.B., R.E.,

DIRECTOR OF TELEGRAPHS, S. AFRICA, 1899-1902.

*Photo by A. F. Hosking, Cape Town.*



LIEUT.-COLONEL D. HENDERSON, D.S.O.,

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, S. AFRICA, 1900-2.

*Photo by W. B. Sherwood, Pietermaritzburg.*



SURG.-GEN. SIR W. D. WILSON, K.C.M.G., M.B.,

PRINCIPAL MEDICAL OFFICER, S. AFRICA, 1899-1902.

*Photo by E. N. Collins, South Norwood.*



LIEUT.-COLONEL (LOCAL COLONEL) W. H. BIRKBECK,

ASSISTANT INSPECTOR OF REMOUNTS, S. AFRICA, 1900-1902.

*Photo by Lafayette, Ltd.*





were readily brought in to the fixed hospitals by this modified field medical unit. As time went on, many of the smaller medical posts ceased to exist; and eventually, after peace was declared, large hospitals only remained open at the stations garrisoned by the troops, such as Pietersburg, Pretoria, Middelburg, Barberton, Standerton, Krugersdorp, and Potchefstroom in the Transvaal; Harrismith, Kroonstad, Bloemfontein, and Ladybrand in the Orange River Colony; Newcastle, Maritzburg, and Howick in Natal; and Kimberley, Naauwpoort, Burgersdorp, Middelburg, Stellenbosch, Winburg, and Cape Town in Cape Colony. Surgeon-General Wilson and his staff\* returned to England shortly after the declaration of peace and after a beginning had been made of establishing the cantonments for the peace garrisons on sanitary lines. For nearly three years he had held the anxious and harassing position of Principal Medical Officer of the forces in the field. The many changes that took place during that time throughout South Africa, and the organizing, splitting-up and reorganizing of medical units to meet them, under conditions of exceptional difficulty as regards medical *personnel* and transport, imposed an immense task upon which Surgeon-General Wilson brought to bear not only the requisite firmness and tact, but also an untiring devotion to duty.

In addition to a large number of smaller temporary hospitals, the Army Medical Service mobilized during the war 22 general hospitals, 9 of which were formed in South Africa, the others being sent out from England, and 41 stationary hospitals, of which all but 5 were formed in South Africa. The number of mobile medical units is not very clear, but 26 field hospitals and 18 bearer companies were mobilized in England and sent out between September, 1899, and May, 1900, in addition to the field hospitals from India which accompanied the Indian contingent to Natal. Several additional bearer companies were formed in South Africa or came from other colonies. Afterwards in October, 1901, when bearer companies and field hospitals were reorganized

Summary of  
the units  
organized by  
the Army  
Medical  
Service.

\* Major Bedford was invalided to England in November, 1900, and his place was taken by Major Simpson.

into small units combining the functions of both, 84 such modified field units were formed. Seven ordinary trains were converted into hospital trains, and several first-class corridor car trains, unaltered, and a number of specially-fitted carriages, placed at convenient intervals on the railways as ambulance coaches, were also used. Six large transports were converted in South Africa into hospital ships in addition to the two hospital ships fitted out in England. Two base depots of medical stores and three advanced depots were mobilized and sent out from England, and three smaller depots were organized in South Africa.

Co-operation  
of the  
Colonial  
Medical  
Services.

Only incidental reference has so far been made to the manner in which the military medical arrangements were supplemented in all directions from colonial, voluntary, and non-military sources. The record would be far from complete without touching shortly on some of the special features of this supplementary aid. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand supplied 51 medical officers, 77 nursing sisters, and 214 subordinate ranks. Cape Colony supplied 10 medical officers and 768 men, while in Natal, 16 medical officers and 2,015 men were engaged locally.\* In addition to these there were engaged locally in South Africa 186 civil surgeons, 405 nursing sisters, and 1,295 subordinates; while voluntary aid societies, formed in connection with the war, such as the Good Hope Red Cross Society, the Durban Ladies Patriotic League, the Maritzburg Aid Society, did excellent work in the supply of special articles of clothing, comforts, and luxuries for the sick and wounded. A Canadian branch of the British Red Cross Society, under Lieut.-Colonel Ryerson of the Canadian Medical Service, opened a depot in Bloemfontein for the supply of similar articles in conjunction with the work of the Central British Red Cross Committee. The Jewish community in Cape

\* See Report of Royal Commission on South African Hospitals, Appendix to Minutes of Evidence, pp. 15, 356. The numbers for Cape Colony include the various companies of the Cape Medical Staff Corps, recruits enrolled by the P.M.O. of the Colonial Forces, enrolments for Carrington's force, and the Jewish Section, mentioned below. The numbers for Natal include the stretcher-bearers enrolled from amongst Transvaal refugees, but not the Indian Ambulance Corps.



Town raised and paid a section of a bearer company, selected from amongst its members.

Amongst the colonial contingents there were regularly-formed units which took their place in the field operations alongside the units of the Royal Army Medical Corps. The Cape Medical Staff Corps, under Lieut.-Colonel Hartley, V.C., was formed into bearer companies or field hospitals which accompanied Lord Methuen's, General Gatacre's, and Lord Roberts's forces. Lieut.-Colonel Hartley afterwards became Principal Medical Officer to the Colonial Division. A field ambulance, combining the functions of a bearer company and field hospital, under Major Fiaschi, formed part of the first New South Wales contingent, and was one of the field medical units during Lord Roberts's advance to Bloemfontein. Colonel Williams of the New South Wales Army Medical Corps, who accompanied it, became the Principal Medical Officer of the Mounted Infantry Division. A second contingent under Lieut.-Colonel Vandeleur Kelly, which contained a mounted bearer section, went to Springfontein and took over the hospital there in February, 1900. A third contingent with drafts for the two previous contingents followed. An Australian field hospital and bearer company under Major Green and Major Howie, V.C., arrived in Natal in March, 1902, as a contingent from the Commonwealth, and worked with the Australian troops during the short time that it was employed. The Canadian Army Medical Corps supplied a field hospital under Lieut.-Colonel Worthington, which was considered ideal in its transport and equipment, its chief features being transport vehicles convertible into ambulance wagons, a special pattern of ward-tent, the Hubert tent, and a plant for lighting the tents with acetylene gas.

The Cape contingent.

The New South Wales contingent.

Australian Commonwealth contingent.

The Canadian contingent.

Reverting to the work of the Central British Red Cross Committee at home, an immense variety of supplementary aid was considered by it before being eventually accepted by the War Office. The most prominent sections of this aid were the hospitals formed by private individuals at their own expense or by subscriptions raised by them and by committees of management; the two hospital ships, *Princess*

The work of the Central British Red Cross Committee.



Red Cross  
Society's  
Commis-  
sioners in  
South Africa.

of *Wales* and *Maine*; and two hospital trains, the "Princess Christian Hospital train," and one of the trains formed in South Africa. Most valuable work was also done by commissioners sent out by the Central British Red Cross Committee to South Africa in order to organize the reception and forwarding of the various gifts and voluntary supplies of clothing, comforts, and luxuries to the sick and wounded in all parts of the country. Colonel Young was the first to go out in the capacity of Chief Commissioner, arriving in Cape Town in November, 1899. Dr. Chepmell and Mr. Bonham Carter were sent out as Assistant Commissioners (the former to Natal), and arrived early in January, 1900. Sir John Furley embarked for South Africa at the end of the month and replaced Colonel Young, who had been obliged to return to England. A Good Hope Red Cross Committee was formed by him in Cape Town, with Mr. Justice Buchanan as Chairman. Its members were four representatives of the Good Hope Society, two of the Army Nursing Reserve, two of the St. John Ambulance Association, and two of the General Officer commanding the lines of communication, together with the Chief Commissioner of the British Red Cross Committee. Depots were opened in various places and travelling agents appointed to accompany consignments and see them delivered to the hospitals.

The Good  
Hope Red  
Cross  
Committee.

The private  
hospitals.

The private hospitals that were sent to South Africa numbered nine in all, and played an important and admirable part in the medical arrangements. The first suggestion of their formation was due to a letter in *The Times* from Dr. George Stoker, who, with considerable previous experience of military hospital work, urged the sending out of self-contained independent units acting under the military authorities, but with their own staff, equipment and transport. The idea was at once taken up by Mrs. Bagot (wife of Captain Bagot, M.P. for South Westmoreland) and resulted in the formation of the Portland Hospital, the chief contributors being the Duke of Portland and residents in the counties of Westmoreland and Cumberland. It was organized as a hospital of 100 beds by a Committee of Management, in consultation with the Army Medical

The Portland  
Hospital.

Department of the War Office, with Major-General Hon. H. P. Eaton as Honorary Secretary. It was opened as a section of No. 3 General Hospital at Rondebosch in January, 1900, was sent to Bloemfontein in April, and finally closed in July. It was followed by the Langman Hospital, presented by Mr. Langman, who had acted as Honorary Treasurer of the Portland Hospital. This was organized on similar lines, opened in Bloemfontein in April, 1900, went to Pretoria in August, and was eventually given to the Government by Mr. Langman as a free gift in November. An American citizen, Mr. Van Alen, equipped and took out a section of a field hospital, which went to Kimberley in March, 1900, and accompanied Lord Methuen in his operations north and west of that town in April. It was subsequently handed over to the military authorities at Paardekraal in July, 1900. Lord Iveagh was the donor of a hospital, called the Irish Hospital, of 100 beds, equipped as a stationary hospital but with a special transport of its own. Part of the latter on arrival in March, 1900, when the hospital was sent to Naauwpoort, accompanied Lord Kitchener's expedition to Prieska. It was not until April that the hospital was opened as a whole in Bloemfontein. A part of it accompanied Lord Roberts to Pretoria, and eventually the whole hospital, as already noted, developed into a large hospital in the Palace of Justice there. In October it ceased to exist as a private hospital, and all its stores and equipment were handed over to the military authorities as a free gift. A 100-bed stationary hospital was given by Mr. Alfred Mosely and called the Princess Christian Hospital. It took a number of huts with it, and was opened at Pinetown, Natal, in April, 1900. In July it was placed at the disposal of H.R.H. Princess Christian, who presented it to the Government. A committee of ladies and gentlemen associated with Wales organized a Welsh hospital, also of 100 beds, which was attached to No. 3 General Hospital at Springfontein in June, 1900, its *personnel* having been distributed amongst military hospitals in Cape Town and Bloemfontein until its equipment was got up. It was transferred to Pretoria in August, and handed over as a free gift

The Langman  
Hospital.

Mr. Van  
Alen's  
Hospital.

The Irish  
Hospital.

The  
Princess  
Christian  
Hospital.

The Welsh  
Hospital.



The  
Edinburgh  
Hospital and  
the Scottish  
National  
Red Cross  
Hospital.

to Government in November, 1900. Two hospitals were organized in Scotland: the Edinburgh Hospital, in Edinburgh and the East of Scotland, by a committee under the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, and the Scottish National Red Cross Hospital, in Glasgow and other parts of Scotland, by the St. Andrew's Ambulance Association. The former was a hospital of 100 beds. It opened at Norval's Pont in May, 1900, and worked there till the following October, when it was presented as a free gift to Government. The latter was commenced as a hospital of 100 beds, but eventually expanded into a general hospital of 520 beds. It went out to South Africa in three sections, and was opened at Kroonstad in June, 1900. It was handed over to Government in October.

The Imperial  
Yeomanry  
Hospitals.

The Imperial Yeomanry Hospital and its branches were organized on a larger scale than the other private hospitals, although they partook of the same character. The idea of providing special hospitals for the Yeomanry in South Africa originated with Lady Chesham and Lady Georgina Curzon (Countess Howe), and eventually took the form of a large general hospital, which was established at Deelfontein, near De Aar, in March, 1900. It continued open for a year. It was followed by a Yeomanry field hospital and bearer company, which accompanied various columns between August, 1900, and March, 1901. When Pretoria was occupied, a branch Yeomanry Hospital was organized and sent there by the representatives of the London Committee in South Africa. It was opened in August, 1900, and closed in September, 1901; it assumed the dimensions of a general hospital during that period. Three minor establishments were also formed in South Africa by the representatives of the London Committee, namely, a hospital of 100 beds at Mackenzie's Farm, Cape Town, a convalescent home for officers at Johannesburg, called the Chesham Home, and a small hospital at Elandsfontein. The first of these minor schemes was continued from August, 1900, to March, 1901, the second from May till October, 1901, and the last from June till December, 1901.

The Pretoria  
Commission.

A form of voluntary aid which stands in a different position from the private hospitals, as it was organized by civilians on the spot, was the "Pretoria Commission."



When the troops arrived the military hospitals were at first deficient in many of the supplies necessary for the patients. Mr. Murray Guthrie, M.P., and Mr. Leigh Wood (who had already rendered notable service to the British prisoners at Waterval), acting under the sanction of the Military Governor and Lord Roberts, combined with four other civilians to form a committee to relieve the position. Being supplied with money by the military authorities, they went to work on the spot and bought everything available, sending notice to the hospitals to requisition; and from that time the necessities of thirty-five hospitals were amply supplied from this source. They further proceeded to take possession of the fine Palace of Justice and equip the building as a hospital, making it ready for the staff of the Irish Hospital on its arrival in Pretoria. The work of the Pretoria Commission affords a significant instance of what practical civilians, possessed of local knowledge, business training and energy, can do to assist the military authorities in an emergency. Many miscellaneous schemes of a minor character were also offered and utilized, and several of the Red Cross Societies of foreign countries offered their assistance.\*

The hospital ship, *Princess of Wales*, was organized, The hospital ships  
equipped, and managed by the Central British Red Cross *Princess of*  
Committee at the request of H.R.H. The Princess of Wales, *Wales and*  
who devoted a special fund at her disposal for the purpose, *Maine.*  
and who never failed to visit it on its arrival at Southampton,  
on the several occasions on which it returned with invalids  
to England. It was admirably prepared and equipped for  
hospital work at Newcastle-on-Tyne, sailed for South Africa  
on December 8, 1899, and made three voyages to South Africa  
and back, in addition to acting as a hospital ship for some  
time at the base. The *Maine* was one of the American  
Transport Company's fleet, and was offered by the chairman

\* Parts viii., xi. and xii. of the Report of the Central British Red Cross Committee on Voluntary Organizations during the War give details of these schemes. They included much excellent work, more especially the formation of convalescent homes in England and Scotland for invalided officers and men. Mention, too, should be made in this connexion of the free accommodation offered to invalided officers by some of the hotels on the Riviera.

of the company, Mr. B. N. Baker, to Government early in the war. It was converted into a hospital ship in the Thames by subscriptions received by a committee of American ladies, under the presidency of Lady Randolph Churchill, and sailed for South Africa at the end of December, 1899. It made two voyages from South Africa with invalids, and in July, 1900, transferred the scene of its labours to China in connexion with the Boxer troubles, returning to England in January, 1901, when Mr. Baker presented the ship to the Government on behalf of his company, the ladies' committee giving all the hospital equipment and fittings which were on board. Since then it has been employed by the Admiralty as a hospital ship on the Mediterranean station.

The hospital  
train  
"Princess  
Christian."

The hospital train, "Princess Christian," was constructed in Birmingham and consisted of seven bogie corridor carriages, with excellent and comfortably-arranged cots, kitchen, dispensary, and other accessories. Its cost was mainly defrayed by subscriptions raised by the borough of Windsor. It was taken out to South Africa and put together there, under Sir John Furley's supervision, in March, 1900, and was the first train to cross the temporary trestle bridge over the Tugela at Colenso and to enter Ladysmith. It was presented to the military authorities as a permanent hospital train in South Africa in June, 1901. The train, known as No. 4 Hospital Train, which was organized at East London by Sir John Furley, at the request of Surgeon-General Wilson, was also equipped out of funds provided by the British Red Cross Society. It commenced its work in June, 1900.

Private  
hospitals com-  
pared with  
military  
hospitals.

For purposes of command and military administration officers on the active or retired list of the Army Medical Service were assigned to practically all these voluntary aid units; apart from these the staff, which included many eminent members of the medical profession, was purely civilian. The staff of the hospital ship *Maine* came entirely from the United States, but an officer of the British Army Medical Service was appointed as its principal medical officer. As compared with the general and stationary hospitals of the regular service, the private hospitals were

luxuriously and lavishly equipped. In two respects this fact somewhat detracted from the eminent services which they otherwise rendered. It led to invidious comparisons between them and the military hospitals. It also added greatly to their weight, causing much difficulty in providing transport for the material at a time when transport was required for other purposes. A military general hospital, for example, of 520 beds, weighs 500 tons, and a stationary hospital of 100 beds, 35 tons. As compared with these, the Langman, Welsh, Portland, and Edinburgh Hospitals, each of 100 beds, weighed 45, 60, 70, and 400 tons respectively. The importance of reduction in weight and bulk cannot be overlooked, and when a private hospital of 100 beds, weighing, as the Edinburgh Hospital did, almost as much as a military hospital of 500 beds, is sent forward, there is a loss, so far as transport is concerned, of 400 beds. At critical times, such as the time of the epidemic of enteric fever at Bloemfontein, this is an important matter and will have to be considered in any arrangements for the employment of private hospitals in future wars. At the base or in the home territory they will always have opportunities of developing in a lavish and luxurious manner, but unless they are equipped, as is the regulation in some Continental armies, on a strictly military scale they are not adapted for work nearer the front.

The services of eminent members of the medical profession were not confined to the private hospitals alone. During the progress of the campaign the Government employed as consulting surgeons \* Sir William MacCormac, Mr. Treves, Mr. G. H. Makins, Mr. Watson Cheyne, Sir William Stokes (who died in South Africa), Professor John Chiene, Mr. Kendal Franks, and Mr. Cheatle. Dr. Washbourne, who had gone to South Africa as one of the staff of the Imperial Yeomanry Hospital, was appointed locally to be a consulting physician. Many of them

The consulting-surgeons.

\* The consulting surgeons were paid by the Government at the rate of £5,000 per annum, but they left lucrative work at home in order to give the hospitals in South Africa the benefit of their experience and skill.



remained in South Africa during a considerable period of the campaign.\*

The Medical Services with the Boer forces.

On the side of the Boers there was no organized medical service, but both the Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republic signified their adhesion to the Geneva Convention when war became imminent, and organized hospitals and ambulances under its protection. But most of the medical work was performed by ambulances from European states, and by the civil medical profession and civil hospitals existing in the country. In the later stages of the guerilla war the Boers were practically without medical assistance and, in fact, depended entirely upon the British, not only for the treatment of the seriously wounded, but also for supplies of medicines and surgical necessaries. But during the major operations excellently-equipped field units from Germany, Holland, Russia, and other sources followed the Boer troops. Some of them fell at times into the hands of the British, just as, on other occasions, some of the British field medical units fell into the hands of the Boers. Pretoria was the chief centre of the Boer fixed hospitals, and, when Lord Roberts occupied the town, the Volks Hospital, a hospital established by Mr. Bourke, a resident of Pretoria, a hospital established by the Boer Government on the race-course, a German ambulance, and a Dutch ambulance were found there. The racecourse hospital had been organized for the treatment of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and was under the charge of an Assistant-Surgeon of the Indian Medical Service, who was taken prisoner at Dundee. Wounded or sick prisoners of war were also found in all the other hospitals left by the Boers in Pretoria.

The Boer information bureau for sick and wounded.

An excellent information bureau was established in Pretoria by Dr. Molengraaf, the State Geologist, as a branch of the Transvaal Red Cross Society. It was supplied with information regarding men who were sick and wounded by agents in all parts of the field, who forwarded the necessary data to

\* Surgeon-General Stevenson, the professor of military surgery at the Army Medical School, also went to South Africa as Consulting Surgeon to the Forces, but afterwards accompanied Lord Roberts as his principal medical officer. Sir T. Fitzgerald offered his services as a consulting surgeon from Australia, and they were accepted.

it by telegram or on special forms. This agency also supplied all the Boers and foreign auxiliaries in the field with identification cards. In this manner the information bureau was not only able to keep the families of the combatants informed as to the men who were killed, sick or wounded,\* but was also ready to transmit similar information regarding the British prisoners of war. In fact, the general provisions of the Geneva Convention were properly applied by Boers as well as by British, although occasionally abuses were brought to light. The gravest abuse of all was committed by an international Red Cross Ambulance organized at Antwerp and a Red Cross Ambulance organized at Chicago.† Both of them were exploited for the purpose of enabling combatants from neutral states to gain admission into the Transvaal by way of Delagoa Bay under the shelter of the Red Cross, and both were eventually repudiated and disowned by the Red Cross Societies of Belgium and the United States, from which they respectively emanated.

Every war has its lessons and its comparisons. With The lessons  
of the war.

\* Full and interesting particulars of this work will be found in the Report of the Seventh International Conference of Red Cross Societies (p. 108), held in St. Petersburg in 1902. The International Red Cross Committee at Geneva endeavoured to open an International Red Cross Agency at Lorenzo Marques, under the auspices of the Portuguese Red Cross Society, but the scheme fell through (Report of the Central British Red Cross Committee on Voluntary Aid during the War, p. 38).

† At the Seventh International Congress of Red Cross Societies at St. Petersburg in May, 1902, Miss Clara Barton, the representative of the United States Red Cross Society, spoke as follows: "It is with humility, mortification, and indignation that I, speaking personally as president of the American Red Cross, am compelled to mention here a most regrettable occurrence which has transpired in relation to the war in the South African States." Miss Barton then went on to say that her Society had given sanction to a body of men in the city of Chicago, some fifty-six in number, to form a Red Cross ambulance for the Transvaal. "Each man of the fifty-six had given his sworn affidavit of loyalty to the cause he represented, and when they asked merely for a letter of recognition and the privilege of making a little Red Cross flag for themselves, that letter and flag were given to their agents. . . . Report said that the men, once safely past the outposts and admitted as Red Cross men, having torn off their brassards and trampled them, had taken allegiance to the Boer commander and entered the army as Irish-American recruits." Miss Barton stated that "the correctness of the report was no longer gainsaid" (Report of Seventh International Conference of Red Cross Societies, p. 192).



*transport*

regard to the Medical Services, those lessons have been of the utmost value. There was little to learn as regards the work in the field, except the necessity, where military conditions allow it, of an adequate supply of stretcher-bearers and of field transport. The mobile units, and the units concerned with evacuation, were always hampered by difficulties of transport. As far as the management and equipment of the military hospitals on lines of communication and at the base is concerned, the British general and stationary hospitals were found to be well suited for their purpose and capable of considerable expansion. The great part which female nursing can play in them, and the extent to which the strain on the trained military staff can be relieved in these hospitals by the introduction of civilian elements, has now been fully recognized. The main lesson, indeed, that had to be learnt from the war is the necessity of the peace organization of all available resources, and of the definite provision for systematic co-ordination on active service between all the various elements, regular, second-line and civilian, which will necessarily compose the Medical Service in any great war. The war served to bring home no less strongly the supreme importance of sanitation, and in this respect its lessons were still further emphasized in Manchuria. In war prevention of disease is far more important than cure. Serious illness, even if the men eventually recover, is, from the point of view of the immediate military operations, much more disastrous than an equally heavy loss of life, and an unhealthy bivouac may be more fatal than the most crushing defeat. The medical authorities fully understood the general sanitary conditions of South Africa before the war, and the regulations and instructions issued by them left little to be desired.\* The real difficulty lay in the insufficient recognition by the army as a whole of the supreme importance of sanitation. Medical officers may, in some cases, have failed to

The importance of sanitation.

\* Many comments and specific suggestions appeared in the public press during and after the war on questions of sanitation and prevention of disease, but they added little to the facts that had long since been recognized and acted on, so far as this was consistent with military operations, by the Army Medical Service. A commission, consisting of Colonel Notter, Professor of Military Hygiene at the Army Medical School, Netley,



insist sufficiently strongly on their point of view. But there are limits to the pressure a subordinate can bring to bear on an indifferent superior absorbed in what he considers more pressing questions, and no regulations can avert enteric from troops who will drink from every puddle. Great advances have been made since the war in these respects: every division and every garrison of any size now has its sanitary officer with a small staff; combatant officers are instructed in sanitary duties, and commanding officers are now definitely made responsible for the health of their command.

The work of the Medical Service in the prevention of disease during the South African War has been unfavourably compared with other wars, and especially with the work of the Japanese Medical Service in the Manchurian Campaign of 1904-5. This unfavourable comment is not justified by facts. Two standards of comparison have been taken, the incidence of enteric fever, and the proportion of deaths from disease to deaths from wounds. Neither with the war that preceded it, namely, that between the United States and Spain, nor with the Russo-Japanese War do the enteric fever statistics of the South African War present an unfavourable comparison, when certain important statistical factors are considered. With regard to the proportion of deaths from disease to deaths from wounds, this, of course, depends as much on the amount of fighting as on the amount of disease. The Japanese proportion was due to the greatness of the former and not to any peculiar diminution of the latter; while the British proportion in South Africa was due to the comparatively small extent of the fighting as compared with the duration of the campaign, the physical privations involved, and the consequent incidence of sickness. The general statistics of the war have not yet been published, but sufficient is known to justify the statement that its medical features show results which, on

Comparison  
of the results  
of the  
medical work  
with those of  
other wars.

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Professor Simpson, Professor of Hygiene at King's College, and Major (now Colonel Sir David) Bruce, R.A.M.C., was also employed in South Africa in studying the origin of dysentery in the field and its relationship to enteric fever, but it too failed to add to previous knowledge on the subject.

the whole, compare favourably with those of all wars in which Great Britain or other countries had been previously engaged.\*

Reforms  
introduced by  
Mr. Brodrick.

When Mr. Brodrick became Secretary of State for War towards the end of 1900, he immediately set to work on the strengthening and improvement of the Army Medical Service. After consultation with the leading members of the medical profession who had been in South Africa, and more particularly with Sir A. Fripp, he formed a strong committee, over which he himself presided, composed mainly of civilians, but including, besides the secretary, Major H. E. R. James, a remarkably able representative of the R.A.M.C. in Lieut.-Colonel (now Surgeon-General Sir A.) Keogh, who had conducted one of the general hospitals in South Africa with conspicuous success. Acting on the recommendations of this committee, Mr. Brodrick carried through a number of reforms of the greatest importance to the service. A new warrant was issued in March, 1902; the pay of officers of the Royal Army Medical Service was increased; the Army Medical School was removed to London from Netley, where

\* See, amongst other reliable sources of information, the statistics published in the *British Medical Journal* of Feb. 2, 1901, p. 306; Baron Takaku's statistics of the Japanese in Manchuria, *Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps*, July, 1906, p. 57, Table iv., *The Russo-Japanese War; Medical and Sanitary Reports*, published by the General Staff, and Mr. Wyndham's speech in the House of Commons, June 29, 1900. During four months of the greatest prevalence of enteric fever in South Africa in 1900 (March to July) the admissions from enteric fever were 5·8 per cent. of the strength. Amongst the American camps during the war with Spain in 1898, 10·4 per cent. of the strength were admitted with undoubted enteric fever and 19·2 per cent. with probable enteric fever during a similar period of five months of greatest enteric prevalence (May to September). In the campaign in Manchuria the Japanese lost 4,073 men from enteric, or an enteric death-rate, on a probable average strength of 250,000, of 13 per thousand per annum. The enteric death-rate in the South African War comes to about 14 per thousand per annum. The case mortality from enteric fever in the South African War is 18 per cent. of admissions; in the Japanese troops in Manchuria it was 32·6 per cent.; in the German troops in South-West Africa 17 per cent.; in the London Hospital, for persons between the ages of 20 and 30, 21·32 per cent.; and, in fact, whatever comparison is made either with military expeditions, military hospitals in peace time, or the great civil hospitals of this country, it is in favour generally of the military hospitals in South Africa.

it had been established since the Crimean War, in order to bring it into closer touch with the great teaching schools; post-graduate courses for senior officers were instituted, with encouragement to specialize in the more important branches of the profession; an Advisory Board for medical services and a Nursing Board were formed, to which civil members of the profession, matrons of civil hospitals, and others were appointed; the nursing side of the Army was further developed by the creation of Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service. Meanwhile, in May, 1901, Surgeon-General Jameson had retired on the completion of his appointment as Director-General, after five years of conscientious and zealous administration of the Medical Service, and was succeeded by Surgeon-General Sir W. Taylor. At the same time Mr. Brodrick took the bold step of promoting Colonel Keogh as Deputy-Director-General over the heads of some thirty or forty senior officers, to assist in the task of carrying through the reforms. Since then the continuity of the new development of the service has been assured by the succession of Sir A. Keogh to the post of Director-General. To the work done by Mr. Brodrick and those who helped him the Medical Service can look back with gratitude, while the army and the nation may look forward with confidence to the account the service will render of itself in time of war.



## CHAPTER X

## [THE ADMINISTRATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE BRITISH COLONIES.]

Martial law proclaimed in parts of Natal and Cape Colony, Oct. 1899.

WHEN the Boer forces invaded British territory they did not enter an entirely hostile theatre of operations. Both in Natal and the Cape Colony, the Transvaal and Free State forces met with many active and secret sympathizers. On the Cape side, in the districts occupied by the Boer commandos, the majority of the able-bodied British subjects of Dutch extraction either openly joined the invaders or aided the enemy by indirect means. Ordinary measures were inadequate to deal with invasion combined with rebellion. The situation demanded exceptional powers, and martial law was proclaimed in the Newcastle, Dundee, Klip River, and Upper Tugela districts of Natal on October 15, followed the next day by its proclamation in the Cape districts of Mafeking, Vryburg, Taungs, Barkly West, Kimberley, and Herbert.

Definition and object of Martial Law.

Martial law may be defined as the law of necessity in face of grave emergency. When the law of the land has ceased to be effective in maintaining public security the executive must employ some other force for this purpose. The object of proclaiming martial law in case of invasion is to assist the military authorities to secure the safety of the realm; in case of rebellion to enable them to restore order. Martial law can only be proclaimed in British possessions by the representative of the Crown, and in proclaiming martial law the executive announce the existence of a grave emergency, and invite the military authorities to take such steps as they deem necessary for the protection of the community while the emergency continues. There is no regular

code for martial law. The Military Commander is intrusted with absolutely arbitrary powers in the proclaimed areas, provided these are used in good faith to insure the security of his troops and the safety of the public. In these two matters the Military Commander is given a free hand, and his action is limited only by the necessity of adhering to the recognized laws and customs of war, and of using with discretion the exceptional powers given him.

The law of most foreign countries formally recognizes what is known as the state of siege,\* a state of affairs intermediate between peace and war, when it becomes necessary by proclamation temporarily to suspend or supplement the ordinary law of the land and to govern by military authority. English jurisprudence does not recognize any equivalent of the state of siege, and makes no provision for the possibility of civil war, invasion, or rebellion bringing about a state of affairs necessitating the government of British territory by martial law. According to the British legal theory there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as martial law. The word is held to connote simply a series of illegal acts committed by the executive authorities in an emergency, and acquiesced in by the judicial authorities, who, while the necessity for martial law exists, abstain from interfering with

Its need not  
be recognized.

\* The most recent instance of the state of siege was its proclamation on December 2, 1908, at Prague as a result of the disturbances caused by Czech-German animosity in Bohemia. The proclamation prescribed summary trial and the infliction of the death penalty upon all persons guilty of rebellion or incitement to rebellion against the authorities. All houses were ordered to be shut at 8 P.M., and all gatherings in the streets, and the public wearing of colours or emblems, was strictly forbidden. Under a state of siege the court of first instance acts as a court of summary procedure with military protection. The executioner, with his assistants, must be within the precincts of the court. The Vienna executioner left for Prague immediately the state of siege was proclaimed. All persons arrested *in flagrante delicto* and all whose guilt appears evident must be brought before the summary court, the proceedings of which must be carried through without interruption. If the four judges composing the court unanimously recognise the guilt of the accused, sentence of death must be passed, and carried out within three hours. Appeal is inadmissible. Only after one or more executions have given the necessary example can the tribunal admit extenuating circumstances in minor cases and inflict penal servitude from five to twenty years.

its exercise.\* The proclamation of martial law in no way alters the character of these acts or their legal consequences unless they are, after the repeal of martial law, covered by an act of indemnity. Such an act may be passed by the local legislature or by the Imperial Parliament or by both, but the former alone will not indemnify the Governor of a colony, who is only answerable to the Ministers of the Crown.

Instances of  
its enforce-  
ment in  
British  
colonies.

Before 1899 there had been but few instances in modern times of the proclamation or exercise of martial law in British territory. There were precedents in the West Indian islands, notably in Barbados in 1805 and 1816, and in Jamaica in 1831 and 1865. That in 1865 was the most important and is rendered memorable by the indictment of Governor Eyre for the murder of a coloured man named Gordon, though an Act of Indemnity had been passed by the local legislature. A Grand Jury in London threw out the indictment, but Eyre was considered to have acted wrongly in arresting Gordon outside the proclaimed district, and in trying him under martial law for an offence committed before its proclamation. In Canada, in 1838, the district of Montreal was kept under martial law for some months as a precautionary measure, though for a prolonged period the contemporaneous action of the regular tribunals was maintained. Martial law had also been proclaimed in Ceylon in 1848, and in certain districts in South Africa in 1835, 1850, and 1852, during the Kaffir wars. Nearly a century had passed since martial law had been enforced in the United Kingdom,† and over thirty years since its last proclamation in the Colonies, so it is not surprising that little provision had been made to meet its requirements in the present war. It is true that Colonel J. L. St. Clair, a

\* Several appeals against arrests or decisions under martial law in South Africa were non-suited in the Supreme Court of Cape Colony, and in one case (*Attorney-General, Cape Colony v. van Reenen and N. Smit*, 1908), which was carried to the judicial committee of the Privy Council, the latter body declined to interfere. Martial law thus rests on the consent of the judiciary, which constitutes a safeguard against its proclamation on insufficient grounds, or its undue prolongation.

† Martial law, though not proclaimed, had been enforced in Ireland in 1798 and 1803.



representative of the Judge Advocate General's Office, was appointed to General Sir Redvers Buller's Staff in October, 1899, as Deputy Judge Advocate. But martial law does not really come within the province of the Judge Advocate General, who deals only with military law, which is an entirely different subject.\* Colonel St. Clair, however, was instructed to give advice on all matters arising under the administration of martial law, though his principal duty was the review of all courts-martial held in South Africa before their despatch to the Judge Advocate General in London.

As the Boer invasion in Natal made progress, martial law was proclaimed on October 23 throughout Natal and Zululand. On the Cape side it was proclaimed on November 3 in the environs of Orange River railway bridge and De Aar Junction, and on the 15th, in view of the increasing danger from rebellion, it was extended to the districts of Colesberg, Steynsburg, Albert, Molteno, Aliwal North, Wodehouse, Glen Grey, Queenstown and Cathcart, and on the 16th to Hay.

The first Memorandum on Martial Law, issued on December 7, 1899, by order of Sir R. Buller, after reciting the object of its proclamation, detailed the officers empowered to administer martial law, and cautioned administrators against any unnecessary interference with the civil rights of peaceful citizens. The principal offences to be dealt with were detailed, viz.: (a) treasonable or seditious acts and words, or acts and words tending to excite disaffection, disloyalty, or distrust of Government; (b) enlisting or engaging in the military forces of the enemy; (c) aiding or abetting the enemy; (d) carrying on trade with or supplying goods to the enemy; destroying railways, bridges, or telegraphs, and acts endangering the safety of her Majesty's forces; also the contravention of rules and regulations made by the military authorities under the proclamation. In detailing the procedure to be followed, the existence of civil

Proclamation  
extended.  
Oct.-Nov.  
1899.

Memorandum  
issued by  
Sir R. Buller,  
Dec. 7, 1899.

\* Military law is the law contained in the Army Act, which forms part of the statute law of England, and is the law under which the soldier is governed in peace and war, at home and abroad. Courts-martial are trials under military law; a trial under martial law may be held by a special military court or by any other court that the authorities decide to constitute.

courts, sitting and administering the ordinary law concurrently with or in aid of the trial of military offences under martial law, was recognized. Military courts were to consist of at least three members, and a civil magistrate, if available, could be nominated a member. The procedure laid down for Field General Courts Martial under the Army Act was to be followed, with the addition that all evidence, including the defence (for which every reasonable facility was to be given), was to be written in full. Sentence of death was only to be passed by a unanimous verdict, and required confirming by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. The records were to be transmitted to the Deputy Judge Advocate at Cape Town. All general officers commanding, brigadiers, and commandants in the proclaimed district were given authority to administer martial law, and could depute their powers to officers not below the rank of captain under their command. Administrators were cautioned that offenders could only be arrested and tried for an offence committed within the area where martial law prevailed, and after the date of its proclamation.

Instructions  
to District  
Magistrates.

The foregoing memorandum had been preceded by a General Circular issued by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief to the magistrates of the districts in which martial law was enforced. This circular pointed out that where martial law prevailed the civil as well as the military authorities had power to arrest without warrant any person suspected of being a spy, or of assisting the enemy, and to detain him pending his trial by a special court constituted by the military authorities. It further pointed out that though the orders of the senior military officer in any locality must be implicitly obeyed there was no intention to interfere unnecessarily with the ordinary work of the civil administration, or the ordinary jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. It was the desire of the General Officer Commanding that, unless otherwise directed by the military authorities, the magistrates and the civil officers under them should carry on their work as usual. Finally the circular, while admitting that martial law gave no right to the Commander to impress persons for military service, claimed the right to

take things required for the needs of the Army at a price to be fixed by the Civil Government.

Towards the end of November, 1899, the Cape Ministry forwarded two reports of the Attorney-General, Mr. (now Sir R.) Solomon, to Sir Alfred Milner, one dealing with the proclamation of martial law, and the other with General Sir R. Buller's circular to the magistracy. The Ministers called attention to the extreme importance of exercising the greatest moderation in the administration of martial law, and suggested that all persons arrested under it by the military authorities should be handed over to the civil authorities to be dealt with by the ordinary procedure.\* They also expressed their readiness to assent to the appointment of the resident magistrate of the district as a member of the military court for the trial of offenders under martial law.

Attitude of  
the Cape  
Ministry.

During the early months of the war few officers could be spared from active operations in the field to carry on the administration of martial law, and those that could be detailed had no previous experience of their duties, and did not understand fully the nature of the powers they were called upon to exercise. The principal objections urged against the extension of the area under martial law were the want of system in its administration and the delay in investigating the cases of persons arrested under it. There was a tendency throughout the Colony, from the Ministry downwards, to make complaints against the military administration, and owing to the novelty of the situation, it was inevitable that some awkward incidents should arise. In December, 1899, after the battle of the Modder River, gaol accommodation at the front being limited, an important prisoner, arrested under martial law, was sent down to Cape Town for safe custody. His friends immediately applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. This was granted, and the man would have been released, had he not been returned promptly to the proclaimed district, where the writ could not be served. The rebels captured by

Administra-  
tion of mar-  
tial law in  
early part of  
the war.

\* The Attorney-General had expressed doubts as to the legality of military courts existing side by side with civil tribunals.



Colonel Pilcher on the 1st January, 1900, at the Sunnyside fight were also sent outside the proclaimed area, tried by the civil power, and sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The undue leniency shown in this instance probably encouraged many British subjects to throw in their lot with the invaders. Up to January, 1900, only fourteen cases appear to have been tried by military courts. The heaviest sentence was one of five years' penal servitude, commuted to two years' imprisonment with hard labour, for high treason and rebellion, by aiding and abetting the enemy in the destruction of the Modder River railway bridge. The other sentences were very light.

Issue of  
second mem-  
orandum,  
Jan. 1900.

On January 30, 1900, the Chief of the Staff, Lord Kitchener, issued a second memorandum, which, in addition to embodying the instructions contained in the first memorandum, empowered administrators to make special local regulations, where necessary, for the preservation of order, or the protection of the troops within their command, such regulations being framed so as to interfere as little as possible with the civil rights of peaceful inhabitants. A breach of the local regulations issued by a Commanding Officer was made an offence to be dealt with by a military court. The memorandum also dealt with the proceedings on arrest, the immediate discharge of persons against whom no evidence was forthcoming, and the remanding for a reasonable time of those against whom evidence could be obtained later. Officers and magistrates were authorised to deal summarily with offences of an unimportant character, or in the case of trifling breaches of the regulations, to transfer the case to the civil authorities, to impose a fine with an alternative of imprisonment, and to sanction the removal of a convicted person from a proclaimed area, on his entering into a personal bond not to return until the war was over. The memorandum was accompanied by a circular cautioning officers to sift carefully charges of disloyalty made against colonists of Dutch extraction, and pointing out that sympathy with an enemy of like race is not an offence, unless accompanied by an act of disloyalty. The dual capacity of the magistracy as civil magistrates and assistants and advisers to the

military administrators was also pointed out; and finally, officers were instructed that if their preliminary investigations disclosed the commission of a serious offence of high treason, likely to entail a death sentence, and if prompt action was not urgent, application should be made for the trial of the offender before a mixed commission composed of a judge of the Supreme Court as president and four officers.

In view of the Boer invasion, and of the rebellion in the western districts of the Colony, martial law was extended to the districts of Philipstown and Hopetown on January 15, to Prieska, Kenhardt, Britstown, and Barkly East on March 5, and to Gordonia on March 23, 1900.

Enforcement  
extended in  
Cape Colony.

Subsequently (May-June, 1900) the commandants administering martial law, in addition to their judicial duties, were made responsible for the general control of the Cape Police in the proclaimed area. They were responsible that all police duties were performed and that the orders of the civil commissioners and resident magistrates were carried out. They were instructed to detail the police for such duties as watching drifts, patrolling rivers, and as guides to military patrols. Passes and permits had to be issued and examined, arms registered, and search made for secreted arms and ammunition.\* To assist future requisitioning, should it be necessary, a census was made of vehicles, cattle, and horses. Measures had to be taken to prevent looting by natives and cattle thefts.

Duties of Ad-  
ministrators.

The occupation of Bloemfontein and the quelling of the insurrection in the Colony left large numbers of the Cape rebels, captured or surrendered, in the hands of the British. By Lord Roberts's instructions the rebels were arranged into two classes: (1) The ringleaders and those who had been actively engaged in assisting the enemy, or in planning and propagating rebellion in Cape Colony; (2) the rank and file, who had been commandeered, or otherwise induced to join

End of the  
first Cape  
rebellion.  
Classification  
of rebels.

\* At first rewards were paid to natives, without public notice, for information as to the secretion of arms and ammunition, but later, in view of the danger of arms being concealed in order to obtain the reward, all information given was sifted most carefully, and rewards publicly offered.

the enemy, or take up arms against the Government. The intention was to keep under arrest all Class 1 rebels, and make a preliminary inquiry into their cases with a view to their trial. Meanwhile their stock was attached, and a caretaker placed in charge. The stock of Class 1 rebels who had absconded was similarly treated. In accordance with the orders of Lord Roberts, Class 2 rebels had been permitted to return to their homes subject to recall. Lists of these rebels with any charges against them were to be sent to the General Officer Commanding, Cape Town.

Treatment of  
rebels.

On these instructions Brigadier-General Settle, the Inspector-General of the Lines of Communication, who was in control of the military administration in the districts under martial law, issued to the administrators of the districts under martial law various circulars dealing with the treatment of rebels and their possessions. The stock of rebels who had absconded was ordered to be collected, and representatives of the transport, remounts, and supplies selected, at a valuation, what they required for their respective departments. After leaving sufficient on the farms to support the families of the rebels the remainder of the stock was sold. The money received was paid over to the Field Paymaster. The immovable, as well as the movable, property of Class 1 rebels who had absconded was attached, and could not be sold without the order of a Civil Court.

Conditions  
of bail.

On July 7, 1900, instructions were issued warning persons against the danger of harbouring rebels or keeping rebel stock on their farms without declaring the same. Later in the month commandants were empowered to release Class 1 rebels on substantial bail, the amount to be assessed in conjunction with the civil magistrate. The following were not allowed bail :—Members of Parliament or of Divisional Councils and Municipalities, Justices of the Peace, Field and Assistant Field Cornets, or occupants of any other official position in the Colony, or who had accepted any official position under the enemy, such as that of Landdrost, Commandant, or Field Cornet, or who had prepared commandeering lists, or been members of a Boer War Committee, etc. In September, 1900, the military authorities notified the banks in



proclaimed districts that all sums and securities lodged with them by Class 1 rebels and absconded rebels were attached, and that no payments were to be made on their account without the previous sanction of Commandants.

On June 6, 1900, when the fall of Pretoria offered a reasonable pretext, Ministers approached the Governor with a view to his withdrawing martial law in the proclaimed districts at the earliest possible moment. They presented a report from the Attorney-General recommending that prisoners under martial law should have the fullest and freest access to their legal advisers, and suggested that those accused of high treason should have greater liberty to deal with their assets, and that bail should be allowed in most cases. Finally, Mr. Solomon, while not recommending the general withdrawal of martial law, considered that there was no necessity for maintaining it in the Queenstown, Glen Grey, Steynsburg, Molteno, and Cathcart districts, and that its administration might be modified in the Aliwal North, Albert, Colesberg, Wodehouse, and Barkly East districts.

Cape  
Ministers  
advocate  
withdrawal  
of martial  
law, June 6,  
1900.

Sir A. Milner agreed to the proposal to withdraw the Cathcart, Queenstown, and Glen Grey districts from the area of martial law, and generally accepted the Attorney-General's recommendations as to the treatment of the rebel prisoners. But he strongly defended the military authorities against any charge of arbitrarily using the powers intrusted to them under martial law. His summary of the situation is worth quoting :

Sir A.  
Milner's sum-  
mary of the  
administra-  
tion of  
martial law.

“By far the most formidable of the powers which may be arrogated to themselves by the military under martial law is that of trying and punishing persons guilty of rebellion. In the present case, except while the rebellion was actually in full swing, nobody has been tried for acts of rebellion or treason by military courts. Even while the rebels were under arms by thousands, the number of persons so tried was exceedingly small, and as soon as rebellion was stamped out in any quarter trial by military courts (except for breaches of mere disciplinary regulations, involving trifling punishment) was entirely suspended. Scores of rebels have been captured in fight, thousands have surrendered

their arms, but there are not six persons at present in prison in this Colony who have been confined and sentences passed on them by military courts for acts of rebellion. No single rebel has been put to death, and the heaviest punishment inflicted on any of them at the hands of the military is two years' imprisonment with a fine of £1,000. The persons arrested by the military for high treason—with very few exceptions—have either been brought to trial before the ordinary tribunals of the land, or they are detained pending the decision of Parliament on the proposal to establish a special court to deal with their cases."

On August 16, 1900, martial law was withdrawn from the Molteno district, and on October 11 from the Steynsburg and Britstown districts, excluding De Aar.

Indemnity  
Act passed,  
Oct. 1900.

The resignation of the Schreiner Ministry in Cape Colony, owing to the refusal of certain of its members to acquiesce in even the mildest form of penalty for rebellion, has been related elsewhere.\* With the help of Mr. Schreiner, Mr. Solomon, and a few of their former supporters, Sir Gordon Sprigg was, however, able to pass an Act entitled, "The Indemnity and Special Tribunals Act, 1900," which was promulgated on October 12.

Constitution  
of Special  
Courts.

The first chapter of this Act indemnified the civil and military authorities for acts done under martial law and confirmed the sentences of the military courts. The second chapter constituted a special court for the purpose of trying all cases of high treason and crimes of a political nature. The special court was constituted of three persons, two at least to be judges of the Supreme Court. Cases committed before or within six months after the passing of the Act were to be tried by the special court without jury. The court had the same powers as the Supreme Court, and was to try the ringleaders only. The accused might be represented by counsel, the sittings were to be in public, a decision of the majority of the court was to be the judgment of the court, but in case the decision was not unanimous, an appeal could be made by the accused to the Supreme Court.

Commis-  
sioners'  
Courts.

Chapter III. of the Act created Commissioners' Courts to deal with Class 2 rebels. The number of Commissioners

\* Vol. iv., p. 497.

was to form some multiple of three, and one in every three was to be a practising advocate, or some person who had filled the office of resident magistrate for not less than ten years. Three commissioners were to form a quorum, and the decision of the majority was to be the judgment of the court. The sittings were to be in public. The accused, if he pleaded guilty, or if found guilty of high treason, or of a crime of a political nature, was sentenced to be disenfranchised for five years. During the six months following the passing of this Act all Cape Colony rebels were dealt with under its provisions.

The fourth chapter dealt with compensation for loss or damage sustained through military operations or the acts of the enemy or rebels. As a result of the passing of the Indemnity Act the administrators of those districts still under martial law were gradually relieved of the control of the cases against rebels. All completed investigations against those of Class 1 were forwarded to the Deputy Judge Advocate General for transmission to the Attorney-General. Lists of Class 2 rebels, as soon as completed, together with all affidavits and other documentary evidence, were transmitted also to the same quarter. Officers were instructed to give every facility for the holding of the special court and the Commissioners' Courts in their areas, and to give every reasonable assistance to prisoners in preparing their defence.

The Act was substantially the one which Mr. Schreiner, the leader of a Bond Ministry, had recommended, and its provisions were marked by a leniency which it would be difficult to parallel, and the wisdom of which may well be open to question. The measure undoubtedly reflected the general impression that the war was practically over, and that the avoidance of ill-feeling was more important than the infliction of an effective deterrent to further rebellion. In the same spirit the stringency of martial law was now relaxed generally in all areas, especially in such matters as the attachment of stock and the circulation of newspapers.

In Natal steps had also been taken to deal with the local rebels arrested in the early months of 1900. On June 29 1900, the local legislature passed an act which empowered

Compensation for loss or damage.

Leniency of the Act.



Constitution of Special Court for high treason in Natal.

the Governor to appoint three persons to be Special Commissioners, who were to constitute a Special Court for the trial, without a jury, of all cases of treason, whether committed before or after the coming into force of the Act. One at least of the Commissioners was to be a Judge of the Supreme Court. The Natal Special Court continued its sittings till December, 1901, when, in view of the near completion of its work, the Natal ministers arranged with Lord Kitchener that the cases of all Natal rebels in the field, who might be captured outside the colony, should be dealt with by the military authorities under martial law.

Situation in Natal as compared with that in Cape Colony.

Little more need be said about the administration of martial law in Natal. The Natal ministers had not the same difficulties to contend with from Dutch sympathizers as faced the Cape Ministry. There was no recrudescence of rebellion as in Cape Colony. This was due, not only to the smaller percentage of Dutch in Natal and to the retirement of the Republican forces from the country, but also largely to the fact that as early as October 23, 1899, directly the magnitude and progress of the Boer invasion was recognized, martial law was proclaimed throughout the whole of Natal and Zululand. No attempt was made to restrict the "area of necessity" as in the Cape Colony, where the area was extended very slowly and very grudgingly until it gradually embraced the whole country. In modern warfare, owing to the means of rapid communication due to telegraphs, railways, and motors, it is inadvisable to limit the area in which martial law is enforced to the actual zone of military operations.

Further proclamation of martial law in Cape Colony, Dec. 1900-Jan. 1901.

On December 16, 1900, Hertzog and Kritzingen crossed the Orange River. This entry into Cape Colony was followed by a fresh outbreak of rebellion which the civil Government, with the ordinary means at its disposal, was powerless to cope with. It became necessary to have recourse again to martial law, which was proclaimed on December 20 in the districts of Britstown, Victoria West, Richmond, Hanover, Murraysburg, Graaff-Reinet, Aberdeen, Middelburg, Steynsburg, Cradock, Tarka, Molteno. On December 27 martial law was extended to Beaufort West and Carnarvon; on

January 7, 1901, to Calvinia, Clanwilliam, Piquetberg, Malmesbury, Tulbagh, Paarl, and Stellenbosch; and on January 17 to the whole of the Colony, excepting the Cape ports, Wynberg, and the native territories. Meanwhile fresh instructions were issued by the civil and military authorities to deal with the second outbreak of rebellion. All offences of a political nature were to be tried by the newly-installed courts till the expiration of the new Act on April 12, 1901. Commandants were authorised to make special regulations for prohibiting meetings, checking the movement of undesirables in and out of their districts, restricting the sale of liquor to troops and natives, and preventing the circulation of seditious or inflammatory matter, or the carrying of arms. Breaches of these regulations were to be dealt with by the resident magistrates acting as deputies of the military commandant. In January, 1901, after it had become essential to denude certain districts of horses and other animals to prevent their falling into the hands of the invaders, instructions were issued as to the requisitioning and purchase of these animals.

On February 8, 1901, there was issued another pamphlet, which, after defining the legal position of those administering martial law, drew attention to the advantage of a uniform system of administration in all the proclaimed districts, and informed commandants that in order to ensure this a set of model regulations to replace those in local use was in preparation. Local amendments were only permitted if sanctioned by the Chief Staff Officer, Lines of Communication. Districts not invaded or immediately threatened were not to be unduly cleared, but every horse and other animal likely to fall into the enemy's hands was to be removed. Commandants were further instructed not to try cases themselves, but to appoint the local magistrate as their deputy for this purpose. Instructions were given also as to the treatment of the press, and with regard to inflammatory writing and speaking.

Further  
instructions  
issued, Feb.  
1901.

On April 6, 1901, a notice was issued by the Attorney-General, Mr. T. L. Graham, to the effect that, in accordance with the provisions of the Act promulgated on October 12,

Military  
Courts.  
Their func-  
tions as pro-  
posed by Cape  
Government,  
April, 1901.

1900, acts of treason and rebellion committed after April 12 would be dealt with by civil courts under the Common Law. If carried out this would have greatly delayed, if not indefinitely postponed the trial of rebels taken in arms. On the 14th Lord Kitchener telegraphed to the Governor, calling attention to the serious state of the midland and north-western districts of Cape Colony, and proposing that all overt acts of rebellion should be tried by military courts. On the 17th the Governor, Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, replied in a telegram embodying a Report by the Attorney-General with which the Ministers concurred. The Attorney-General reluctantly admitted that there were certain districts where the civil courts could not adequately deal with the cases of treason and rebellion, which were increasing within their jurisdiction, but urged that military courts should only deal with those accused of actively bearing arms with the enemy, treacherously doing some overt act which endangered the safety of the troops, wrecking or firing on trains, wanton personal outrages upon his Majesty's subjects, and other acts of similar nature or gravity. He proposed that the military courts should be carefully constituted, so that only officers of experience and judgment should sit on them; that the evidence be fully recorded, and the prisoner given every facility for his defence; that every sentence be confirmed by Lord Kitchener; and that where a death penalty was given the proceedings should be read by a competent legal adviser on his staff.

Instructions  
to district  
administra-  
tors, May 1,  
1901.

To these stipulations Lord Kitchener agreed, and on April 22 published a notice to the effect that on and after that date all persons in the districts in the Colony where martial law prevailed were liable for trial by military tribunals for the offences enumerated above. As a result of this notice the military authorities in Cape Colony once more had to revise their instructions. Major-General Wynne, who in April had succeeded General Forestier-Walker as General Officer Commanding in the Colony, sent out to all concerned, on May 1, a pamphlet dealing with the new situation. Embodying as it did the experiences gained during the first eighteen months of the war, the pamphlet



enabled administrators to carry out their work uniformly and effectively and with a clearer idea of what was required of them. The pamphlet consisted of two parts, the first dealing with martial law and its administration, while the second contained the regulations to be enforced under it. These were framed with the view to give the necessary security to districts without unduly interfering with the every-day life of their residents. A second edition of the pamphlet was published in October, 1901, and a third edition on May 1, 1902. This final edition will be examined more fully later.

Down to April, 1901, martial law had been carried out with little severity, and the regulations enforced in proclaimed districts were little more severe than the police regulations recently existing in some Continental countries. With the country overrun by commandos and marauding bands, one of which actually penetrated to within 35 miles of Cape Town, and with a large portion of the population openly or latently disloyal, it was imperative to take more severe action to prevent the invader receiving reinforcements in men, arms, or horses. Gradually the regulations enforced were rendered more severe, till, towards the end of the war, in those districts in which active operations were in actual or threatened progress, consideration for the inhabitants had to give way, in large measure, to military requirements. Dutch farmers now found that they could no longer openly express their sympathy with the invaders, and that assistance given to the Boer bands was fraught with danger to themselves. More even than passive neutrality was required of them, and British subjects were informed that they must be actively on the side of the Crown, and were bound to give every assistance, short of actual military service, to suppress the rebellion.

The stricter administration gradually had the desired effect in hampering the movements of the Boer commandos, but its introduction was the cause of innumerable complaints from those who, hitherto, had been accustomed to sympathize with, or indirectly assist, the invader with little risk to themselves. Members of Parliament, inundated with complaints

Greater  
severity of  
martial law.

Its beneficial  
effect

from their constituents, called the attention of Ministers to every alleged grievance, and Ministers passed them on, usually without inquiry, to the already overworked General Officer commanding the Cape District. This officer, on his part, had for some time past been hampered in dealing effectively with the situation in Cape Colony by the fact that martial law was not in force in the Cape ports. The military authorities knew that the enemy was receiving recruits, ammunition, supplies, and correspondence through these ports, and had pressed on the Cape authorities the desirability of bringing them under martial law. The Cape Government did not at first see their way to comply, but later, after Sir G. Sprigg had proceeded to Pretoria to confer personally with Lord Kitchener, an agreement was reached, and the Governor proclaimed martial law on October 9, 1901, in the Cape Town, Wynberg, Simonstown, Port Elizabeth, and East London districts. The agreement stipulated that the military authorities should leave the control of the harbour, docks, and railways in the hands of the civil authorities, and should not interfere with the ordinary course of business, or the liberty of well-behaved persons. The military were to exercise control over the landing and departure of undesirables, and had the power to deport persons who were not British subjects. They might censor letters and messages, but only with the object of preventing intelligence reaching the enemy. Breaches of martial law regulations were to be tried by the resident magistrates, and no military courts were to be established at the ports for the trial of British subjects, and no British subject was to be removed from the ports for trial or detention elsewhere. No commandeering of goods and animals was to be permitted in the newly-proclaimed areas, and British subjects were not to be arrested by order of the military authorities, save upon an affidavit charging them with the commission of a crime, and upon the certificate of the Attorney-General that such affidavit justified the arrest. In order to prevent munitions of war and other means of assistance reaching the enemy, the Prime Minister pledged himself to a thorough examination of all cargoes landed at the ports, and the

Martial law  
proclaimed at  
the Cape  
ports, Oct. 9,  
1901.

military authorities were given full power to supervise such examination.

The proclamation of the Cape ports greatly strengthened the hands of the military authorities, who at the same time were relieved of an immense amount of work by the establishment of a Board to consider all complaints regarding the administration of martial law in the Cape Colony, pecuniary claims against his Majesty's Government excepted. The Board consisted of three members nominated by the Governor, the Prime Minister, and the General Officer commanding Cape Colony respectively. They had no power to review the proceedings of military tribunals, and only dealt with grievances of administration. The opinion of the Board was to be that of the majority, and was to be communicated to the General Officer commanding Cape Colony, who was to take action unless he disagreed, for military reasons, with the decision, in which case he had to refer the matter to Lord Kitchener for settlement. All officers, including those whose own acts were called in question, were ordered to give the Board every information in their power and to facilitate the Board's investigations in every manner. Communications for the Board were to be transmitted direct to the Secretary, without being delayed or censored in any way. It was to the interest of the military that every real wrong should be righted, and every well-founded grievance, if possible, removed, and the institution of the Martial Law Board assisted their efforts in this direction. In addition to relieving the overworked Cape staff the Board served as a safety valve, conciliating many who chafed under imaginary or exaggerated grievances, and drawing attention to any real hardship that existed. The members nominated were Mr. (now Sir Lewis) Michell, the well-known South African banker, Mr. J. J. Graham, Secretary to the Law Department, and Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Fearon; the latter was succeeded later by Captain George Cockerill, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Cape Town, an officer who, during the previous two years, had had much experience in dealing with martial law, and who was afterwards attached to the Royal Commission on Martial Law Sentences. The Board, composed

Martial Law  
Board  
established in  
Cape Colony  
to deal with  
complaints.



of broadminded men of the world, formed a strong triumvirate, and by their actions fully justified their selection. On December 3 Mr. Michell, the President, in an interim report, informed the Governor that the Board had inquired into 199 cases. In the majority of instances the Board held that complainants had suffered through some misconduct of their own, or were deported, imprisoned, or otherwise made to suffer on reasonable grounds of suspicion. In certain cases where a miscarriage of justice had occurred, owing to a lack of legal experience, or to action having been taken on information apparently reliable, but impossible for the moment to check, the grievances had been redressed. The Martial Law Board continued its work till July 25, 1902, when it was dissolved. During the ten months of its existence 540 cases were brought before it, of which 135 were outside its scope, 90 were adjusted satisfactorily without its direct intervention, 50 were adjusted owing to the termination of the war, 64 were redressed through its recommendation, while in 219 cases the Board decided not to interfere.

Further administrative changes,  
Dec. 1, 1901.

On December 1, 1901, a fresh change had been made in the method of administering martial law, and the system now introduced remained in force practically unchanged till the end of the war. Cape Colony, which embraces an area more than five times that of England, was divided into eight military districts, and with a view to securing uniformity of administration each of these was subdivided into one or more areas, or groups of magisterial districts. Hitherto commanders of military districts, in addition to exercising military command, had carried out the administration of martial law; for the future they were relieved of this last duty, which was transferred to officers called Administrators of Areas, who, exercising no military command, were able to devote their whole energies to the proper administration of martial law in their areas. Administrators were assisted by a staff, and by a deputy in each magisterial district (usually the resident magistrate), and were responsible, through the officer commanding their military district, to the General Officer at Cape Town. The resident magistrates,

as deputy administrators, were instructed to put the benefit of their local knowledge and experiences of civil administration at the service of the military. Administrators had the power of arrest without warrant, but the power was sparingly used. In addition to powers of arrest, administrators had the power to order any person suspected of disaffection to give security for his good behaviour, or to report himself at stated intervals to the military authorities, or to reside within a defended area. When the state of a district demanded it, farmers and others were liable to receive orders to remain on their farms.

Offences were classified into three categories: offences involving trial by military court, minor breaches of martial law regulations, and common law offences. Military courts had the power of sentencing to death an offender found guilty of a serious offence. Any officer in command could convene a military court, or depute his powers to officers not under the rank of captain under his own command. Two standing military courts were established for the trial of serious offences, one at Graaff-Reinet, and another in the Western district. The time had arrived for greater severity to be shown, and some 700 rebels were sentenced to death by these courts, though only 35 death sentences were confirmed by Lord Kitchener. Of the 35 death sentences confirmed, 31 were carried into effect in 1901 and 4 in 1902. The majority of the men executed were British subjects taken in arms against their country, but a few members of the enemy's forces were shot for breaches of the laws and customs of war. A typical instance of the former case is that of Commandant Lotter, captured on September 5, 1901, and tried by a military court at Graaff-Reinet on September 27. Lotter was a British subject and was tried on 9 charges, 2 being for murder; he was found guilty of all the charges, and was shot on October 12, 7 other British subjects of his commando sharing the same fate. A good instance of the second case is the trial of Commandant Scheepers, a burgher of the Free State. This officer was arraigned on no less than 30 charges, 7 being for murder, 1 for attempted murder, while others included flogging a

Method of  
dealing with  
offences.

British subject, placing prisoners in the firing line, and 15 cases of arson. The prisoner was found guilty of all the charges, except the fifth charge of murder, and was sentenced to death by being hanged. The sentence was commuted to death by being shot and was carried into effect on January 18, 1902. The Dutch suppressed all allusion to the more serious charges and spread the report that Scheepers was shot only for train-wrecking and arson. The case of General Kritzing, a burgher of the Free State, who was tried on March 29, 1902, on four charges of murder and one of destroying the railway, ended more happily, as the late Assistant Chief Commandant of the Boer forces in Cape Colony was found not guilty on all the counts. The greater portion of the rebels whose sentences were commuted were deported to Bermuda or elsewhere, while others were sentenced to terms of imprisonment or were fined. Minor breaches of martial law regulations were usually summarily dealt with by the administrator or by his deputy at the preliminary investigation. The punishment inflicted could not exceed a fine of £60, or imprisonment for six months, with or without hard labour, or one or both of such penalties. Ordinary common law offences were dealt with by the magistrate under the ordinary law.

General  
instructions  
to adminis-  
trators.

Administrators were instructed to move constantly through their area, supervising the administration of their districts, and to deal personally with matters that affected the safety of troops, delegating to their deputies those which concerned the preservation of good order among the civil population. In disturbed districts a small force was specially allotted, where necessary, to support the administration; elsewhere no troops were detailed for this purpose, though in special circumstances troops were obtained on application to the officer commanding the Imperial or Colonial forces in the district. Whenever operations on a large scale were in progress in a district, or it was within striking distance of the enemy's main commandos, the commandant of the military district could, on his own initiative, declare the district to be within the "area of operations," with a view to the more rigorous enforcement of precautionary measures.



The military authorities possessed the right to requisition animals, vehicles, supplies and stores of all kinds to supply the wants of the Army, or to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. Buildings or land for erecting temporary structures required for military purposes could also be requisitioned. Requisitioning and purchasing were carried out by an officer on the staff of the commander of the military district, who communicated his requirements to the administrator, who in turn issued instructions to the resident magistrates of districts; the receipts for supplies so obtained were furnished by the magistrate. If those whose property was requisitioned considered the value assessed inadequate they could appeal to the administrator. Trafficking in receipts was forbidden.

All goods likely to be of use to the enemy, such as food-stuffs for men and animals, tobacco, blankets, rugs and similar goods, harness, saddlery and leather, clothing and underclothing, boots, shoes, and *velschoens*, horse-shoes, nails and shoeing implements, bolt clippers and wire cutters, cycles and automobiles, field glasses and telescopes, arms, ammunition, dynamite and other explosives, were classed as "prohibited goods," and every effort was made to prevent their reaching the Boer commandos. Check was kept on the landing of these stores at the Cape ports, and consignments of these goods were not accepted by the railways except for certain garrisoned stations on the railway lines. These stations, and other places where stores existed, selected by commandants of districts, were to form "centres" from which the inhabitants could replenish their supplies, the administrator controlling the distribution. The stocks of civil stores not situated on the railway were kept at the minimum required to replenish the district. A careful check was kept on the drawing of supplies, so that farmers should not draw from more than one centre. In "areas of operation" prohibited goods were only permitted in unrestricted quantities in such towns and villages as had garrisons strong enough to defend them. Elsewhere no householder, except in special cases, was permitted to have more than seven to fourteen days' supply of food-stuffs. Wheat, barley, mealies,

Requisition-  
ing of  
animals,  
supplies, etc.

Steps taken  
to prevent  
"prohibited  
goods" reach-  
ing the  
enemy.

oat hay, potatoes, tobacco, and other produce were also brought into defended towns and stored. When the enemy was in the vicinity, the crops that could not be brought in were destroyed, and all animals, vehicles, and prohibited goods were ordered to be at once brought into defended towns for protection. No compensation was paid for animals, supplies, and stores which fell into the hands of the enemy. The amount of cultivation allowed was fixed by the administrator in consultation with the magistrate. The sale of wheat and barley was restricted and the bulk of the oat hay was requisitioned. All horses, except those actually required for work on the farms, were taken over by the authorities to prevent their being used as remounts for the enemy's commandos.

Check kept  
on inhabi-  
tants. The  
permit  
system.

To enable a check to be kept on the inhabitants in "areas of operation," the name and description of every person living outside defended limits was inscribed on a printed form affixed to the front door of the house or farm occupied. Patrols had orders to arrest any unauthorised person found in any house or farm, and to note the names of absentees, who, failing a satisfactory explanation, were liable to be treated as rebels. Whenever the enemy was in the neighbourhood, persons suspected of the intention of joining or assisting the Boers were ordered into a defended town, with orders to report periodically to the military authorities. In special cases, where the person suspected was a man of undoubted local influence, he could be removed to another part of the district, or, with the approval of the general, to another district. In the case of indigent people brought into a town, or when no lodgings were procurable, they were maintained at the public expense. Foreign subjects were not to be arrested or removed unless it could be clearly proved they had committed some distinct breach of neutrality. A permit was required to enter, leave, or move to and fro in a district, or to enter or leave any town in a district except for the purpose of bringing produce to market, or animals for sale to the military, or to report oneself, attend church, or seek medical advice in case of sickness. Those travelling were compelled to proceed direct to their

destination, and report themselves, on arrival, to the Deputy Administrator. When the enemy was in a district, the district passes were withdrawn, and not re-issued till he had left. Road passes were most sparingly issued, and carried on the back a description of the holder to prevent their fraudulent transfer. A visitor or stranger arriving at any house or farm had to be reported by the occupier. Trading passes and hawkers' licences were suspended, and commercial travellers were not allowed to move through a district unless provided with a special permit. Hotel proprietors were made responsible for people visiting their hotels, and had to supply the Deputy Administrator with a daily report of their visitors.

Except meetings in authorised places of worship for religious purposes, and those of the divisional and municipal councils, all meetings, whether in public places or private houses, indoors or in the open air, were prohibited unless previously sanctioned by the Deputy Administrator. A meeting was defined as the gathering of six or more people. Inflammatory speaking and writing, directly inciting persons to take up arms, was dealt with under martial law, other cases being dealt with by the resident magistrate in his civil capacity under the ordinary law for seditious libel. Newspapers were only prohibited if they excited disaffection or fostered sympathy with the enemy. Every person was ordered to remain indoors between certain fixed hours—usually 10 P.M. to 5 A.M.—and no lights were allowed, after a certain hour, except in cases of sickness or emergency. Precautions were taken to prevent signalling communication with the enemy, and bonfires and the burning of coloured lights were prohibited. The sale of liquor was controlled, and it was forbidden to sell or give drink to a soldier or native. Bicycles were registered, and regulations issued forbidding the sale, purchase, or unauthorised wearing of military uniforms or colourable imitations, and the sketching or photographing of defences. Letters and private telegrams were liable to be censored, and the latter were not permitted in cipher. The unauthorised possession of arms, ammunition, and explosives was a serious offence, and anyone knowing of such possession, and not reporting the same, was

Other  
regulations.



liable to prosecution. Stringent regulations were published forbidding consorting or communicating with, or harbouring the enemy. The failure to report immediately the presence of the enemy, or to lay information against those who joined or assisted the enemy, was made an offence. Farmers were warned that it was their duty to render active assistance towards locating the enemy's presence, and to obtain all information possible as to his numbers, armament, condition of horses, and intended movements, and that an attitude of neutrality on their part was quite inconsistent with loyalty, and would render them liable to be tried by a military court.

Good effect of  
the regula-  
tions. Their  
reasonable-  
ness.

The steady application of martial law on these lines rapidly produced good results. Farmers realized for the first time that it was to their interest to end the war, and the invaders experienced great difficulties in supporting their commandos and in replacing their used-up horses. General Smuts, in his report on the state of the Colony, wrote that thousands of the Cape Dutch were anxious to join him, but were deterred by the absence of horses, which had been collected in every district, and stated that if animals were not so scarce it would be possible to cause a general rising. The scarcity of bread and forage, due to the new regulations, prevented the concentration of any large force of the enemy. The system of passes and registration was most unpopular, but undoubtedly it stopped many from joining the enemy, and prevented rebels concealing their arms and posing as peaceful members of a farmer's family. The system was introduced at the request of the commanders of mobile columns, and, by its means, several stragglers from the Boer commandos were apprehended, and the movements of Boer emissaries engaged in fomenting insurrection and collecting information were much hampered. Denuding the country of horses and mules gave rise to more grievances than any other measure adopted. If the collection was enforced strictly, endless complaints were made by the farmers, who brought pressure to bear on the Cape Ministers; if, on the other hand, a district was not swept bare of animals, column commanders telegraphed to headquarters that their movements were hampered by the enemy obtaining fresh

horses. In one district alone where undue leniency was shown, the enemy obtained 300 remounts from horses left on farms. Complaints were made, also, that in some districts pressure was put upon inhabitants to join the town guard or the local defence forces, and that persons refusing to join were threatened with imprisonment or were actually confined, and that in other cases persons were lodged in gaol and kept for long periods without being dealt with. In the few cases where inquiry proved there was some foundation for the complaints, redress was given, but in the majority of instances the action taken was shown to be fully justified. War cannot be carried on with kid gloves, and individual hardships are inevitable. No doubt mistakes were made occasionally by the military authorities, but, on the whole, martial law was enforced with moderation and discretion. The best officers could not always be spared from field operations, but the authorities carefully selected those that were available, and, with few exceptions these carried out their difficult duties satisfactorily, and with little unnecessary friction. A word of praise is due also to their deputies, the civilian resident magistrates, who, in the majority of cases, worked in loyal co-operation with their military colleagues. These men, especially when of Dutch descent, were in a difficult position. Their association with military government tended to make them unpopular in districts in which they formerly held important and influential positions, and in which they had to remain when the war was over.

The military authorities had evolved a very different administration at the end of the war from the system first introduced. At the outbreak of war the only districts proclaimed were those in which active operations were in progress, and martial law was administered by officers, not only inexperienced in its working, but with their energies fully taxed by other and often more pressing duties. Few had any intimate knowledge of the country, or of the Dutch character, while nearly all were ignorant of the *taal*, and so were dependent on interpreters, who were often strongly biassed against their Dutch fellow-colonists. On the other hand, the Cape Ministry, returned in large measure by Dutch

Development  
of martial  
law during  
the war.

votes, watched carefully every action of the military authorities likely to give offence to their constituents, and used all their influence to reduce the area affected by martial law, and the powers of those administering it. Considering all these circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that officers at first made little effective use of the powers given to them. Contrasted with this, at the end of the war we find martial law in force throughout the Colony, administered on a uniform system by officers thoroughly acquainted with its requirements and able to devote their whole energies to enforcing a clearly-drawn code of regulations. Civilian magistrates are acting in close co-operation with, and as the deputies of, military administrators, while many of the latter are not only thoroughly acquainted with the country and people, but are also able to deal directly with them without an interpreter. Civil courts and military tribunals are seen working side by side without friction, while the higher civil courts in the Colony refuse to interfere in cases arising out of arrests made by military administrators, or with the judgments of military courts.

The end of  
martial law.  
The Royal  
Commission  
and the Act  
of Indemnity.

As soon as peace was concluded, every effort was made, by civil and military authorities alike, to restore the normal condition of affairs as rapidly as possible. Called into being by a grave emergency, and justified only by necessity, martial law fell into abeyance as soon as the danger had passed, and law and order had been restored. It was formally and finally repealed on September 16, 1902. The enforcement of martial law was naturally resented by rebels and by those politicians who sympathized with them, and determined efforts were made to force the Sprigg Ministry to acquiesce in a general inquisition into all proceedings carried on under the military *régime*. The Imperial Government solved the difficulty by the appointment, on August 2, 1902, of a Royal Commission to inquire into the sentences passed by military courts during the war. The Commission, which consisted of Baron Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England, Mr. Justice Bigham, and Major-General Sir John Ardagh, inquired into 794 cases in Cape Colony and Natal, and remitted or reduced certain sentences



of the military courts. In November, 1902, the curtain falls on the administration of martial law in Cape Colony with the passing of a final Act of Indemnity giving all those concerned with the administration of martial law full protection against future prosecution for acts ordered or done in good faith in the exercise of the special powers entrusted to them during the period of its enforcement. Martial law was repealed in Natal on October 4, and in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies on November 19, 1902.\*

It would be a national blunder if any of the experiences of the South African War, bought at such cost in men and money, were lost. Martial law lasted for three years during and after the Boer War, and, since that campaign, has twice been reintroduced into South Africa, in connexion with native outbreaks. It would seem, therefore, that the time has come for English jurisprudence to recognise its necessity and existence, and for British jurists to study the practical and rational system gradually evolved in South Africa, and, taught by our costly experiences in that country, to codify a set of Martial Law Regulations, much in the same manner as the first Hague Conference codified the laws and customs of war applicable to the Military Administration of Occupied Territory.† But, so far, little has appeared in print to assist our military administrators of martial law and occupied territory in future campaigns. The defects of our system of military government reflect in great measure the defects of the British race. As a nation we have small regard for system, and little capacity for prevision. Moreover,

Conclusion.

\* Martial law was not proclaimed in Rhodesia.

† After the insurrection in Jamaica in 1865 the Royal Commissioners in the Report to the Queen expressed their belief that "much which is now lamented might have been avoided if clear and precise instructions had been given for the regulation of the conduct of those engaged in the suppression of the disturbances." The Government on this considered whether any general regulations could be laid down for the guidance of officers who in times of civil disturbance are called upon to exercise extraordinary powers after the declaration of martial law, and issued a circular despatch, dated Jan. 26, 1867, enclosing certain proposed rules to be introduced on the subject of martial law into the volume of Colonial Regulations. These proposed rules were republished in 1906 in the Blue-book: Natal—"Correspondence relating to Native Disturbances in Natal," Cd. 2905.

on this particular issue our national ignorance of the meaning of war inclines us towards mistaken leniency in dealing with our enemies, whom we try to conciliate during hostilities, often at the expense of our friends. Martial law and military government, as these terms are understood by the great military powers of Europe, were never enforced throughout the war, and possibly never will be under our present system of party government. The French, Germans, and Russians in South Africa considered our martial law regulations mild to the verge of weakness, while the majority of the British and Colonials, who did not understand what war is, considered the same regulations far too drastic. How drastic martial law can be, may be realized from the study of Davoust's military administration of Hamburg in 1807, or of the system enforced by the German army in France in 1870-71. Should British territory ever be invaded—and many thinking soldiers consider this by no means impossible—the sternness with which martial law will be enforced will strike terror to the heart of a population accustomed to regard human life as the most sacred thing in the universe.

## CHAPTER XI

## THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY\*

THE invasion of the territories of the Boer Republics necessitated steps being taken to administer the area in effective occupation by the British forces. Recent British campaigns had given the Army no experience of the varied responsibilities entailed in the military occupation of a conquered territory inhabited by a European population. The Hague Conference of 1899 had codified certain laws and customs of war applicable to the subject, but time had not permitted these rules to be embodied in military regulations, nor was either Republic a party to the agreements arrived at by the Conference. Their purport, as regards the administration of occupied territory, shortly amounted to this: That territory cannot be considered occupied till the authority of the invader is established and can make itself felt; but that, when a belligerent so occupies a territory, the responsibility for administering it devolves upon him, and he is bound to do all that lies in his power to maintain public security. The inhabitants cannot be compelled to take an oath of allegiance, or to take part in military operations against their own country, and they are entitled to have their lives, rights, family honours, religion, and private property respected, unless the latter is required for military purposes.

General rules  
laid down by  
Hague Con-  
ference, 1899.

\* The present chapter only deals with the administrative work carried out by the military authorities during the months immediately following the occupation of Bloemfontein and Pretoria, regarded as an essential concomitant of the military operations, and as affording a useful experience for any possible future campaign in a civilized country. The work of political and administrative reconstruction in the new colonies during the progress of the war has been fully dealt with in Part I., ch. i.



Contributions of money and requisitions of animals, vehicles, stores, supplies and labour can be levied for the needs of the Army, but all pillage is prohibited. If the invader collects taxes he must do so in the usual manner and defray out of them the cost of administration. Individuals who do not comply with orders or who commit prohibited acts can be punished; but no general penalty can be inflicted on the inhabitants for the act of individuals, unless the population can be proved to be collectively responsible for the misdeeds. A belligerent has the right to seize State property, and is authorized to make full use of all railway plant, telegraphs, telephones and war material, even when belonging to private persons, but is prohibited from seizing, destroying or intentionally injuring any religious, charitable or educational institution, or historical monuments or works of art or science.

*The Military Administration of the Orange Free State*

Lord Roberts's first proclamations. The oath of neutrality.

On entering the Free State, Lord Roberts issued the first of many proclamations to the burghers of the Republics. After briefly reciting the cause of his invasion, the proclamation warned all burghers to desist from further hostilities, promising that those who complied and remained quietly in their homes would not be made to suffer in person or property in consequence of their having taken up arms in obedience to the orders of their Government.\* A further proclamation,

\* On entering France in August 1870, the German authorities issued a proclamation to the following effect:—"From this moment military government is established. It will be applied in the French territory occupied by the German forces to all acts which tend to compromise the security of the troops, and to cause them damage, or acts which assist the enemy. As soon as a notice is fixed in any part of a canton, military government will be vigorously exercised throughout its area. All persons who do not form part of the French army and cannot establish their status as soldiers by external signs, and who (1) serve the enemy as spies; (2) lead the German troops astray when ordered to serve them as guides; (3) kill, wound, or rob persons attached to the German troops, or followers of the German forces; (4) destroy bridges or canals, damage telegraphs or railways, destroy roads, burn stores or supplies, or quarters of the German troops; (5) take up arms against the German troops: will be punished with death. In each case the officer ordering the trial will appoint a military court to inquire into the affair and pronounce judgment. Mili-

issued on March 15, two days after the occupation of Bloemfontein, contained the following :

"All burghers who have not taken a prominent part in the policy which has led to the war between Her Majesty and the Orange Free State, or commanded any forces of the Republic, or commandeered or used violence to any British subjects, and who are willing to lay down their arms at once, and to bind themselves by an oath to abstain from further participation in the war, will be given passes to allow them to return to their homes and will not be made prisoners of war, nor will their property be taken from them."

The proclamations were distributed, not only in the Bloemfontein district, but were also disseminated through large tracts of the south of the Free State by small parties sent out with this special object. Meanwhile, though many of the Bloemfontein residents were British in their sympathies, the capital of the Free State was full of Boer partizans and stragglers from the commandos. Major Poore, the Provost-marshal, with several assistants, was soon hard at work administering to these men the oath of neutrality, and taking over any arms and ammunition they produced. The wording of the oath ran thus :

"I, the undersigned . . . . . of . . . . . in the district of . . . . . do solemnly make Oath and declare that I have handed in and given up all arms and ammunition demanded of me by the British authorities, namely, all rifles and rifle ammunition of whatsoever description they may be, and that I know of none such being concealed or withheld by anybody whatsoever. And I further swear that I will not, at any time, furnish any members of the republican forces with assistance of any kind, or with information as to the numbers, movements, or other details as to the British forces that may come to my knowledge. I do further promise and swear to remain quietly at my home until the war is over. I am aware that if I have in any way falsely declared

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tary courts can award sentence of death only. The sentence will be immediately carried out. The commune to which the guilty person belongs, as well as the district in which the act was perpetrated, will be liable, in every case, to a fine equal to the annual amount of the land tax."

in the premises, or if I break my oath or promise as above set forth, I shall render myself liable to be summarily and severely punished by the British authorities. I make the above declaration solemnly believing it to be true, so help me God.

"Before me . . . . ."

On subscribing to the above, burghers were provided with a pass to proceed to their own homes. Many burghers undoubtedly left Bloemfontein fully intending to act up to their oath and take no further part in the war, but few had sufficient courage to stand the consequences of their refusal to rejoin their commando, when the order to do so was backed by force. To their honour be it said, in a few cases, burghers did adhere to their oath, even when threatened with death if they did not again take up arms; but the test was too severe for the majority, and military courts, before whom offenders were charged with "breaking the oath of neutrality," recognized this by the leniency with which they treated prisoners guilty of this offence.

General  
Pretymann  
made Military  
Governor of  
Bloemfontein  
and of the  
O.F.S.

The occupation of Bloemfontein, accompanied as it was by a general collapse of Boer authority in the southern portion of the Free State, and likely to be followed by a still further extension of the British occupation in the near future, would have necessitated some provision for the establishment of a military administration, even if permanent annexation had not been contemplated by the British Government. On the afternoon of March 13, the date of his entry into Bloemfontein, Lord Roberts appointed Major-General Pretymann to be Military Governor of the town, with Major O'Meara, late Chief Staff Officer at Kimberley, as his assistant.\* There were no military regulations prescribing the duties of a military governor, and no special instructions were issued. General Pretymann was left to discover the scope of his new authority as well as to

\* The Germans divided the French occupied territory into four governments, viz., Alsace, Lorraine, Rheims, and Versailles, each under a military governor-general assisted by a civil commissary. German officials in most cases replaced the French prefects and higher officials, but use was made of the minor and municipal French officials who could be induced to remain in office.



exercise it. The first consideration was the maintenance of order in Bloemfontein. The Commissioner of Police was strongly anti-British and had already been relieved from duty, but a sergeant and some Dutch and Kaffir policemen had been left in the town by the retreating Boers, and the services of these were retained and the usual police patrols sent out. The house of the head of the Free State Intelligence Department was searched for documents, and warrants issued for the arrest of four prominent Boer officials known to be at large in the town. The arrest of these men was the cause of some little friction with the Provost-marshal, who considered that his prerogative had been infringed, and the men were released a few hours later. The incident may appear trivial, but it has some importance as being the first of many difficulties in the Free State and, later, in the Transvaal, due to the want of definite instructions in the British service as to the powers of a military governor and his relations with the other military authorities in his sphere of administration. Owing to this lack of prevision there was much overlapping of work, and regulations, made after careful consideration by military administrators, were overruled on occasion by senior officers operating in the same area. The results were equally unsatisfactory to military commanders, to administrators, military and civil, and to the inhabitants. While Lord Roberts remained at Bloemfontein he was able to co-ordinate the work of administration and military command, but when the main advance was continued the powers and position of General Pretymann still remained very undefined. By a proclamation of April 20 he had been appointed Military Governor and Administrator of the whole of the then occupied territory of the Orange Free State, and of all districts that might hereafter be occupied by the British forces, with power to control and direct all matters connected with their government. But his relations with Lieut.-General Kelly-Kenny, who now took over the military command of the same area, were nowhere clearly laid down. Each, for instance, had his own intelligence officer and his own assistant Provost-marshal. With the best wish to co-operate there were bound to be

Indefiniteness of his powers.

differences between two departments covering the same ground. The liberal issue, by the Military Governor's office, of passes to burghers to ride in and out of the town, and the appointment of ex-burghers to various offices, were inevitable sources of friction. It was not till towards the end of the year that this duplication and confusion was stopped by instructions sent from Pretoria for the Military Governor's intelligence officer to report himself in the same capacity to the general in command.

Desirability  
of securing  
local  
co-operation.

The first consideration of a military administrator should be to make full use of the knowledge and services of the local authorities, provided they are trustworthy and are willing to continue in office, at any rate till such time as arrangements can be made to replace them. The extent to which this can be done will, of course, vary with the nature of the different departments. Some departments are of immediate consequence to the military, some are less so, while others, though of vital importance to the civil population, have practically no bearing on military affairs. Railway and other communications, telegraphs and telephones, and the administration of the police, directly affect the conduct of war and should be controlled entirely by military officers; civil supplies, postal and customs services and sanitation, indirectly affect military operations and should be controlled jointly by the civil and military authorities; while purely civil institutions, such as, for instance, an orphan chamber, *i.e.*, public trustee's office, need no control by the invader, though their continuance in time of war may be greatly to the interest of the inhabitants. The co-operation of the existing authorities and of prominent inhabitants generally is no less desirable to allay apprehensions and to establish confidence in the population, and to secure advice on all matters affecting national customs and prejudices, which it is always well to regard as far as military exigencies allow. In this respect the British task was facilitated by the large proportion of the inhabitants of both Republics who were either active partizans of the British cause or prepared to acquiesce in its success, and by the absence of any really profound difference between the

general conditions in the Republics and in the adjoining colonies.

Bloemfontein was practically the only town of importance in the Free State, and in it were centralized the headquarters of the various departments in existence prior to the war. These consisted of the Treasury, the Judicial Department, the Government Secretary's Department, those of the Auditor-General, the Attorney-General, the Surveyor-General, Public Instruction, Public Works, Customs, Railways, Postal Services, Registration of Deeds, the Orphan Chamber, and the Bankruptcy Court. Some of these departments were set going at once. Lieut.-Colonel Girouard, the Director of Railways, was appointed Administrator of the State Railways on the day Bloemfontein was captured, and the railway and railway telegraph services were resumed as far as circumstances permitted. The ordinary telegraph service, also the the property of the State, was taken over at once by the military authorities and worked by the Director of Telegraphs in the interests of the Army. On the day following the occupation the banks were notified that the accounts of the Republican Government, and those of some of their supporters, were attached, and the managers were directed to send instructions to their branches in all parts of the country informing them of this interdict, and forbidding any payments being made till an order of release had been obtained from the military authorities. Persons whose accounts were attached were compelled to apply to the Military Governor for a release. The Post Office was visited immediately on the entry of the troops, the stock of stamps seized and the cash balance taken. Four days later Lord Roberts reinstated Mr. Falck,\* the late Administrator of Civil Posts and Telegraphs, and placed him in charge of the civil postal service in the Free State. In a few days the sale of stamps and exchange of mails with the Cape Colony and the south of the Free State was renewed; the stamps issued were the old Orange Free State stock surcharged V.R.I., and were largely bought by the Army and public. The annual postal

Railways,  
telegraphs,  
Post Office,  
etc., taken  
over.

\* Officials of the O.F.S. had to take the oath of allegiance before being reinstated in their old appointments.



revenue of the whole Free State, before the war, was only £10,000, yet in six weeks the Bloemfontein office sold £9,000 worth of stamps, and the Postal Department cleared a profit of £16,000 out of the £26,000 received in the first seven months of the occupation. The money was needed by the administration, which felt the loss of receipts from the State railways and telegraphs, which formerly had contributed some 50 per cent. of the Free State revenue.\*

Revenue and  
Customs.

It was the desire of the authorities from the outset to make the administration self-supporting, and every effort was made to collect revenue. As soon as railway accommodation was restored two skilled accountants were obtained from Cape Town, and Mr. Emrys Evans, an ex-official of the Standard Bank and late British Vice-Consul at Johannesburg, was appointed Financial Adviser, and took control of the Treasury and of all financial affairs in the Free State. There were not many sources of revenue, as the Free State Boer paid few direct taxes. There was a small tax on land known as quit-rent, and efforts were made, with a fair amount of success, to collect this in the more settled districts of the occupied territory. The only other sources of revenue available of any account were the customs and trade licences. To facilitate commerce between the Free State and the British colonies, Lord Roberts, on March 15, issued a proclamation declaring null and void the proclamation issued in December, 1899, rendering unnecessary the protesting of promissory notes, bills of exchange, and other negotiable paper, and followed this action up on the 20th by issuing a further proclamation continuing the provisions of the customs convention existing prior to the war between the British colonies and the Free State. The customs service was reopened, and Mr. Meiring, the Collector of Customs, and several of his assistants under the late Government, were reinstated in their old appointments. The customs receipts amounted to over £65,000 in the first seven months of the military administration, while stamp duties, native poll tax, and claim licences amounted to nearly £27,000 in the same period. Owing to these receipts the Military Adminis-

\* The estimated revenue of the O.F.S. for 1899 was about £700,000.

tration was able to meet the interest on the Free State debt as it fell due.

The Auditor-General's office was closed, as was practically that of the Registrar of Deeds, and though the Public Works Department was reopened under its old chief, Mr. Northcroft, little work was undertaken owing to the necessity of economy and the unsettled state of the country. The Orphan Chamber was permitted to reopen and continue working, under the late Government officials, in administering the estates of all deceased persons. The necessity of restarting the Orphan Chamber is apparent when it is explained that no widow or widower could re-marry whilst the office was closed. The war had made many widows, and even as early as March, 1900, a few of these had already considered the question of re-marrying.

To assist the Military Governor in drafting proclamations and in other legal matters, Mr. Hopley, one of the Cape Colony judges, was appointed Legal Adviser, but, after holding the office for some few weeks, was succeeded by Mr. Tancred, a Johannesburg solicitor. The High Court had been closed when Bloemfontein was occupied, and, pending a decision as to its reconstitution under the future Crown Colony system, serious and urgent cases were dealt with by military courts. In view, however, of the fact that the natives showed a tendency to give trouble, and of the necessity of maintaining order, it was considered expedient to re-open the old Landdrost's Court for the trial of criminal offences. Mr. Collins, late Under Government Secretary of the Free State, was appointed landdrost, and reopened the court on March 19. Criminal cases were dealt with by this court under the law of the Orange Free State. The term "landdrost" was changed later to that of resident magistrate. The services of the civil police were retained, but their numbers being quite inadequate for the efficient policing of the town, they were supplemented by military police. All natives were ordered to be in their locations after 8 p.m.

The Mayor and Town Council of Bloemfontein were encouraged to remain in office after the British occupation, and their powers, held from the Free State Government, were

Other departments.

The administration of justice.

Municipal affairs.

confirmed at a later date. There was at one time a certain amount of friction between the Military Administration and the Town Council, as the latter was not prepared to recognize that the situation was an exceptional one, and that the requirements of the military authorities had to be met by it. Good sanitation was necessary in the municipal area in view of the large number of troops camped round the town in March, April and May. Although the municipality was in receipt of £1,000 a month from the military authorities, it did not, in the opinion of the latter, afford its sanitary officer and city engineer sufficient support or means to carry out the necessary sanitary measures. The Military Administration, therefore, took the matter in hand, doubled the number of municipal carts and scavengers employed, and generally looked to the repair and cleansing of roads, the removal of carcases and emptying of rubbish pits, the purity of the water supply, and other important sanitary measures. It seems desirable in the future to appoint an engineer officer in every large town to control municipal services during a military occupation. This was done later in Johannesburg, with good results. To encourage farmers to bring in fruit, vegetables, butter, milk, eggs, poultry and forage, the town market was reopened, at first under military control, but, after May 8, under the superintendence of the Bloemfontein Town Council. The opening of the market was a great boon to the hospitals and messes, but it assisted the Boer secret service in communicating with their agents in the town, and in obtaining intelligence as to the numbers, disposition, and movements of our troops, though, no doubt, its institution proved equally valuable to our own Intelligence Department. The export of food from Bloemfontein was controlled to prevent Boer parties in outlying districts replenishing their supplies from the town; a special permit was necessary to send grain, produce, foodstuffs and live stock outside the Orange Free State border.

Administra-  
tion of the  
country  
districts.

It soon became obvious that the outlying country districts required a closer control than could be exercised from Bloemfontein, and it was determined to appoint officers to represent the Military Governor in the outlying districts as



these were occupied. Gradually, as this area extended, the whole of the Free State was divided up into thirteen districts, each of which was administered by a District Commissioner, with usually an officer, as Assistant District Commissioner, to help him in the work. Nearly half the officers appointed were obtained from Militia, Yeomanry, and Colonial Corps. The headquarters of districts were at Jagersfontein, Smithfield, Wepener, Ladybrand, Bloemfontein, Boshof, Hoopstad, Winburg, Bethlehem, Harrismith, Kroonstad, Heilbron and Vrede. District commissioners were instructed to maintain law and order in their districts, and to collect all revenue as it became due. They were to collect all saddle horses in their district and to requisition all transport superfluous to farm requirements. They were responsible that all burghers in the district were deprived of arms and ammunition, and were instructed to apply to the nearest garrison for officers to form a military court should it be necessary to try any inhabitant for a grave offence. With a view to establishing civil courts for the trial of criminal cases, and to assist the district commissioners in their work, an attempt was made to reappoint certain of the Free State landdrosts, but the system did not work well. Some of those appointed were actively hostile, while others proved feeble and useless. Few of the old local officials were eventually retained, and most of them were replaced by resident magistrates. The majority of the appointments to resident magistrate were allotted to Yeomanry or colonial officers, but later vacancies were filled by the High Commissioner, usually from members of the Cape Civil Service. To towns too small to require a resident magistrate, local justices of the peace were appointed, selected from leading storekeepers or farmers in the district.

The new administrative system at first seemed to promise well. The majority of the burghers in the country districts in the southern portion of the Free State took the oath of neutrality, many rifles were handed in, and farmers showed a disposition to settle down and cultivate their land. A small force of Provisional Mounted Police was raised by calling for volunteers from irregular corps, and Inspector Lorimer, chief of the detective police in Kimberley, came

Initial success  
of the ad-  
ministration.

from that city to assist in their organization. The conditions of service published in Army Orders proved attractive, and many applications were received from men of the right stamp; but commanding officers objected to let their best men leave, with the unfortunate result that, finally, only 180 were obtained out of the authorized establishment of 300. The duties of the police were to put down cattle stealing and prevent natives from molesting the property of Dutch farmers, in addition to supporting the authority of district commissioners and other British officials in the district. In May and June, 1900, the principal towns in the occupied districts were garrisoned, and the support of these troops strengthened the position of district commissioners and enabled the police patrols to move about more freely and to get in touch with the farmers in outlying districts. District commissioners had no control over the troops in their areas, unless they happened to be the senior officers present in case of attack.

The adminis-  
tration  
collapses,  
Sept.-Nov.,  
1900.

In July, August and September, owing to military requirements elsewhere, the garrisons were reduced, and in some cases withdrawn altogether, and the district commissioners were left in many instances with little material support beyond a few of the Provisional Mounted Police and possibly a troop of Yeomanry or one or companies of infantry. As a result, officials found great difficulty in carrying on their duties, or even in remaining at their posts at all. In one or two instances where exceptionally good officers had been appointed who combined energy, administrative ability, and consummate tact in dealing with the farmers in the districts, these were able to maintain their position for some time by the force of their individuality alone. Unfortunately such officers were the exception among the district commissioners and resident magistrates provisionally appointed. Nor can this be wondered at when it is considered that practically none of the officers had any previous experience in, or training for, civil administration, while, in addition, commanding officers could ill afford to spare their best regimental officers from their units. The features of the collapse were the same in most districts. At first Boer

scouts entered in twos and threes, followed shortly by small roving bands from twenty to seventy strong; these being unmolested, gradually gathered strength, reoccupied unprotected towns, and in some instances drove out, or captured, the garrisons of those that were occupied in insufficient force. The Ladybrand, Smithfield, and Jagersfontein districts were overrun by Boer marauding parties during September. During the next two months these were joined by large numbers of surrendered burghers in the southern districts, and further reinforced by fresh contingents from the north. By the middle of November all civil administration, outside the immediate proximity of towns held by British garrisons, was practically at a standstill.

In spite of the unfortunate retrogression in the military situation, the High Commissioner was resolved not to delay any longer with the establishment of a civil administration on a permanent basis in the new colonies. In January, 1901, Major Goold-Adams, the Administrator of British Bechuanaland, was appointed Deputy Administrator of the Orange River Colony, and took over the administration from General Pretymann on February 3. The administration was rapidly divested of its military character, and the majority of the officers employed in it returned to military duty. The military offices which had been in existence under the Military Governor were abolished or their work transferred to the military authorities. The civil departments were retained and the old Free State officials, who had been employed temporarily by the Military Governor, were mostly continued in their respective offices. Three officers were retained temporarily as district commissioners at Harrismith, Boshof, and Bloemfontein, while the duties of the remaining district commissioners were taken over by the resident magistrates. By September, 1901, the last of the military officials had disappeared, and the civil administration in outlying districts was entirely in the hands of the magistrates, who received their instructions on general subjects from the newly-appointed Secretary to the Administration, and on legal and financial matters from the legal and financial advisers at Bloemfontein. On June 28, 1901, a special criminal court

Establishment of a civil administration in the O.R.C.



of three magistrates was established for the trial, without jury, of civilians charged with serious offences. The proclamation establishing the court also gave resident magistrates a limited jurisdiction in civil cases. Martial law was enforced throughout the Orange River Colony concurrently with this civil jurisdiction. Apart from the troops and those followers of the Army subject to military law under the terms of the Army Act, all inhabitants of the colony were liable to be dealt with by military tribunals for any serious breach of martial law regulations. General and other officers commanding had power to convene these military courts, which were assembled also by column commanders operating in the field, for the trial of prisoners charged with an offence against the laws and customs of war.

The South  
African Con-  
stabulary.

For police purposes the whole of the colony was mapped out into eight districts, to be taken over by the newly-raised South African Constabulary. Each of these districts was placed in charge of a Major of the Constabulary, who was given certain powers to make regulations analogous to those under martial law, and was authorized to deal summarily with disturbers of the peace. As early as June, 1901, the S.A.C. had begun to make their influence felt in the country by establishing posts from Jacobsdal on the western border, through Petrusburg and Abrahams Kraal, as far east as Thaba 'Nchu, and gradually, with the assistance of some five hundred burgher police,\* an area round Bloemfontein was cleared of the enemy, within which farmers could cultivate the land and graze flocks and herds collected from outlying districts. In the main, however, the S.A.C. in the Orange River Colony, and still more in the Transvaal, were able to do but little of the work for which they were originally raised, and were perforce confined to purely military duties.

Lessons of  
the military  
administra-  
tion.

Before dealing with affairs in the Transvaal it is advisable to consider the lessons to be learnt from the military administration of the Free State territory before the establishment of a civil government. The first and most obvious is the necessity of defining the duties of a military governor and of his subordinates, and their position with regard to other

\* See vol. v., p. 248.

officers exercising military command within the area of their jurisdiction. Similarly, the military and civil staff required to assist in the administration should be worked out, and officers who possess the requisite qualifications should be noted in peace time, and, once appointed, should not be removed without strong reason. At Bloemfontein, in ten months the Military Governor had both his Chief Staff Officer and Assistant Provost-marshal changed, and no less than four different officers were placed in charge of his Intelligence Office in the same period. Continuity of work under such conditions is difficult. There is no doubt, too, that in some cases insufficient care was exercised in the selection of subordinate officials, especially in the country districts, with the result that the administration lost authority with Dutch and British alike. The attempt to conciliate the Dutch by an easy-going display of confidence in their goodwill did not meet with the success anticipated, and adversely affected the military situation. Conciliation of that character during the progress of hostilities is usually ascribed to weakness, and is best reserved till such time as peace is restored. The change of system which followed on Lord Roberts's realization of the failure of the policy of over-confidence, and the various menacing proclamations issued between May and September 1900, have been dealt with in a previous volume.\* Some of the expedients then adopted, more particularly to meet attempts to wreck the railway line, such as, for instance, the imposition of heavy fines on the inhabitants in the neighbourhood, the destruction of their houses, the placing of prominent residents on the engines of trains when danger was anticipated, were copied from the example of the Germans in 1871.† But they were not well suited to the

\* Vol. iv., pp. 490-495.

† In October, 1870, the Commander of the Second German Army issued a proclamation declaring that all houses and villages giving shelter to *Franc-Tireurs* would be burned unless the mayor of the commune informed the nearest Prussian officer of their presence immediately on their arrival in the commune; all communes in which injury was done to railways, telegraphs, bridges or canals were to pay a special contribution, notwithstanding that such injury might have been done by others than the inhabitants, and even without their knowledge. At the end of January, 1871, the French destroyed the railway bridge over the Moselle at

peculiar conditions of the South African War. Except for the burning of a number of farms, there was no means of enforcing them. Lastly, there was little real intention of enforcing them, in such cases, for instance, where the death penalty was threatened. Proclamations of such a character should be as few and as clear as possible, and should contain no threat which cannot and will not be enforced effectively and without delay. It cannot be said that the British proclamations during the war fulfilled these conditions.

*The Military Administration of the Transvaal.*

The occupa-  
tion of  
Johannes-  
burg.

In the Transvaal the chief interest, as far as military administration is concerned, centres in the measures taken for the administration of the great industrial area of the Witwatersrand. During the advance from Bloemfontein it was recognized that the capture of Johannesburg would entail serious responsibilities. It was known at Army headquarters that the majority of the Dutch officials of that town were on commando, and that few of those remaining could be trusted to serve British interests; it was resolved, therefore, to replace them by British subjects on the arrival of the Army. For this purpose four Johannesburg gentlemen, Messrs. Wybergh, Hoyle, Douglas Forster and Samuel Evans, travelled up from Cape Town and joined the Army in order

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Fontenoy. On account of this action the Governor-General of Lorraine inflicted a fine of 10,000,000 francs on the district, the village of Fontenoy was burnt, and the mayor of Nancy was ordered to find 500 workmen to repair the bridge within twenty hours. He was informed that, should these men not be forthcoming, the superintendents first, and a certain number of workmen afterwards, would be seized and shot, while in addition all the public works, factories, mines, etc., in the department would be closed down, and employers who kept their works open would be fined from 10,000 to 20,000 francs for every day they so offended. On a previous occasion the Governor-General of Rheims issued the following order:—"Railways having been frequently damaged, the trains shall be accompanied by well-known and respected persons inhabiting the towns or other localities in the neighbourhood of the lines. These persons shall be placed on the engine, so that it may be understood that in every accident caused by the hostility of the inhabitants, their compatriots will be the first to suffer."



to assist the Military Administration, on arriving at Johannesburg, in dealing with the various complicated problems which would have to be faced, while a number of others were summoned up immediately after the occupation. During the halt at Kroonstad a complete scheme for organizing the military government of the town was drawn up. When Johannesburg was occupied on May 31, Lord Roberts detailed the 15th Brigade for garrison duty, and appointed Colonel Colin Mackenzie, his Director of Field Intelligence, to be the Military Governor of the town and adjoining districts, with Lieut.-Colonel Davies, Grenadier Guards, as Military Commissioner of Police. Mr. Wybergh was appointed to look after the mines, Mr. Evans was made Civil Commissioner, and Mr. Forster legal adviser to the Military Governor. The district placed under the Military Governor's jurisdiction extended from Randfontein on the west to Springs on the east, a distance of nearly fifty miles. Contained in this area of five hundred square miles were mine buildings, plant and machinery, representing the expenditure of many millions of pounds, while the town itself maintained before the war a population of over 100,000. At the time the troops entered many houses and places of business were shut up, and the population numbered less than 25,000 Europeans and Boers. Few British subjects remained, and the majority of the foreigners had strong Dutch sympathies. Several hundred of the latter, who had served on commando, sought safety in the town when the Boers retreated northwards. The presence of this anti-British foreign element, a portion of whom had come to the Transvaal during the war as soldiers of fortune, added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.

The first consideration was the security of the town. Early in the war the Transvaal police, the "Zarps," had been withdrawn for service at the front, and their duties were taken over in Johannesburg by a special police force, mainly composed of neutrals working under the orders of Dr. Krause, acting commandant of the town. These men were asked to continue temporarily in office till arrangements could be made to relieve them. Meanwhile, on the arrival of

Measures of security.

the 15th Brigade, arrangements were made with its commander to dispose his troops so as to control the town. Johannesburg, with its immediate environs, was divided into six districts, and a small force of troops assigned to each of these areas. The orders given to the troops were to turn all natives out of the town and confine them to their locations and mine compounds, to repress all rioting and looting, and to keep the streets clear of civilians between sunset and sunrise. Before the advent of the British some of the poor Dutch, with the riff-raff of the foreign population, and a few natives, had started looting unoccupied houses and business premises, and, had not this been suppressed promptly, the loss of property would have been great.

The police  
administra-  
tion of  
Johannes-  
burg.

To control the six areas, officers were appointed as district commissioners. These officers maintained law and order and enforced in their area all regulations and police notices issued from time to time. They collected all arms, registered and issued passes to the inhabitants on their taking the oath of neutrality, exercised limited judicial functions, conducted the preliminary investigations in more serious cases, and were generally the channel of communication between the inhabitants and the Military Commissioner of Police. This combination of police and judicial duties, though usually inadvisable, worked well under martial law. During the first few weeks of occupation over 2,000 rifles were collected, and the oath of neutrality administered to over 10,000 male Europeans in addition to the issue of residential, riding, bicycling, and various other passes. The inhabitants quickly learnt to apply to their district commissioners in cases where they desired assistance and advice, and the way in which the great majority of the population settled down under martial law speaks well for the ability with which these officers carried out their varied and unaccustomed work. The district commissioners were directly responsible to Colonel Davies for the discharge of their duties, and, from time to time, this officer issued instructions for their guidance in the form of police circulars. In addition to exercising a general control over district commissioners, the Military Commissioner of Police was concerned with the arrest of prisoners

of war, the deportation of undesirables, the issue of police regulations, the granting of permits to travel by rail, and of passes conferring special privileges, the protection of the property of absentees, the ejection of persons in unlawful occupation of premises, the dealing with claims for compensation for damage done, or property taken on requisition by the troops, and other miscellaneous matters. During the first days of occupation it was necessary to deal summarily with any infringement of regulations, as some of the inhabitants showed a tendency to give trouble, but a strict enforcement of martial law soon brought the population to order. One of the first steps taken was to raise a temporary military police, by calling upon battalions in Johannesburg to furnish the numbers required to police the town efficiently. The men obtained, few of whom had any previous police experience, did good work during the few months their services were needed; they were gradually replaced in the beginning of 1901 by a permanent police force recruited from time-expired men serving in South Africa. The organization of this force was worked out by Mr. (now Sir E.) Henry C.S.I., the present Commissioner of Police for the metropolis, who also introduced the finger-print system of identification into the Transvaal.

The policing of the area outside the municipal limits was intrusted to the troops in the district, and to the Special Mine Police raised by the Republican authorities. A fortnight after the occupation, the 28th Company of I.Y. was added to the police force, and took over the control of the country to north of the town, and, six weeks later, the Railway Pioneer Regiment was placed at the disposal of the Military Governor for police work on the Witwatersrand. This area was divided into the six districts of Boksburg, Germiston, Ophirtown, Braamfontein, Maraisburg and Krugersdorp.\* Lieut.-Colonel Capper, commanding the Railway Pioneers, was made responsible for protecting the greater part of the Rand from the attack of Boer commandos, as well as for the policing of the area. Carefully selected posts were occupied and artificially strengthened, and a detailed system

The outside districts.

\* Assistant Commissioners were appointed to Boksburg and Krugersdorp.



of control introduced. Over 900 rifles were collected, and nearly 5,000 residential passes issued outside the municipal area. During the first nine months of the occupation the District Military Police lost 9 killed and 10 wounded in the numerous skirmishes and attacks made on patrols and posts, but they accounted for 11 killed, 32 wounded, and 37 prisoners in the same period.

**The Criminal  
Investigation  
Department.**

A Criminal Investigation Department was also introduced and organized by Messrs. Chadwick and Izdebski, two experienced detectives from Kimberley. At first the services of the more reputable of the Transvaal Detective Department were made use of, as these men knew the locality, and were acquainted with the more notorious criminals in the town, but by degrees they were replaced by British subjects. Efforts were made, not altogether without success, to stamp out two prevalent crimes, the theft of raw gold and the illicit liquor traffic. Large quantities of Delagoa Bay spirit, intended for native consumption, were seized and destroyed, and, in some instances, those concerned with this demoralizing trade were sentenced by the military courts to heavy fines and long terms of imprisonment with hard labour.

**The Military  
Tribunal and  
Chief Magis-  
trate's Court.**

Within a week of the occupation the Military Governor, by proclamation, constituted a permanent Military Tribunal to deal with all criminal cases, with jurisdiction over the whole district and town of Johannesburg, and with power to administer such punishments as it might determine. The Military Tribunal consisted of three officers, a president and two members. A sentence of death required the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief. By the same proclamation a Chief Magistrate's Court was constituted, to be presided over by an officer, with powers to dispose of all criminal cases, save and except murder, treason, sedition, rape, robbery, arson and concealment of arms. The chief magistrate was empowered to sentence a convicted prisoner to imprisonment not exceeding two years, or to a fine not exceeding £100, or to any number of lashes not exceeding fifty. Major O'Brien, East Lancashire Regiment, was appointed president of the Military Tribunal, and Captain Victor Ferguson, South Wales Borderers, Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg. During the ten months these

courts were in existence, the Military Tribunal tried 483 cases, resulting in 416 convictions, and the Chief Magistrate's Court 839 cases, with 607 convictions.\* The more serious were murder and manslaughter, usually the result of Kaffir quarrels, or acts committed by organized bands of natives on the families of Dutch or Italian farmers in the Klip River district. The infliction of the capital penalty in three of these cases acted as a deterrent to the repetition of similar offences. The first trial in the Military Tribunal, the case of *R. v. von Gehso*, a German subject, charged with cutting down the Union Jack at the Court House, took place on June 4. The case is typical of the promptness of military justice, as the accused in this case was tried, condemned, and commenced his term of imprisonment, all within two hours of the committal of the offence.

The Military Commissioner of Police had from the first realized that careful watch would have to be kept on the large number of disaffected foreigners in the town, many of whom were without employment or means of support. It was known that this element meant mischief, but it was not till July 13 that sufficient evidence was forthcoming to enable any definite action to be taken. On that date reliable information was obtained from more than one source that preparations had been made for a rising on the following day, when it was expected that many officers and soldiers of the small British garrison would attend a race meeting which was taking place outside Johannesburg. A number of foreigners who had been on commando or were in sympathy with the Boers, working in conjunction with the Boer element in the town, intended to take advantage of the exodus to the races to attempt to retake the town for the Boers. The Military Governor, on becoming aware of the gravity of the situation, gave the Military Commissioner of Police authority to arrest all those who might reasonably be supposed to be concerned in the rising. Immediate

The contemplated Johannesburg rising. Promptitude of the authorities. Deportation of foreigners.

\* Many cases were complicated by the nationalities of the witnesses. It was no unusual thing to have three or four interpreters employed in one case. It was estimated that at least twenty-seven different languages were spoken in Johannesburg, including such tongues as Turkish, Greek, Russian, Yiddish, Tamil and Chinese.

action was taken on these instructions, and a number of adventurers and low-class hangers-on of the mining community were arrested, and those whose consuls would not vouch for them were deported. The measures adopted proved effective, and prevented not only any outbreak at the time, but any further trouble in the future. Through the action of the police 364 British or neutral subjects who had served on commando were made prisoners of war, and 475 disaffected foreigners were deported. In addition, over 1,100 indigent foreign subjects were given free passages to Europe, on the recommendation of their respective consuls.

The Cordua  
plot.

In this connexion reference may be made to another plot, or rather attempt to get up a plot, which was discovered at Pretoria about the same time, and led to one of the very few executions which actually were carried out after a sentence of death imposed by a military court in the occupied territories. The originator of the plot, Hans Cordua, a young German who had come out to the Transvaal shortly before the war, and had been made a lieutenant in the Transvaal forces, was tried by a military tribunal on two charges: (1) violating his parole in two instances; (2) treacherously conspiring against British authority. The evidence produced at the trial showed that Cordua, who had been released on parole in Pretoria, had endeavoured to induce Major Erasmus, of the State Artillery, and other ex-officers and burghers to enter into a plot to kidnap Lord Roberts and other officers of the British army in Pretoria. To induce the former to join him Cordua stated that he was in communication with General Botha and the Boer commandos in the neighbourhood. The prisoner was arrested outside the outpost lines dressed in British uniform. Cordua was found guilty of both charges and sentenced to be shot. The sentence was carried into effect. Although Cordua thoroughly deserved his fate his case created great excitement among the Dutch, while the fact that he had been assisted in arranging his plot by a South American named Gano, a detective in the pay of the British, evoked considerable sympathy in England.

Native affairs.

The question of controlling the natives, of whom there



were 35,000 in Johannesburg and its immediate vicinity, was one of the most urgent problems requiring attention. Under the Republic every native was compelled to take out a pass and produce it whenever required to do so. Many Kaffirs, in the belief that the British would not enforce the Pass Law, destroyed their passes, and it took some time for them to realize that the military authorities intended to continue the old system of registration.\* At the outbreak of war the Boer Government had reduced the wages of natives to £1 a month, and their food. Many of the Kaffirs looked for the millennium with the arrival of the British, and expected, not only that the black man would be treated as an equal, but that all those in the public employment would receive their pre-war rate of pay, with arrears. Some of the municipal employees refused to continue their work, while those of the lighting department showed such a mutinous spirit that the assistance of the troops was necessary to arrest the ringleaders. The majority of the natives, however, loyally accepted the continuance of the old system under the new administration. A Native Affairs Department was formed, and placed in charge of Captain Baldwin, R.A., who was assisted in his duties by a Johannesburg officer, Captain Anderson of the S.A.L.H. Superintendents and police were placed in charge of the native locations and wash sites, to supervise the native population, and to check the manufacture and consumption of Kaffir beer. These locations were later put under the control of the municipal authorities. As a large number of natives were without employment, it was necessary to establish Government depots where these men could be fed and housed till work could be found for them. For this purpose three mine compounds were taken over at Boksburg, Johannesburg and Krugersdorp, and all natives waiting for an engagement were employed in breaking stones, which were bought by the municipality, the money received going to the individual, after deducting the cost of his keep. These

\* A proclamation was issued on June 2 continuing in force the Pass Law of the South African Republic. The Pass Offices, which at first were under the administration of Mr. Wybergh, the Mining Commissioner, were transferred in July to the Native Affairs Department.

compounds were a distinct success, and a convenience both to the employer of labour and the native. The Native Affairs Department supplied over 12,000 natives from these compounds to the Imperial Military Railways and other military departments during the occupation. On July 2 a native court was constituted to deal with all questions arising between employers and their native servants, and with breaches of the Pass Laws. The facilities offered by the court for obtaining speedy justice were greatly appreciated by both sides, and nearly 1,400 cases were dealt with by Lieutenant Bradshaw, the magistrate in charge.

The department of Civil Supplies.

On the occupation of Johannesburg the troops, who had out-marched their supplies, were forced to make heavy demands on the food-stuffs in the town before resuming their advance. In order to husband the stores remaining, the Military Governor appointed Mr. Monypenny, Imperial Light Horse, Director of Civil Supplies. Steps were at once taken to prevent the export of goods from the town, and to re-establish the market,\* so as to get in produce from outside. The price of all necessaries was fixed by proclamation. The food supplies lasted well during the first two months of the occupation, but in August, despite every care, the stock of flour and of other necessaries of life was practically exhausted. During August and September, Army headquarters at Pretoria handed over 10,000 bags of flour to Johannesburg, but it was not till the Eastern Railway was in British possession that the military authorities were able to allot any railway facilities for the import of supplies from the coast, and, for a time, three trains a week were allotted to the town. The scarcity of supplies made it necessary to adopt a scheme for strictly rationing the town and district. Householders, on obtaining a permit from their district commissioner, were able to purchase a fixed quantity of stores. Careful arrangements were necessary to replenish the stores in the country districts, lest supplies should reach the enemy, and this entailed the issue of over 18,000 permits for the removal of food outside the municipal area. To make

\* The market-place was on one occasion surrounded with troops, and all those found without passes were arrested.

any fair allotment of the food supplies and other stores imported as between the merchants was impossible, and, in any case, most of those remaining in the town were foreigners, who would have profited at the expense of their exiled British competitors. It was accordingly determined to import and sell the food and other goods required to meet the more pressing needs of the inhabitants on Government account. With the aid of the Chamber of Commerce an organization was established to deal with the supplies sent up from the coast. Government stores were opened in various parts of the town and stocked with goods supplied through the agency of the Director of Civil Supplies. These Government stores were placed under the control of Major Cavaye, Cameron Highlanders, who also supervised the working of the local customs department. The sales in the Government stores amounted to over £140,000, and, after paying expenses, a profit of nearly £30,000 resulted. Owing to the great poverty of a large number of the Dutch in Fordsburg and in other districts of the town, it was necessary to issue relief to these, as well as to a small number of British subjects. Before the end of the military administration nearly a thousand persons were supplied daily with food and other necessities.

Early in the occupation, a commission of officers and Johannesburg business men was formed to deal with the issue of liquor licenses and to control the sale of drink in the town. A Yeomanry officer, Major Macpherson, presided over the Liquor Commission, as well as carried out the duties of Commandeering Officer in the town. Hotels and restaurants were permitted to sell intoxicating liquors between 12 noon and 9 p.m., but all bars, canteens and bottle stores were closed. The sale or gift of drink to soldiers was prohibited, and any license-holder proved guilty of this offence was liable to imprisonment and the loss of his license.

On June 18 the Civil Post Office was opened to the public for the transaction of local business, and a town service instituted. A few days later Captain Lugard was placed in charge of the Post Office and appointed Press Censor. An exchange of mails with Pretoria was arranged

Liquor  
licenses.

The Post  
Office and  
censorship.



for, and before the end of the month a service, within the limits of the Military Governor's jurisdiction, was in force. The first outward mail to Cape Colony and foreign countries was despatched on July 18. All letters, except those sent through the Army Post Office, and all telegrams for soldiers and civilians were censored; and it was notified to the cosmopolitan population that correspondence in Russian, Hebrew and Greek was liable to be delayed. Little useful information was obtained by the censorship, but it no doubt acted as a deterrent to the misuse of the postal service.

#### Banking.

Certain banks were permitted to carry on business under precise restrictions. Customers were limited to drawing £20 weekly; cheques for a higher amount were not to be honoured without special authority. Payments were received in specie only, for credit of current accounts, or on fixed deposit, and cheques were paid across the counter in specie only. No other class of banking business was permitted; transfers of accounts, as from one customer to another, or from one bank to another bank, or to a branch bank, were forbidden; no advances were allowed to customers or other persons; securities could not be released, removed, or handed over. These measures effectually prevented any financial assistance reaching the Boers in the field. The promptitude with which the books of the various banks were examined immediately after the entry of the British troops led to the successful stopping of a cheque for £40,000 which had just been drawn by one of the banks in favour of the Transvaal Government, and the amount was eventually duly credited to the British authorities. In course of time restrictions on banking were gradually relaxed in favour of individuals whose good faith was beyond suspicion, but a general control of banking business was maintained throughout.

#### The mines.

With the exception of the pumping necessary for the preservation of the mines, all mining was stopped, but processes for the treatment of products of crushing which were actually in progress were allowed to be completed. All persons in possession of unwrought gold were required to deposit it in a bank. After the establishment of civil

administration, when the security of the lines of railway had been better established and the military authorities had acquired control of sufficient rolling stock, a limited quantity of material required for working the mines was gradually obtained, and mining, in a steadily increasing ratio, was resumed.

In view of the inefficiency and unrepresentative character of the old *stadraad*, it was considered inadvisable to retain its services. Major O'Meara was withdrawn from his multitudinous duties at Bloemfontein to take over the office of Mayor, and for the next eleven months administered municipal affairs with conspicuous ability and success. The work of the municipality was divided amongst the following departments: Secretary's, Town Treasurer's, Lighting, Town Engineer's, Public Health, Sanitary, Fire Brigade, Inspector of Natives and Locations, Traffic, and Assizer. Major O'Meara himself took over the Secretary's Department, and his first action was to bring the heads of the other departments directly under his control, and to limit their powers of purchasing direct for their several departments. The boundaries of the municipal area were increased by proclamation so as to include seven outlying townships. The work of the municipality was carried on under the existing laws of the South African Republic and the by-laws and regulations of the late council; only such changes were made as were necessary in the interests of health, or to protect rate payers. During the eleven months of the military administration a municipal revenue was collected of over £106,000 and a debt incurred of £32,414; these figures must be considered satisfactory, as, owing to the absence of civil courts, no proceedings could be taken to enforce payment of rates and fees. During the first eight months of the war, under the Dutch administration, the Town Council had incurred a debt of nearly £40,000. Despite the insufficiency and bad quality of the coal supply the town was lit with both gas and electricity. On January 20, 1901, the Boers destroyed the Brakpan generating station which supplied not only the current for lighting a portion of the town and the two railway stations, but also the power for running the

Municipal  
affairs.

I.M.R. workshops. By a rearrangement of the connexions on the switch-board at the main lighting works, and by running the whole of the plant and bringing reserve boilers and machines into use, the inconvenience was quickly remedied.

Return of  
Rand  
population.  
Establish-  
ment of civil  
administra-  
tion.

Towards the end of 1900 it was intended to permit the return of a large number of the British refugees at the coast, but the outbreak of guerilla war, with its attendant difficulties of supply, prevented this policy being carried out. During the first half of 1901, however, many were allowed to return to attend to business interests or to work on the mines that had restarted working. On arrival, British subjects were enrolled in the Rand Rifles, a corps organized on the lines of a volunteer regiment. From small beginnings the corps increased till, at the end of the war, it had nearly 17,000 men on its rolls, 8,000 of whom had been drilled, armed and exercised in musketry, and the presence of so many armed men gave an additional security to the town and mining area. Meanwhile, early in May, 1901, it was agreed between Lord Milner, who had been in residence in Johannesburg since March, and the Commander-in-Chief that the time had come when the military administration could be abolished and arrangements made for the establishment of civil government. Later in the month Colonel Mackenzie handed over his office. On his departure Colonel Davies was appointed Acting Commissioner of the newly raised permanent police force of Johannesburg and the Rand, with orders to report to Mr. Solomon at Pretoria. Major O'Meara exchanged his title of Mayor for that of Government Commissioner, and was made chairman of a nominee municipal council consisting of twelve leading men of business, assisted by a very capable and energetic Acting Town Clerk, Mr. Lionel Curtis, lately of the C.I.V. Civil supplies, burgher camps and relief were placed under the central administration at Pretoria. Mining affairs were left in the hands of Mr. Wybergh, who was now made Acting Commissioner of Mines. Trading licenses and customs were taken over by the Treasurer at Pretoria. Mr. Nourse, who had supervised the working of the Government compounds for natives, was placed under Mr. Wybergh



till the arrival of the newly-appointed Commissioner of Native Affairs, Sir G. Lagden. The Rand Rifles were brought under the orders of the officer commanding the military district.

The administration of Johannesburg by a Military Governor, assisted by officers and civilian officials, has been dealt with at some length, as it is the most enlightening experience of the kind ever vouchsafed to the British Army. In one respect, however, the problem differed fundamentally from the administration of a large city in invaded territory under usual conditions. Ordinarily the administration of such a city is regarded purely as a temporary interruption of normal conditions; on the conclusion of hostilities civil life is resumed on the established lines. The military object is simply to see that martial law regulations, framed to secure the neutrality and proper ordering of the civil population, are enforced, and the existing civil officials are encouraged to carry out such duties as are not inconsistent with military requirements. In this case there was no question of Johannesburg reverting to its former rulers. And although the military administration was necessarily provisional, it was obvious that a great deal could be done by it to clear the way for the future. The eventual life and progress of Johannesburg would have been materially retarded and damaged if the military authorities had sat idle for the year of their power, and had made no effort to prepare for the eventual resumption of civil life and industrial activities. Faults may certainly be found with the inexperience of the small band of British officers and civilians who carried out the task, but their honesty of purpose and straightforwardness were unquestioned, and were a refreshing revelation to those who were accustomed to the Johannesburg of pre-war days.

The importance of the experience.

Little need be said about the military administration of the rest of the Transvaal. On the occupation of Pretoria Major-General (now Sir John) Maxwell was appointed Military Governor, with jurisdiction over the remainder of the occupied country, with the exception of the Witwatersrand. General Maxwell, who had recently been Military

The rest of the Transvaal.

Governor of Omdurman, was one of the few officers in the British service with experience of military government. District commissioners were appointed in some cases,\* but, except in the western districts, where a precarious attempt at administration was maintained for a few weeks after General Hunter's advance, British authority was practically confined to the occupied towns and the railway lines, and the dividing of the country into administrative areas like those of the southern Free State was impracticable. Outside the chief towns officers commanding sections of the railway and commandants of stations were responsible for the areas under their control and administered martial law in them. In Pretoria itself the various Government departments were taken over as at Bloemfontein. But, owing to the presence of Army headquarters, and to the belief that the war would be over in a few weeks and civil government inaugurated, the military administration never acquired as distinct a character as at Bloemfontein or Johannesburg. Mr. Fiddes, who was attached to Lord Roberts's staff as Political Adviser, Mr. Emrys Evans and Mr. (now Sir W.) van Hulsteyn, who acted as Financial and Legal Advisers, did useful work in studying the existing administrative framework and in making such preparations as were possible to facilitate the establishment of the civil administration. Early in 1901 several more of the chief officials of the future Crown Colony Government arrived and took up the organization of their departments. They were followed in March by Lord Milner himself. The establishment of the civil administration and its development during the progress of the war have been fully dealt with in the earlier part of this volume.

\* District Commissioners were appointed at Utrecht, Heidelberg, Middleburg, Standerton, Zeerust, and Barberton, Lydenburg, Rustenburg, and Vryheid. Subsequently, on the introduction of civil administration, they were superseded by resident magistrates.

## CHAPTER XII.

## FINANCE

IN concluding this history of a war which cost the country over two hundred millions, a few remarks on finance will not be out of place. All the conditions conspired to make the campaign extraordinarily costly: the vast sums spent in transporting men, animals and supplies from the four corners of the earth; the liberal rates of pay given to Colonial and irregular troops; the high general level of prices in the theatre of war; the profusion in which everything that money could buy was supplied. When once the lack of sufficient reserves of stores at starting had been made good, there never was an army so well found. A stitch in time saves nine; and one member of Lord Elgin's Commission recorded his opinion that if, a few months before the outbreak of hostilities, the War Office had had a sum of ten millions at its disposal to be spent only with the consent of the Cabinet, but without the publicity of Parliament, preparations could have been made which would have reduced the cost of the war by probably not less than a hundred millions sterling, even if they had not prevented the Boers from declaring war. Must not a financial system which fails to provide such a fund be condemned as rendering efficient preparation for war impossible?

The War Office is provided with funds in just the same way as any other public department. Parliament votes the annual Army Estimates under some fifteen distinct votes (Pay, Transport, Supplies, Stores, Works, etc.). It then, by a separate procedure, passes the annual Appropriation Act, which authorizes the issue of the money from the Exchequer and formally "appropriates" the sum granted under each vote to the purposes of that vote only. The Comptroller and Auditor-General, officers of whose department sit in the War

Causes of heavy expenditure on the war.

System of Army finance.



Office and continuously audit its accounts, sees that money is only issued from the Exchequer with the sanction of Parliament, and only spent on the objects to which Parliament has appropriated it. This venerable and complicated system dates from a period when misappropriation of public funds was an almost amiable weakness, and when a standing army was a standing menace to the liberties of the subject, only to be controlled by keeping a tight hold on the purse-strings. But its chief value to-day is to provide the House of Commons with opportunities for political criticism of the administration. It does not in fact prevent the Government from spending ten millions, or twice that sum, in preparations for war without first obtaining the leave of Parliament. The public funds are not in reality so tightly tied up as may seem. The Appropriation Act gives power to the Treasury to sanction provisionally, subject to subsequent confirmation by Parliament, diversion of funds from one Army vote to another. By the beginning of August, when all the estimates have been voted, the Government has in hand the total provision for the Army up to the end of March to spend as it likes, subject to formal condonation a year later. If that is not enough, it can draw temporarily on the funds provided by the Appropriation Act for Navy or Civil services, on condition that before the end of March it passes a supplementary Army Estimate. Moreover, payment for guns, stores and transports is not made in advance, so that the Government's power of ordering such things is not even limited by the cash immediately at its disposal. Of course, such action in anticipation of Parliamentary sanction is irregular and only to be adopted in grave emergency; but a Government that is prepared to declare war will not hesitate to take this responsibility. The real difficulty in making preparations is that, under modern conditions, the placing of large orders for warlike stores, the fitting out of transports, or the buying of thousands of animals, soon becomes known all over the world, and perhaps precipitates a war diplomacy might still avoid. No Spandau-chest of gold in the vaults of Whitehall can alter this. The War Office was short of stores in 1899, partly because successive Governments had limited the scale of preparations to a much smaller force than was sent out, and

partly because it had under-estimated the time necessary to procure further supplies on the outbreak of war. The appropriate remedy for this, the maintenance in peace of adequate reserves (not of gold but of stores), was adopted in 1900. The War Office, some months before the war, had brought to the notice of the Government requirements of transport-fittings, stores, etc., for the expedition of one Army Corps then contemplated, amounting to some £640,000; but the Cabinet decided not to proceed. There was no formal submission to, and refusal by, the officials of the Treasury.\* Whatever the merits of the decision, it was dictated neither by lack of funds nor by red-tape.

The war cost the Imperial Exchequer £23,000,000 in 1899-1900, £63,737,000 in 1900-1, £67,670,000 in 1901-2, and £47,500,000 in 1902-3, making a total of £201,907,000 up to March, 1903. This does not include the interest on war debt (£9,249,000). During this period there was also the cost of the war in China (£6,010,000) to provide for, making £217,166,000 in all. Of this sum, £149,482,000 was charged to capital account and £9,228,000 was obtained by suspending the Sinking Fund in 1900-1 and 1901-2, leaving £58,456,000 to be met out of revenue. To provide this extra sum, to make good the shrinkage of ordinary revenue during the war, and to meet the growth of ordinary expenditure, it was necessary to impose new taxation to the extent of £75,150,000:—

Cost of the war and method of raising necessary funds.

Article.	Extra Duty.	Imposed In.	Total Yield.
Tea. . . . .	2d. per lb. . . . .	1900-1	£ 6,014,000
Tobacco . . . . .	4d. " . . . .	"	3,967,000
Beer . . . . .	1s. per barrel . . . .	"	5,324,000
Spirits . . . . .	6d. per gallon . . . .	"	3,280,000
Sugar . . . . .	4s. 2d. per cwt. . . .	1901-2	10,876,000
Coal. . . . .	1s. per ton (export)	"	3,304,000
Glucose . . . . .	" . . . . .	"	154,000
Corn . . . . .	3d. per cwt. . . . .	1902-3	2,347,000
Flour . . . . .	5d. " . . . .		
Income Tax . . . .	4d. . . . .	1900-1	39,884,000
" . . . . .	6d. . . . .	1901-2	
" . . . . .	7d. . . . .	1902-3	
Total . . . . .	..	..	75,150,000

\* See Elgin Commission Report, para. 281.

The debt created in providing for the capital charges amounted to £159,000,000:—

Year.	—	Debt Created.	Cash Proceeds.
		£	£
1899, 1900 . . .	Treasury Bills . . . . .	13,000,000	13,000,000
1900 . . . . .	Exchequer Bonds . . . . .	24,000,000	23,423,000
1900 . . . . .	War Loan (2½%) . . . . .	30,000,000	29,519,000
1901, 1902 . . .	Consols . . . . .	92,000,000	86,428,000
Total . . .	..	159,000,000	152,370,000

Arrear charges which came in after March, 1903, brought the total expenditure on the war up to £205,000,000, in addition to the interest on war debt and to pension charges from April 1, 1903, on which date the increase of the pension list stood at about half a million a year. These charges will be felt for many years to come.

Analysis  
of the ex-  
penditure.

A rough analysis of the £205,000,000 will give some idea of how the money was spent:—

#### EXPENDITURE FROM ARMY VOTES.

	£
Pay, etc., of Regular Forces (extra to peace establishment) .	14,500,000
"    "    Imperial Yeomanry and Volunteer companies .	5,150,000
"    "    Oversea Colonials . . . . .	2,700,000
"    "    South African local forces . . . . .	7,500,000
Gratuities to the troops . . . . .	3,500,000
Wages of transport-drivers and other civilian subordinates .	7,670,000
Pay of medical establishments, instruments, and medicines .	2,270,000
Pay, etc., of embodied Militia . . . . .	4,000,000
Freight ships and Transports . . . . .	30,500,000
Railway charges, carriage of stores, etc. . . . .	15,700,000
Horses, mules, and trek-oxen . . . . .	16,525,000
Supplies, etc. . . . .	47,600,000
Compensation for damages and goods commandeered . . .	4,580,000
Maintenance of Concentration Camps . . . . .	3,540,000
Clothing . . . . .	9,400,000
Ammunition . . . . .	4,815,000
Other Stores . . . . .	17,470,000
Works, Telegraphs and Engineer services . . . . .	4,700,000
Pensions (to 31st March, 1903) . . . . .	1,660,000
Miscellaneous charges . . . . .	1,270,000
Total from Army Votes . . . . .	204,550,000



## Expenditure from Civil (Colonial Office) Votes :—

	£
Expenses of South African Constabulary . . . . .	4,500,000
Expenses of Railways in new Colonies (including £1,000,000 for extra rolling stock). . . . .	2,800,000
Expenses of Civil Administration . . . . .	2,000,000
Grant to Burghers (Terms of Surrender) . . . . .	3,000,000
Grant to British subjects and others . . . . .	2,000,000
Grants to Lord Roberts (£100,000) and Lord Kitchener (£50,000) . . . . .	150,000
<b>Total from Civil Votes . . . . .</b>	<b>*14,450,000</b>
<b>Grand Total . . . . .</b>	<b>219,000,000</b>
<b>Less receipts from sales, etc. . . . .</b>	<b>14,000,000</b>
<b>Net Total . . . . .</b>	<b>205,000,000</b>

Even this total does not represent the whole cost of the war to the Empire, for the first contingents from the oversea colonies were equipped and paid by their own Governments, while the Cape and Natal also spent considerable sums in maintaining local forces during the war.

Cash at stations abroad, not only for Army but also for Naval or other Imperial services, is raised by the Army Paymaster acting as Treasury Chest Officer under the immediate orders of the Treasury. In South Africa, before the war, the Treasury Chest Officer drew upon the Colonial Treasurer, the Home Treasury repaying the Agent-General of the Colony in London. For war requirements this was inadequate, and arrangements were made for the Standard Bank of South Africa to negotiate at fixed charges (afterwards reduced at the suggestion of Lord Kitchener's financial adviser) bills drawn by the Treasury Chest Officer on London, and also to provide specie at up-country towns.

Goods requisitioned by the troops were at first paid for currently, but it was found that this supplied the enemy with the sinews of war, and in December, 1900, current payments were suspended till hostilities should cease.

\* Three millions of this was an advance repayable out of the first loan issued by the new Colonies. A further three millions, advanced to meet the loans for repatriation purposes promised in the Terms of Surrender, and similarly repayable, is not included in the figures here given. See Part I., pp. 20, 82-84.

Meanwhile, claims were collected and examined. Large numbers of claims for losses and damages caused by the war were also received, and these required careful consideration, not only as regards the extent of the claim, but as to whether the damage was done by troops under British command, and whether the claimant was a friend, a neutral, or an enemy. A central Military Board was formed to deal with questions of principle, and local Military Boards to investigate the facts of each claim on the spot. At the end of the war there was great congestion of these claims for commandeering and damage, and much dissatisfaction at the slow progress made with payments. The Military Boards were also not ideal tribunals for the purpose. Mr. Chamberlain, during his visit to South Africa in the winter of 1902, arranged that the Civil Government of the new colonies should take over the liability for these claims on payment from Army funds of a sum of three millions sterling; and the fund so created was administered and distributed by the Central Judicial Commission appointed by Lord Milner to administer the grants of three millions to burghers of the late Republic and two millions to British subjects.\* The claims of foreign subjects deported from South Africa by the military authorities were investigated by a special commission under Mr. Milvain, K.C., and, after negotiations with the Governments interested, were settled for payments amounting in all to £107,000.

Army  
finance. The  
constitution  
of the War  
Office.

So much for what a Chancellor of the Exchequer would call the finance of the war. But what is called Army finance is of wider scope, embracing questions of the administration and control of expenditure, contracts, accounts and the business side of military affairs generally. Before the Crimean War, the hold of Parliament over the Sovereign's Army lay in the control exercised over its expenditure in detail by a Parliamentary official called the Secretary at War. The Commissariat was a branch of the Treasury, and the Ordnance an independent civil department. The creation of a Secretary of State for War, absorbing the functions of the Secretary at War, the assertion of his direct

\* See Part I., pp. 80-82.

responsibility to Parliament for the exercise of the royal prerogative in relation to the Army, and the transfer to him of the Commissariat and Ordnance, gave Parliament a control no longer resting on finance only. The removal of the Commander-in-Chief in 1870 from the Horse Guards to the Secretary of State's office in Pall Mall, as his principal military adviser, paved the way for the great change of 1887 by which the military department became responsible for the *matériel* as well as for the *personnel* of the Army. Before the war broke out, this change had been completed by the transfer to the military department of the Ordnance Factories and Clothing Department which, as semi-civilian concerns, had in 1887 been retained by the civil department. The administration of all Army expenditure thus lay with the military heads of departments under the orders of the Secretary of State, the functions of the civil department being reduced to criticism of proposals for expenditure in their financial aspects, audit of accounts, and the making of contracts.

The mode of procedure was as follows: The military departments prepared their proposals for numbers of men, and their estimates for transport, supplies, stores and works. The Finance Department prepared the estimate for pay of men, and examined the estimates for transport and *matériel*. The Secretary of State, in communication with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Cabinet on the one hand, and with his military advisers on the other, decided what should stand in the estimates, and what should be cut out. The votes were then formally submitted to the Treasury for approval, and presented to Parliament. The administration of the votes lay with the military departments; they raised the men and ordered the stores in the approved programme without reference to the Finance Department; but any fresh proposals not included in the estimates had to be referred for financial criticism before action was taken, the Secretary of State deciding in case of disagreement. Proposals which would seriously pledge next year's estimates, or in which generosity at the public expense was to be feared, *e.g.*, rates of pay and allowances, or concessions to contractors.

Financial  
procedure.



had to be submitted to the Treasury. This principle, wholesome in itself, had been expanded by the continuous efforts of the Exchequer and Audit Department, with the never-failing support of the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons, until a mass of precedents required the submission to the Treasury of almost every individual point calling for the exercise of discretion, or, as the sole means of escape, the elaboration (under Treasury sanction) of Army regulations to provide for every conceivable case. The permanent head of the Finance Department (the Accountant-General) was personally responsible that nothing requiring the sanction of the Treasury went through without it. His officers examined and paid the War Office bills for stores, building work, etc., and audited the cash expenditure of the military districts, as well as store accounts of all kinds. In this way he was answerable for the regularity of all Army expenditure, but had only a limited advisory voice as to its merit.

**Contract  
Department.**

Contracts for stores and building-work were made by the Director of Contracts. The military departments indented on him for what they wanted, fixed the patterns and specifications, were consulted as to the placing of orders, and carried out the inspection. The duties of the Contract Department were to maintain touch with the markets, to secure fair competition, and to see that orders were placed with a single eye to the public interest. When the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance was abolished in 1887, this portion of his work, though administrative rather than financial, was placed under the Financial Secretary in order to maintain direct Parliamentary control. The Accountant-General had nothing to do with it.

**Local ad-  
ministration.**

Outside the War Office, the affairs of the Army were conducted by the general officers commanding districts, with their military staffs. Regulations defined the rates of pay and allowances, the rations to be drawn, the ammunition to be fired, the bedding, furniture and utensils allowed for barracks. These regulations were necessarily elaborate, because for an army continually circulating from station to station uniformity of practice is essential; but they had become needlessly so, owing very largely to the tendency

(already mentioned) to withdraw from the War Office all discretion in matters of expenditure. If emergency arose, however, the regulations gave the general power to do what he thought necessary, reporting to the War Office for covering sanction. Contracts for food, forage, etc., were made locally by the Army Service Corps, and reported to the War Office for review; but to secure uniformity of pattern, expert inspection, and the advantages of wholesale buying, stores were obtained centrally at Woolwich, and distributed by the Ordnance Department. For items of minor importance, the general could buy up to £25 or, in special cases, £100. The duties of the Army Paymaster were to supply commanding officers with cash to pay the troops, to check their pay accounts and send them to the War Office with his own accounts, and to pay local bills.\* The Pay Department, originally under the Accountant-General, had been taken over by the Quartermaster-General at the War Office in 1888, and placed locally under the generals, to avoid the possibility of divided control over even cashier duties in war.

Thus, in the War Office, while the initiative in all expenditure lay with the Military Departments, there was criticism by the Finance Department before action was taken—a criticism which normally took the form of friendly consultation—and, in the making of contracts, the action was taken by the civilian branch. But in the districts, the keynote of the whole system was the complete responsibility of the military commander—so far as the formidable code of regulations permitted. The administrative services (Army Service Corps, Ordnance, Works, Pay) were under his immediate control, he was free from civilian leading-strings, and could develop initiative and sense of responsibility by acting for himself, and facing any criticism that might afterwards be made. And the ideal which many military reformers were ventilating was the extension of this system to the War

\* In Great Britain, bills of £100 and over were sent on to the War Office to pay, not because higher professional skill is required to write a larger cheque, but to avoid keeping large bank balances all over the country.

Office itself, the reduction of the Accountant-General's share in the business of the Army from consultation beforehand to audit in arrear, and the making of all contracts by the military departments.

Lack of  
special  
financial pre-  
parations for  
the war.

No special preparations for the war were made in the financial province. Nobody had realized the character of the coming struggle, and neither the Finance Department as responsible for securing due accounts, nor the Quartermaster-General's Department as responsible for rendering them, had foreseen the accounting difficulties of a long campaign over a vast territory. The narrow limits assigned to local purchases in time of peace did not, of course, apply to war, and it was obvious that there would be large transactions in South Africa which could not be controlled from home; but acquiescing in the current doctrine that civilians had no place outside the War Office itself, neither Finance nor Contract Department took any steps to send out representatives. The generals commanding, and their military staffs, were to manage the business for themselves. The first great contract for supplying the Army with meat was, indeed, referred home by cable; but, as though to show the impossibility of conducting affairs from a distance, the result was a misunderstanding about its terms. All sections of the War Office were very soon overwhelmed with work, ransacking the globe for animals, supplies and stores, and dealing with all the novel questions that arose in improvising additions to the Army. There was little attention to spare for business affairs in South Africa.

Lord  
Kitchener  
appoints a  
Financial  
Adviser

True to his reputation as an economist, Lord Kitchener was the first to impart some share of financial control into proceedings there. Feeling that economy, for which he was responsible as well as for military operations, had fallen into neglect for want of a special guardian of its interests, he determined to create a Financial Adviser on his own staff, and offered the post to the local head of the Army Pay Department. That officer professing himself unable either to undertake the duty or to nominate any officer of his department as qualified for the task, Lord Kitchener obtained the services of Mr. (now Sir G.) Fleetwood Wilson, Assistant



Under-Secretary of State at the War Office. He arrived in South Africa in March, 1901, and at once found ample work ready to his hand in regulating such matters as the procedure relating to commandeering and to damages done by the troops, the finances of the military railway administration in the new territories, the extravagant purchasing methods of the Ordnance Department at Cape Town,\* the charges for provision of specie. In these and other directions the Financial Adviser effected valuable reforms and substantial economies; and under Lord Kitchener's directions he went on to establish a general control of expenditure, no large purchases or contracts being made without previous reference to him.

On Mr. Fleetwood Wilson's return to the War Office in August, 1901, he was succeeded by Major O. Armstrong, who carried on the duties of Financial Adviser on the same lines, until Lord Kitchener left South Africa in June, 1902, and the command there was divided into three districts. The appointment of Major Armstrong, who was not a representative of the Finance Department of the War Office, but a special assistant selected by Lord Kitchener himself, then lapsed, and the normal system, under which each head of a department was subject only to the personal control of his general, revived. Major Armstrong remained some months longer in South Africa, clearing up outstanding financial questions, but there was no more control of contracts; and when, in October, he telegraphed home for instructions as to his position, the Secretary of State decided to adhere to the theory of the complete responsibility of the generals and to consult them before replying. They declined the assistance of a Financial Adviser, and Major Armstrong came home.

Meanwhile, contract questions had assumed great importance. The stocks of supplies in the country when peace was declared had cost four and a half millions, and shiploads were arriving in unbroken sequence; for though peace had been on the horizon for some time, Lord Kitchener considered it politic to show no sign of slackening, and nobody took the responsibility of reducing the purchases and shipments. When war had actually ceased, orders were cancelled as far

Financial control dispensed with after the peace.

The surplus stores scandal.

\* See Appendix to the evidence before the War Stores Commission.

as possible, but by March, 1903, further supplies to the value of some four millions had arrived.\* In all, including contracts made in South Africa, the stores to be disposed of amounted to nearly £11,000,000. Lord Kitchener, before leaving the country, sold to Lord Milner transport and other goods to the value of £1,391,000 for use in repatriating the inhabitants of the new colonies. Altogether a total of over £3,500,000 (including £850,000 of supplies) was bought from the Army by the Colonial Governments for repatriation purposes.† A far larger quantity of supplies would have been bought had not the military authorities at the outset held out for exorbitant terms and thus forced the repatriation departments to import from overseas. But Lord Kitchener and Colonel Morgan apparently held a very high idea of the prices which the Army ought to be able to secure at this crisis in a country which war had denuded of food-stuffs and plentifully supplied with cash. To take advantage of the opportunity, and for other reasons, detailed elsewhere,‡ Lord Kitchener recommended to the War Office that the whole of the surplus stocks should be sold, and that the garrison left in South Africa should be supplied by contracts made locally. The War Office authorities would have preferred to continue to use up the surplus or to make fresh contracts for importation until South Africa had thoroughly settled down; but they deferred to the opinion of the man on the spot and approved the system of local contracts. Had Lord Kitchener, or the officers who had been working immediately under him, remained to direct affairs, the results would doubtless have been different; but the head of the Supply Department was changed, financial review of contracts had gone by the board, and matters soon reached an extraordinary position. The civil administration imported enormous quantities of supplies and kept down prices. There was little or no genuine competition to buy from the military; the making and subsequent interpretation of sale contracts were so imperfect

\* For some details as to the composition of these stores, and for the story of their disposal from the point of view of the Army Service Corps, see ch. v., pp. 404-407.

† See part i., p. 41.

‡ See ch. v., p. 404.

that buyers whose "knock-out" prices were accepted as applying to the stocks as they stood, good, bad or indifferent, were able triumphantly to carry off refunds for anything that, even months after the sale, was not in first-rate condition; the contracts for supplying the garrison failed to attract contractors of good standing, and a mushroom firm, specially created to deal in Army supplies, secured within a fortnight contracts both to buy them and to supply them to the Army at higher prices. Under these contracts, oats were sold at 11s. per 100 lbs. and bought back at 17s. 11½d., and as the firm had no capital it was benevolently arranged that it should be paid promptly for what it sold, and given credit for what it bought; it even received a "refund" of £21,000 on goods for which it had not yet paid. Over this deal in oats and other goods the firm netted £69,000 without effort and without risk; and others made still larger profits.

In the course of these sales the Colonial Governments, including those of the new territories, claimed, not unreasonably, that the customs dues, which were not paid on goods imported for the Army, became payable on their sale to the general public. The generals contested this claim, but the customs authorities of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony enforced it by seizing the goods on rail, and the duties had to be paid under protest. The railway administrations, too, which had conveyed Government stores at a reduced rate during the war, insisted on the full rate being paid when the stores were now moved about the country as part of an ordinary commercial transaction. Meanwhile, officers had entirely ignored these possibilities in fixing sale prices, and had, in many cases, sold goods for hardly enough to cover duty and freight. In one instance, indeed, in Natal, the duties came to £16,900 on goods sold for £13,000, and though there was some talk of a reasonable concession, they had finally to be paid in full. On the other hand, both Natal and the Cape admitted that where the Army had bought in the colonies, for its own use, stores on which full dues had been paid by the importers, the Imperial Government was in equity entitled to a rebate. Natal refunded £135,000 under this head; but though the Cape Government admitted the

Duties on  
imported  
goods.



claim in principle and agreed to its assessment at £170,000, a request for payment produced a counter-claim for some 6½ millions, covering expenditure and losses of all kinds incurred by the colony and its inhabitants through the war. The Imperial Government denied liability for these charges; but after protracted and fruitless correspondence it ceased to pursue its claim for the rebate. In these and other ways the fact that the Imperial Government waged war on territory which fiscally was neither its own nor the enemy's, gave rise to troublesome complications.

The Royal  
Commission  
on War  
Stores.

So complete was the detachment of the authorities from business affairs in South Africa that it was not until the Exchequer and Audit Department, putting two and two together from the accounts, questioned these sale-and-purchase transactions, that the War Office woke up to what was going on; and when it called for an explanation from South Africa the first reply was that public money was saved by the arrangement. Further investigation was unavoidable. A War Office Committee under Lieut.-General Sir William Butler, after a hurried and incomplete examination, presented a most disquieting report, and finally a special Act of Parliament was passed in July, 1905, providing for a full investigation by a Royal Commission under Mr. Justice Farwell. The report made by that Commission, after a year of laborious inquiry both at home and in South Africa, was reassuring in so far as it acquitted the officers principally concerned of actual corruption or corrupt motive, but it established a degree of neglect of the public interest well-nigh incredible even in overworked men, weary of South Africa and everything in it, whose one desire was to wind up the business and get home. It put the preventible loss to the public, in these transactions, at between three-quarters of a million and one and a quarter millions sterling, pronounced the responsibility of the general to be little more than nominal, and expressed the opinion that Lord Kitchener's system of review of contracts by a Financial Adviser would have prevented the mischief.

Payment of  
troops in the  
field.

The system of paying troops in the field broke down, and endless difficulties were experienced in settling up with both Regulars and Irregulars. Military authority has always

insisted that the soldier shall receive his pay from the hand of his captain, and shall look to him in any difficulty or grievance.\* Consequently the captain had always been responsible for keeping the men's accounts. The so-called Regimental Paymasters of earlier days only settled those accounts with the War Office. The accounts of pay itself, at a fixed daily rate, are far simpler than the wages-books of a factory with their calculations of hours and quarters of an hour, and extra rates for overtime; but the soldier's domestic expenditure in time of peace is largely managed for him by his captain, and fines and stoppages for his messing, his clothing, his breakages, etc., have to be brought into his accounts in reckoning the cash to be handed to him at the pay-table. And when he is transferred from one unit to another, his account (not infrequently in debt) has to be transferred too. In war, all this is very much simplified. The soldier is fed and clothed entirely at the public expense, stoppages disappear, and pay-day only comes when a place is reached where the soldier wants cash and his captain can get it. A greatly simplified form of account was therefore taken into use when the troops took the field. But the captain still had to render the account, and when men left the unit to join elsewhere, or as invalids, he still had to transfer their accounts and balances. That hard-worked officer, sitting down on the veld to write up his accounts with his colour-sergeant on an off-day, did not bless the system, especially if the officer or sergeant who made up the last account had been shot in the interval, or the enemy had been busy with the baggage. The accounts had to be made out in duplicate, one copy for the pay office and one for the unit, and sent down to Cape Town for examination; and as communications were often cut, they were liable to get lost on the way. The transfer statements were very frequently not rendered, and men came home in thousands, invalided or discharged, with nothing to show how their accounts stood.

\* Sir R. Buller, after his return from South Africa, wrote that it would be "nothing short of a disaster to the British army to attempt to make the soldier look to any one except his commander for justice or assistance in the matter of his pay."

The pay accounts of the Imperial Yeomanry were in such confusion that six months after the men had come home, there was nothing for it but to ship such records as existed back to London and there settle each man's account as well as might be. Of course in case of doubt the man had to have the benefit of it, at the expense of the public. Under the new system since adopted, the captain pays the man approximate sums from time to time, enters them in a book carried by the man himself, and reports them to the accountant at the base, who keeps the official account with each individual soldier, and is in a position, when a man leaves for home, to settle up his account promptly and finally. And in order to avoid change of system on the outbreak of war, a similar plan has been adopted in peace, to the great relief of company commanders.

Supply  
accounts.

There were also great difficulties in closing the accounts of animals, supplies, and stores. These things at the front in war mean more than money; they represent striking-power, and require to be most jealously controlled. It is consequently right to set up the ideal of accurate accounting for them, even if partial failures and discrepancies are inevitable. Unless these are investigated and settled on the spot, while the transactions are still fresh in the memories of those concerned, the accounts lose their value. The War Office sent out two missions to audit these accounts; but so late that little could be done except to wipe out the past and take stock as a basis for future accounts.

The weak  
point of the  
old system.

Apart from accounting difficulties, the main lesson of the war, in the province of Army finance, was the failure of the theory of the direct and undivided responsibility of the military commander for the business of his army; a theory which lay at the root of the whole system and admitted no separation between command and administration, between the leading of troops against the enemy and the business of keeping them fed and clothed. Subordinate administrative departments, indeed, there were—Army Service Corps, Ordnance Department, Pay Department—but their control and coordination lay with the men who were



responsible for the strategy and tactics of the campaign. Germany long ago saw that this confusion of functions courted failure at both points—disasters in the field and scandals in administration—and placed at the right hand of every commander an *Intendant*, a non-combatant official with definite responsibilities for business affairs. France has always done the same. The Nation of Shopkeepers alone left the control of such affairs to its fighting men. The responsibility of the general, in which it put its trust, proved to be a sham which served but to destroy the responsibility of the heads of the departments. And this system reacted upon the efficiency of the departments, which offered no career to an ambitious officer. Even if he was conscious that his talents did not lie in the field, he had to obtain a fighting command or retire as a colonel; while it was mainly to those who lacked ambition, or means, or real vocation for soldiering, that the better pay and not too exacting routine of the administrative services appealed. The defects of the system became only too manifest in the particular case of the disposal of the surplus supplies. It may, no doubt, be urged in extenuation that the Army Service Corps officers in South Africa had had no previous training in transactions of the kind they were suddenly called upon to conduct: the Army normally buys and does not sell supplies. But to pay a contractor large sums for the privilege of feeding the Army's horses on the Army's oats, to "refund" to him cash which he had never paid, to sell goods for less than the duties payable on them—the avoidance of these things requires not special technical training, but a better *personnel* and more effective financial supervision.

The changes made on the recommendation of Lord Esher's War Office Reconstitution Committee of 1904 have gone far to provide the departmental officer with both the career and the supervision he needed. Administrative generals have been created in the commands, not independent of the fighting commanders, but with distinct responsibilities for business affairs; and though the separation between the General Staff and the Administrative Staff is not complete, as it is in

Reforms since  
the war

continental armies, this step is at all events in the right direction. A Financial Adviser has also been provided for each command, both in peace and in war. The congestion of business in the War Office during the war forced the question of decentralization to the front, and in 1901 sections of the Accountant-General's Department were established at the headquarters of military districts, to audit accounts of all kinds and to give such information and advice in financial matters to the local military authorities as might save references to the War Office. In 1904 these sections, and a part of the Accountant-General's staff at the War Office, were amalgamated with the Army Pay Department to form the Army Accounts Department, under the administration of the Financial Secretary. The head of this department in a command, or with an army in the field, is directly responsible to the head of the War Office Finance Branch for cashier duties, for the keeping of the soldier's accounts, and for audit; but he is also placed on the staff of the general as Financial Adviser, though it rests with the former to say how and when he will make use of him in that capacity. In the same way, officers of the Accounts Department in the War Office have been formally assigned as Financial Advisers to the Military Members of Council, and the responsibility of the latter for giving due weight to financial as well as to military considerations in the administration of their votes has been emphasized. A third recommendation of Lord Esher's Committee, the making of all contracts by the military departments, has also been tried; but experience has not been favourable to the change, and the directorship of contracts, abolished in 1904, has recently been revived. Courses of instruction in the principles and practice of commercial administration have been instituted at the London School of Economics for officers desirous of qualifying for the higher administrative posts.

**Conclusion.**

All these changes are calculated to assist in destroying the last traces of the traditional military view, inherited from pre-Crimean days, that control of expenditure is an obstacle to be vainly kicked against in peace and happily

removed in war. Military expenditure and the resulting military efficiency are not directly commensurable; there can be no setting-off of the expenditure against the return, no annual balance of profit or loss. The total expenditure in peace must be limited year by year to a sum determined in advance by the various considerations of what may be called "peace strategy," and the mode of control in detail must differ from the commercial methods, which look to net profit as the final criterion. The whole machinery of estimates, regulations and financial criticism arises from these conditions. But in war this external limitation disappears; the wants of the Army must be supplied, unless its commander is to be relieved of his responsibility for victory or defeat, and the machinery of finance is directed mainly to the control of the *how* of expenditure. The control of the *what*, according to the military necessities of the situation, must come from the Army itself, and can only be limited by the ultimate capacity or willingness of the nation to carry on the struggle. At home a vast expenditure was conducted successfully and without irregularities, though the inadequacy of the initial preparations before the war on the one side, due to faulty peace strategy, and the excessive stocks on hand at the end of the war on the other, due to defective control of scale, each involved heavy loss—far heavier, indeed, in the former case than in the latter. In South Africa, Lord Kitchener wisely set himself to control both the scale and the conduct of the local expenditure. Unfortunately the theories of the War Office would not permit it to obtrude its help on his successors. War will always be wasteful, but a trained military administrator, possessing the full confidence of the supreme commander, and not afraid of the responsibility of saying "Enough," can do much to minimize the waste. Not to control him, but to assist him in controlling others, he should have with him officials well versed in all financial and contract methods. Only if a race of military administrators is trained in peace to exercise economy instinctively, can we expect to find the right man for the task ready to hand in the next great war. Only if the Civil Department of the War Office, abandoning



a purely critical attitude, places its expert knowledge and long experience at the service of the military administrator, will his efforts give the best results. It is this active co-operation of the soldier and the civilian which should open the way to the attack of the ultimate problem of Army finance: the control, not only of the conduct of expenditure in war, but of the expenditure itself.


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